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ABSTRACT 
This thesis investigates the construction of identity in relation to an other. It considers three 
writers who, working at moments when the nature of selfhood was an urgent issue, conduct 
profound and original enquiries into the question of self- construction, and seeks both to 
reassess their contributions to this debate, and, in bringing their preoccupations and methods 
to bear upon each other, to open up new ways of approaching and reading their work. 
Considering a range of socio-cultural and religious forms of otherness -- the cannibal, the 
witch, the Jew, the aristocrat, the woman, the divine -- it embraces material from a number of 
important modem critical fields, and suggests how these topics might be combined to offer a 
coherent statement about the enduring issue of s elf- fashioning. 
The thesis seeks to map out a trajectory of decreasing investment in external communities, 
and an increasing perception of the self as a source and agent in the construction of identity. 
Looking in turn at the work of Montaigne, Proust and Woolf, it argues that where the Essais 
construct complex orders which appropriate the other to reinforce the identity of the self, 
Proust and Woolf increasingly, although gradually, and by no means always successfully, 
attempt to negotiate a less preci sely- engaged relationship between other and self, and to 
assign the other a less constitutive role in the realization and expression of identity. The 
thesis also considers more briefly contexts in which this trajectory is reversed. To the extent 
that they examine modernist subjectivity, Proust and Woolf articulate an anxiety about the 
separation of self and world which leads to an attempted recuperation of the integrated orders 
depicted by Montaigne. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Ever since Burckhardt's famous analysis of Renaissance individuality, critics have claimed 
that the Renaissance witnessed a decisive shift in the perception and expression of selfhood. 
Formerly 'dreaming', in Burckhardt's terms, 'beneath a veil of faith and illusion', the 
individual gradually emerged, over the course of the Renaissance, as a self-conscious and 
independent category. ' More recently, Greenblatt (among others) has sought to modify this 
claim, arguing for a more dynamic and problematic model of Renaissance subjectivity. 
Where Burckhardt depicts the uncontested growth and autonomous expression of individual 
self-consciousness, Greenblatt describes a 'resolutely dialectical' relation between the self 
and the social and political structures which surround it; according to which the subject's 
heightened awareness and articulation of its individual selfhood is set against a renewed 
commitment, on the part of external collectivities, to the government and control of identity. 
If there is a new social mobility in the Renaissance, and an increasing sense of individual 
agency, there are also new measures to restrict and determine all movement, and to 
circumscribe and delimit the individual will. 2 According to this interpretation, the self is no 
longer an independent category, but is forged instead in relation, and specifically in 
opposition, to an external other. Elsewhere in Greenblatt, this other is not a social or political 
order, but rather an 'alien': the savage, heretic, traitor or witch. 
Central to the debate about Renaissance selfhood are Montaigne's Essais, which explore in 
depth and detail the role of the other in the construction of the self. The Montaignean self is 
1 Jacob Burckhardt, The Civilization of the Renaissance in Italy, trans. by S. G. C. Middlemore 
(London: Penguin, 1990), p. 98. 
2 Stephen Greenblatt, Renaissance Self- Fash ion ing: From More to Shakespeare (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 1980). See in particular the opening section of his introduction, pp. 1-2. For another 
account of the relationship between Renaissance self and other which seeks to challenge Burckhardt's 
interpretation, see Natalie Zemon Davis, 'Boundaries and the Sense of Self in Sixteenth-Century 
France', in Reconstructing Individualism: Autonomy, Individuality and the Self in Western Thought, ed. 
by Thomas C. Heller, Morton Sosna and David E. Wellbery (Stanford University Press, 1986), pp. 53- 
63. 
1) 
intensely aware of, and continually in dialogue with, a wide variety of others: writers and 
philosophers from antiquity; Protestantism; witches and the divine; his social others 
(peasants and princes) and the social order; the cultural otherness of the cannibal, and the 
unfamiliar customs of foreign lands. Like Greenblatt, he perceives self and other as 
inextricably linked. '[A] Ce grand monde', he observes, Vest le miroUer oU' il nous faut 
3 
regarder pour nous connoistre de bon biais'. It is by looking in the mirror of the other that 
the self can know and see itself; in relation to the other that identity is assumed and sustained. 
However, the dynamics of this relationship in Montaigne are not always as simple as 
Greenblatt suggests. While there are many instances in the Essais where tensions clearly do 
emerge between self and other -- the self often discovers that the other threatens, rather than 
enabling, the appropriation of a coherent identity, or circumscribes, rather than providing a 
context for, its self-articulation -- this is not always the case. In the extract above, self- 
fashioning is no longer perceived as a problematic affair. The looking-glass of the world, 
revealing the enormity and majesty of nature, provides a context and perspective which do 
not curtail the self, but rather enable it to elucidate its coordinates and dimensions within a 
larger whole. In Montaigne, the self may be defined through participation in, as well as in 
opposition to, a wider order; through identification with, rather than differentiation from, the 
other. Even when self and other do stand in a conflictual relation, the opposition between the 
two is rarely as absolute as Greenblatt suggests. I shall seek in what follows to elaborate a 
more complex model for the relationship between other and self, in which dependence and 
fascination pull against hostility, and complicate and problematize the process of negotiation 
between the two. 
Just as Renaissance criticism has identified a decisive break in the organization and 
expression of selfhood in the early modem period, so too critics of modernist literature have 
3 Michel de Montaigne, (Euvres compl&es, ed. by Albert Thibaudet and Maurice Rat (Paris: Gallimard, 
1962), 1: 26, P. 157. 
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identified an important transition in the perception of the self at the start of the twentieth 
century. As Virginia Woolf herself observed, 'In or about December, 1910, human character 
changed. ý4 As the modernist movement began, the self, along with many other conceptual and 
cultural categories, underwent a 'cataclysmic upheaval'; one of those 'overwhelming 
dislocations' which seem to topple 'even the most solid and substantial of our beliefs and 
assumptions'. 5 Central to this 'upheaval' was the dissolution of the self as a stable and 
integrated centre of thought and consciousness. Important too, however, was the relationship 
between self and world. Modernist writing envisages a reality in which self and other have 
become remote; in which shared meanings and languages have disintegrated, and in which an 
isolated self is left either to withdraw from external reality, or to negotiate as best it can a 
precarious and partial communication with the world. 6 
There are significant parallels between modernist and Renaissance discussions of selfhood, 
therefore. Both closely examine the question of the self and its relation with the other; both 
are aware that tensions and dynamic exchanges accompany the decisive shifts which they 
depict in this relationship, and both envisage that negotiation with the other is fundamental to 
the appropriation of a coherent or stable identity. They invite, therefore, comparative study. 
If modernist subjectivity is to be compared with Renaissance identity, then Proust, like 
Montaigne, stands out as a figure through whom discussion might be focussed. 
Computational scholarship has found the word 'moi' on average 1.1996 times per page in A 
la recherche dit temps perdu, and this statistic is an accurate reflection of the important 
4, Mr Bennett and Mrs Brown' (1924), in The Captain's Death Bed and Other Essays (London: 
Hogarth, 1950), pp. 90-111 (p. 91). 
5 Malcolm Bradbury and James McFarlane, 'The Name and Nature of Modernism', in Modernism, 
1890-1930, ed. by Bradbury and McFarlane (London: Penguin, 1976), p. 19. This sense of radical 
change is explored in relation to the self on p. 27. 
6 Michael Levenson emphasizes the problematic relationship of the self both with itself and with the 
world beyond. The modernist self 'discovered enemies within and enemies without; walls within, 
mirrors without; it no Ion-jer perched securely on the throne of the self; it no longer sat confidently at 
4 
position occupied by the text. As Malcolm Bowie suggests, 'The modem, secular, 
psychological moi' discovers in Proust 'a moment of extraordinary power and authority': 
'For a moment, indeed, the human self and its vicissitudes become the essential subject- 
matter of art' .7 The comparison of Proust with Montaigne 
is a fruitful one; generating in 
particular new ways of approaching A la recherche. The themes of Jewishness, class- 
consciousness and selfhood are conventionally perceived as separate critical issues in 
ProUSt, 8 but the example of Montaigne forces one to draw them together. Montaigne's self- 
conscious dialogues with the social, religious, cultural and philosophical orders and others of 
his time suggest that political and social themes are inextricably bound up with questions of 
self-fashioning, and I shall argue below that this is very much the case in A la recherche. 
Operating in the text as expressions of the self-other relation, these topics open up important 
dimensions of, and offer important insights into, Proustian subjectivity, and together they 
provide access to patterns in the self's response to the other which enable a provisional 
sketch of Proustian self-fashioning. 
Since self and other stand in such an inextricable relation, a discussion of their relationship 
demands not only an exploration of the subject's self-construction, but also of the selfhood of 
the other. This second form of subjectivity is expressed most clearly in the early twentieth 
century in the self-consciousness of the female writer, and is focussed above all in the 
intensely self-reflexive novels and critical work of Virginia Woolf. It is clear that Woolf felt 
alienated from patriarchal culture -- as a woman, and in particular as a woman writer -- at a 
number of levels. She stood in a precarious relation first of all, as an uneducated woman, to 
the center of the social world'. Modernism and the Fate of Individuality: Character and Novelistic 
Forinfrom Conrad to Woolf (Cambridge: CUP, 1991), p. xi. 
7 Malcolm Bowie, Proust Among the Stars (London: HarperCollins, 1998), pp. 2-3 (italics in original). 
Bowie notes that the statistical exercise on the self gathered references to 'moi' as a noun or pronoun; 
to occurrences of 'me' and 'myself', therefore, as well as 'self'. 
S The social dimension of the novel is explored in relation to selfhood by Leo Bersani, in Marcel 
Proust. - The Fictions of Life and of A rt (New York: Oxford University Press, 1965). However, he 
leaves aside the question of race altogether, and the trajectory of withdrawal he describes L- I runs directlv 
counter to the engaged negotiations explored in my own discussion. t -1 -- . 1-1 - 
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her position as a literary critic. Jane Marcus compares her to Walter Benjamin and other 
Jewish intellectuals in Weimar Germany, 'administering the intellectual property of a people 
who denied them the right to do so'. 9 She was alienated too from literary history, a stately 
march of male voices, she felt, that excluded, rather than grounded, her female vision. She 
even felt restricted by 'the very form of the sentence'; which, like a number of other literary 
conventions in her view, was designed to accommodate and articulate a specifically male 
understanding of the world. 'O The result of this alienation is a continual self-articulation from 
the position of the other. When Woolf relates in A Room of One's Own how a Beadle 
prevents her encroachment upon the male domain of the lawn, or a black-gowned gentleman 
her access to the manuscripts of Lycidas and Esmond, " she self-consciously constructs 
herself as the unlettered other of the educated man; comparable to the 'uncivilized' cannibals 
(who have JA] nul cognoissance de lettres; nulle science de nombres' 1: 3 1; p. 204) 
described in Montaigne's account. Her novels perform a sustained and profound examination 
of the consequences of occupying this second position, examining both the ways in which it 
affects the range and expression of individual selfhood, and the strategies available to the 
female self as it seeks to recuperate a voice, and to construct a tradition, of its own. 
Neither Proust nor Woolf was entirely unaware of the connections I am seeking to establish. 
Both were conscious of their predecessors -- Proust reading Montaigne; Woolf, both Proust 
and Montaigne -- and both had occasion to reflect upon a possible relation between the texts 
they encountered and their own. The link between Proust and Montaigne is the least well- 
12 
established of the three: Montaigne is in fact one of 'Les Grands Absents d'A la recherche' , 
never alluded or referred to in the course of Proust's giant text. However, it is clear from his 
9 Jane Marcus, 'Thinking Back Through Our Mothers', in New Feminist Essays oil Virginia Woolf 
(Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1981), pp. 1-30 (pp. 2-3). 
10 'Women and Fiction', in Granite and Rainbow: Essays by Virginia Woolf (London: Hogarth, 1958), 
pp. 76-84 (p. 81). 
Virginia Woolf, 'A Room of One's Own'and 'Three Guineas' (London: Penguin, 1993), pp. 5-7. 
12 Mich&le M. Magill, 'Les Grands Absents dA la recherche du temps perdu', Romance Notes, 29 
(1988-89), 15-20. 
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letters that Proust was familiar with the Essais, and that he greatly admired his Renaissance 
forebear. Quotations from, and allusions to, the Essais are scattered through his 
Correspondance, 13 while letters to Robert de Montesquiou and Alberto Lumbroso 
demonstrate his pleasure at contemporary critical comparisons between his own work and 
Montaigne's. 14 Jacques Porel (who relates how Proust would cite the Essais at great length) 
also makes clear that Proust, like the selves I shall discuss below, sharpened and defined his 
own thought through dialogue with his literary others. 15 
Like Proust, Woolf was a critic as well as a novelist, and she negotiated with the texts she 
encountered even more self-consciously than her French contemporary. Her dialogue with 
Montaigne is carried on throughout her writing life; in letters to friends after a visit to his 
famous tower; in her diaries; in a more engaged fashion in her reading notebooks. 16 She also 
actively appropriates him as a literary forebear; conceiving him as her starting-point in a 
projected history of modem literature and thought, and writing an essay for the TLS in 1924 
which establishes him as a precursor and example. " This obvious identification with his 
work has led to a number of recent studies which, considering his influence upon her work, 
13 See, for example, his letters to Lionel Hauser, in May 1917 and Paul Souday, I January 1920. 
Correspondance, ed. by Philip Kolb, 21 vols (Paris: Plon, 1970-93), XVI (1917), p. 133 and XIX 
(1920), p. 38. 
14 Proust notes in a letter to Montesquiou dated 15 May 1907 that Beaunier 'm'y comparait 
Montaiane et diverses autres personnes de qualit6', and reflects with evident satisfaction upon 'I'effet tý 
que cela avait produit'. He writes to Lumbroso in May 1920 that 'I-6on Daudet est revenu A plusieurs 
reprises dans I'Actionjranýaise o6 il me nomme le d6licieux h6ritier de Montaigne, l'incomparable 
(pardon! ) Marcel Proust'. Correspondance, VII (1907), p. 157; XIX (1920), pp. 266-67. 
15 Jacques Porel, Fils de Rýjane (Paris: Plon, 195 1), 1, pp. 321,328. 
16 Woolf writes to Ethel Smyth, to Vita Sackville-West (twice), and to Vanessa Bell about her visit to 
Montaigne in April 193 1: 'The Tower still stands; and the very door, room, stairs, and windows where, 
in which - grammar gone - Montaigne wrote his essays; also his saddle and a view precisely the same 
he saw. Does this excite youT. See The Letters of Virginia Woolf, ed. by Nigel Nicolson, 6 vols 
(London: Hogarth, 1975-80), IV: A Reflection of the Other Person, 1929-1931, pp. 317-19. Woolf's 
reading notes on Montaigne are gathered in volumes XX, XXIII and XXVI of the Holograph Notes. L- C-1 
See Brenda R. Silver, Virginia Woolf s Reading Notebooks (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1983). pp. 113,122 and 143. 
17 See Thc Essays of Virginia Woolf, ed. by Andrew McNeillie, 4 vols (London: Hogarth, 1986- ), IV, 
pp. 71-SI. 
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or her 'reception' of his, draw their thought very close together. 18 1 wish to argue instead for a 
more problematic relationship between their writing and thought. By pitching a reading of 
Montaigne against a reading of Woolf -- rather than addressing questions of influence or 
reception -- I wish to propose a more plural and unstable relationship between their work-, a 
relationship marked by tensions as well as affinities. 
Woolf also identifies Proust as a possible influence for her work. She began to read A la 
recherche early in 1922, after encouragement from Roger Fry, and her letters and diaries 
record both a sustained admiration for the novel ('I am in a state of amazement; as if a 
miracle were being done before my eyes'), and a recognition that Proust's writing and 
thought might come to shape her own. 19 
I have indicated above some of the ways in which the relationship between other and self 
may potentially be figured. It may be oppositional, it may be circurnscriptive, it may enable 
or prohibit self-realization or expression. However, it may be helpful, before turning to the 
texts themselves, to provide a more systematic summary of the ways in which the self-other 
relation may be formulated or exploited, as well as an outline of the trajectory which I shall 
seek to trace out as I follow the development of this relation from Montaigne to Proust to 
Woolf. The diagrams overpage seek to perform the first of these functions; mapping the basic 
18 See in particular Juliet Dusinberre, Virginia Woolf s Renaissance: Woman Reader or Common 
Reader? (London: Macmillan, 1997), pp. 40-64, and Dudley M. Marchi, Montaigne Among the 
Aloderns: Receptions of the 'Essais' (Oxford: Berghahn Books, 1994), pp. 185-92,222-77. Dusinberre 
sees Montaigne as part of an 'alternative' Renaissance to which Woolf could belong; Marchi, Woolf s 
commitment to personal vision as a refraction of Montaignean scepticism and belief in individual 
difference. See also Nicola Luckhurst's, 'To Quote my Quotation from Montaigne'. in Virginia Woolf. - 
Reading the Renaissance, ed. by Sally Greene (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1999), pp. 41-64; which 
posits the Essais as Woolf s source. I shall return to consider these discussions below, none of which, 
however, explores the idea of the self. 
19 Letters, II: The Question of Things Happening, pp. 565-66 (writing to Roger Fry, 3 October 1922); 
The Diary of Virginia Woolf, ed. by Anne Olivier Bell, 5 vols (London: Hogarth, 1977-84), Il: 1920-24, 
P. 234 (10 February 1923). Woolf writes: 'I wonder if this next lap will be influenced by Proust? I think 
his French language. tradition, &c, prevents that: yet his command of every resource is so extravagant 
tliýtt one can hardly fail to profit, & must not flinch, through cowardice. ' 
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forms which the encounter takes, the responses available to the self, and the potential results 
of such negotiations. 
The self-other relations depicted in the chapters which follow are characterized in the first 
instance either by a fundamental sameness, or by a decisive difference. Relationships of 
sameness are displayed in figure one; of difference, in figure two. 
Form. Sameness may take the form either of a philosophical or ideological coincidence of 
self and other -- as, for example, when the self identifies or agrees with a thinker from 
classical antiquity (AI) -- or of a close integration of the two; as when the self participates in, 
or conforms to, a wider social or political order or community (A2). The difference of the 
other most commonly consists in a cultural or religious alterity -- for example that of the 
cannibal or witch (FI) -- but it may sometimes take a second form. An object of desire, for 
example, may manifest its otherness principally through its elusiveness; through withholding 
itself from the subject (F2). In this case its 'difference' consists in a refusal to conform to the 
aspirations or desires of the self. 
Effects. In each instance, the sameness or difference of the other may potentially have 
positive or negative consequences for the self. Both the conformity of the self to a wider 
order, and the philosophical coincidence of self and other, potentially enable the self to 
appropriate or reinforce a coherent identity, by providing a framework within which it can 
identify and articulate its selfhood, and authorize and stabilize its thought (B2). However, 
each may equally have a negative effect upon the self. When the self locates itself within a 
wider order, it potentially faces the curtailment or contradiction of its subjectivity, as the 
external structure imposes a form upon it (B3). When its thought coincides with that of the 
other, however. it finds that its boundaries begin to dissolve, and that it loses its integrity as 
an independent entity (B I). 
9 
The difference of the other, likewise, may have in both its forms either benefits or drawbacks 
for the self. Social or cultural alterity may act as a defining other, identifying through its 
difference the position and boundaries of the self (GI). However, its difference may equally 
be experienced as a threat: as a subversion of, or challenge to, the perspective of the self 
(G2). The withholding of the other may in certain circumstances benefit the self; which is 
able in its absence to construct an imagined ideal relation with it (G3). More commonly, 
however, such an elusiveness leads to frustration and to a painful sense of exclusion (G4). 
Response. In the works I have chosen to discuss, the sameness or difference of the other is 
always experienced either in positive and negative terms at once (most noticeably in 
Montaigne) or in purely negative terms; never in positive terms alone. As a result, the self is 
always compelled to modify its relation with the other in order to secure a coherent or stable 
identity. This modification may take a variety of forms. The self may first of all withdraw; 
whether from a circurnscriptive wider framework (C I), or from the threat of the cannibal or 
witch (H3). More commonly, however, the self seeks to negotiate with the other, and to 
redefine its relation with it. When the self-other relation is characterized by sameness, the 
self most commonly attempts to preserve its position within the wider community, but to 
negotiate either a degree of difference from the other (if it finds that its boundaries have 
begun to dissolve), or to secure a degree of autonomy (if it has found itself subject to 
circumscription) (C2). The self constrained by a wider order may alternatively reject 
negotiation, and seek instead to dismantle the structures by which it is trapped (0). 
When the other is different from the self, the self may choose either to control, or to 
eliminate, that difference. If the former, the other may become subject either to demonization 
(the cannibal interpreted in terms of inferiority and absence, the Protestant/Catholic in terms 
of heresy) (H I i) or to exclusion (H I ii). If the self chooses to eliminate the difference of the 
10 
other, it commonly reinterprets the other's position such that it reinforces, rather than 
undermining, the beliefs, priorities, or philosophical coordinates of the self (H2i). In this 
instance, the other is changed only in the mind of the self. Alternatively, the self may seek a 
more substantive colonization, in which the behaviour of the other, as well as its conceptual 
significance, is dictated by the self (H2ii). The self may also, more rarely, seek assimilation 
to its other (H2ii). The self which envies the privileges of a different social category may 
seek not to convert the other to its own terms, but rather to reinvent itself in the image of that 
other. The self which encounters an other characterized by difference may finally establish 
communication with it (H2iii). Less appropriative than the other available responses, this is 
most frequently the project of a self isolated or separated from a wider social whole. 
These responses are not, of course, exclusive. In some instances, the self performs one 
operation in preparation for another. Thus the demonization or discreditation of the other 
may be an end in itself, but is often a preliminary step designed to 'legitimate' a subsequent 
colonization. In other cases, the self may be led by the failure of one response to consider or 
attempt another. If the other resists an attempted assimilation, the self will generally seek to 
control through demonization the difference it is unable to eliminate. Some responses may 
also conflate two or more forms of negotiation. Demonization, for example, is often, but not 
always, a form of marginalization or exclusion. 
Locus o transformation lResults. Each of these responses to the problematic self-other !f 
relation may meet in the short term with either success or failure. If the other is the projected 
site of transformation (if it, rather than the self, is to be changed in the process of negotiation) 
(132; J 1), then the self's success or failure will take the form of submission or resistance by 
the other (E3, E4; K I, K2). Resistance may be carefully plotted, but it may equally be 
unconscious, or even involuntary. If the self is the locus of transformation (J2), or if neither 
the self nor the other is to be changed in the course of negotiation (when the self withdraws, 
II 
the relationship between the two terms shifts, but neither is transformed in itself) (D I; B). 
then success or failure takes the form of an achievement or failure by the self of its 
anticipated end (El, E2; K3, K4). In most instances, the process of negotiation comes to an 
end at this point. If the self succeeds, it establishes the relationship, and appropriates the 
identity, for which it has been seeking; if it fails, it returns to the problematic relationship 
indicated at level B or G. However, in some cases, the situation is more complex than this. It 
is possible that success may lead to disappointment rather than fulfilment. When the self 
seeks to colonize a mysterious or exotic other, for example, or to be assimilated into a 
privileged or desired community, it may find that success leads to demystification and 
disillusionment rather than self-realization. In these situations, the self may accept the new 
relation, or it may enter into a new series of projections and negotiations designed to recover 
the lost allure. In other instances, withdrawal from an other, or the explosion of a framework 
which circumscribes the self, does achieve the liberation for which the self was looking, but 
at the same time pitches the subject towards self-loss. Once again, therefore, further 
negotiation is required. There may also, finally, be unexpected consequences for the self 
which fails to attain the relationship it seeks. In certain circumstances, the self which fails in 
its negotiation with the other does not simply return to its former, unsatisfactory relationship, 
but finds itself subject in addition to self-fragmentation or erasure. 
The principal trajectory I shall map out through exploring these negotiations in Montaigne, 
Proust and Woolf is one of increasing detachment from wider orders and frameworks, and an 
increasing perception and installation of the self as a source and agent in the construction of 
its own identity. The self which begins by demanding that self and other be fashioned 
together into a coherent order that provides the self with a stable set of co-ordinates and 
identity, ends, after a series of transpositions and shifts, by negotiating a relationship in 
which the wider community or individual other triggers and enables self-expression, but 
remains essentially external to the process of self-construction. However, I also wish to insist 
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upon fundamental continuities between the visions of the writers I am considering. In each of 
the chapters which follow, the self is determined to protect or to negotiate an identity 
consistent with its own integrity or ambition. Thus even the self which takes up a place in a 
wider order or community is careful to construct that order in such a way that it legitimates 
its own point of view, or makes provision for a degree of personal autonomy. At the same 
time, however, each writer makes clear that the self remains dependent upon the other. The 
self which approaches autonomy most closely also tends towards self-loss. 
I have also, more briefly, sought to sketch out a counter-trajectory. While at one level Proust 
and Woolf move away from the situated self elaborated in Montaigne, and pursue his 
commitment to individual subjectivity in increasingly radical directions, at another they 
express a longing for the integrated orders and coherent relations which the Essais describe, 
and exarrfine the extent to which it possible to recuperate such a stability and relatedness. 
The first of these trajectories is in a broad sense supported by Charles Taylor's discussion of 
modem inwardness in his monumental work on the development of modem identity. 
Beginning with Plato, for whom the self properly governed by reason participates in an 
inherently-meaningful cosmic order, he traces first the transition to Descartes -- for whom 
'ideas' and meanings are located in the mind, and the world is a disenchanted mass of pure 
matter -- and from Descartes the evolution of the self-responsible modem individual, 
governed by ideals of freedom and self-mastery. 20 This progressive internalization of ideas 
and moral sources finds echoes in my own discussion, which at a different level also depicts 
the (attempted) appropriation by the self of the power to construct and confer, rather than 
simply to acknowledge, identities and meanings. However, the complete disengagement from 
the Nvorld described by Taylor moves far beyond the partial impulse to self-regulation 
20 Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self. - The Making of the Modern Identity (Cambridge: C. U. P., 1989). 
For Plato, see pp. 115-26 (in particular, pp. 120-24); for Descartes, pp. 143-58 (pp. 1431-49)-, for the 
self-responsible modern self, pp. 159-60,167-74,185. 
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expressed in the texts I am considering; in which self-articulation always depends upon either 
the submission, or the inspiration, of an other. 
Elsewhere in his account, Taylor explicitly establishes a link between Montaigne and modern 
subjectivity; identifying him as a crucial figure in the tradition of self-expl oration which 
develops from Augustine's elaboration of a 'radically reflexive' stance (that intimate self- 
presence in which I am aware of my own awareness, and experience my own experiencing). 
This tradition, in which identity is mapped through probing the contours of individual 
interiority, is seen to anticipate the modem commitment to individual particularity and 
difference '2' and it clearly would be possible, therefore, to link Montaigne with Proust and 
Woolf in these terms. However, this tradition of se If-expl oration excludes, rather than 
t- ocusses, the self's relation with the other, and it therefore has little in common with the 
terms of my own discussion. While I shall have occasion in what follows to consider the 
self's inner depths, in particular the jealousy and desire examined so exhaustively in the later 
volumes of A la recherche, I am concerned only with the ways in which these emotions and 
desires motivate or generate the self's relationship with its other. 
The thesis breaks down into three main chapters; each of which examines a series of self- 
other dialectics, and each of which concentrates upon one of the writers I have chosen to 
discuss. The opening chapter considers the Essais, and focusses most closely upon two of 
Montaigne's most famous essays. In 'Des cannibales', the European self is confronted with 
the cultural difference of the New World native; an otherness which it seeks to interpret and 
dissolve, I shall suggest, in a different way than other writers of Montaigne's time. In the 
Apologie de Rayinond Sebond, Montaigne explores the relationship between man and God, 
21 Taylor discusses Montaigne, pp. 177-84, and Augustine's radical reflexivity, pp. 127-42 (see 
especially, pp. 129-31). 
14 
and my discussion examines the tensions in the text between a desire to locate the self within 
the framework of Christian theology, and a counter-impulse to autonomy. Before turning to 
these two essays, however, the chapter looks in a less detailed way at three other self-other 
relations in the Essais. Two of these dialectics -- between the self and classical antiquity, and 
between the self and the supernatural other -- feature strongly in other Renaissance 
discussions of otherness and self-fashioning, but are reinflected, once again, in important 
ways by Montaigne. The third dialectic, between the self and wider social communities, 
articulates more openly the sense of curtailment which remains beneath the surface of the 
Apologie, and seeks to negotiate an independent identity for the individual self. The chapter 
closes with a short discussion of scepticism in the Essais; looking at both the ways in which 
it is exploited in the Apologie, and its employment elsewhere in the text to explore alternative 
ways of responding to the other. 
The second chapter, on Proust, examines first of all the extended struggle between a series of 
bourgeois selves and their aristocratic other in A la recherche. Deeply envious of the 
nobility's social distinction, these characters seek to assume an aristocratic status and 
identity, and my discussion considers both the extent to which this project is realized, and the 
consequences for the self of its failure. The second part of the chapter turns to consider the 
relationship between the antisemitic self and its Jewish other. Variously cast in terms of 
religious, cultural and racial otherness, the Jew is subject in turn to strategies of assimilation, 
demonization and exclusion, and I have explored the ways in which, and the extent to which, 
it is successful in resisting these attempted appropriations. The chapter finally examines the 
relationship between the subject and object of desire. The self is impelled by a compulsive 
jealousy to seek knowledge and control of the other's movements and thoughts, and my 
discussion explores the series of paradoxes which first prevent, and then render hollow, such 
a colonization. 
15 
The final chapter begins with a discussion of Woolf's To the Lighthouse, and the dialogue it 
stages between the female self and the patriarchal order. Contrasting the cautious 
negotiations of Mrs Ramsay, who remains largely complicit with the patriarchal regime, with 
the more radical response of Lily Briscoe, my account considers different forms of social and 
spiritual community, and the extent to which they make provision for female self-expression. 
The second half of the chapter turns to examine the plight of the isolated modernist self, first 
in Mrs Dalloway -- which expresses a longing for reintegration, but scepticism about the 
possibility of achieving such a communion -- and then comparatively in To the Lighthouse 
and A la recherche. The latter texts, which treat the question more systematically, both 
propose that a degree, at least, of resolution may be achieved through art. 
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MONTAIGNE 
'[B] Qui que ce soit, ou art ou nature, qui nous imprime cette condition de vivre par la 
relation A autruy, nous faict beaucoup plus de mal que de bien'. ' The Essais articulate, time 
and again, the threat which the other poses to the self. The authority of the other constrains 
the self, its alterity destabilizes the self, its eloquence overshadows the self, and the demands 
it makes displace the self from itself. In every instance, it appears, the other undermines the 
integrity, impedes the realization, or challenges the position of the individual subject. 
However, there is also in the Essais -- for all the vocabulary of inwardness and the claims of 
self-sufficiency -- a consciousness that the self depends upon the other. It is in relation to the 
other that subjectivity is defined and expressed, through the rnirror of the other that self- 
consciousness is claimed, and through negotiation with the other that beliefs and values are 
authorized and affirmed. These contradictions are not the result of an unstable subjective 
perspective: the famous flux of human being. Rather, they express a paradox whereby the self 
is at the same time both threatened by otherness and dependent upon it. Each other which the 
subject encounters brings both the promise of self-realization, and the threat of 
circumscription or self-loss. I wish to suggest in what follows that this paradox is resolved in 
each instance by binding self and other together into integrated orders which reflect or 
accommodate the values and ideas of the self. Either the self takes up a place in an existing 
moral or spiritual order (often reinterpreted to accommodate its own priorities), or it 
constructs 'communities of belief, assigning apparently alien cultural and religious others 
significances which resonate with its own. Before turning to 'Des cannibales' and the 
Apologie de Raymond Sebond, I wish to argue for the wide resonance of this paradox and 
solution by considering in a less detailed way their articulation elsewhere in the text. 
Michel de Montaigne, (Euvres compl&es, ed. by Albert Thibaudet and Maurice Rat (Paris: Gallimard, 
1962), 111: 9; p. 932. All references are to this edition, and are hereafter cited in parentheses after 
quotations in the text. The letters A, B and C indicate the edition in Nvhich the passage quoted first 
appeared; referring respectively to the editions of 1580,1588 and 1595. 
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Self and classical other 
The experience of being dependent upon, yet also threatened by, the other is repeatedly 
expressed by Renaissance selves in relation to the classical past. Exemplary and 
authoritative, ancient authors and texts provide on the one hand models for understanding 
and responding to the world which inspire and ground Renaissance writing and thought. 
Plato, Plutarch, Cicero and Seneca offer frameworks and contexts within which the 
Renaissance self can think, and in relation to which it can develop its own ideas. At the same 
time, however, exemplary classical others often appear to leave no room for the self. 
Saturating the self's intellectual space, 2 they cast seern=ingly inescapable shadows which 
threaten to envelop it. 
This anxiety-dependence dichotomy emerges in various configurations over the course of the 
Essais. I wish to consider two of them here; the first at the beginning of 'De Finstitution des 
enfants': 
[A] Entreprenant de parler indifferemment de tout ce qui se presente a ma 
fantasie et n'y employant que mes propres et naturels moyens, s'il m'advient, 
comme il faict souvent, de rencontrer de fortune dans les bons autheurs ces 
mesmes lieux que j'ay entrepris de traiter, comme je vien de faire chez 
Plutarque tout presentement son discours de la force de l'imagination, a me 
reconnoistre, au prix de ces gens la, si foible et si chetif, si poisant et si 
endormy, je me fay piti6 ou desdain a moy mesmes. Si me gratifie-je de cecy, 
que mes opinions ont cet honneur de rencontrer souvent aux leurs; et que je 
vais au moins de loing apres, disant que voire. (1: 26; p. 145) 
On the one hand, the coincidence between the thought of the classical other and that of the 
self reinforces and affirms the 'propres et naturels moyens' of the individual subject, which 
appropriates the authority of the ancient other to legitimate and validate its own thought. At 
Throughout the thesis, French texts are cited in the original; other languages in translation. 
2 The phrase is Jeanneret's; used in his description of the ancients' threat to Montaigne: 'They are 
omnipresent, they saturate his intellectual space. Their books fill up his library; their mottoes are 
engraved on the beams of the ceiling; their examples haunt his memory and, when he sets himself to 
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the same time, however, the superiority of the classical articulation poses a threat. Its 
eloquence and excellence expose the deficiency of the subject's thought, which appears 
'foible', 'chetif , 'poisant' and 'endormy' in comparison. The classical other authorizes and 
undermines the self at once. 
Later in the same essay, different tensions characterize the relation with the classical other: 
[A] Qu'll luy face tout passer pas 1'estamine et ne loge rien en sa teste par 
simple authorit6 et a credit; les principes d'Aristote ne luy soyent principes, 
non plus que ceux des Stoiciens ou Epicuriens. Qu'on luy propose cette 
diversite de j ugemens: il choisira s'il peut, sinon il en derneurera en doubte. 
[ ... ] S'il embrasse les opinions de Xenophon et de Platon par son propre discours, ce ne seront plus les leurs, ce seront les siennes. [C] Qui suit un 
autre, il ne suit rien. 11 ne trouve rien, voire il ne cerche rien. Non sumus sub 
rege; sibi quisque se vindicet. (p. 150) 
Once again, a doubleness becomes apparent in this passage. On the one hand, the encounter 
with the classical other is seen to enable the formation or realization of individual identity: 
the child identifies with, and appropriates to himself, values and ideas which are articulated 
or formulated for him by the classical authors he comes into contact with. Plato and 
Xenophon hold up a mirror through which he is able to recognize and claim as his own a set 
of philosophical coordinates and values. His subjectivity is realized, and his identity 
fashioned and formed, through the internalization of ideas and ideals expressed by the 
classical other. 
However, there is also in this passage an undercurrent of anxiety about the status of 
subjectivities fashioned in this way. The insistence that 'Qui suit un autre, il ne suit rien' 
suggests a fear that the presence of these exemplary forbears may lead to the erasure or 
absorption of the self which identifies with them. Invested with authority and priority. and 
occupying the same theoretical space as the self, they threaten to obliterate it altogether. A Z-- 
write, their Nvords, their ideas flow from his pen. ' Michel Jeanneret, 'The Renaissance and its Ancients: 
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comparable anxiety also hovers around the margins of the first extract above. The self which 
begins the extract proudly declaring its independence and originality is reduced by the close 
to a follower-after; murmuring 'hear hear' as it trails in the wake of the exemplary ancient 
author who has already expressed its ideas. The problem is more acute, however, in this 
second instance. The commitments of the self are now forged through, rather than prior to, 
the encounter with the other, and the authenticity of the self which it produces thus begins to 
be called into question. A fear of self-alienation and absence lurks behind the insistence, 
throughout 'De l'institution des enfans' that the self which appropriates the thought of 
another fashions an authentic subjectivity: 'S[i 1'enfant] embrasse les opinions de Xenophon 
et de Platon par son propre discours, ce ne seront plus les leurs, ce seront les siennes. 93 A 
related fear is that the classical other may constrain the self, or limit its horizons: '[B] Nostre 
ame ne branle qu'a credit, li6e et contrainte A I'appetit des fantasies d'autruy, serve et 
captivee soubs l'authorite de leur leýon' (p. 150); '[C] Obest plerumque iis qui discere volluit 
auctoritas eorum qui docent' (p. 149). 
There are at least two contradictory relationships between self and classical other in the text, 
therefore. The superior ancient text authorizes the ideas of the self, but the gap between their 
present expression and the earlier, more eloquent articulation demonstrates the inferiority and 
weakness of the self. Identification with a classical other, however, while it forges and 
clarifies subjectivity, also carries a threat of inauthenticity, restriction and the loss of 
individual integrity. 
Dismembering and Devouring', MLN, 110 (1995), 1043-53 (p. 1043). 1-1 t-- 3 Similar statements are also scattered through the Essais as a whole. See, for example, 'De la 
pi-xsumption': JA] Les plus fermes Imaginations que j'aye, et generalles, sont celles qui, par maniere 
de dire, nasquirent avec moy. Elles sont naturelles et toutes miennes. Je les produisis crues et simples, 
d'une production hardie et forte, mais un peu trouble et imparfaicte; depuis Je les ay establies et 
fortifi6es par I'authorit6 d'autruy, et par les sains discours des anciens, ausquels je me suis renconti-6 
conforme en jugement: ceux-IA m'en ont assui-6 la prinse, et m'en ont donn6 la jouyssance et possession 
plus entiere' (11: IT, pp. 641-42). 
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The text employs various strategies to resolve the difficulties it identifies in each of these two 
relations, while seeking in each case to preserve the benefits of the relationship with the 
classical past. The anxieties engendered by the superiority of the classical other are tackled 
through a reworking of the Renaissance doctrine of dissimulation; according to which the 
imitator should conceal his borrowings from classical sources, and display only his own 
refashioning of their ideas: 'This is what our mind should do: it should hide away all the 
materials by which it has been aided, and bring to light only what it has made of them. 14 Thus 
Petrarch, writing of his young secretary, Giovanni Malpaghini, writes: 'I am confident that he 
will strengthen his thought and expression, forging a personal style from his extensive 
reading, not necessarily avoiding imitation but concealing it so that his work will not 
resemble anyone else's, and appear to be bringing from the writers of old something new to 
Latium. 5 The threat posed by the distinguished ancestor is overcome through the suppression 
of his presence in or behind the words of the self. 
Dissimulation is also discussed in 'Des livres'. It is exploited by Montaigne, however, to a 
different end: 
[B] Es raisons et inventions que je transplante en mon solage et confons aux 
miennes, j'ay a escient ommis parfois d'en marquer I'autheur, pour tenir en 
bride la temerit6 de ces sentences hastives qui se jettent sur toute sorte 
d'escrits, notarnment jeunes escrits d'hommes encore vivants, et en vulgaire, 
qui reqoit tout le monde a en parler et qui sernble convaincre la conception et 
le dessein, vulgaire de mesmes. Je veux qu'ils donnent une nazarde a 
Plutarque sur mon nez, et qu'ils s'eschaudent a injurier Seneque en moy. 11 
faut musser ma foiblesse souz ces grands credits. (H: 10; pp. 387-88) 
Montaigne declares that he practises the dissimulation urged by Seneca, deliberately omitting 
to signal what material he has borrowed and where he has taken it from. However, in 
announcing this concealment, he effectively exposes it: where in Seneca and Petrarch the 
4 Seneca-4d Lucilium: epistulae morales, trans. by Richard M. Gummere, 3 vols (London: Heinemann; 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1953), 11, LXXXIV, pp. 277-85 (p. 28 1). 
ý'Petrarch, Rei-linifaindtarum libri, XXII - XXIV. trans. by Aldo S. Bernardo (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1985), XXIII. 19 (to Giovanni Boccaccio); p. 301. 
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theory and practice of dissimulation are kept apart, and thus do not compromise the 
dissimulations they envisage, Montaigne combines the practice and annunciation of 
concealment; in what appears to be a self-frustrating move. However, it is a manoeuvre 
which makes sense in the context of, and as a response to, the complex relation of self and 
classical other he is seeking to resolve. The unacknowledged dissimulation for which Seneca 
calls only partially responds to this paradox. While it removes the threatening shadow of the 
imitated text, it also erases the other as a stabilizing force, able to justify and support the 
thinking of the self. As Pigman observes, in the 'thoroughly dissimulated transformation [] 
the relation between text and model disappears'. 6 The benefit is lost with the threat. In the 
extract above, by contrast, the advantage of the ancient other is preserved, and only the threat 
disappears. The concealment of the other prevents the exposure of the inferiority of the self, 
as it does in a conventional dissimulation. At the same time, however, the declaration that 
classical writers have silently been incorporated into its fabric lends the text the authority of 
these invisible others, and since the locations of these borrowings are not announced, this 
authority is effectively extended to every part of the text. 
The second paradoxical relation of self and classical other -- according to which the other 
facilitates the subject's self-constitution as a self-conscious category, but also threatens its 
authenticity and independence -- demands a different response. The issue is no longer the gap 
between the thought of the self and that of the classical other, but rather their identity, which 
leaves the self without an independent space in which to stand, and which raises questions 
about the authenticity of the identity it appropriates. The self must find a way, if not to depart 
radically from the classical other, at least to make the ancient's thought its own; to ground it 
in, and to make it express, its individual subjectivity. 
6 31 G. W. Pigman 111, Wersions of Imitation in the Renaissance', Renaissance Quarterly, 33 (1980), 1-) 
P. 
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This appropriation of the thought of the classical other is envisaged by Erasmus's Bulephorus 
in terms of a transformative imitation: 
All that you have devoured in a long course of varied reading must be 
thoroughly digested and by the action of thought incorporated into your 
deepest mental processes, not your memory or word-list. Then your mind, 
fattened on fodder of all kinds, will generate out of its own resources not a 
speech redolent of this or that flower or leaf or herb, but one redolent of your 
personality, your sensitivities, your feelings, and the reader will hail not 
snippets abstracted from Cicero, but the manifestation of a mind packed with 
every kind of knowledge. ' 
The digestive topos mobilized by Erasmus here envisages the other broken down and 
absorbed by the self, and made to express its own nature and thought. 8 This effectively 
guarantees the integrity of the self's identity. Where the simple interiorization of the classical 
other constitutes the adoption of an artificial mask, its transformation through digestion is a 
natural process through which the self is nourished and fed in preparation for its self- 
realization through self-expression. 9 The other continues to be a vital source of individual 
subjectivity, but ceases to formulate, eclipse or constrain it, and the problematic doubleness 
of the self's relationship with it is thus essentially overcome. 
There were apparently times during the composition of the Essais when Montaigne was 
sceptical about the possibility of performing such a naturalization of the exemplary other. 
The passage in 'De la phisionomie' which reflects upon his transformation of his sources, for 
example, ends in the 1588 edition with a suggestive comparison, later cut, which questions 
the possibility of appropriating the other and making it one's own: 
7 Collected Works of Erasmus, XXVIII: Dialogus Ciceronianus (1528), trans. by Betty 1. Knott, ed. by 
A. H. T. Levi (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1986), p. 402. 
S ' Pigman, p. 8 lists other examples of this digestive topos (following Seneca) in Quintilian, Macrobius, LI tý 
Petrarch, Poliziano, Erasmus, Calcagnini, Dolet, Florido, Du Bellay, Sidney, and Jonson. C, 
For a discussion of how the metaphor of dis-estion is used first (in Quintilian) to envisage 'a process r-I 
by which alien, external materials may be transformed so that they may re-emerge as a function of 
-natui-c-, and more specifically of the speaker's nature', and then (in Erasmus) to root the transformed 
materials more directly in individual subjectivity, see Terence Cave, The Cornucoplan Text: Problems 
of Writing In the French Renaissance (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979), pp. 37,42-43. 
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[B] Comme ceux qui desrobent les chevaux, je leur peins le crin et la queue, 
et parfois je les esborgne; si le premier maistre s'en servoit a bestes d'amble, 
je les mets au trot, et au bast, s'ils servoient a la selle. (HI: 12; p. 1667) 
A transformation of sorts takes place in the extract here, but it is far from the confident 
assumption of possession and the subjective reinvention demanded by the Erasmian 
formulation. There is a measure of redeployment -- saddle-horses are turned into pack 
animals, and former amblers made to trot -- and a degree of transformation: the appearance, 
at least, of the horses is changed. However, these changes are dictated primarily by the desire 
to employ them in a different way from their former master; rather than by the needs or 
priorities of the self which takes possession of them. In this sense, the change is a self- 
conscious, reactionary recoil from the practice of the former master, which continues to 
shape, although by inversion, the ways in which they are employed. The superficiality of this 
transformation also raises the issue of authenticity once more: the process of dyeing the 
horses' manes and tails in order 'desrobe[r]' them smacks of an artifice directly opposed to 
the natural self-expression demanded by Erasmus. And to the extent that the self does 
transform the horses, it has to deal once again with the issue of inferiority. The poking-out of 
the horse's eye suggests not subjective reinvention, but deformity: as the self attempts to 
make the other its own, it succeeds only in exposing its own deficiency. 
Elsewhere, however, the notion of transformation is apparently embraced: 
[C] Que [I'enfant] sache qu'il sqait, au moins. [A] E faut qu'il emboive [les] 
hurneurs [des anciens], non qu'il aprenne leurs preceptes. Et qu'il oublie 
hardiment, s'il veut, d'ou' il les tient, mais qu'il se les sqache approprier. La 
verit6 et la raison sont communes a un chacun, et ne sont non plus a qui les a 
dites premierement, qu'a qui les dict apres. [C] Ce West non plus selon Platon 
que selon moy, puis que luy et moi 1'entendons et voyons de mesme. [A] Les 
abeilles pillotent deqa delA les fleurs, mais elles en font apres le Miel, qui est 
tout leur-, ce n'est plus thin ny marjolaine: ainsi les pieces emprunt6es 
d'autruy, 11 les transformera et confondera, pour en faire un ouvrage tout sien, 
a sqavoir son jugement. Son institution, son travail et estude ne vise qu'a le 
former. (1: 26; pp. 150-5 1) 
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Montaigne turns here to the most widely-deployed image of transformation in the 
Renaissance. As bees collect pollen from different flowers, but ultimately produce honey, 
which is a different substance entirely, so the child must draw upon the ideas of classical 
writers, but transform and combine them as he fashions his individual judgement. As in the 
Erasmian account, the self continues to depend upon the classical other -- which provides the 
substance from which it fashions its own ideas -- but its authenticity and individual integrity 
are no longer called into question. 
However, the passage above moves beyond Erasmus: seeking to legitimate an identity 
between other and self. Erasmus assumes that an authentic self will be different from the 
classical other it follows: 'If you want to express the whole Cicero you cannot express 
yourself, and if you do not express yourself your speech will be a lying mirror. "O The subject 
must choose between expressing the other and expressing itself. Seneca, likewise, insists that 
self and other must be distinct: 'we should see to it that whatever we have absorbed should 
not be allowed to remain unchanged, or it will be no part of us'. " Montaigne, by contrast, 
before he turns to the apian metaphor, claims that Ta verite et la raison sont communes ý un 
chacun, et ne sont non plus a qui les a dites prernierement, qu'a qui les dict apres. Ce West 
plus selon Platon que selon moy, puis que luy et moi 1'entendons et voyons de mesme. ' The 
erasure of the distinction between other and self is validated through the construction of truth 
as a static and absolute category. If such a truth may be seen to exist -- rather than simply a 
mass of relative perspectives -- then agreement with Plato represents not an imitation of him, 
but initation into a community which has penetrated through to reality. The ideas expressed 
by the earlier writer are taken from his ownership, and made available to every subject to 
appropriate for himself according to his own understanding. 12 Identity is stabilized and 
10 Ciceronianus, p. 399. 
11 Epistulae morales, LXXXIV, p. 281. 
12 See Rendall in this context: 'Truth and reason are common property. In this domain at least, prior 
possession is not the relevant criterion of ownership, and Montaigne suggests that all ideas -- even 
Plato's -- are appropriated from a common 
fund. In doing so, he firmly locates literary property in the 
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solidified by its coincidence with the thought of the classical writer, therefore, rather than 
obliterated by it. And by grounding the 'alien' thought in the self's own judgement -- which 
expresses subjectivity even as it is itself fashioned in the encounter with the other -- the fear 
of inauthenticity is likewise overcome. 
Each of the contradictory relations between the self and its classical other is resolved, 
therefore, as the self succeeds in authenticating its position within, or participating in, a 
community of shared philosophical ideas and beliefs first promulgated by the writers of the 
classical past. In the first instance, the gap which excluded the self is narrowed or disguised 
by the acknowledgement of unspecified classical borrowings, which thus authorize, without 
exposing the deficiency of, the thought and expression of the self. In the second instance, the 
appropriation by the self of the thought and ideas of the other is legitimated through the 
negotiation of a category of truth, and the elaboration of a theory of transformation, which 
naturalize the philosophies of the other in the subjectivity of the self. 
Self and social other 
A second essay which examines the paradoxical status of otherness is Te la vanit6': 
[B] 'Regardez, dict chacun, les branles du ciel, regardez au public, a la 
querelle de cettuy-la, au pouls d'un tel, au testament de cet autre; somme 
regardez tousjours haut ou bas, ou a cost6, ou devant, ou derriere vous. ' 
C'estoit un commandement paradoxe que nous faisoit anciennement ce Dieu a 
Delphes: 'Regardez dans vous, reconnoissez vous, tenez vous a vous; vostre 
esprit et vostre volont6, qui se consomme ailleurs, ramenez la en soy; vous 
vous escoulez, vous vous respandez; appilez vous, soutenez vous; on vous 
trahit, on vous dissipe, on vous desrobe a vous. Voy tu pas que ce monde tient 
toutes ses veues contraintes au dedans et ses yeux ouverts a se contempler 
soy-mesme? ' (111: 9; p. 979) 
Living with reference to others is here seen to lead to the loss or dissipation of selfhood. 
Looking outwards rather than inwards, the subject pours itself out in various directions, and 
process of individual understanding or judgement. ' Steven Rendall, Distinguo: Reading Monta' LI igne 
Diffei-ently (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), p. 61. 
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thus loses sight of its own frontiers. This is a theme which, in various forms, resurfaces 
throughout the Essais. Earlier in 'De la vanite', it emerges in reverse: interaction with others 
is seen to constrain or delimit the self: '[B] Je fuis a me submettre a toute sorte Tobligation, 
mais sur tout a celle qui m'attache par devoir d'honneur. Je ne trouve rien si cher que ce qui 
m'est donne et ce pourquoy ma volont6 derneure hypothequee par tiltre de gratitude, et reqois 
plus volontiers les offices qui sont ý vendre. Je croy bien; pour ceux-cy je ne donne que de 
Pargent; pour les autres je me donne moy-mesme' (p. 944). Elsewhere, it leads to the 
falsification of self: '[B] Nous nous defraudons de nos propres utilitez pour former les 
apparences a l'opinion commune. 11 ne nous chaut pas tant quel soit nostre estre en nous et en 
effaict, comme quel il soit en la cognoissance publique' (p. 932). And in 'De mesnager sa 
volont6', social ties are perceived as bonds which lead to the dispersal of selfhood rather than 
relations which ground and support it: '[B] La plus part des reigles et preceptes du monde 
[] nous pousse[nt] hors de nous et chasse[nt] en la place, a l'usage de la societe publique. 
Ils ont pensý faire un bel effect de nous destourner et distraire de nous, presupposans que 
nous n'y tinsions que trop' (111: 10; p. 983). The wider community invites the self to 
compromise, pressurize, or dispossess itself, and at times itself performs such a 
dispossession. As it enters into relations with the social other, the subject finds itself bound 
by a contract, or a process of exchange, which in some sense circumscribes its agency. 
The solution offered to these constraints in the passage itself is a turning-away from the 
world, and a turning-in upon oneself: 'Regardez dans vous, reconnoissez vous, tenez vous a 
vous; vostre esprit et vostre volont6, qui se consomme ailleurs, ramenez la en soy; [I 
appilez vous, soutenez vous. ' To the extent that the subject is able to generate and sustain 
itself, it can withdraw from the world which threatens to restrain or control it, and live in 
accordance with itself. This is a philosophy which reverberates right through the final book 
of the Essais: '[B] ne vous tenez pas A leur sentence; [C] tenez vous a la vostre. Tuo tibi 
judicio est utendum' (111: 2; p. 785); '[B] Nous [ ... ] devons avoir estably un patron au dedans, 
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auquel toucher nos actions, et selon iceluy, nous caresser tantost, tantost nous chastier. Fay 
mes loix et ma court pour juger de moy, et m'y adresse plus qu'ailleurs' (p. 785). 13 
However, the same essays which expose the dangers of the social other also articulate a 
dependence upon it which problernatizes such an impulse to autonomy. Subjectivity is 
realized and fashioned at a number of levels in 'De Futile et de I'honneste' in relation to the 
social or public other: 
[B] Certes, j'ay eu souvent despit de voir des juges attirer par fraude et fauces 
esperances de faveur ou pardon le criminel a descouvrir son fait, et y 
employer la piperie et Fimpudence. 11 serviroit bien a la justice, et a Platon 
mesmes, qui favorise cet usage, de me fournir d'autres moyens plus selon 
moy. Cest une justice malitieuse; et ne 1'estime pas moins bless6e par soy- 
mesme que par autruy. Je respondy, n'y a pas long temps, qu'a peine 
trahirois-je le Prince pour un particulier, qui serois tres marry de trahir aucun 
particulier pour le Prince; et ne hay pas seulement a piper, mais je hay aussi 
qu'on se pipe en moy. Je n'y veux pas seulement fournir de matiere et 
d'occasion. 
En ce peu que j'ay eu a negotier entre nos Princes, en ces divisions et 
subdivisions qui nous deschirent aujourd'huy, j'ay curieusement evit6 qu'ils 
se mesprinssent en moy et s'enferrassent en mon masque. (111: 1; p. 768) 
The dangers of the public realm remain visible in the passage here. The negotiations which 
take place in both law and royal courts invite, if they do not necessitate, falsification of and 
by the self, and the demands made upon the self once it enters the public realm are likewise 
made clear. However, this extract also demonstrates the vital role that the social other has to 
play in the appropriation and realization of identity. The moral dimension of selfhood, in 
particular, is validated and tested in the public sphere: the self which wishes to represent 
'truth' against 'falsity' secures such an identity through faithfulness in negotiation with 
Prince and people. It is also clear that identity is not a private possession, but also depends 
13 The same position is taken up, although less consistently, elsewhere in the Essals. See especially 'De 
la solitude' (1: 39): JA] Faisons que nostre contentement despende de nous; desprenons nous de toutes 
les liaisons qui nous attachent A autruy, gaignons sur nous de pouvoir A bon escient vivre seuls et y L- : _- I 
vivre 'a nostr'aise' (pp. 234-35), JA] L'homme d'entendement n'a rien perdu, s''I a soy mesme' (p. 
--1 35); JA] La plus grande chose 
du monde, Cest de sqavoir estre ý soy' (p. 236). 
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upon the perception of others: the self which elsewhere wishes to withdraw from the sight 
and interference of the world, here invests energy in seeking to ensure that it is transparent to 
those who encounter it. 
The idea of public negotiation also raises the issue of duty; another theme which recurs 
throughout the final book of the Essais. 'De l'utile et de I'honneste' and 'De mesnager sa 
volont6' in particular consider public service, and they demonstrate once again that while 
such duties clearly involve the constraints discussed above, they also represent an important 
part of the purpose and calling of the self. 14 Thus while 'De mesnager sa volont6' complains 
that '[B] Les hommes se donnent a louage. Leurs facultez ne sont pas pour eux, elles sont 
pour ceux ý qui ils s'asservissent; leurs locataires sont chez eux, ce ne sont pas eux' (p. 98 1), 
it also offers significant c ounter- statements: the man who knows '[B] ce qu'il se doibt, trouve 
dans son rolle qu'il doibt appliquer a soy l'usage des autres hommes et du monde, et, pour ce 
faire, contribuer a la soci6t6 publique les devoirs et offices qui le touchent. [C] Qui ne vit 
aucunernent a autruy, ne vit guere a soy' (p. 984). Even Te la vanite' sets against its 
exposition of the dangers of the social other, an acknowledgement of the importance of 
public service: '[B] Je suis de cet avis, que la plus honnorable vacation est de servir au publiq 
et estre utile a beaucoup' (p. 929). 
Like the relationship between the self and classical other, therefore, that between the self and 
the wider social whole is marked by clear tensions. On the one hand, it compromises, 
circumscribes and dissipates the self; delimýiting or dispersing it through the demands it 
places upon it. On the other hand, however, it has an important part to play in the fashioning 
of subjectivity. The moral dimension of identity is negotiated in the public sphere, and 
subjectivity is also realized in part through the performance of social and political roles. The 
14 Marcyaret McGowan discusses three roles which Montaigne carves out for the nobleman in society: a 4-- 
military role, a courtier's role, and a political role. All three are clearly governed by the tensions I am 
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fulfilment of selfhood involves taking up a place in a wider social order, as well as guarding 
and protecting the boundaries of individual subjectivity. 15 
The self is confronted with the problem, therefore, of finding a way of engaging with, or 
participating in, the world as a public servant or moral agent, while retaining its integrity and 
freedom. One solution is proposed in 'De la cousturne et de ne changer aisement une loy 
receile': 
[A] Le sage doit au dedans retirer son ame de la presse, et la tenir en libert6 et 
puissance de j uger librement des choses; mais, quant au dehors, qu'il doit 
suivre entierement les faqons et formes receues. La societ6 publique n'a que 
faire de nos pensees; mais le derneurant, comme nos actions, nostre travail, 
nos fortunes et nostre vie propre, il la faut preter et abandonner a son service 
et aux opinions communes. (1: 23; p. 117) 
This passage seeks to respond to the duty-integrity dichotomy by splitting the self into public 
and private layers. Withdrawal from the world is accompanied by a surface conforrmty to its 
demands; as the self fashions an external face which performs the roles demanded by the 
world, and an internal subjectivity which withholds itself, and remains untainted by such 
contact. As Starobinski puts it, the self seeks to 'preserver Fint6grit6 du rapport a soi, tout en 
interposant, en direction d'autrui, les apparences exigees par les circonstances: on offrira au 
,q 16 dehors une image sans verite . This apparently has potential for the self faced with public 
duty, which is able through such a doubling of itself to fulfil its roles within the social or 
political community, while protecting and preserving its independent integrity as an 
individual subject. Thus 'De mesnager sa volont6' recommends a detached service which 
identifying here. 'Montaigne: A Social Role for the NoblemanT, in Monta' ne and h's Age, ed. by L- I ig Keith Cameron (Exeter: University of Exeter, 198 1), pp. 87-96 (pp. 92-95). 
15 Jack 1. Abecassis discusses similar 'antagonistic views' in his account of the public/private theme in 
Montaigne. 'Adherence to custom as a necessary principle of public social practice' is set against 'an 
optional private artistic creation which represents the writer's subjective free play with tradition, 
experience and desire'. In this instance, however, the self never ceases to engage with external codes 
and traditions: the tension Abecassis discusses is between the necessity to conform to, and the desire to 
exploit or rewrite, these codes. "'Le Maire et Montaigne ont tousjours est6 deux, d'une separation bien 
claire": Public Necessity and Private Freedom in Montaigne', MLN, 110 (1995), 1067-89 (pp. 1067- 
68). 
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tends towards such role-play: '[B] Je ne veux pas qu'on refuse aux charges qu'on prend 
Pattention, les pas, les parolles, et la sueur et le sang au besoing: non ipse pro charis amicisl 
A ut patria timidus perire. Mais Cest par emprunt et accidentalement, Yesprit se tenant 
tousjours en repos et en sante, non pas sans action, mais sans vexation, sans passion. [I 
Fay peu me mesler des charges publiques sans me despartir de moy de la largeur d'une 
ongle, [C] et me donner a autruy sans m'oster a moy' (pp. 984-85). 
However, such a resolution also presents dangers for the self. There is firstly the question of 
how far detachment from oneself is compatible with self-realization. If the self performs its 
external roles without emotional or moral identification, can it be said to fulfil or work out its 
subjectivity through them? Equally, at what point does self-detachment disintegrate into self- 
fragmentation or disjuncture? A further potential problem is described by Starobinski, who 
suggests that the interposition of a mask between subject and world may finally lead to a 
false self-image: 'Si mon 6tre, et ma forme deviennent inconcevables hors de la "relation A 
autruy", le mensonge n'est pas seulement une d6loyaut6 coupable envers notre prochain; il 
est, pour nous-m6mes, une catastrophe ontologique. ' 17 The mask may stick, and selfhood may 
thus be compromised through an unwitting appropriation of the projected identity. Even as it 
warns us to separate role and self ([B] du masque et de I'apparence il Wen faut pas faire une 
essence r6elle, ny de 1'estranger le propre'), 'De mesnager sa volont6' acknowledges the 
difficulty of doing so: 'nous ne sqavons distinguer la peau de la chemise' (p. 989). 
While the division of self into public and private layers does provide a way of fulfilling 
external duties and protecting the integrity of the self, therefore, it is not an unproblematic 
solution. It is also unable to respond to the different set of issues raised in 'De Futile et de 
I'honneste'. When the self is engaging with the world in order to appropriate a moral identity 
16 Jean Starobinski, Montaigne en mouvement (Paris: Gallimard, 1982), p. 116. 
17 Starobinski, p. 123. 
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-- by aligning itself with truth and defining itself against falsehood and deceit -- and when it 
construes 'identity' in terms of the other's perception of it, as well as its own self-image, it 
clearly cannot undertake the artifice and dissimulation recommended in 'De la cousturne'. 
This second essay offers instead a simpler solution: 
[B] Les gens du mestier se tiennent les plus couverts et se presentent et 
contrefont les plus moyens et les plus voisins qu'ils peuvent. Moy, je m'offre 
par mes opinions les plus vives et par la forme plus rnienne. Tendre 
negotiateur et novice, qui ayme mieux faillir a I'affaire qu'a moy! C'a est6 
pourtant j usques a cette heure avec tel heur (car certes la fortune ya 
principalle part) que peu ont pass6 de main a autre avec moins de soubqon, 
plus de faveur et de privaute. (pp. 768-69) 
The artifice and dissimulation recommended in 'De la cousturne' are here transformed into 
the deceitful practice of others; rejected by the 'truthful' self. Instead, the self lives itself out 
before the other: je m'y offre par mes opinions les plus vives et par la forme plus mienne'. 
The paradox it confronted is thus resolved: the self is able to appropriate a moral identity 
without betraying itself. However, once again, the resulting self-other relation continues to 
manifest tensions. While the openness of the self has so far led to favour and success, the 
passage makes clear that this is not an inevitable outcome. The commitment to personal 
integrity on the part of the self threatens its negotiations with the other, which are 
characterized as precarious and unstable. Only fortune preserves the equilibrium which exists 
between the two. 
These contradictory moral impulses -- to withdrawal from, and engagement with, the wider 
community -- are never completely resolved in the final book of the Essais, therefore. 
Whether the self seeks to identify layers of subjectivity, and to direct the most external -- the 
realm of action and speech -- towards the world, while protecting the interior self, or whether 
it preserves its own integrity by performing itself unreservedly before the other it encounters, 
the individual subject finds that difficulties and tensions remain. The self which seeks to 
participate outwardly in the world, and to withhold its inner self, loses the benefits of 
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engagement through its detachment, and still risks distorting the internal self it hoped to 
protect. The self which presents itself without reserve or compromise to the other also falls to 
negotiate with the world in any meaningful way, and this time finds that its relationship with 
that order stands continually on the brink of rupture. 
Self and supernatural other 
The third other which I wish to discuss -- the witch -- is a classic locus of debate in the 
Renaissance, and one onto which the paradox I have been describing can easily be mapped. 
Contracted to the Devil, the witch embodies the threat of the fearsome powers of darkness: 'It 
is undeniable that the devil lives, yes, rules, in all the world. Therefore witchcraft and sorcery 
are works of the devil, by which he not only injures people but sometimes, with God's 
permission, destroys them. ' 18 At the same time, however, this concretization of the notion of 
absolute evil becomes a powerful symbol against which goodness and godliness may be 
defined. 
This traditional reading is first re-rehearsed, and then transposed, in Montaigne's 'Des 
boyteux': 
[13111 ya quelques ann6es, que je passay par les terres d'un prince souverain, 
lequel, en ma faveur et pour rabatre mon incredulit6, me fit cette grace de me 
faire voir en sa presence, en lieu particulier, dix ou douze prisonniers de cette 
nature, et une vieille entre autres, vrayment bien sorciere en laideur et 
deformit6, tres-fameuse de longue main en cette profession. Je vis et preuves 
et libres confessions et je ne sqay quelle marque insensible sur cette miserable 
vieille; et m'enquis et parlay tout mon saoul, y apportant la plus saine 
attention que je peusse; et ne suis pas homme qui me laisse guiere garroter le 
jucTement par preoccupation. En fin et en conscience, je leur eusse plustost Z-- 
ordonn6 de 1'ellebore que de la cicue. [C] Captisque res magis mentibus, 
qiuinz consceleratis sinzilis visa. (III: 11; p. 1010) 
18 Luther's WOrks, XXVI: Lectures on Galatians, 1-535, Chapters 1-4, trans. and ed. by Jaroslav 
Pelikan (Saint Louis: Concordia, 1963). p. 190. 
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There are two accounts of witchcraft in play in the extract here. The prince who allows 
Montaigne to visit the witch clearly accepts her self-definition as an instrument of darkness; 
since he seeks to overcome through her the scepticism of his guest. The threat which she 
offers is controlled, however, through imprisonment. She remains on display, and is thus able 
to function as a defining other for the controlling self, but her power is curtailed: where she 
was formerly an agent, she is now reduced to a symbol, of spiritual otherness. This is 
(structurally) similar to the process which takes place in the accounts of witchcraft provided 
by contemporary theology. Both Luther and Calvin, having emphasized the reality of the 
enemy, turn to those Scriptures which affirm the victory of the powers of good over those of 
darkness. '9 The quotation from Luther above already anticipates such an affirmation; 
emphasizing that the devil -- and by implication the witches he empowers -- operates only by 
the permission of God. 
The Montaignean self responds to the threat of the witch in a different way. Rather than 
affirming then controlling the witch's supernatural power, he disallows it, in a parodic 
reversal of the inquisitorial interrogation. Taking up the role of the inquisitor -- 'Je [] 
m'enquis et parlay tout mon saoul' -- he assembles the evidence -- a 'marque insensible', 
libi-es confessions' -- and reaches his verdict; a verdict which reverses, however, the 
accusation of the witch-hunter by refusing, rather than imposing, a witch's identity. Where 
the prince disempowers the witch by containing her supernatural power, the Montaignean 
self eliminates her threat by dissolving it into a fiction. This delusion remains, however, as a 
defining other for the self, which negotiates its own stability and sanity as it diagnoses L- 
madness: 'je leur eusse plustost ordonn6 de l'ellebore que de la cicue'. 
19 Luther (p. 193) turns to I John 4.4: ... He is greater that is in us, than he that is in the world"'; while LI 
Calvin, after an extended survey of the power accorded to the forces of darkness ('our most powerful 
foes') in the Bible, provides a section on the assurance of victory through God and Christ. Institutes of 
the Christian Religion, trans. by Ford Lewis Battles, ed. by John T. McNeill, Library of Christian 
Classics, 20-22 1,2 vols (London: S. C. M. Press, 1961). 1,1: 14; pp. 172-73,176. 
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This complete elimination of oppositional otherness is unusual in the context of witchcraft. 
Even sceptical writers, while they seek to cast doubt upon the supernatural acts apparently 
performed by witches, acknowledge the existence of evil powers. Thus Reginald Scot, for 
example, writing in 1584, declares that 'witches neither seeke nor beleeve to have salvation 
at the hands of divels, but by them they are onlie deceived; the instruments of their phantasie 
being corrupted, and so infatuated, that they suppose, confesse, and saie they can doo that, 
which is [ ... ] farre beyond their power and nature to doo'. 
20 While the delusions and false 
confessions of 'Des boyteux' reappear in Scot's account, along with a decisive rejection of 
witches' supernatural powers, the existence of an evil supernatural dimension is recovered at 
a different level: the delusions to which the 'witches' are subject are themselves inspired by 
devils. In the same way Johann Weyer's important account of witchcraft, De praestigiis 
daemonum, argues that 'witches' are the product of demonic deception and mental 
instability: 'virtually all of the actions hitherto attributed to the Larnia ['dulled by age, or 
inconstant by reason of her sex, or unsteady because of her weak-mindedness'] -- actions to 
which the crazed woman even confesses, because her powers of imagination have been 
corrupted by the Deceiver -- proceed not from the Larnia but from Satan himself'. 
21 In each 
case, there is an ongoing opposition between supernatural evil and its opponents. 
Montaigne, by contrast, eliminates the witch as a supernatural phenomenon without 
recuperating her power and significance at a higher level. The witch is simply deluded, and 
20 Reginald Scot, The Discoverie of Witchcraft, ed. by Brinsley Nicholson (Wakefield: EP Publishing, 
1973), 111: 19 pp. 55-56. Scot also quotes 'certeine generall councels' which rule that 'wicked women 
following sathan's provocations, being seduced by the illusions of divels', profess that they possess 
supernatural powers. Discoierie, 111: 16; p. 5 1. 
21 De praestiglis daemonian (1583), trans. by John Shea, ed. by George Mora, Medieval and 
Renaissance Texts and Studies, 73 (New York: SUNY, 1991), pp. 173-74. See also Stuart Clark's 
discussion of Henri Boguet's Discours des sorciers. Boguet is a believer rather than a sceptic, but 
locates the power of the witch in 'the devil which is her familiar' in a similar way, Clark suggests, to 
\Veyer. Thinking With Demons. - The Idea of Witchcraft in Earl. vAlodern Europe (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1997), pp. 195-203- 
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the supernatural other eliminated from his account. 22 In one sense, this spiritual opposition is 
immediately replaced by psychological otherness, through the diagnosis of insanity in the 
final sentence of the passage. However, in this instance, the madness attributed to the witch is 
a madness of delusion rather than of deviance: serving to eliminate, rather than to displace, 
her otherness and its threat. 23 Such an erasure is typical as a response to the threatening other 
in the Essais. I shall suggest, as I proceed, that the Montaignean self seeks not to contain or 
subdue, but rather to explain away, problematic difference, and to construct an integrated -- 
as opposed to a coherent but oppositional -- order. 
However, in the instance presently in view, there is a second reason for Montaigne's decision 
to fictionalize, rather than to demonize, the other. The extract above not only explores how 
unbelief can be used to disempower the supernatural other which threatens the self, but also 
how tales of the supernatural threaten a philosophy of unbelief. Scepticism is not only the 
tool through which the threat of the other is dismantled; it is at another level the position with 
which the self identifies, and which testimony about the supernatural threatens to undermine: 
the prince takes Montaigne to see the witch 'pour rebatre [s]on incredulit6'. In this sense, the 
project of the self is not to overcome the threat of her power, but to eliminate the threat (to 
his disbelief) of her reality. The decision to eliminate her spiritual otherness is therefore 
inevitable. 
22 11sewhere in the essay, he does acknowledge the existence of witches, speaking of '[B] les exemples 
que la divine parolle nous offre de telles choses, tr6s certains et irrefragables exemples'. However, he 
seeks to set their reality at a safe historical distance: '[131 Pour accommoder [ces exemples] et les 
att. icher ý nos evenemens modernes, puisque nous n1en voyons ny les causes, ny les moyens, il y faut 
autre engin que le nostre' (p. 1008). Each example of witchcraft examined in the essay is treated with t- 
considerable scepticism, and the supernatural is characterized throughout as remote, theoretical and 
exceptional. 
23 Elsewhere in his treatise, Scot too describes the witches' envisaged powers in terms of delusion: 'If 
anie man advisedlie marke their words, actions, cogitations, and gestures, he shall perceive that 
melancholie abounding in their head, and occupieng their braine, hath deprived or rather depraved their r-1 
judgements, and all their senses: I meane not of coosening witches, but of poore melancholi ie women, 
which are themselves deceived. ' Discoverie, 111: 9; p. 41. 
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This validation of disbelief through the reinterpretation of the supernatural other also occurs 
elsewhere in 'Des boyteux% 24 and in other parts of the Essais as a whole: 
[B] Le demon de Socrates estoit a I'advanture certaine impulsion de volonte, 
qui se presentoit a luy, sans attendre le conseil de son discours. En une ame 
bien espuree, comme la sienne, et prepar6e par continuel exercice de sagesse 
et de vertu, il est vray semblable que ces inclinations, quoy que temeraires et 
indigestes, estoyent tous jours importantes et dignes d'estre suyvies. Chacun 
sent en soi quelque image de telles agitations [C] d'une opinion prompte, 
vehemente et fortuite. (1: 11; p. 45) 
In this passage from 'Des prognostications', the supernatural is recuperated back by the self. 
Socrates' 'demon', commonly seen as divine inspiration, is interpreted instead as an 
expression of the natural self; an 'impulsion de volonte' or 'une opinion prompte, vehemente 
et fortuite'. That which seemed to stand beyond the natural order comes instead to represent 
the hyper-natural; the passions and 'agitations' which lie beneath the surface of the wise and 
virtuous man. As Screech puts it: 'Socrates' daemon, which made him near-infallible, was in 
fact a natural impulse found to some extent in all of us. So the ecstasies of Socrates were at 
most "natural" ones. 25 The supernatural other turns out to be another form of self. And in the 
same way, the otherness of genius is dismantled by the self: that which belonged to the 'ame 
bien espuree, comme la sienne', becomes as the extract proceeds the property of 'chacun'. In 
each case, the other is appropriated by the (natural, human, unexceptional) self to represent 
its own position. In this sense, the passage above moves beyond the discussion of witchcraft 
in 'Des boyteux': while the supematural othemess of the witch is dissolved, the deluded old 
woman who remains is a no-longer-other rather than a version of self. However, the passage 
See for example the passage which precedes the narrative of the visit to the witch: '[B] Fay les 
oreilles battuýs de mille tels comptes: "Trois le virent un tel jour en levant; trols le virent lendemain en 
occident, A telle heure, tel lieu, ainsi vestu. " Certes je ne m'en croirois pas moy mesme. Combien 
trOUV6-Je plus naturel et plus vray-semblable que deux hommes mentent, que je ne fay qu'un homme en 
douze heures passe, quand et les vents, d'orient en occident? Combien plus naturel que nostre 
entendement soit emport6 de sa place par la volubilit6 de nostre esprit detraqu6, que cela, qu'un de nous 
a du tuiau de sa chemin6e, en chair et en os, par un esprit estranglerT (p. Solt envol6 sur un balay, au lon, -- 1009). In this instance, it is the mendacity, rather than the delusion, of the witnesses which produces the 
miracle'; but the process of translation -- from 'miracle' to fiction -- is essentially the same. 
25 Micliel de Montaigne, The Complete Essays, trans. and ed. by M. A. Screech (London: Penguin, 
1987), p. 4 1. 
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above less completely resolves the paradox of the supematural other. While the self's 
reinterpretations eliminate its threat, they leave very little by way of defining other. Only the 
4memory' of the demon's disallowed supernatural status remains for the self to define itself 
against. 
The relationship between other and self is crucially overdetermined in the Essais, therefore. 
A sense of anxiety in the presence of the other is balanced, in each of the examples above, by 
a recognition on the part of the self that the realization or authorization of its subjectivity 
entails an investment in the other. In each case, these contradictions lead the self to seek to 
fashion an integrated relation. The Renaissance self identifies in the classical past 
philosophical positions which will stabilize and authorize its own, if it can appropriate them 
to itself. The self of 'De la vanite' and 'De mesnager sa volonte' sees in the social whole the 
opportunity to work out its self-understanding as a moral and social agent; although such a 
self-fulfilling engagement with the other is precariously achieved, at best. An equivalent 
impulse to integration also underwrites the encounter with the supernatural other. Able to 
assimilate the Socratic demon, the self succeeds in dissolving, but is unable to recuperate 
further, the othemess of the self-professed witch. 
I wish now to examine in greater detail the way in which this process works in two of 
Montaigne's most famous essays. 'Des cannibales' demonstrates the ways in which the gap 
between self and other both benefits and undermines the perspective of the self, and reveals 
ways in which the distinction may be preserved, but the substantial difference which divides 
the two overcome. The Apologie de Raymond Sebond, by contrast, considers the advantages 
and drawbacks of a close integration of other and self. In this second example, the project is 
to divorce, rather than to draw together, the two parts; without relinquishing, however, the 
stability which their fusion had produced. 
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'DES CANNIBALES' 
In Renaissance Self- Fashioning, Greenblatt argues that 'self-fashioning is achieved in 
relation to something perceived as alien, strange, or hostile. This threatening Other - heretic, 
savage, witch, adulteress, traitor, Antichrist - must be discovered or invented in order to be 
attacked and destroyed' . 
26 The contradictory activities of the other - in this case the 
definition and subversion of the values attaching to the self - are countered in this 
interpretation by a continual process of evocation and destruction: an other is invented to 
situate and delineate the values upheld by a particular group, and then destroyed before it can 
begin to establish itself, and thus to challenge or destabilize the term it was employed to 
define. Such a cycle is very clearly employed in Renaissance accounts of the New World; 
which is cast first of all as Europe's cultural, religious and social other, and then eliminated 
through colonization. However, although these processes of definition and subversion are 
evident in many of the sources for 'Des cannibales', Montaigne himself addresses the alterity 
of the other in a different way, a way which binds self and other together into a more stable 
and integrated reality. 
Greenblatt, Thevet, Montaigne 
In 'Des cannibales' it often appears that difference is not controlled or checked at all: that it 
is accommodated and accepted, by contrast, as if it posed no threat to the self: 
[A] [Un prophete] prognostique les choses a venir et les evenemens qu'ils 
doivent esperer de leurs entreprinses, les achernine ou destourne de la guerre; 
mais c'est par tel si que, oU' 11 faut a bien devenir, et s'iI leur advient 
autrement qu'il ne leur a predit, 11 est hach6 en mille pieces s'ils I'attrapent et 
condamne pour faux prophete. A cette cause, celuy qui s'est une fois 
mescont6, on ne le void plus. 
[C] C'est don de Dieu que la divination; voyla pourquoy ce devroit estre 
une imposture punissable, d'en abuser. (1: 3 1; p. 206) 
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There is no immediate evidence of colonization in the passage here. The role of the prophet 
in cannibalistic culture, and the ways in which false prophecy is punished, are evoked and 
related apparently with interest: otherness is given, rather than denied, a space. It is passages 
such as these that have created what Quint describes as 'the traditional and still prevalent 
reception of "Des cannibales"' which 'has congratulated Montaigne for his freedom from 
ethnocentric prejudice' . 
2' The surface of the text, at least, suggests a tolerance of cultural 
difference, rather than an impulse to erase it. 
However, beneath this apparent accommodation of difference, otherness is carefully 
manipulated here. The way in which it exercises control can be approached in part through an 
insight offered by Greenblatt in Marvelous Possessions. Discussing the practice of bringing 
New World natives to Europe for public display, he observes that: 
What the spectators get for their money is the experience of wonder in the 
presence of the alien: they see and perhaps touch [ ... Ia fragment of a world 
elsewhere, a world of difference. But, of course, that world is not present; 
only a sliver of it, an anecdote in the form of a dead or dying captive, has 
crossed the immense distance. 28 
The presence of the captive before the spectators promises an insight into 'a world 
elsewhere' that this encounter is unable to deliver. While the captive himself is authentic, a 
genuine fragment of the land from which he has been taken, his presence is insufficient to 
communicate anything substantial about that world to the spectators who gather to see him. 
The account he can give of his native land is ultimately incomplete: detached from a wider 
context, he is reduced to a 'sliver', or 'anecdote'. 
21, Stephen Greenblatt, Renaissance Self- Fash ion ing: From More to Shakespeare (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 1980), p. 9. 
27 David Quint, Montaigne and the QualitY of MercY. - Ethical and Political Themes in the 'Essals' 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), p. 77. 
28 Greenblatt, Marvelous Possessions: The Wonder of the New World (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 199 1) 
p. 122 
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The New World custom of killing false prophets might usefully be seen in much the same 
way. Transported to France in his servant's account, as the captive has been in the colonizer's 
boat, it, too, is incomplete. It is described at reasonable length, but is available only in 
outline: the social narratives and cultural traditions in which it was once embedded, and from 
which it formerly took its meaning, have inevitably been lost in transmission. Like 
Greenblatt's world of difference, they have failed to cross 'the immense distance' which lies 
between the two worlds. And once separated from these narratives, the custom is unable to 
resonate or communicate as it formerly could. It may be able to gesture towards the fuller 
meaning it once possessed, but as an expression of religious belief and cultural tradition, its 
significance is dependent upon its context. The account provided by the servant, therefore, is 
crucially incomplete. 
Detached from its wider context, neither the New World captive described by Greenblatt, nor 
the custom related by Montaigne, has a free-standing significance. Apparently available for 
immediate apprehension, they finally fail to offer a complete or unambiguous meaning. They 
are consequently open to appropriation and misinterpretation by their viewers, who, in the 
absence of complete and incontrovertible prior meaning, inevitably construct the otherness of 
their subjects according to their own preferences or imaginative resources. This manipulation 
is evident in both accounts; but the ways in which it operates are finally very different. 
Greenblatt continues his account of the captive with a closer assessment of the spectators 
who travel to view the cultural fragment: 
Even this sliver of otherness is not accessible to direct apprehension; the 
viewers carry with them to the exhibits, as to the lands from which the 
exhibits have been seized, a powerful set of mediating conceptions by which 
they assimilate exotic representations to their own culture. 29 
29 Marvelous Possessions, P. 122. 
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The passage above, and the previous extract describing the New World captive. display 
between them the dual and contradictory impulses by which Greenblatt characterizes 
sixteenth-century attempts to control and regulate difference: an otherness is 'discovered or 
invented in order to be attacked and destroyed'. The spectators are first involved in a process 
of invention: they pay their money, and expect to see, 'a world elsewhere'; the world of 'the 
alien'; which they 'experience' with 'wonder'. Like many of those who actually travelled to 
the New World, the spectators construct an 'exotic' New World as they look upon the captive 
placed before them; a world entirely and palpably different from their own. 30 In some sense, 
of course, this difference is less 'other' than it appears: the subject of travel writing from 
Pliny the elder to John de Mandeville, exoticism is by the Renaissance already a familiar 
other, sanitized through its mythologization over the course of preceding centuries. However, 
the captive remains a symbol of what the European mind imagines to be not-self. 
However, even as the spectators construct him in such terms, they seek to eliminate the 
otherness they have made, employing a 'powerful set of mediating conceptions' to 
'assirmlate' this 'exotic representation' to 'their own culture'. The threat of the other is such 
that even as it is constructed, it begins to be incorporated back into the culture by which it 
has been fashioned. The two processes merge into one in the passages here; as they always 
must in practice. If the New World is to act as a defining other without challenging the 
assumptions and premisses of the authority which employed it, it must be as continuously 
destroyed as it is continuously evoked. The identity of the authority depends upon the 
existence of this otherness; its stability and security upon its absence. Invention and 
assimilation, therefore, must both be taking place at every moment. 
30 For a traveller's account which describes the New World in such terms, see Columbus's diary. The 
entry for 16 October 149-1 describes fish 'so unlike ours that it is a marvel; the colours are so fine 
that no man would not wonder at them', and trees with 'many branches of different kinds, and all 
coming from one root; one branch is of one kind and one of another, and they are so unlike each other 
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This method of dealing with the paradox of difference is a very familiar one, and is clearly 
used by Montaigne's principal source for his discussion of New World prophecy. Andr6 
Thevet's Les Singularites de la France antarctique autrement nommý amerique, published in 
1558 31 describes the practice of killing false prophets in the following way: 
Ces sauvages ont encores une autre opinion estrange et abusive de quelques 
uns d'entre eux, qu'ils estiment vrays Prophetes, et les nornment en leur 
langue Pagýs. [ ... 
] 11 faut noter que les Sauvages ont en tel honneur et 
reverence ces Pages, qu'ils les adorent ou plustost idolatrent: mesmes quand 
ils retoument de quelque part, vous verriez le populaire aller au devant, se 
prosternant, et les prier: disant, Fais que je ne sois malade, que je ne meure 
point, ne moy, ne mes enfans: ou autre chose. Et luy respond, Tu ne mourras 
point, tu ne seras malade, et semblables choses. Que s'il advient quelquesfois 
que ces Pages ne dient la verit6, et que les choses arrivent autrement que le 
presage, ils ne font difficulte de les faire mourir, comme indignes de ce tiltre 
et dignite de Pages. 32 
In the same way as Greenblatt's spectators, Thevet sees the custom he describes in terms of 
difference. The elevation by the people of 'quelques uns d'entre eux' to the role of Pagý (the 
retention of the Amerindian word itself signals categorical difference) is 'estrange et 
abusive', while the 'honneur' and 'reverence' in which these prophets are held is seen to be 
idolatrous. The whole religious practice of the cannibals is interpreted in terms of blasphemy. 
In this sense, Thevet moves beyond the Greenblattian spectators: where they create an 'other' 
which is clearly different from, but stands in no specific relation to, the self, Thevet's New 
33 World religion is interpreted as the inverse of the authority he represents. This stricter 
definition of difference is important, for it is this, to a large extent, which generates a 
coherent self-other relation. Thevet clearly intends and anticipates that the tradition he 
that it is the greatest wonder in the world'. The Journal of Christopher Columbus, trans. by Cecil Jane 
(London: Blond & Orion Press, 1960), p. 33. 
31 Bernard Weinberg draws together the evidence that Thevet was a source for Montaigne in 
'Montaigne's Readings for "Des Cannibales"', in Renaissance and Other Studies in Honor of William 
Leon Wile 
- N,, 
University of North Carolina Studies in the Romance Languages and Literatures, 72 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1968), pp. 261-79. 
-12 Andi-6 Thevet, Les Singularitýs de la France antarctique autreinent nommý amýrique: et de plusieurs 
terres et Wes decoui, ertes de notre temps (1558) (Paris: Le Temps, 1982), pp. 65,67. Unlike the 
Gallimard edition of the Essais, this is a normalized text. 
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relates, like the captive, will ultimately be replaced by his own religious practice. Ultimately. 
therefore, the difference of the other will be erased. However, the New World other is in one 
sense already controlled through the judgement implied in the definition of otherness as a 
demonic parody of self. Perceived as the inversion of an incontrovertible order, the election 
and adoration of Pagis is renounced, if it is not destroyed, at the very moment, and in the 
very process, of its creation. The twin operations continually undertaken by those who view 
the captive are here inherent in a single act: the custom of appointing prophets is perceived to 
have a form which the self has denounced before the encounter begins. 
In essence, therefore, the same cycle develops here as in the earlier extract from Greenblatt. 
If otherness is not quite so clearly invented in this instance -- the self apparently encounters 
and interprets, rather than projects, the otherness of the cannibal (although Thevet's account 
suggests very strongly a deliberate attempt to construct in his narrative an idolatrous other 
against which to define a pious self) -- still, the self goes to the New World expecting to find 
its religious other, and intending to convert it to its own terms (whether from a missionary or 
imperialistic impulse). The difference of the other is first encountered, then erased, in a cycle 
which, whether this is the purpose, or simply a product, of the encounter, defines and upholds 
the religious identity of the self. 
Montaigne's rewriting of Thevet's account situates otherness in a different relation to the 
self. Where Thevet depicts an idolatrous people whose rituals are a blasphemous parody of 
Christianity, Montaigne describes a cannibalistic religion which closely resembles his own. 
As he begins to interpret the practice of killing false prophets, he fills the space behind the 
sui-face he has been given with meanings which make it comprehensible and justifiable to 
hiniself: 'C'est don de Dieu que la divination; voyla pourquoy ce devroit estre une imposture 
33 Jean de Ury, whose 1578 account of the New World was also used by Montaigne, similarly 
describes the religious assemblies of the Tupi in terms of devil-worship. Histoire d'un voý'agefait en la 
terre A Brýsil, ed. by Jean-Claude Morisot (Geneva: Droz, 1975), p. 243. 
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punissable, d'en abuser. ' Like us, the cannibals have prophets, and like us, they understand 
and respond to the abuse of so sacred a ministry. Although the custom is itself entirely 
foreign, it is grounded, in Montaigne's interpretation, in an ethic wholly intelligible to the 
European Christian. The fundamental relation between other and self is no longer difference 
but identi ty. 34 
This identity appears to be problernatized as the passage proceeds: 
[C] Cest don de Dieu que la divination; voyla pourquoy ce devroit estre une 
imposture punissable, d'en abuser. Entre les Scythes, quand les devins avoient 
failli de rencontre, on les couchoit, enforgez de pieds et de mains, sur des 
charriotes pleines de bruyere, tir6es par des bceufs, en quoy on les faisoit 
brusler. Ceux qui manient les choses subjettes a la conduitte de I'humaine 
suffisance, sont excusables d'y faire ce qu'ils peuvent. Mais ces autres, qui 
nous viennent pipant des asseurances d'une facult6 extraordinaire qui est hors 
de nostre cognoissance, faut-il pas les punir de ce qu'lls ne maintiennent 
1'effect de leur promesse, et de la ternerite de leur imposture? (pp. 206-07) 
The resonances which attach to the Scythians in this passage are complex and ambiguous. 
Already embedded in the European consciousness, and located in classical antiquity, they are 
in one sense familiar to the French Renaissance subject, and in this sense help to mediate 
between the New World other and European self. Abecassis describes this process in his 
account of the 'other other': the cannibal can be made familiar by 'pass[ant] par "I'autre 
autre" impossible, a savoir par 1'exemplum antique. De la sorte, nous avons un triangle dont 
les trois angles se construisent par le cannibale, les anciens et les contemporains. [] 11 ya 
donc une circularit6 parfaite entre un passe perdu et un Autre 6loigne dans Fespace mais 
34 Michael T. Ryan, describes a more blatant example of the invention of similarity: Tabricatincr L_ 
genealogies was a major intellectual activity in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Human 
culture was a series of complicated derivations and transmissions from the book of Genesis to the 
present. While the genealogist is intoxicated with the past, genealogy is essentially anti-historical: i t-I Cl I its 
orientation is to an original ancestor in time past. Genealogical scholarship -- in whatever area -- 
provided consolation for men who trembled before the vicissitudes since it revealed the hidden identity 
of past with present. ' 'Assimilating New Worlds in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries', 
Comparath, e Studies in Society and History, 23 (1981), 519-38 (p. 532). 
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proche dans le logos. ' 35However, there is also a sense in which the comparison with the 
Scythians appears to problematize the interpretation I have offered. In Herodotus (from 
whom Montaigne has taken the account above), the Scythians are a barbarian people whose 
customs are related by the author as curious examples of the thought and belief of others, in 
much the same way, in fact, as cannibalistic practices are described by Renaissance 
ethnographers. 36 If the Scythians are to be seen in such a way in 'Des cannibales', they do not 
reduce the alterity of the cannibals, but rather reinforce their otherness. 37 
However, I would suggest that to the extent that they do represent the other in this passage, 
their otherness is controlled, and is not allowed to disrupt the trajectory of the passage as a 
whole. The reference to the Scythians is placed in the middle of a passage which reflects 
upon the role of the prophet in the self's own terms: those who falsely claim prophetic 
powers should indeed be punished for their presumption and deceit. It is governed and 
controlled, therefore, by the terms of that interpretation. The Scythians are subject to the 
same process of appropriation as the cannibals with whom they are compared: the customs of 
each are assimilated by the beliefs and understanding of the self. 
35 Jack 1. Abecassis, "'Des cannibales" et la logique de la repr6sentation de I'alt&46 chez Montaigne', C) BSAM, 7th series, 29-32 (July 1992-June 1993), 195-207 (p. 203). Frank Lestringant argues that the 
self-antiquity-cannibal triangle works in a different way elsewhere in the text. In the Golden Age 
passage discussed below, it is 'le Cannibale qui fait la leqon au philosophe d'Ath6nes: "C'est une 
nation, diroy-je ý Platon, en laquelle il n'y a aucune espece de trafdique ... " Platon seroit surpris, A tout le inoins, qu'une soci6t6, contrairement A celle qu'll a imagin6e, puisse "se maintenir avec si peu 
d'artifice et de soudeure humaine". Cinglant d6menti apport6, au nom de Pexperience, A la savante et 
complexe architecture de la Rýpublique'. 'Sept paradoxes sur "Des cannibales" (Montaigne, Essals, 1: 
3 1)', L'Information Littýraire, 45.2 (March-April 1993), 3-16 (p. 5). 
36 Herodotus, The Histories, trans. by Aubrey de S61incourt, rev. by John M. Marincola (London: 
Penguin, 1954), IV: 69; p. 237. The custom of killing false prophets is described amongst accounts of 4-- 
how the Scythians swear oaths, what the king does when he is ill, and the willow-rods used by 
soothsayers (IV: 67-70; pp. 236-37). 
37 The other references to Scythians in the Essais do not resolve this issue either way. While in 'De la 
conscience', Apollodorus '[A] songeolt qu'll se voyolt escorcher par les Scythes, et puis bouillir dedans 
une marmite' (11: 5, p. 347), elsewhere the Scythians are used to demonstrate the wisdom of 
withdrawing from battle ('De la constance'; 1: 12; pp. 46-47), and as a courageous martial people in 
'Du pedantisme'; which seeks to prove that '[C] 1'estude des sciences amollit et effernine les courages, 
Plus qu'il ne les fermit et aguerrit' (1: 25, P. 143). 
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The otherness of cannibalistic practice is overcome, therefore, through an appropriative 
representation which attributes to it the values and priorities of the self; a process which is 
partly mediated by, and which partly expands to include, the practices of ancient Scythia. 
However, this foreshortening of difference does not constitute a complete elimination of 
alterity. Neither the assignation to the custom of a familiar ethical motivation, nor its 
transposition through the comparison with that of the Scythians, eradicates difference 
entirely. Instead, these manoeuvres seek to demonstrate that difference is underwritten by 
similarity; that disparate practices manifest the same religious priorities, and that otherness 
resembles something valorized by the self. This remnant of difference is important, for it is 
this which enables the resolution of the paradox of difference. Where in Greenblatt, the 
contradictory demands that otherness be present and absent at once are met by the continuous 
and simultaneous performance of two oppositional processes, and where in Thevet they are 
addressed through the denunciation, and anticipated conversion of otherness, in Montaigne 
they are met by the creation of an other which is different enough to define the self, but 
which remains nevertheless firmly rooted in sameness, and which consequently offers no real 
threat. 
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This new model for resolving the paradox of difference has two significant features. Firstly, 
it replaces the opposition identified by Greenblatt and displayed in Thevet's account with a 
basically integrated order, characterized by agreement rather than conflict. In Greenblatt the 
cannibal never loses its status as other: while individual communities may be assimilated or 
I'S ilar difference-in-similari i Andre Tournon, reporting the conclusions of Pascal Lemaire, sees a sirM 11 ity in 
the Apologle: 'Ici, le traitement des donn6es trouv6es chez Gomara tend A accentuer les ressemblances, 
ou A estomper les traits distinctifs. Par exemple, au sUiet de rites azt6ques, I'historien d6crivait un 
comportement d'6nergum6nes: "Quand ils entrent au temple pour parler A leur idole, ils se prennent A 
pleurer et braire (et Cest ce que veut dire ce mot quaca) et se trainent par terre j usqu'A leur 'dole, avec 
laquelle ils parlent un langage inconnu A tout le peuple"; cela devient dans les Essais: "la faqon aux 
pi-&res d'user en officiant de langue particuli6re et non vulgaire", et Fon se retrouve A Saint Nicolas du 
Chardonnet. Mais, [ ... 
I sur la trame des ressemblances se d6tachent des diff6rences de d6tails: grotte 
POUr arche dans le m the du D61uge, purgatoire glacial. ' However, he interprets these divergences in y tý L- 
terms of disruption rather than surface difference: Ia s6rie des similitudes est fauss6e par Firruption 
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colonized, the notion of 'savage' remains as the inverse of European 'civilization', and will 
be frequently re-evoked as such as the cycle of invention and destruction proceeds. (In the 
same way, the heretic or witch remains a symbol of deviance, even when she has been burnt, 
and her threatening otherness thus overcome. ) Montaigne, by contrast, reinvents the other in 
the image of the self, and binds the two together into an integrated whole . 
39The 
other is 
recruited to uphold and reinforce the ideals and beliefs of the self; to construct a community 
of shared belief, within which the self can locate itself, and by which it is protected. This is 
the same process as in 'Des boyteux', where the supernatural other, conventionally controlled 
through demonization, is first fictionalized -- and thus removed as an oppositional other -- 
and then (in the case of Socrates' 'demon') recuperated back to self, and used to reinforce the 
subject's own beliefs. 
This elimination of oppositional otherness also makes the Montaignean relation between self 
and other more stable than that described by Greenblatt. In the cultural economy which 
Greenblatt describes, there is always scope for resistance. As cultural materialist critics have 
emphasized, 'to contain a threat by rehearsing it one must first give it a voice, a part, a 
presence [ ... ]. Through this process the very condition of something's containment may 
constitute the terms of its challenge: opportunities for resistance become apparent, [ ... ] even 
as the threat is being disempowered' . 
40 The potential for such disruption is clearly evident in 
Greenblatt: the assimilation which must constantly take place, as a controlling counter- 
sporadique de quelques anomalies'. Uttrange semblable', BSAM, 7th series, 29-32 (July 1992-June 
1993), 249-61 (p. 25 1). 
39 The text makes explicit that the self resembles the New World other (as, for example, when 
cannibalism is compared to the Wars of Religion), and various critical studies have suggested that in tl 
Montaigne (Lestringant, p. 14) and ethnographies in general (see G6rard Defaux, 'Un cannibale en haut 
de chausses: Montaiane, la diff6rence et la logique de 1-dentitC, MLN, 97 (1982), 919-57 (p. 957)) the r-1 -- III 
self extends its meaning and range through identification with the other. I want to suggest that in 
Montaigne, the reverse is also the case; that the other is used to buttress and reinforce the position of the 
self. 
40 Jonathan Dollimore, Radical Tragedýy: Religion, Ideology and Power in the Drama of Shakespeare 
and his Contemporaries 2nd edn (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1989), p. xxi. 
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pressure to the emergence (even though itself controlled) of otherness, signals the threat 
which not-self represents to self. 
In the passage from Montaigne, by contrast, there is never any threat of struggle or contest. 
Constructed as essentially similar to self, otherness can be openly acknowledged or 
embraced, and the instabilities and conflicts which characterize the earlier models are 
replaced by a far less problematic relation, in which difference serves to sharpen individual 
outlines rather than undermining the position of the self. '[A] Je trouve [ ... ] qu'il n'y a rien de 
barbare et de sauvage en cette nation' (p. 203), Montaigne concludes. Unlike those who do 
find disorderly otherness at the heart of the other, he is not obliged to civilize and control it. 
I wish now to suggest that the same basic model of difference-in-sameness is established at 
other moments and levels in the text, and to consider the ways in which it operates in these 
instances. I propose to look briefly first of all at the politics of naming: the ways in which, at 
a linguistic level, difference can be evoked or suppressed; and then to consider a passage 
which has recently been used to place the Montaignean practice within the tradition of 
inventing and colonizing otherness from which I am seeking to differentiate it. 
Linguistic colonization 
Renaissance ethnographies display a degree of manipulation even in the names they assign to 
Amerindian objects and figures, and once again there are decisive differences between the 
methods adopted by the majority of interpreters, and those employed by Montaigne. It is 
instructive once more to consider the sources from which he is working: 
Thevet: Les maisons ou ils habitent sont petites logettes, qu'ils appellent en 
leur langue Mortugabes assembl6es par hameaux ou villages, tels que nous les 
voyons en anciens lieux par deqa. Ces logettes sont basties de bois, et 
couvertes de feuilles de palme [ ... ] Chacune logette a plusieurs belles 
couvertures. [ ... ] Au n-fflieu clesquelles chacun en son quartier, sont penclus les 
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licts a pilliers, forts et puissants attachez en quarrure, lesquelles sont faits de 
bon coton. 
Ury: Les sauvages appellent [leur] bruvage Caou-in, lequel estant trouble et 
espais comme lie, a presque goust de laict aigre: et en ont de rouge et de blanc 
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comme nous avons de vin. 
If there is no obvious attempt to invent the New World as any particular form of otherness in 
these extracts, its alterity is nevertheless made clear. Ury is explicit, noting that 'leur 
coustume' is 'du tout contraire a la nostre', while the terms which are used to describe the 
cannibalistic furniture also implicitly participate in this discourse of otherness. Both Thevet 
and Ury employ the Amerindian words for the objects they are seeking to describe; Thevet 
using the cannibalistic Mortugabes, Lery the Tupi Caou-in. Never absorbed or accepted by 
the European text (the Amerindian words remain what les sauvages appellent leur breuvage' 
in Lery; what 'ils appellent en leur langue Mortugabes' in Thevet) the Indian terms signal the 
decisive difference the writers perceive between the two worlds. In the same way as the 
exotic language used of the flora and fauna in such accounts, the Amerindian names are here 
employed as tools of defamiliarization. 42 
Once again, however, this difference is effaced or controlled once it has been evoked. The 
crudest form of this linguistic colonization is exemplified in the diary of Christopher 
Columbus: 
To the first island which I found I gave the name 'San Salvador', in 
remembrance of the Divine Majesty, Who had marvellously bestowed all this; 
the Indians call it 'Guanahani'. To the second, I gave the name the island of 
'Santa Maria de Concepcion', to the third, 'Fernandina', to the fourth, 
'Isabella', to the fifth island, 'Juana', and so each received from me a new 
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name. 
41 Thevet, Les SingularWs, p. 84; Ury, HI'stoire. p. 125. 
42 For exotic accounts of Amerindian animals, see for example Ury's chapters 'Des animaux, 
venaisons, gros lezards, serpens, et autres bestes monstrueuses de I'Amerique' and 'De la variet6 des 
ON'SCMIx de I'Amerique, tous differens des nostres: ensemble des grosses chauvessouris, abeilles, 
mousches, mouschillons. et autres vermines estranges de ce pays-la'. See also Columbus's descriptions 
of the fish and trees at footnote 30 above. 
43 , Letter', 15 February 1493. Journal, pp. 191-201 (p. 191). 
50 
The names which the Indians had given their islands are erased and replaced in the extract 
here by others, which represent the religious and regal authorities of the colonizer's land. 
There is no negotiation between the two; no attempt to accommodate or translate the Indian 
name. There is not even the appropriation seen with the captive or the prophetic tradition; 
where otherness is assimilated to self. Instead, there is a simple substitution: the Indian name 
is eliminated entirely, and a European alternative established in its place. The other is 
literally converted to the terms of the self. 
In Lery, a more complex process takes place. At one level, the other remains irreducibly 
different from the text in which it stands: throughout his account, Ury continues to use the 
Amerindian words for the food, drink, plants and animals he describes. The two types of root 
which the Indians eat are 'aypi' and 'maniot'; the fire they cook on, 'boucan'; the most 
common herbs and plants, 'ananas', 'panacons' and 'petun'. At the same time, however, the 
status of these words shifts over the course of the text. In the chapter on Tupi food and drink, 
for example, 'Caou-in', which is initially what 'Ies sauvages appellent [leur] bruvage' 
becomes first 'ce Caou-in' (p. 126), and finally simply 'vingt pots de Caou-in' (p. 129). As it 
becomes increasingly fan-ffliar -- both as a word with obvious European equivalents, and as a 
term understood by the European reader -- it is integrated, if not absorbed, into the European 
account; its otherness controlled, and to some extent effaced. 
The combination of equivalence and difference which thus comes to characterize the other in 
this instance might be understood as a response to the paradox of difference in one of two 
ways. It might firstly be seen to reproduce at a linguistic level the difference-in-sameness 
modelled by the Montaignean account of the false prophet, and to consist in a residual, 
surface difference diffused and controlled through the notion of equivalence by which it is 
Linderw ri tten. However, I would argue instead that there is a tension in Ury's text between 
the sameness and difference it attributes to the Amerindian term; that the impulse to 
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integration confronts, rather than diffusing, the unequivocal alterity of the italicized foreign 
term. As such, it holds in dynamic tension the impulses to evoke and eliminate difference 
described in Greenblatt's account. Flickering between the two, it maps out the double 
movement of invention and control through the constant mutual displacement of sameness 
and difference. 
These tensions become clearer when Lery's practice is compared with that of Montaigne: 
[A] Leurs bastimens sont fort longs, et capables de deux ou trois cents ames, 
estoffez d'escorse de grands arbres, tenans a terre par un bout et se soustenans 
et appuyans l'un contre I'autre par le feste, a la mode d'aucunes de noz 
granges. [ ... ] Leurs lits sont d'un tissu de coton, suspenduz contre le toict, 
comme ceux de nos navires. [ ... I Ils ne boyvent pas lors, comme Suidas dict de quelques autres peuples d'Orient, qui beuvoient hors du manger; ils 
boivent a plusieurs fois sur jour, et d'autant. Leur breuvage est faict de 
quelque racine, et est de la couleur de nos vins clairets. [ ... ] Au lieu du pain, ils usent d'une certaine matiere blanche, comme du coriandre confit. (p. 205) 
The repeated 'de nos', used to link the elements in each of the comparisons above, implies, as 
in Ury, an equivalence between us and them, ours and theirs. Their buildings, beds and 
drinks are fundamentally the same as those which are familiar to the self. However, unlike 
Thevet and Ury, Montaigne refrains from using Amerindian words throughout. He does not 
assign the objects he describes any kind of name at all: instead, he describes a cannibalistic 
object in European terms, and then supervises it further through comparison with the closest 
European equivalent. Where in Lery, sameness is set in tension with categorical difference, 
Montaigne constructs a relation based upon similarity. 
However, a distinction is still preserved between self and other in Montaigne. Unlike those 
New World travellers described by Tuttle, for whom 'similarities in function, in behaviour or 
even in odour or flavour could [ ... I provide sufficient bases for association or shift', and who 
absorb American species of plant and animal, and varieties of foodstuffs into pre-existent 
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European categories, 44Montaigne is careful not to collapse self and other together, and to 
make provision for the retention of otherness. When he says that cannibalistic buildings are 
'estoffez d'escorce de grands arbres, tenans a terre par un bout et se soustenans et appuyans 
l'un contre I'autre par le feste a la mode d'aucunes de noz granges', or that leurs lits sont 
d'un tissu de coton, suspenduz contre le toict, comme ceux de nos navires', he offers 
comparisons between the two: in each case the New World is like the old. Each has a 
separate textual space (where in Ury's Histoire the European equivalent stands (invisibly) 
behind, rather than alongside, the New World clesignaturn), and the two are never allowed to 
merge into one. 
The relationship between the similarity and difference attributed to the New World other is 
thus significantly different in Lery and Montaigne. Where in Ury, categorical difference and 
equivalence stand in continual tension, in Montaigne, difference is allowed to emerge only in 
a much more limited way; within, and strictly controlled by, a larger framework of 
integration. As with the custom of killing false prophets, otherness is not controlled, but 
erased; its relation with the self not a dynamic opposition, but a stable integration which 
grounds and reinforces the identity of the self. 
Montaigne and the Golden Age 
I wish finally to look at a very famous passage from the early part of 'Des cannibales', which 
has been used to place Montaigne within the tradition of inventing and erasing difference 
from which I am seeking to differentiate his practice: 
44 Edward F. Tuttle, 'Borrowing Versus Semantic Shift: New World Nomenclature in European 
Lang Li es', in First Images of America. - The Impact of the New World on the Old, ed. by Fredi Z'ý C11 
Chiapelli, 2 vols (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976), 11, pp. 595-611 (p. 598). This 
process of 'extension' is also described by Anthony Pagden, who relates how New World explorers 
tended, in the first instance, 'to describe things which looked alike as if they were, in fact, identical. For 
men like Gonzalo Ferndndez de Oviedo, chief overseer of the mines of Hispaniola and author of the 
earliest natural history of America, pumas were lions, jaguars tigers and so on' (italics in original). The 
Fall of Natural Man: The, 4inerican Indian and the Origins of Comparative Ethnology (Cambridge: C. 
U. P., 1982), p. II- 
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[A] 11 me semble que ce que nous voyons par experience en ces nations IA, 
surpasse non seulement toutes les peintures dequoy la poiýsie a embelly I'age 
dore et toutes ses inventions a feindre une heureuse condition d'hommes, 
mais encore la conception et le desir mesme de la philosophie. Ils n'ont peu 
imaginer une nayfvete si pure et simple, comme nous la voyons par 
experience; ny Wont peu croire que nostre societe se peut maintenir avec si 
peu d'artifice et de soudeure humaine. Cest une nation, diroy je a Platon, en 
laquelle il n'y a aucune espece de trafique; nul cognoissance de lettres; nulle 
science de nombres; nul nom de magistrat, ny de superiorit6 politique; nul 
usage de service, de richesse ou de pauvret6; nuls contrats; nulles successions; 
nuls partages; nulles occupations qu'oysives; nul respect de parent6 que 
commun; nuls vestemens; nulle agriculture; nul metal; nul usage de vin ou de 
bled. Les paroles mesmes qui signifient la mensonge, la trahison, la 
dissimulation, I'avarice, Fenvie, la detraction, le pardon, inouies. Combien 
trouveroit il la republique qu'il a imaginee esloignee de cette perfection: [C] 
viri a this recentes. 
[B] Hos natura modos primum dedit. (p. 204) 
This passage is described by Paul Brown in terms of 'a "negative formula", in which the 
alien 'is afforded no positive terms' but 'merely displays the absence of those qualities that 
constitute civility, for example, no law, no goverriment, no marriage, no social hierarchy, no 
visible mode of production, no permanent settlement'. Discussing Shakespeare's The 
Tenipest, he suggests that 'Gonzalo's description of his imagined island kingdom in 11.1, 
culled from Montaigne, rehearses the standard formula by which the colonized is denigrated'. 
He argues that the 'typical orientation of the other around the negative formula [ ... ] is the 
production of a tabula rasa. [ ... ] Here the other is an empty space to be inscribed at will by 
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the desire of the colonizer' . 
This interpretation clearly reinvokes the pattern identified by Greenblatt. Characterized by 
the 'absence of those qualities which constitute civility', the cannibal is cast as negative 
other- the nature he represents is set against a cultured European norm; his absence against a 
positive, developed European presence. Both are thus perceived as 'denigrating' terms. A 
similar interpretation of Montaigne's intention in this passage is offered by Quint, who sees 
45 ... This Thing of Darkness I Acknowledge Mine": The Tempest and the Discourse of Colonialism', 
Political Shakespeare: Essays in Cultural Materialism, ed. by Jonathan Dollimore and Alan Sinfield 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1985) pp. 48-71 (p. 56). 
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the 'chain of privatives' built up as the description proceeds as a sign of ignorance and 
backwardness rather than of virtue: 'what the cannibal lacks, above all, is the self- 
consciousness and self-division of the European. [ ... ] The cannibal cannot tell a 
lie, not 
knowing what one is, or betray, or dissemble' . 
4' Quint's account, depicting the cannibal as an 
unformed and essentially identity-less creature, also points towards the tabula rasa produced 
by the negative formula; an argument which begins to look beyond the invention of the 
cannibalistic other, and to suggest instead his erasure. There is a sense in which cannibalistic 
otherness is erased even as it is identified in Brown's interpretation. Evoked as an absence or 
lack, it is paradoxically written out, even at the moment, and in the process, of being written 
into Montaigne's account. And as a blank page, or 'empty space', the cannibal is also 
vulnerable to the inscription and colonization which will transform him from negative other 
into a version of self. 
As in the examples from Thevet and Greenblatt, therefore, the paradox of difference is 
tackled by Montaigne, according to Brown's account, by the invention and appropriation of 
the cannibalistic other. Its otherness is constructed as the antithesis of self, before the familiar 
process of annexation eliminates difference entirely. This is in many ways a persuasive 
interpretation; locating the essay within a recognizable tradition. However, there are a 
number of ways in which it is also problematic. The reading of the 'negative formula' it 
provides does not sit easily either with the immediate context of the essay, nor with the spirit 
of the classical tradition from which it has been borrowed, and its insistence upon the 
otherness of the cannibals might also be called into question. A closer examination of these 
two issues begins to suggest that Montaigne adopts a different approach to the difficulties 
posed by the cultural otherness of the cannibals in the passage; an approach which returns us 
to the strategies he employed in his encounter with New World prophecy. 
46 Quint, p. 75. 
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The 'negative formula' Montaigne uses in this passage draws upon a tradition which reaches 
back to Ovid. At the start of his Metamorphoses, Ovid describes the four ages which 
followed the creation of the earth; the first of which, the golden age: 
unconstrained 
With heart and soul, obedient to no law, 
Gave honour to good faith and trighteousness. 
No punishment they knew, no fear; they read 
No penalties engraved on plates of bronze; 
No suppliant throng with dread beheld their judge; 
No judges had they then, but lived secure. [ ... ] 
Earth willingly, untouched, unwounded yet 
By hoe or plough, gave all her bounteous store; 
Men were content with nature's food unforced, 
And gathered strawberries on the mountainside 
And cherries and the clutching bramble's fruit, 
And acorns fallen from Jove's spreading tree. 47 
Ovid employs the negative formula not to describe a wild and primitive generation, 
characterized by privation, but rather to evoke an ideal, prelapsarian era in which the 
structures envisaged by Brown as the condition of civilization are not yet required: 'sine 
lege', everyone does what is right; 'sponte sua', the earth provides 'omnia tellus'. Rather than 
lawlessness, Ovid depicts natural virtue; instead of an uncultivated earth, he describes its 
natural plentitude. 48 The absence which Brown detects in Montaigne's description of the 
cannibals is here replaced by fullness: for Ovid it is the silver age, in which men are forced to 
till an unflourishing earth, which will symbolize lack and deprivation. If the golden age 
represents otherness at all, it is the not-here and not-now of utopia; the perfection of which is 
negatively rendered to amplify the baseness -- the positive evil -- of the present. With the 
arrival of the iron age, 'all evil straight broke out, /And honour fled and truth and loyalty, 
/Replaced by fraud, deceit and treachery/ And violence and wicked greed for gain. ý49 
47 Ovid, Meta n io rph oses, trans. by A. D. Melville (Oxford: 0. U. P., 1986), 1.88-94,102-07; pp. 3-4. 
48 The same theme is taken up by other writers to whorn Montaigne refers. Seneca recounts how the soil 
was 'more productive v,, hen untilled, and quotes Virgil's Georgics, which describe how the 'earth more 
freely gave/ Her riches to her sons who sought them not'. Epistulae morales, II, XC, pp. 398-431 (pp. 
423,425). 
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In its original context, therefore, the negative formula did not imply absence or lack, nor did 
it signify a primitive savagery. Rather it evoked an ideal, envisaging a world without the 
deprivations and corruptions which characterize the writer's own. This does not, of course, 
automatically mean that when the formula is reinvoked by later writers, its terms will retain 
the same significance. Many Renaissance writers do choose to redeploy it in the way 
suggested by Brown; transfom-iing the ideal/conrupt dichotomy established in their source 
into a savage/civility antithesis which is used to denigrate the natural condition of the 
Indians. Columbus, for example, during his first voyage to America, reflects that the Indians 
he encounters are 'very deficient in everything'; 'it appeared to me that they had no creed', 
and existed 'without arms and without laws' . 
50 Thysiquement nus, [ils] sont aussi, [a ses] 
yeux, depouillýs de toute propriäý culturelle: ils se caract6risent, en quelque sorte, par 
I'absence de couturnes, rites, religion. 951 
However, the evidence of the passage from 'Des cannibales' suggests that Montaigne intends 
to uphold, not subvert, the provisions made by the Ovidian convention. The iron/gold 
dichotomy is still in some sense transposed, but where Columbus transforms natural 
plenitude into primitive lack, Montaigne redeploys the concept of 'naturalness' as the 
antithesis of art in its negative sense of artifice: the cannibals are 'pure' and 'simple', living 
without 'artifice' and 'soudeure humaine'. Nature is thus reassigned its positive resonance, 
while the structures of civilization, so grandly conceived elsewhere, are reduced to 
unnecessary trappings: '[A] Ce n'est pas raison que Fart gaigne le point d'honneur sur nostre 
grande et puissante mere nature. Nous avons tant recharg6 la beaute et richesse de ses 
ouvrages par nos inventions, que nous I'avons du tout estouff6e' (p. 203). 
49 Metainoi-phoses, 1.129-32; p. 5. 
. so Journal, II October 1492, pp. 23-24,4 November 1492, p. 52. 
51 Tzvetan Todorov, La Conquete de VAinerique: la question de Vautre (Paris: tditions de Seull, 
1982), P. 41. 
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The text finally fails to support, therefore, a reading which envisages the evocation of a 
cannibalistic other devoid of cultural belongings; the very absence of which both authorizes 
and enables its ultimate inscription with the properties of self. Montaigne's cannibals emerge 
not as shadows or outlines, characterized by deficiency or want, but as exemplars of a social 
ideal, untarnished by the corruption, and unsmothered by the inventions, of their European 
counterparts. The paradox of difference is not approached in this case by the invention and 
close supervision, and eventual dissolution, of otherness, therefore: in possession of their 
own identity, the cannibals are not available for the colonization envisaged by Brown. 
It remains to consider what strategies are employed instead, and at this point it becomes 
relevant to consider how, and to what extent, the cannibals are finally different from the 
European self in Montaigne's account. In one sense, they are absolutely and incontestably 
other to the corruptions and pretensions of Europe in the passage which compares them to the 
Age of Gold. Following Ovid, Montaigne proceeds by a series of antitheses; which admit no 
similarities and articulate absolute difference . 
52 The use of the utopian mode itself also sets 
the imagined other at a considerable distance: although Virgil enshrined the hope that the 
Golden Age might one day return, it is conventionally set in the historical past, and its ideals 
envisage an irrecoverable innocence and perfection. Montaigne retrieves these ideals from 
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the mythical past in assigning them to the cannibals, but they remain in his account beyond 
the grasp of the 'civilized' European. The cannibals are able to represent golden age 
perfection JA] pour avoir receu fort peu de faqon de Fesprit humain', and remain 'fort 
iI 
.- As Abecassis puts it, '[Ll'inversion en s6rie est une figure structurale de tout r6cit utopique dont la 
lecture intuitive est fort simple: les autres sont litt6ralement nos antipodes dans le sens oEi ils refl6tent A 
1'envers ce que nous sommes. ' 'UalteritC, p. 203. 
. 53 For a discussion of the ways in which a comparison between the New World and the Golden Age 
may be used to bring utopia to the here and now, see Stelio Cro: 'In the classical tradition the golden 
ýige is conceived as unreachable and far away in a distant past. To that golden past, the classical author 
often compares the present time, and refers to it as the "iron age", an age of decadence. ( ... 
] Peter 
Martyr, instead, presents classical antiquity for the first time as a bookish mirage, compared with the 
real experience of the Spaniards in the New World. [ ... ] The myth of the golden age appears here in 
perspective from present to future. ' The Noble Savage: Allegory of Freedom (Waterloo, Ont.: Wilfred 
Laurier University Press, 1990), pp. -1-1, -14. 
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voisines de leur naifvet6 originelle' (p. 204): they have never been corrupted by a 
4cognoissance de lettres' or a 'science de nombres'. For nations which have pursued such 
knowledges, there is no way of turning back: science cannot be undiscovered, or literacy 
unleamt. 
Both through the oppositions by which it proceeds, therefore, and the golden age topos it 
appropriates, the passage establishes a decisive difference between the cannibals and the 
nations which have discovered them. However, the passage also moves beyond this binary 
opposition. In any utopian vision, whether set in the future or the past, whether achievable or 
irrecoverable, there is a degree of investment by the self which constructs it, an imaginative 
or emotional identification with the ideals which it represents. This is clearly the case in the 
passage from Montaigne; where the ideal New World he invents is characterized by a number 
of beliefs to which the Essais as a whole demonstrate his own commitment. The way in 
which he adapts the account provided by Ovid is particularly telling: replacing the 
plenitude/privation and innocence/corruption antitheses with an opposition between nature 
and artifice, he is able to present a society without 'la mensonge, la trahison [et] la 
dissimulation' -- against which he continually rails in the Essais -- and which lives, without 
trying, 'I'humaine vie'. The codes to which they conform, therefore, and which Europe is 
implicitly seen to deviate from, are those of Europe itself. Beneath the oppositions, there is 
only one interpretation of how one should behave. The cannibals conform to this set of 
ethics, which Europe accepts, but in practice fails to uphold. Beneath the sense of antithesis 
which is insistently asserted on the surface, there is a single set of moral imperatives and 
commitments. As in the instances above, Montaigne produces an integrated reality in which 
self and other combine to form a coherent whole reflecting the values of the self. Once again 
too, the paradox of difference is satisfied by the retention of a residual difference; not this 
time the surface difference which emerges in the passage about the prophet, but through the 
incomplete adherence of the self to the beliefs and commitments it professes. 
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I wish finally to think for a moment about a feature of the Montaignean resolution of the 
paradox of difference that I have so far left to one side. I have suggested that Montaigne 
produces a less problematic, more integrated relation between self and world than the writers 
he draws upon, and others who were writing in his moment. This does not, however, alter the 
fact that the bond established between other and self is finally a fabrication. As in Greenblatt, 
Lery or Thevet, the otherness which is encountered in Montaigne is constructed by, and for 
the purposes of, the self. Curiously, this is something which the essay itself, apparently 
unconsciously, makes manifest. In its final paragraphs, Montaigne describes the interview he 
is able to secure with one of three cannibals visiting France: 
[A] Je parlay a l'un d'eux fort long temps; mais j'avois un truchement qui me 
suyvoit si mal et qui estoit si empesche a recevoir mes imaginations par sa 
bestise, que je Wen peus tirer guiere de plaisir. Sur ce que je luy demanday 
quel fruict il recevoit de la superiorit6 qu'il avoit parmy les siens (car c'estoit 
un Capitaine, et nos matelots le nommoient Roy), il me dict que c'estoit 
marcher le premier a la guerre; [ ... I si, 
hors la guerre, toute son authorit6 estoit 
expir6e, il dict qu'il luy en restoit cela que, quand il visitoit les villages qui 
dependoient de luy, on luy dressoit des sentiers au travers des hayes de leurs 
bois, par oU' il peut passer bien a I'aise. 
Tout cela ne va pas trop mal: mais quoy, ils ne portent point de haut de 
chausses! (p. 213) 
On the surface, this is not a problematic passage. The privileged position of the cannibal is 
carefully translated into European terms -- 'Capitaine', 'Roy' -- and described in terms of 
honour and nobility with which the European can identify. The picture which emerges of the 
cannibals here, as throughout the essay, is of people similar to, not radically different from, 
the wilting self. The final sentence of the essay ironically dismisses those who cannot look 
beneath the surface, the absence of trousers, and see that these 'savages' are actually as 
civilized as themselves. However, on this occasion, the appropriations which have taken 
place finally make themselves clear. At the beginning of the extract, Montaigne describes his 
difficulty in communicating with the native: je n'en peus tirer guiere de plaisir'. This 
difficulty is attributed to la bestise' of 'un truchement qui me suyvoit mal et qui estoit 
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empesch6 ý recevoir mes imaginations'. However, it might alternatively be taken to indicate 
the disjunctive relation in which self and other stand when the difference of the other has not 
been excluded by prior assimilation. Placed in direct contact with a native; or rather in a 
situation where the distance between himself and that native is mediated only by an 
interpreter -- who must bear meanings in both directions -- the communication breaks down. 
While the strategy of constructing an otherness which resembles the self secures a very stable 
fiction of reality, it is vulnerable to the intrusion of otherness itself: when monologic 
imagination gives way to dialogic exchange, the smooth surface texture of similarity is 
disrupted by the incoherence and discontinuity of incomprehension and otherness. 
For the most part, however, the constructions and manipulations which take place in 'Des 
cannibales' are silently performed by the self. Where the other in Greenblatt or Thevet, 
alternately represented as (exotic or deviant) 'other' and (assimilated) 'self', bears the traces 
of its colonization, the cultural other of 'Des cannibales' displays no signs of the 
transformation which has taken place. Interpreted from the start as another form of self, it 
undergoes no change, and therefore does not signal the assimilative pressures to which it has 
been subject. This is important in the context of the Montaignean agenda. Thevet understands 
the conversions he anticipates in terms of amelioration. It does not matter, therefore; indeed, 
it is good and right, that these transformations should be made known. In Montaigne, by 
contrast, where the self seeks to reinforce its own position by interpreting the other as another 
form of self, it is essential that the manipulations it performs are not allowed to emerge. The 
irruption of difference in the final paragraphs of the essay, undermining and exposing the 
appropriations which have taken place, thus becomes a sign of both the distinctive integrative 
vision of 'Des cannibales', and the methods through which it is pursued. In place of the 
unstable cycle of demonization, and conversion envisaged by Greenblatt and Thevet, 
Montaigne constructs, or 'discovers', what I have chosen to call a 'community of belief'; a 
community in which the self is able to participate, but within which it retains a distinct 
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identity and a specific set of coordinates. 
THE APOLOGIE DE RA YmoND SEBOND 
In the Apologie de Raymond Sebond, the relationship between man and God becomes the 
focus of attention. Like the dialectic between the European self and New World other in 'Des 
cannibales', it is marked by contradictions: while the divine other is fundamental to the 
realization, articulation and comprehension of human identity, it is also represented as a 
source of self-betrayal and loss. However, the cause of these tensions has now changed. 
Where in 'Des cannibales' it is the difference of the other which both threatens and enables 
the negotiation of the identity, in the Apologie, it is the close integration of the two which has 
both benefits and drawbacks for the self. The authoritative divine other is on the one hand a 
source of selfhood; on the other, however, He demands an obedience and a conformity which 
are felt to delimit and contradict it. This change in the self's relation to the other also 
generates significant shifts in the nature and form of the self's response. Where in 'Des 
cannibales', the subject seeks to overcome the alterity of the other, binding self and other 
together into a coherent and integrated order, the self in the Apologie seeks to loosen the ties 
it perceives between itself and God, reinterpreting the divine order in such a way that 
provision is made for its own self-fashioning. 
The relationship between man and God 
The extent to which human subjectivity is conceived in relation to God in the Apologie 
becomes clear in comparison with a passage from Pico's De hominis dignitate (1486): 
[God] took man as a creature of indeterminate nature and [ ... I addressed him 
thus: 'Neither a fixed abode nor a form that is thine alone nor any function 
peculiar to thyself have we given thee, Adam, to the end that according to thy 
longing and according to thy judgement thou mayest have and possess what 
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abode, what form, and what function thou thyself shalt desire. The nature of 
all other beings is limited and constrained within the bounds of laws 
prescribed by Us. Thou, constrained by no limits, in accordance with thine 
own free will, in whose hand We have placed thee, shalt ordain for thyself the 
limits of thy nature. 51 
[A] Nos raisons et nos discours humains, c'est comme la matiere lourde et 
sterile: la grace de Dieu en est la forme; c'est elle qui y donne la faqon et le 
pris. Tout ainsi que les actions vertueuses de Socrates et de Caton derneurent 
vaines et inutiles pour Wavoir eu leur fin et Wavoir regard6 I'amour et 
obeissance du vray createur de toutes choses, et pour avoir ignore Dieu: ainsin 
est-il de nos imaginations et discours; ils ont quelque corps, mais c'est une 
masse informe, sans faqon et sans jour, si la foy et grace de Dieu n'y sont 
joinctes. (H: 12; pp. 424-25) 
Where Pico grants man complete autonomy from God, Montaigne makes human subjectivity 
crucially dependent upon the divine. Pico establishes no fixed end or aim for man; 
interpreting freedom from such goals as a fundamental condition of man's dignity. 
Montaigne, by contrast, allows a single human goal: as the 'createur de toutes choses', God 
should also be the 'fin': human existence is invested with purpose and meaning through 
being directed towards God. And where Pico allows man to negotiate his own subjectivity, 
and to live according to his own judgement, desire and will, Montaigne perceives God as a 
crucial point of reference in the organization of human conduct. Human action is to be a 
response to God, performed in 'obe*fssance' to him, and motivated by Tamour'. Actions 
performed without reference to Him -- even 'Ies actions vertueuses de Socrates et de Caton' - 
have no validity or value. The independence and authority assigned to man by Pico are 
revoked by Montaigne, who resituates subjectivity with a spiritual and relational framework. 
The influence of God upon man in the Apologie extract here also goes deeper than this: to the 
extent that human action is performed out of love for God, it is also motivated by Him. At 
this point, the boundary between self and other begins to break down. The subject not only 
t'ashions himself in relation to God, but is also fashioned by God: the inner prompting to 
54 Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, De hominis dignitate (1486), trans. by Elizabeth Livermore Forbes, 
in The Renaissance Philosophy of Man, ed. by Ernst Cassirer, Paul Oskar Kristeller and John Herman 
Randall, Jr (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948), pp. 223-54 (pp. 224-25). 4-1 r-I 
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which the self responds is itself inspired by the divine. The same sense that God shapes the 
subject from within as well as without is less ambiguously expressed in those parts of the 
extract above which examine human thought and discourse. God is immediately recognized 
as a collaborator with man: the subject can provide the basic material, but this 'matiere 
55 lourde et sterile' requires 'la grace de Dieu' to give it any clarity or form. God is thus 
intrinsic to the process of knowing, and intemal. to the knower: He does not make the world 
available for knowledge; rather, He is 'the basic support and underlying principle of our 
knowing activity. ' It is He who 'powers the eye which sees'. So the light of God is not just 
'out there illuminating the order of being; [ ... ] it is also an inner light. 
56 God's grace is 
constitutive in the formation of human thought. 
God is thus seen to shape the subject both from the outside (as an organizing principle), and 
from within (as a motivating force or inspiration). These two operations, in their turn, confer 
a significance and value upon the thoughts and actions they help to produce. Underwriting 
virtuous actions, God retrieves a value and a purpose for acts which would otherwise be 
'vaines' and 'inutiles', and as the inspiration of, and a collaborator in, human discourse, He 
again grants la faqon et le pris'. 
Human subjectivity also depends upon the divine in other ways in the Apologie. The 
following text responds to those who have suggested that Sebond's arguments are weak: 
[A] 11 leur semble qu'on leur donne beau jeu de les mettre en libert6 de 
combatre nostre religion par les armes pures humaines, laquelle ils 
n'oseroyent ataquer en sa majest6 pleine d'authorit6 et de commandement. Le 
moyen que je prens pour rebatre cette frenaisie et qui me semble le plus 
55 This also bears comparison with Pico: whereas Montaigne speaks of 'matiere lourde et sterile', Pico 
speaks of fertile seeds which no longer require external, divine cultivation in order to bear fruit: 'On t-- 
man when he came into life the Father conferred the seeds of all kinds and the germs of every way of 
lifc. Whatever seeds each man cultivates will grow to maturity and bear their own fruit. ' De hoinin' Is 
dignitate, p. 225. 
5" Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self. - The Making of the Modern Identity (Cambridge: C. U. P., 1989), 
P. I -, (). 
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propre, clest de froisser et fouler aux pieds I'orgueil et humaine fierte; leur 
faire sentir Pinanite, la vanite et deneantise de I'homme; leur arracher des 
points les chetives armes de leur raison; leur faire baisser la teste et mordre la 
terre soubs I'authorit6 et reverance de la majeste divine. C'est a elle seule 
qu'apartient la science et la sapience; elle seule qui peut estimer de soy 
quelque chose, et a qui nous desrobons ce que nous nous contons et ce que 
nous nous pfisons. (pp. 425-26) 
The divine is conceived in the extract here as a defining other for man. The littleness of 
humanity is made clear in relation to the magnificence of God: 'les armes pures humaines' 
are contrasted with the 'majeste pleine d'authorite et de commandement'; Tinanit6, la vanit6 
et deneantise de Fhornme' with Tauthorit6 et reverance de la majeste divine'. All that is true 
and right comes from God, and rightfully belongs to Him: 'ce que nous nous contons et ce 
que nous nous prisons' is 'desrob[6]' from Him. Elsewhere in the text, God as Creator is the 
author of a scheme which locates the self in an integrated framework, and provides him with 
a stable set of co-ordinates: JA] 11 West piece du monde qui desmante son facteur. Ce seroit 
faire tort a la bont6 divine, si Funivers ne consentoit a nostre creance. Le ciel, la terre, les 
elemans, nostre corps et nostre ame, toutes choses y conspirent; 11 West que de trouver le 
moyen de s'en servir. Elles nous instruisent, si nous sommes capables d'entendre. Car ce 
monde est un temple tressainct' (p. 424). 
The divine is thus crucial to human subjectivity in the Apologie; stabilizing, grounding and 
defining it, organizing and prompting it, and shaping it from within. However, there are also 
ways in which the human-divine relation is problematic in the text. The Montaignean 
position becomes clearer in the context of a passage from Calvin's commentary on 
Ephesians: 
Adam was at first created in the image of God, so that he might reflect, as in a 
mirror, the righteousness of God. But that image, having been wiped out by 
sin, must now be restored in Christ. The regeneration of the godly is indeed, 
as is said in 11 Corinthians 3.18, nothing else than the reformation of the 
image of God in them. But there is a far more rich and powerful grace of God 
in this second creation than in the first. Yet Scripture only considers that our 
highest perfection consists in our conformity and resemblance to God. Adam 
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lost the image which he had originally received, therefore it is necessary that 
it shall be restored to us by Christ. Therefore he teaches that the design in 
regeneration is to lead us back from error to that end for which we were 
created. 57 
An identity grounded in God constitutes for Calvin selfhood as it was created to be. The 
distorted identity inherited from Adam is replaced, through surrender to the grace available 
through Christ, by the image of God, in which consists 'our highest perfection'. This 
transformation is not experienced as an invasion of self: the vocabulary of 'reformation' and 
4regeneration' signals instead the realization of an identity formerly obscured. As Schw6bel, 
following Tillich, suggests, Christian new being, while in one sense 'creatively new, insofar 
as the true relationship between God and humanity is not a stage in the natural development 
of humanity', is also 'the reconstitution, the renewal of the relationship between God and 
humanity', and thefulfilment of that relationship, and of the self which embarks upon it 
(italics in original). 58 Despite the opposition of Adam and Christ, and the idea of a 'second 
creation' in the passage above, there is a powerful continuity between old self and new which 
guarantees the preservation of individual personhood, even in its conformation to the image 
of God. There is no lingering affection in Calvin, therefore, for the old self discarded in this 
process. As a deformed and degenerate version of self, it is a contradiction, not a part, of true 
identity, as Calvin makes clear in his Institutes: 'our very being is nothing else than 
subsistence in the one God'; 'As it was the spiritual life of Adam to remain united and bound 
to his Maker, so estrangement from him was the death of his Soul. ' 
59As Schwbbel puts it: 'In 
the Fall human beings have dislocated themselves in the order of created being. [ ... ] In trying 
to put themselves in the place of the creator they do not relate to their own relatedness in 
accordance with its created structure, but in contradiction to it. Therefore sin is not only self- 
57 Jean Calvin, The Epistles of Paul the Apostle to the Galatians, Ephesians, Philippians and 
Colossians (1548), trans. by T. H. L. Parker, ed. by David W. Torrance and Thomas F. Torrance 
(Edinburah: Oliver and Boyd, 1965), p. 191. Calvin is commenting on Ephesians 4.20-24. 1-1 58 Christoph Schwobel, 'Human Being as Relational Being: Twelve Theses for a Christian 
Anthropology', in Persons, Divine and Human: King's College Essa - vs 
in Theological Anthropology, 
ed. by Christoph Schw6bel and Colin E. Gunton (Edinburah: Clark, 1991), pp. 141-65; p. 148. 
. SQ Calvin, Institutes, 1, L 1, p. 35; 11.1, p. 246. 
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deception, but also self-contradiction insofar as by sinning human beings contradict their own 
destiny in the created order. ' 60 
This is an assessment with which other Renaissance theologians agree. Luther, in his 
interpretation of Romans 7.18, likewise discusses the restoration of created identity through 
the destruction of an old self which is at once continuous with the new and a radical 
contradiction of it: 'God in Christ restores man as created and cleanses corrupted man of his 
guilt immediately and of his weakness gradually. 6' However, it is different from the account 
of self-in-God provided by Montaigne: 
[A] [Le scepticismel presente Fhornme nud et vuide, recognoissant sa 
foiblesse naturelle, propre a recevoir d'en haut quelque force estrangere, 
desgarni d'hurnaine science, et d'autant plus apte a loger en soy la divine, 
aneantissant son jugement pour faire plus de place a la foy. [ ... ] [B] Cest une 
carte blanche prepar6e a prendre du doigt de Dieu telles formes qu'il luy 
plaira y graver. Plus nous nous renvoyons et commettons a Dieu, et renonqons 
a nous, mieux nous en valons. (pp. 486-87) 
A sense of loss is articulated in the passage here. The old self is shed: man is 'desgarni' of 
human learning, and 'aneantit' his intellect. In the context of earlier passages, which 
humiliate the pride of man, this loss is right and fitting. However, this cleconstruction of 
Renaissance Man does not lead to the restoration of a true, created identity. In place of the 
new self donned in the passage from Calvin, Montaigne depicts 'une carte blanche', a space, 
or non-self, which God may then engrave as He pleases. The self is evacuated for God rather 
than realized through Him, and there is something disturbing about the image of the 'carte 
blanche', employed in 'Des cannibales' to describe foreign peoples ripe for colonization. 62 
The following sentence, too, follows a similar pattern: 'plus nous nous renvoyons et 
commettons a Dieu, et renonqons 'a nous, mieux nous en valons'. We are called to reject 
'0 SchwObel, P. 149. 
61 Litther's lVorks, XXV, Lectures on Romans. - Glosses and Schol'a (1515-16), trans. by Walter G. 
Tillmanns and Jacob A. 0. Preus, ed. by Hilton C. Oswald (Saint Louis: Concordia, 1972), p. 63. 
02 See p. 54 above. 
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ourselves, but no new identity lies waiting in the wings. We become worth more by allowing 
God to take over what we once identified as self, rather than by allowing Him to renew and 
perfect that fallen and corrupted subjectivity. The same sense of loss is expressed once more 
a little later in the Apologie. Responding to the notion that Man might approach God, 
Montaigne argues that '[A] si, pour nous rendre capables [de concevoir la grandeur des 
divines promesses], on reforme et rechange nostre estre (comme tu dis, Platon, par tes 
purifications), ce doit estre d'un si extreme changement et si universel que, par la doctrine 
physique, ce ne sera plus nous' (p. 499). God reforms us to the point where our former self 
no longer exists. 
Elsewhere in the Apologie, the shaping hand of God is apparently experienced as an 
interference in identity. In the passage which speaks of '[A] le neud qui devroit attacher 
nostre j ugement et nostre volont6, qui devroit estreindre nostre ame et j oindre a nostre 
createur' (p. 424), for example, the terminology is crucially ambiguous. 'Neud' may be used 
of a close and welcome bond, but it may also describe an unwanted tie ; 63 'estreindre' can 
mean to embrace, but it can also mean to clutch or grip. There is a sense of restriction lurking 
beneath the surface here; as there is also in the passage which complains about the premisses 
foisted upon us by other systems of belief or frames of reference: '[A] chasque science a ses 
principes presupposez par oU' le jugement humain est brid6 de toutes parts' (p. 522). 
Adherence to the command and guidance of God, the text implies, can lead to the 
circumscription and delimitation of identity, rather than to its realization. The vocabulary of 
otherness used of God in the Apologie also makes His authority over human identity 
problematic. When the text speaks of God's grace as '[A] la liberalit6 d'autruy' (p. 479), for 
example, or of man's need to receive his faith 'par authorit6 et par commandement estranger' 
(pp. 479-80), it expresses a sense that God is not only categorically different from the self, 
63 See, for example, 'De la vamtC: 'Le neud qui me tient par la loy d'honnestet6 me semble bien plus 
pressant et plus poisant que West celuy de la contrainte civile. On me ra-arrote plus doucement par un 
notaire que par moy' (111: 9; p. 944). 
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but radically alien to it. Lurking behind all this is the sense that self-contradiction exists not 
as it does for Calvin, in existence apart from God, but instead in submission to Him. 
There are, of course, occasions when Calvin does acknowledge a sense of self-contradiction 
in his Christian selfhood. Commenting in 1540 on Romans 7.15 (Tor I know not that which 
I do. For what I would, that I do not, but what I would not, that do I'), he discusses the 
fundamental self-division of every man living under grace: 
Among the godly, [ ... I the regeneration of God has been begun. They are so divided, however, that although they aspire to God with the special desire of 
their hearts, seek heavenly righteousness, and hate sin, they are drawn back 
again to the earth by the remnants of their flesh. Accordingly, in this state of 
distraction, they fight against their own nature and feel their own nature 
fighting against them. They condemn their sins, not only because they are 
compelled by the judgment of reason, but because they abhor them with 
genuine feeling of the heart and detest their conduct in committing sin. This is 
the Christian warfare between flesh and spirit, of which Paul speaks in Gal. 5. 
17. 
It has, therefore, been well said that the carnal man plunges into sin with the 
consent of his whole soul, but that a division at once begins as soon as he is 
called by the Lord and renewed by the Spirit. 64 
The conflict identified here between fleshly nature and spiritual desire clearly leads to a 
sense of self-division. However, there are decisive differences between this self-contradiction 
and the self-betrayal described in Montaigne. Where in Montaigne, being in God is 
inherently contradictory-selfhood must be relinquished if godliness is to be attained-it is 
only the remains of the old and sinful self which produce the tensions in Calvin's account: 
true and perfect selfhood, as the will has already identified, is to be found in God. Where 
Montaigne experiences divine refashioning in terms of contradiction, Calvin's Christian 
explicitly disowns that part of himself which sets itself in opposition to the reconstitution 
effected by the power of the Holy Spirit. Where in Montaigne the contradiction is 
fundamental and irresolvable, in Calvin it is not. Inevitable and perpetual in a fallen human 
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being, it is the temporary and partial division of a selfhOod seeking to surrender its falsehood, 
and to establish itself as it was created to be. 
In the Apologie, however, the relationship between self and other is characterized by 
significant tensions. As in 'Des cannibales', the self ultimately feels both dependent on, and 
threatened by, the other it depicts. The self is seen to depend upon the divine for the 
identification and expression of its subjectivity, yet at the same time, it feels itself threatened 
by it: the shaping hand of God is experienced in terms of constraint and self-loss. However, 
the paradox here is not quite the same as that in 'Des cannibales'. In the earlier essay it is the 
difference of otherness which causes difficulty, even while it also enables the definition and 
identification of selfhood. In the Apologie, by contrast, it is the close integration of divine 
and human realms that is perceived to be both problematic and beneficial at once. In this 
sense the Apologie is closer to 'De la vanite' than to 'Des cannibales'. However, the 
perceived threat to the self is far more radical in the Apologie than in 'De la vanit6'. In the 
latter, while the social whole demands that the self adhere to a specific set of codes, and 
while the self's responses to these codes may ultimately, as Starobinski suggests, lead to the 
internalization of a false self-image, the other never violates the boundaries of the subject. 65 
The Apologie, by contrast, shows the divine-as-other remodelling the self from within. And 
where in 'De la vanitC, the self suffers dissipation, dispersal or constraint, in the Apologie it 
is subject to erasure. The authority and influence of the divine are such that both the level of 
dependence, and the extent of the perceived threat, are raised to a higher power. 
The tensions here are also more complex than in the other essays I have discussed. There are 
now two problematic relations between other and self: God stands both within and without 
the boundaries of the subject, and in each case, the self feels both threatened by, and 
64Calvin, The Epistles of Paul the Apostle to the Romans and to the Thessalonians. trans. by Ross 
Mackenzie, ed. by David W. Torrance and Thomas F. Torrance (Edinburgh: Oliver and Boyd, 1960), p. 
149). 
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dependent upon Him. As an external other, the divine enables the definition, expression and 
organization of man's identity, but is also experienced as the 'neud' which constrains and 
delimits it. As an internal other, the divine is perceived both as an integral part of the 
subject's correct responsiveness to the world-the illumination and motivation which come 
from God are the source of right perception, understanding and behaviour-and as an 
interference which contradicts and empties out individual selfhood. 
There are complex sets of demands to be met, therefore, if the human-divine relation 
constructed by Montaigne is to be resolved. The divine must continue to inform the 
judgement and understanding of the self, without erasing or supplanting its interiority, and to 
contextualize and organize human identity and action, without placing limits upon them. The 
first step in the process through which these conditions are met is a reconception of the 
natural condition of man. 
The natural condition of man 
Most of the Renaissance writers who chose to write about the misery of the human condition 
believed that misery to consist in an original and inevitable sinfulness inherited from the Fall. 
This is clearly the case in Calvin's commentary on Ephesians above; a very similar account is 
also, perhaps surprisingly, provided by a number of humanist writers. Thus Poggio, in his De 
iniseria hunzantv conditionis libri (1455), describes a 'public law of the misery of life, fixed 
by nature in our senses, contracted from the guilt of the first parents. All our unhappiness 
hangs on this, from this the errors, vices, and crimes of men take their origin, from them the 
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inisery of this life is propagated'. Even Salutati, whose view of man is in general far more 
optimistic, speaks in 1371 of: 
65 See p. 30 above. 
66 Po,,, -, Io Bracciolini, De nuseria humana, - conditionis libri, in Opera oinnia, ed. by Riccardo Fubini, 4 ltý -- II 
vols (Torino: Bottega d'Erasmo, 1964) 1, pp. 88-131 (p. 89). Trans. by Charles Trinkaus, 'Itz Our 4-1 Image and Likeness'. - Humanity and Divinity if, Italian Humanist Thought, 2 vols (London: Constable, 
1970), 1, p. 260. 
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the road on which we wheel with the vehicle of our wills, which we alone are 
able to deflect towards evils, yet supported by divine grace we are also able to 
apply effectively for good. Place before your eyes, wretched man, the state of 
your miserable will whose freedom you glory in; see what is permitted to you 
by your will. What do I say, 'permitted'? The best things indeed are 
permitted. But see rather what you are able, indeed what you are not able. For 
you can, which is the highest impotence, only wish evil through your own 
power. Indeed by the transgression of the first parents all posterity is held to 
this penalty, that, although they were able by their own will not to sin, now 
we are completely unable not to sin, so that it is necessary to admit that 
whatever good we wish, if we wish to know rightly, we choose because God 
moves our WillS. 67 
Not every writer on human misery would agree that the will is as bound as Salutati supposes 
here. Almost all would subscribe, however, to his view of an inherently corrupt human 
nature, based on the evidence of Genesis and the Fall. That is why almost all, like Calvin, are 
happy to surrender to the direction of God, and to seek an identity in Him. For Salutati, the 
effective application of the human will for good can be achieved only with the 'support' of 
'divine grace'; for Poggio, only grace can lift man above nature. The true self-in whom the 
distortions produced by the Fall have been reversed-can be reclaimed by turning to God. 
However, such an account of man is largely abandoned by Montaigne. The Apologie de 
Rayniond Sebond presents both man's misery, and his natural condition, in an entirely 
different way. 
The misery of man is addressed at an early stage in the Apologie: 
[A] Qu'il me face entendre par 1'effort de son discours, sur quels fondemens il 
a basty ces grands avantages qu'il pense avoir sur les autres creatures. Qui luy 
a persuad6 que ce branle admirable de la voute celeste, la lumiere etemelle de 
ces flambeaux roulans si fierement sur sa teste, les mouvemens 
espouvantables de cette mer infinie, soyent establis et se continuent tant de 
siecles pour sa commodit6 et pour son service? Est-il possible de rien 
imaginer si ridicule que cette miserable et chetive creature, qui West pas 
seulement maistresse de soy, exposee aux offences de toutes choses, se die 
67 Coluccio Salutati, De seculo et i-eligione, ed. by B. L. Ullman (Florence: Olscki, 1957), 1: 33; p. 77; 
trans. hv Trinkaus, pp. 196-97. 
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maistresse et emperiere de Funivers, duquel il West pas en sa puissance de 
cognoistre la moindre partie, tant s'en faut de la commander? (p. 427) 
Human misery is here described through a series of counter-assertions to humanist arguments 
of the dignity of man. Where writers like Manetti, drawing on I Corinthians 3.21-22 (*All 
things are yours, whether [ ... ] the world or life or death'), believe that 'the world and all 
its 
beauties seems to have been first invented and established by Almighty God for the use of 
man', and that 'God, after He had created men, blessed them, [ ... ] and made them lords of all 
creation and kings and emperors of the earth', 68 Montaigne presents a version of humanity 
denied the grandeur and dignity it would assign itself; according to which the world is neither 
created for man, nor subject to him. Likewise reason, also employed by Manetti and others as 
the basis of man's superiority and dignity, even his quasi-divinity, 69 is taken from man by 
Montaigne. Man cannot know 'la moindre partie' of the world he presumes to control: '[A] 
de toutes les vanitez, la plus vaine c'est I'homme; [ ... I I'homme qui presume de son sqavoir, 
ne sqait pas encore que c'est que sqavoir' (p. 427). His misery consists in an 'inanit6', 
'vanit6' and 'deneantise'; his lack of all that he presumes to have and to be, and in this 
laughable presumption itself. 'O 
The humiliation of man provided in these terms is comprehensive and consistent in the 
Apologie. However, it is crucially different from the accounts of Poggio and Salutati. Where 
in their interpretation man is inherently evil, Montaigne conducts his enquiry with no 
ret-erence at all to notions of fallenness or sin. Man is not the dignified creature he imagines 
68 Giannozzo Manetti, De dignitate et excellentia hominis (1452-53), ed. by Elizabeth R. Leonard 
(Patavil: Antenoreis, 1975), 111, p. 78; 11, p. 45. Trans. by Trinkaus, pp. 238; 247.1 Corinthians 3.21- 
2-1 is taken from the NIV translation of the Bible. 
69 , God made man in his image and similitude, and He created a soul for him of such a quality that, L- 
endowed with reason and immortality, intelligence and memory and will, he might excel and dominate 
all other animals. ' Manetti, 11, p. 47; trans. by Trinkaus, p. 219. 
70 Pascal reverses this perception, suggesting that 'La grandeur de Yhomme est grande en ce qu'll se t--- L- 
connait mis6rable'. The Pensýes characterize man's wretchedness as a sign of his greatness: 'La 
grandeur de I'homme est si visible qu'elle se tire rnýme de sa mis6re. Car ce qui est nature aux animaux, 
iious I'appelons mis6re en I'homme. Par oý nous reconnaissons que, sa nature 6tant aujourd'hui pareille 
ii celle des animaux, il est d6chu d'une meilleure nature qui lui 6tait propre autrefols. Car qui se trou've 
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himself to be, but neither is he necessarily evil. As Pierre Statius, reflecting upon Tabsence 
dans les Essais de toute We de p6che, souillure ou peccabilite', suggests, 'il ya un abime 
entre l'hunüliation de l'homme telle qu'elle s'accomplit dans le chapitre 12 du livre H sous 
les auspices de Sextus et les discours religieux; [ ... ] I'homme West pas, aux yeux 
de 
Montaigne, une cr6ature in6vitablement malheureuse ici-bas, ontologiquernent imparfaite'. 71 
When the language of moral corruption is used in the Apologie, it is to describe man's search 
for knowledge-his attempts to rise above himself-rather than his natural condition. '2 
Against the 'Ataraxie' which is sought and cherished by Pyrrhonian sceptics, are set '[A] des 
agitations que nous recevons par Firnpression de l'opinion et science que nous pensons avoir 
des choses. D'oU' naissent la crainte, l'avarice, Fenvie, les desirs immoderez, l'ambition, 
Forgueil, la superstition, I'amour de nouvellet6, la rebellion, la desobeissance, l'opiniatret6 et 
la pluspart des maux corporels' (p. 483). 'Natural' man, by contrast, represented for 
Montaigne by those who are not seduced and corrupted by the acquisition of knowledge, is 
apparently inherently virtuous: JA] L'incivilite, Fignorance, la simplesse, la ruclesse 
s'accompaignent volontiers de l'innoncence; la curiosit6, la subtilit6, le sýavoir trainent la 
malice a leur suite; I'humilit6, la crainte, l'obeissance, la debormairete (qui sont les pieces 
principales pour la conservation de la societ6 humaine) demandent une ame vuide, docile et 
presumant peu de soy' (p. 477). The concept of innocence here, with its prelapsarian 
resonance, stands in sharp contrast to the flawed and sinful humanity evoked by Poggio and 
Salutati. 
This shift is clearly significant in terms of the paradoxes I have identified. Where Calvin, 
Salutati and Poggio turn to God, through whom alone they can be released from their sinful 
identity and restored to the selfhood for which they were created, in Montaigne there is a 
malheureux de n8tre pas roi, sinon un roi d6possýdd? [ ... 1 Qui se trouve malheureux de n'avoir qu'une boucheT Blaise Pascal, Pensýes (1670) (Paris: Mercure de France, 1976), pp. 81-83. 
71 Pierre Statius, Ta Relluion de Montaigne: essai d'interpretation', BSAM, 7th series, 33-34 (July- LI December 1993), 89-107 (p. 91). 
72 See my discussion below, pp. 90-9 1,100-01. 
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human identity to embrace. He continues to recognize the imperfection of man, and to 
provide a narrative of amelioration, but since the corruption he identifies is now subsequent 
rather than original, the agent of that change may be man himself. The locus of virtue now 
lies within, rather than without, the self, and the sense of invasion and loss which attended 
divine transformation may be overcome by replacing divine regeneration with human self- 
realignment in accordance with its natural, and naturally virtuous, state. 
However, such a transferral of agency is problematic in the Apologie's own terms. To resolve 
a sense of self-contradiction under the shaping hand of God by positing a subject which can 
realize itself apart from God cuts very much against the grain of a text which emphasizes the 
incapacity of man in his own strength, and rails against the irreverence and presumption of 
seeking to stand apart from God: JA] Considerons donq pour cette heure I'homme seul, sans 
secours estranger, arme seulement de ses armes, et despourvue de la grace et cognoissance 
divine, qui est tout son honneur, sa force et le fondement de son estre. Voyons combien il a 
de tenue en ce bel equipage' (p. 427). Man is also dependent upon God, as I have sought to 
demonstrate above, for the organization and expression of his identity, and while self- 
conformation to a fundamentally virtuous human nature does not altogether rule out divine 
illumination or guidance, the displacement of God which it supposes does problematize the 
notion that the divine might provide a context for human identity. However, I wish now to 
suggest that the perception of a basically virtuous humanity in the text is accompanied by a 
conception of God which, rather than disallowing human self-reference, transforms it into a 
properly humble and reverent activity. 
The hiddenness of God 
The Apologie repeatedly insists upon the mystery and inaccessibility of the divine: '[A] 11 
s'en faut tant que nos forces conqoivent la hauteur divine, que, des ouvrages de nostre 
ci, eateur, ceux-la portent rnieux sa marque et sont n-iieux siens, que nous entendons le moins 
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(p. 478); '[C] "Melius scitur deus nesciendo", dict S. Augustin' (p. 478); JA] comme dit 
Euripides, "Les wuvres de Dieu en diversesl FaVons nous donnent des traverses... (p. 490); 
'[A] De toutes les opinions humaines et anciennes touchant la religion, celle la me semble 
avoir eu plus de vraysemblance et plus d'excuse, qui reconnoissoit Dieu comme une 
puissance incomprehensible' (p. 493). The two levels-divine and human-are entirely and 
absolutely distinct. It is presumptuous and vain, therefore, to link them through speculation or 
enquiry: '[C] Platon estime qu'il y ayt quelque vice dimpiet6 a trop curieusement s'enquerir 
et de Dieu' (p. 479); '[B] C'est plus grande presomption, dict Plutarque, a ceux qui ne sont 
qu'hommes d'entreprendre de parler et discourir des dieux et des demy-dieux que ce n'est a 
un homme ignorant de musique, vouloir j uger de ceux qui chantent' (p. 50 1). 
If God is beyond man's legitimate reach, the reclamation of an identity in God becomes 
somewhat problematic. Once human and divine realms have been so decisively set apart, 
man's 'natural' condition and home appear to be worldly rather than heavenly, and reaching 
towards the divine, seen by Calvin as the way to reclaim one's true and perfect identity, is 
transformed into the unnaturalness of the learned overreacher, and contrasted with the limited 
human condition: 'Quel sacrilege, en effet, aux yeux de Montaigne, quel crime de lese- 
divinite, mais aussi quelle folie, quel crime contre l'homme r&l, dans sa v6ritý propre, dans 
ses limites d'homme, que de pr6tendre acceder a ce qui est absolument inaccessible car 
i-adicalement 6tranger a Fhomme dans sa radicale alterite: Dieu! ' 73 It is not irreverent to look 
inwards rather than upwards, therefore, but rather the reverse: where for Poggio or Calvin, 
irian is raised from his natural sinfulness to a dignity found in God, for Montaigne, man's 
misery consists in his aspiration towards dignity and divinity; his greatest dignity in turning 
from the contemplation of God to embrace his natural humanity. It is entirely proper to 
abandon the search for God, therefore, and to live out one's natural condition. The text 
73 G6ralde Nakam, Te Dieu de I'Apologie de Raymond Sebond: de Plutarque ý Montaigne', BSAM, 7th 
series, 333-14 (July-December 1993), 132-48 (p. 133). 
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suggests not only that man may look to himself rather than God, but even that he ought to 
reclaim this natural identity. 
However, there is still one further move for the text to make. The conformity to one's natural 
humanity, while it is a properly humble alternative to the presumption of reaching towards 
God, is also associated with divine command: 
[A] 11 est plus honorable d'estre achemin6 et oblig6 a regl6ement agir par 
naturelle et inevitable condition, et plus approchant de la divinite, que d'agir 
regl6ment par liberte terneraire et fortuite; et plus seur de laisser a nature qu'A 
nous les resnes de nostre conduicte. La vanite de nostre presomption faict que 
nous aymons mieux devoir a nos forces qu'a sa liberalit6 nostre suffisance; et 
enrichissons les autres animaux des biens naturels et les leur renonqons, pour 
nous honorer et ennoblir des biens acquis; par une hurneur bien simple, ce me 
semble, car je priseroy bien autant des graces toutes miennes et naifves que 
celles que j'aurois est6 mendier et quester de I'apprentis sage. 11 West pas en 
nostre puissance d'acquerir une plus belle recommendation que d'estre 
favorise de Dieu et de nature. (p. 437) 
While nature and the divine are never equated in the Apologie, passages such as this suggest 
that it is in looking to nature that man might fulfil God's purposes for him. It is when ruled 
by natural impulse that the self 'approche la divinit6' most closely, and 'Dieu et nature' 
together bestow the 'graces' and 'biens' with which it is blessed. In earlier versions of the 
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text, the final line ends alternately with 'favoris6 de Dieu' and 'favoris6 de nature' . This 
indecision between the two terms, and the final retention of both as sources of the human 
condition, suggest that nature, created by God, is for Montaigne the condition to which He 
wishes man to conform. Likewise elsewhere virtue, associated throughout the Essais with the 
virtuous natural condition, is seen as the proper product of Christian truth: '[B] La marque 
peculiere de nostre veritd devroit estre nostre vertu, comme elle est aussi la plus celeste 
74 Hugo Friedrich describes this hesitation in his discussion of nature in Montaigne: '11 h6site d'abord 
entre les termes "Dieu" et "nature", passant de I'un h I'autre, pour finalement les assimiler dans la 
formule "Dieu et la nature"'. Montaigne, trans. by Robert Rovini (Paris: Galfirnard, 1968), p. 33 1. 
Craig B. Brush cites a second instance -- in "C'est folie de rapporter le vray et le faux A nostre 
suffisance" -- where 'Montaigne crossed out the word "Dieu" and substituted "nature" for it'. 
Montaigne and Bayle: Variations oil the Theme of Skepticism (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1966), p. 46. 
77 
marque et la plus difficile, et que c'est la plus digne production de la verit6' (p. 419). Where 
Sebond proposes the Book of Nature as a source of revelation about God, Montaigne presents 
the book of human nature as a (partial) index to God's purposes for man. 
The natural condition to which the self must conform in the absence of God is thus itself 
divinely ordained. According to the passage above, the self chooses submission rather than 
freedom in conforming to its own condition: life 'achemin6 et oblig6 a regl6ement agir par 
naturelle et inevitable condition' is explicitly contrasted with life 'reglement par libert6 
terneraire et fortuite'. However, it effectively chooses both conformity to self and submission 
to God at once. Once natural human impulses become a register (however partial), of a 
divinely-appointed morality, life in accordance with oneself and with God begin to collapse 
together. 
This vision of a divinity situated beyond the reach of man, and a human nature which serves 
as a guide for human conduct, resolves many of the tensions which formerly characterized 
the human-divine relationship. Both the sense of (external) constraint and (internal) invasion 
dissolve once the self's own nature is merged with divine decree: there is no longer a radical 
other authorized to circumscribe or empty out the subject, no longer a problematic tension 
between the commands of the other and the desires of the self. And at the same time, the 
benefits of the divine other continue to be felt. The hidden God described by Montaigne is 
still able to function as a defining other for man: symbolizing the Absolute, and beyond 
human apprehension, He serves to demonstrate the littleness and misery of impoverished 
liumanity. The otherness of creature to Creator is preserved, therefore, even though what it 
ineans to fulfil that creatureliness is now revealed by virtuous human nature. The immediate, 
problematic presence of God as an Other with the authority to intervene in human identity is 
eliminated, but the idea of God remains. In the same way, the divine is still an important 
point of reference in the formation of human identity. The principle of obedience to God is 
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nowhere revoked; but the subject now decides what such obedience consists in according to 
the natural moral resources with which God has equipped him. The power of God to 
illuminate man is also, finally, preserved in this account. Since divine inspiration is in some 
sense relocated within human nature, even as God Himself is removed to a divine elsewhere, 
the illumination and motivation which the self earlier sought remain available to him. 
This reinterpretation of the human-divine relation finds expression in the final scene of the 
essay: 
[A] Et nous, et nostre jugement, et toutes choses mortelles, vont coulant et 
roulant sans cesse. Ainsin il ne se peut establir rien de certain de l'un ý 
I'autre, et le j ugeant et le j ug6 estans en continuelle mutation et branle. 
Dieu seul est, non poinct selon aucune mesure du temps, mais selon une 
etemite immuable et immobile, non mesuree par temps, ny subjecte a aucune 
declinaison. [ ... ] A cette conclusion si religieuse d'un homme payen je veux joindre seulement 
ce mot d'un tesmoing de mesme condition [ ... 1: "0 la vile chose, dict-il, et 
abjecte que Fhomme, s'il ne s'esleve au dessus de I'humanit6! " Voyla un bon 
mot et un utile desir, mais pareillement absurde. Car de faire la poign6e plus 
grande que le poing, la brass6e plus grande que le bras, et d'esperer enjamber 
plus que de I'estanduiý de nos jambes, cela est impossible et monstreux. Ny 
que I'homme se monte au dessus de soy et de I'humanite: car il ne peut voir 
que de ses yeux, ny saisir que de ses prises. 11 s'eslevera si Dieu lui preste 
extraordinairement la main; il s'eslevera, abandonnant et renonqant a ses 
propres moyens, et se laissant hausser et soubslever par les moyens purement 
celestes. (pp. 586,588-89) 
God is still an important presence in the passage here, but He is also set at a distance from the 
individual human subject. As Being-one who is, 'non point selon aucune mesure du temps, 
mais selon une etemite immuable et immobile'-He remains a defining other against which 
human judgement, 'coulant et roulant sans cesse' may be placed, and in relation to which Its 
insignificance and misery may be understood. At the same time, however, He is set at a 
considerable distance. The possibility of transcendence is acknowledged; but man may rise 
only 'extraordinairement'; as a result of exceptional divine intervention. As Nakam puts it, 
'C'est a 1'extr6me limite du possible que l'oxymore de Montaigne unit l'ordre divin du 
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miracle et l'ordre humain et naturel de la m6tamorphose. 975 Transcendence, like the 
miraculous in 'Des boyteux', becomes a theoretical possibility, placed beyond the normal 
experience of man, and also beyond his legitimate aspiration. He should not seek to rise 
beyond his natural condition: 'faire la poignee plus grande que le poing', or 'esperer 
enjamber plus que de 1'estandu6 de nos jambes' is not to approach godliness, but rather to 
pitch towards the 'monstreux', and to overreach one's calling. This calling is to conformity 
with the natural state and reach of the self; which must seek only to 'saisir [ ... ] de ses prises'. 
The self is confined by the remoteness of God to the realm of his own humanity; a 
confinement' which grants it the authority, however, to 'voir [ ... ] de ses yeux', and to speak 
its own words. 
To an extent, therefore, the text succeeds in meeting the contradictory demands of the 
human-divine relation. The theorization of an inherently virtuous and divinely-inspired 
natural condition, and a remote, majestic God, enables the continued definition of the self 
through the otherness of the divine, and the continued illumination of the self through the 
convergence of the human and divine, but the removal of the threat to the integrity of the self 
which the divine was formerly perceived to pose. 
The absence of Christ 
I wish finally to consider the absence of Christ from the Apologie, and to suggest that it 
supports my reading of the text, since the presence of Christ would contradict Montaignean 
theology as I have defined it in important ways. The lack of reference to Christ, both in the 
Apologle, and in the Essais as a whole, is frequently noted by critics. Brush reflects that 'The 
austerely inhuman God of the Apologie seems un-Christian to the extent that Christianity is 
the religion of God made man. Of the three persons of the Trinity, the Son is absent; and the 
75 Nakam, p. 137. 
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Holy Ghost, if present, is banished to the highest heavens, whence He descends seldom'. " 
Conche notes that les mots "Sainte Trinite", "Incarnation", "R6demption" Wapparalssent pas 
dans les Essais', while 'le mot "Dieu" revient trois cent trente et une fois', while Pholien 
remarks that 'les allusions au Christ sont rarissimes clans les Essais'. 77 Christine Brousseau 
suggests that 'dans I'Apologie, et dans les Essais plus generalement, Dieu est si abstrait, si 
au-delä des dogmes, de Fincarnation et par consequent de la Trinite, si peu chretien en 
somme, que, malgr6 les citations de Paul et d'Augustin, il est plus proche du Dieu des 
44 78 philosophes" deistes que du Dieu de la theologie scolastique'. Leake, in his concordance 
to the Essais, finds only six references to Christ, all of which are incidental, and only one of 
which is in the Apologie. '9 
The Incarnation is also evoked only occasionally in the text, and is always displaced or 
disguised. Reflecting upon human reason, Montaigne suggests that '[A] la vraye raison et 
essentielle, de qui nous clesrobons le nom a fauces enseignes, elle loge clans le sein de Dieu; 
c'est la son giste et sa retraite, c'est de la ou' elle part quand il plaist a Dieu nous en faire voir 
quelque rayon, comme Pallas saillit de la teste de son pere pour se communiquer au monde' 
(p. 523). It is the glimmers of understanding which God may bestow, rather than his self- 
revelation through Christ, which are compared to Pallas's departure 'de son p6re pour se 
communiquer au monde'. Elsewhere, the possibility of divine incarnation appears among the 
presumptuous beliefs of other people. In his discussion of how philosophy has spoken of 
76 Brush, p. 114. 
77 Marcel Conche, Ta Signification de Dieu pour Montaigne, BSAM, 7th series, 33-34 (July-December 
1993), 21-34 (p. 23). Georges Pholien, 'Les Essais et la religion', BSAM, 7th series, 35-36 (January- 
June 1994), 123-31 (p. 131). 
78 Christine Brousseau, Ta Divine d6construction dans I'Apologie de Raymond Sebond', BSAM, 7th 
series, 33-34 (July-December 1993), pp. 69-88 (p. 69). 
79 Christ is referred to in a passage dismissing oracles, which '[A] avoyent commenc6 ý perdre leur 
credit [ ... J bonne piece avant la venu6 de Jesus-Christ' (1: 11; p. 42); as an example of one '[A] qui [a] 
annobli [sa] vie par renomm6e' yet died before the age of thirty-five (1: 20; p. 83); in a quote from Saint 
Paul: '[A] "Je d6sire, dict Sainct Paul, estre dissoult pour estre avec Jesus-Christ"' (11: 3; p. 342); in an 
adaption of the same verse in the Apologie: '[A] Je veuil estre dissout, dirions nous, et estre aveques 
Jesus-Christ' (11: 12; p. 422); and twice in a passage where a bishop describes the Emperor Julian as a 
traistre ý Christ', and then thanks Christ that, having lost his sight, he cannot see the emperor's 'visacre Z- L- 
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God, Montaigne describes, with evident disapproval, how men '[B] ramenent Dieu jusques a 
l'accointance charnelle des femmes. [ ... ] [Q Combien ya 
il, es histoires, de pareils cocuages 
procurez par les Dieux contre les pauvres humains? et des maris injurieusement descriez en 
faveur des enfans? En la religion de Mahumet, il se trouve, par la croyance de ce peuple, 
ass6s de Merlins: assavoir enfans sans pere, spirituels, nays divinement au ventre des 
pucelles' (pp. 512-13). 'o Likewise, he dismisses '[C] anciennes conclusions' to the effect that 
'Dieu est [ ... ] revestu de I'humaine figure. Ita est informatum, anticipatum mentibus nostris 
ut homini, cum de deo cogitet, forma occurrat humand (p. 514). 81 
This absence of Christ is interpreted in various ways by the critics who choose to discuss it. 
Brousseau suggests that it is partially explained by 'Le projet de I'Apologie'; which is 'sans 
82 doute de pr&her l'ob6issance civile et religieuse plut6t que le salut'. Brush sees it as a 
symbol of 'the lack of mediation between Montaigne's God and man'. 83 A more detailed 
explanation is offered by Nakam, who argues that Te Dieu de I'Apologie ne peut avoir de 
"m6diateur". 11 doit rester radicalement "autre". Le Dieu chretien s'incame. Le Dieu de 
I'Apologie ne peut pas, ne doit pas s'incarner, mais rester impenetrable et abstrait. Cette 
conception est indispensable a Montaigne pour confondre, l'inepte et monstrueuse pretention 
84 des th6ologiens, de leur "doctrine", de leurs diktats'. This is in many ways a convincing 
interpretation: a number of the passages above are extracted from diatribes against the 
presumption of humanity in fashioning God in his own image. It is also clear that a number of 
impudent' (IL 19; p. 652). Roy E. Leake, Concordance des 'Essais'de Montaigne, Travaux 
d'Humanisme et Renaissance, 187,2 vols (Geneva: Droz, 198 1), 1, p. 660. 
80 Brush, pp. 93-94 discusses this passage in his analysis of Montaigne's religious (in)sincerity: 'To 
have made gods human can only have come from "une merveilleuse yvresse de 1'entendement humain". 
But what of the Christian doctrine of the incarnation? [ ... ] When he mocks ancient legends of virgins 
impregnated by gods, how can one help thinking of the virgin MaryT. 
8 LI t-ý 1 Elsewhere, the power of Scripture to reveal God, and the Passion of Christ, are apparently also cast in 
doubt: '[A] Nous disons bien puissance, verit6, justice. [ ... I [B] Nous disons que Dieu craint, que Dieu 
se courrouce, que Dieu ayme, Innnortalia mortali sernione notantes; ce sont toutes agitations et 
ýinotions qui ne peuvent loger en Dieu selon nostre forme. [... ] [C] La fortitude ý porter la douleur, le 
labeur, les dangers, luy appartiennent aussi peu, ces trois choses n'ayans nul acc6s pr6s de luy' (p. 479). 
X2 Brousseau, p. 69. 
83 Brush, p. 113. S4 
Nakam, p. 13 7. 
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humanist writers did interpret the Incarnation as the glorification of man by God: 'But if our 
first parents had never sinned, Christ, nevertheless, would have descended from heaven to 
earth [ ... ] in order that through this humble assumption of human flesh He might 
marvellously and unbelievably honour and glorify man. For it was thought that nothing also 
was lacking to that nature which He had made so beautiful, so ingenious, so wise and so 
opulent, so worthy and so potent, finally so happy and so blessed for its total and absolute 
perfection in every respect except that through admixture with divinity itself it should not 
only be conjoined in that person of Christ with the divine person but also rendered one and 
the same with the divine nature. ' 85 
The absence of Christ operates in the first instance, therefore, as a weapon against the 
presumption of contemporary theologians and philosophers. However, it is also necessary if 
the self-conforming subjectivity I have suggested Montaigne envisages is to appear 
theologically legitimate. Christ is presented in other Renaissance texts as an example for the 
human subject to model his life upon. As Thomas a Kempis had exhorted fifteeth-century 
man to 'conform his whole life to His' '86 So too sixteenth-century handbooks of Christian 
conduct call for a close imitation of Christ. Erasmus, in his Enchiridion militis christiani 
(1503), believes 'the model of all piety' to be 'readily found in Christ', and seeks to illustrate 
the fruit of the Spirit by appealing to His example: 'Where is charity, where is that joy of the 
rnind? Where is peace toward all men? Where is patience, long-suffering, goodness, 
kindness, gentleness, faithfulness, modesty, self-control, chastity? Where is the image of 
Christ in your morals ? 987 Tyndale, too, in his Obedience of a Christian Man (1528) 
continually exhorts his reader to make Christ his example and guide. He observes how 
'Christ also suffered for our sakes, leaving us an ensample to follow his steps'; and praises 
85 Manetti, III, p. 98; trans. by Trinkaus, pp. 252-53. 
86 The Imitation of Christ, trans. by Leo Sherley-Price (London: Penguin, 1952), p. 27. 
87 Enchirldion militis christiam, in Collected Works of Erasmus, LXVI, trans. by Charles Fantazzi, ed. 
by John W. O'Malley (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988). pp. 72,75. For the Latin, see 
Opera onmia, V, ed. by Petri Vander (Hildesheim: Olms, 1962), pp. 31,33. 
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the 'spiritual men' who 'look on the exceeding mercy, love, and kindness, which God hath 
shewed them in Christ; and therefore love again, and work freely'; and urges the reader to 
88 'becometh a servant to other, (after the ensample of Christ and his apostles)' . 
This emphasis upon the imitation of Christ contradicts Montaignean theology in a 
fundamental way. I have suggested that his objective of adherence to self, of life lived in 
accordance with one's natural humanity, is justified in terms of an unknowable and 
unreachable God, in seeking whom man exceeds his human prerogative. If Christ is 
acknowledged as a model, however, such a theology becomes impossible to sustain. 
Embodying the principles and precepts of God, Christ dissolves the barriers separating God 
from man, and problernatizes the autonomy and self-inscription envisaged by Montaigne. 
While the absence of Christ from his account may signal an attempt to confound those 
theologians who interpret the Incarnation as evidence for the dignity of man, his own 
theology also requires the elimination of Christ. Seeking to establish the autonomy of man, 
his thinking has no place for a divine exemplar. 89 
Chnstological doctrine also poses a second threat to the theology of Montaigne. Petrarch 
interprets the Incarnation in the following terms: 
By an unchanging law of divine wisdom from eternity humanity was to be 
raised up, divinity bent down. And both equally having happened, there 
occurred the salutary and celebrated union without which humanitas would 
have lain sick and torpid forever. Neither one could be done without the other; 
88 William Tyndale, The Obedience of a Christian Man, in Doctrinal Treatises and Introductions to 
Different Portions of the HolY Scriptures, ed. by Henry Walter (Cambridge: C. U. P., 1848), pp. 13 1- 
344 (pp. 172,182,190). 
89 Conche, p. 21 suggests that the Essais as a whole, if not specifically the Apologie, substitute Socrates 
for Christ as an example to men: ... 11 est bien advenu que le plus digne homme d'estre cogneu et 
d'estre present6 au monde pour exemple, ce soit celuy duquel nous ayons plus certaine cognoissance. 
[ ... F (Villey). C'est un chr6tien qui parle. Le plus digne homme d'6tre "pr6sent6 au monde pour 
c\einple" ne peut donc 6tre que Msus. Vous n'y &es pas. C'est de Socrate qu'il s'agit. [ ... ] Admirons, dit-il, celui qui "dressa non seulement les plus regl6es, mais les plus hautes et vigoreuses creances, 
actions et meurs qui furent onques" Qui est celui-cl? Msus, 6videmment (quelles croyances furent plus 
-hautes- que les siennes? ). Mais non! C'est Socrate encore. ' 
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or rather it could be done through none other than through Him who 'bowed 
down His heavens and descended', who looked upon earth and made it 
tremble. 90 
For Petrarch, Christ is the redeemer of sinful mankind, the mediator between fallen man and 
God. And if Christ is the Saviour of man, then man must stand in need of salvation: one 
doctrine presupposes the other. This does not, however, acconu-nodate the basically virtuous 
natural humanity posited by Montaigne. The Incarnation is a response to the Fall: the two are 
inextricably bound together as parts of the same theological scheme. Having chosen to reject 
the account provided in Genesis, therefore, Montaigne inevitably discovers a disjunction 
between the Christian doctrine of salvation and the anthropology he constructs. 9' Yet unlike 
those humanist writers who take an optimistic view of mankind, Montaigne cannot reinterpret 
the Incarnation as a sign of man's dignity and glory: his perception of man's vanity and 
weakness militates against such a solution. He wants it both ways: he wishes on the one hand 
to humiliate man, but on the other to ascribe an initial unfallenness to him, to eliminate the 
notion of inevitable human sin. There is no easy way for him to sustain this interpretation in 
the face of the Gospel narratives. And without this concept of man, the conforrnity to self 
which he envisages ceases to exist as a viable philosophy. There are two ways, therefore, in 
which Christological doctrine underrnines Montaignean theology, and thus Montaigne's 
resolution of the paradox of otherness. Revealing God to man, and reconciling fallen man to 
God, the figure of Christ invalidates both the idea of a natural human virtue, and the theology 
of a God so distant that man must live in accordance with himself. It is necessary, therefore, 
that Christ remain absent from his text. While he wishes to fashion human identity in relation 
to God, he seeks to establish a distance from God, and to assume a degree of virtue apart 
tI rom God, which the figure of Christ disallows. 
90 Francesco Petrarch, De otio religioso (1347), ed. by Giuseppe Rotondi (Vatican City: Biblioteca 
Apostolica Vaticana, 1958). p. 41. Trans. by Trinkaus, p. 37. 
() j For Montaigne, 'la nature humaine West pas fonci6rement corrompue et n'a nul besoin d'un 
Rýdempteur'. Pholien, p. 1 27 
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Nevertheless, the extent to which Montaigne does wish to see man's identity in the 
perspective of his relationship with God is clear in the context of the extract from De hominis 
dignitate with which I began. According to Pico, man stands completely independent of God; 
granted by his Maker the authority to live according to his own desire and will. No demands 
are made upon him; no laws established to govern him, no function ordained to guide and 
direct him. Compared with such a vision, the complexities of the Montaignean account are 
made manifest. The impulse to self-government which the Apologie articulates, and its desire 
to relocate the divine presence beyond the boundaries and the perception of the self, are set 
against a need to be part of an order ordained and governed by God. The self depends upon 
the divine for purpose and definition, and for illumination and motivation to shape its thought 
and conduct. Where Pico abolishes all contexts and frameworks, therefore, Montaigne is 
careful to keep them in place. The self continues to stand in a specific relation to God, and to 
conceive its identity within a coherent spiritual order. However, it seeks to manipulate that 
order to ensure that it accommodates its own desires and self-understanding. Theorizing a 
divinely-inspired, naturally virtuous human condition, and a remote, majestic God, the text 
attempts to negotiate a human identity generated by the individual self, yet also conforming 
to the purposes and laws of God. 
SCEPTICISM 
I wish finally to look at the use made of philosophical scepticism in the Essais, and the ways 
in which it is relevant to the issues examined above; firstly in the Apologie - where it has a 
vital role to play in the negotiation of the relation between self and divine other which I have 
described - and then as a way of resolving the paradox of difference elaborated in 'Des 
cannibales' and 'Des boyteux'. 
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Scepticism in the Apologie 
In the Apologie, scepticism is used to humiliate human reason, and thus to point man back 
towards humble submission to God. However, the way in which it operates in the text also 
disguises, or reinflects, the negotiations which take place as the self takes up a position 
within a wider spiritual framework, while retaining its right to self-reference. I have 
suggested above that the self interprets God as remote and inaccessible, and that it is this 
unknowability of divine decree which authorizes the self to live according to the prompting 
of a potentially virtuous human nature. The presence and use of scepticism in the passages 
which discuss the character of God make such an interpretation of the divine seem more 
reverent, and less motivated, than it might otherwise appear. The account of Pyrrhonian 
scepticism in the essay differs from that in his source, Sextus Empiricus, in a number of 
significant ways, and these specific modifications work to further and enhance a disguise 
which exploits the suspension of judgement at the heart of the sceptical process. 
Montaigne's account of ancient scepticism appears at first glance to follow the Greek original 
very closely. He describes how, finding it impossible to discern the truth on any subject, 
Pyrrhonians are led to suspend their judgement, and to incline instead towards doubt on every 
side: 
[A] Leurs faqons de parler sont: Je Westablis rien; il West non plus ainsi 
qu'ainsin, ou que ny Fun ny I'autre; je ne le comprens point; les apparences 
sont 6gales par tout; la loy de parler et pour et contre, est pareille. [C] Rien ne 
semble vray, qui ne puisse sembler faux. [A] Leur mot sacramental, Cest 
mEXo), c'est a dire je soutiens, je ne bouge. Voyla leurs refreins, et autres de 
pareille substance. Leur effect, c'est une pure, entiere et tres-parfaicte 
surceance et suspension de jugement. Ils se servent de leur raison pour 
enquerir et pour debatre, mais non pas pour arrester et choisir. (11: 12, p. 485) 
This is the epoche (moXil) described by Sextus in his Hypotyposes: a complete suspension of 
judgement compelled by the contradictory arguments which confront the enquiring mind. The 
result of this suspension of judgement is atarcLvia (caapaýta), '[A] une condition de vie 
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paisible, rassise, exempte des agitations que nous recevons par Firnpression de l'opinion et 
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science que nous pensons avoir des choses' (p. 483). However, while the sceptic does not 
need a system of belief in order to live in the world, he does require some kind of framework 
to govem his actions; and this he finds in custom, laws and natural inclinations: '[A] Quant 
aux actions de la vie, ils sont en cela de la commune faqon. Ils se prestent et accommodent 
aux inclinations naturelles, a l'impulsion et contrainte des passions, aux constitutions des loix 
et des cousturnes et a la tradition des arts' (p. 485). 
However, while the substance of this passage can be traced directly to the first book of the 
Hypotyposes, Montaigne modifies Sextus's account in two important ways. The first is his 
description of the steps which lead to the sceptical epoche. Sextus describes a process which 
begins with a search for truth: 'Men of talent, who were perturbed by the contradictions in 
things and in doubt as to which of the alternatives they ought to accept, were led on to inquire 
what is true in things and what false, hoping by the settlement of this question to attain 
quietude. ý93 However, owing to the 'equipollence' (isosthenia), the 'equality in respect of 
probability and improbability', of the conflicting arguments before him, the enquirer is forced 
to suspend his judgement, and in doing so finds that the quietude he has sought comes to him 
by accident: 'The Sceptic, in fact, had the same experience which is said to have befallen the 
painter Apelles. Once, they say, when he was painting a horse and wished to represent in the 
painting the horse's foam, he was so unsuccessful that he gave up the attempt and flung at the 
picture the sponge on which he used to wipe the paints off his brush, and the mark of the 
sponge produced the effect of a horse's foam. 994 The sceptical suspension of judgement is 
92 For Sextus's description of atara-via, see Sextus Empiricus, trans. by R. G. Bury, 4 vols (London: 
Heinemann-, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1961), 1: Outlines of Pyrrhonisin, 1: 4, p. 9. 
93 Outlines, 1: 6, p. 9. 
94 Outlines, 1: 4, pp. 7-9; 1: 7, pp. 19-2 1 
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originally unintended, therefore, and finally takes place due to the undecidability of the 
subject under discussion. 
95 
The Apologie presents the process in different terms. While its initial presentation of the 
sceptical method introduces the idea of undecidability ('iI n'est non plus ainsi qu'ainsin, ou 
que ny I'un ny I'autre; [ ... ] les apparences sont egales par tout; la loy de parler et pour et 
contre, est pareille'), the text as a whole appears to interpret the sceptical process as a 
determined confession of ignorance which aims for, rather than being led to, a complete 
suspension of judgement. Sceptics JA] cerchent qu'on les contredie, pour engendrer la 
dubitation et surceance de jugement, qui est leur fin' (p. 483); Pyrrhonians '[B] se sont 
reservez un merveilleux advantage au combat, s'estant deschargez du soing de se couvrir. 11 
ne leur importe qu'on les frape, pourveu qu'ils frappent; et font leurs besongnes de tout. S'lls 
vainquent, vostre proposition cloche; si vous, la leur. S'ils faillent, ils verifient l'ignorance; si 
vous faillez, vous la verifiez' (p. 484). In some sense, this interpretation already lurks beneath 
the surface of Sextus's account: although the first time he suspends his judgement, the 
sceptic may not anticipate that ataraxia will follow, it seems inevitable, despite Sextus's 
insistence to the contrary, that his scepticism would subsequently consist of a search for 
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tranquillity through epoche. However, in Montaigne, this impulse to ataraxia is openly 
95 Burnyeat emphasizes that the sceptic 'does not and could not choose epoche for the sake of 
ataraxia': 'So far from relying on the will to control assent, the sceptic panacea, beginning with the Ten 
Modes of Aenesidemus, is to use reason to check all the sources of belief and destroy all trust in reason 
itself, thereby eliminating the very inclination to believe. The life without belief is not an achievement 
of the will but a paralysis of reason by itself. ' 'Can the Sceptic Live his Scepticism? ', in Doubt and 
Dogmatism: Studies in Hellenistic Epistemology, ed. by Malcolm Schofield, Myles Burnyeat and 
Jonathan Barnes (Oxford: Clarendon Press: 1980), pp. 20-53 (p. 42). 
96 Martha Nussbaum identifies the way in which Sextus upholds his position. Considering the clause in 
Sextus "'from which we come, through the equal force [ ... ] first into suspension, and after that into 
atareLvia"', she argues that 'Two possibilities appear to be open. First, we might treat the clause as a 
nonrestrictive modifier. [ ... ] In the (sic) case, skepticism would apparently be any old antithetike dunands, and it just happens to lead to these results. The second possibility is that the modifier is 
restrictive, the results a part of the definition. Skepticism is a particular antithetike dunands, namely, 
the one from which we come into suspension, equipoise, ataraxi . a. The skeptic is not operating 
correctly as a skeptic, unless he is aiming his know-how at those results, or at least practicing (sic) his 
know-how in the particular way that would produce those results. We shall later see that the ambiguity 
is no accident: that Sextus wants and needs to claim the first understanding, but is forced continually 
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acknowledged, and the original dynamic of enquiry --> conflict --> isostheneia --- > epoche -- 
ataraxia is thus transformed into a static demonstration of a pre-acknowledged ignorance. 
The second important difference between the presentation of Pyrrhonism in the Hypotyposes 
and the account provided by Montaigne is the latter's interpretation of the sceptical concept 
of life lived according to custom, or the way things appear to be. When Sextus speaks of 'the 
guidance of Nature', he means 'that by which we are naturally capable of sensation and 
thought'; the 'constraint of the passions', or 'that whereby hunger drives us to food and thirst 
to drink'. 9' In Montaigne, however, the term has a much wider application. This in turn 
depends upon a third modification of Sextus's original account. According to Sextus, the 
value of atara-xia is its capacity to free men from perturbation and dispute: 'The man who 
opines that anything is by nature good or bad is for ever being disquieted. [ ... ] On the other 
hand, the man who determines nothing as to what is naturally good or bad neither shuns nor 
pursues anything eagerly; and, in consequence, he is unperturbed. '98 While scepticism is 
concerned with the desirability, as well as the possibility, of knowledge, therefore, its 
ultimate end is human happiness. In Montaigne's account, by contrast, ataraxia acquires a 
moral resonance: as JA] une condition de vie' which stands opposed to Topinion et 
science', it manages to avoid la crainte, Favarice, 1'envie, les desirs immoderez, I'ambition, 
l'orgucil, la superstition, I'amour de nouvellet6, la rebellion, la desobeissance, l'opiniatret6 et 
la pluspart des maux corporels' (p. 483). 99 It thus becomes identified with the natural virtue 
which I have discussed above, and which is elsewhere described in very similar terms: '[A] 
L'incivilite, l'ignorance, la simplesse, la rudesse s'accompaignent volontiers de 
towards the second. ' 'Skeptic Purgatives: Therapeutic Arguments in Ancient Skepticism', Journal of 
the Histoiy of Philosophy, 29 (1991), 521-57 (pp. 528-29). 
97 Outlines, 1: 11, p. 17. 
()S Outlines, 1: 12, p. 19. 
99 David R. Hiley assigns a 'moral purpose' to Pyrrhonian scepticism also. However, this moral point is 
equivalent to the 'quietude' which I have identified above: 'moral' in this instance designates the 
human, as against the epistemological, end of Pyrrhonism; rather than the values which attach to 
atarax-I'a in the Montaignean account. 'The Deep Challenge of Pyrrhonian Scepticism', Journal of the 
History of PhilosophN,, 25 (1987), 185-213 (pp. 185-87). 
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l'innoncence; la curiosit6, la subtilit6, le sqavoir trainent la malice ý leur suite; I'humilit6, la 
crainte, Pobeissance, la debonnairete (qui sont les pieces principales pour la conservation de 
la societe humaine) demandent une ame vuide, docile et presumant peu de soy' (p. 477). 
When the Montaignean account of scepticism moves immediately on from this description of 
epoche and ataraxia to the way in which the sceptic lives out his life, therefore, the 
'inclinations naturelles' which it cites as its guiding principle extend beyond the appetites 
and passions described by Sextus (which the passage has already related) to incorporate also 
the natural virtue to which the sceptical process is itself seen to lead. 
Montaigne's representation of Pyrrhonian scepticism deviates from the original in two key 
ways, therefore. It reduces emphasis upon enquiry and undecidability; envisaging the 
suspension of judgement as the goal of the sceptical process, and it extends the range of 
impulses to which the sceptic can refer as he seeks to live his life according to nature. I wish 
now to suggest that these specific modifications of Sextus's account, and the suspension of 
judgement at the heart of the sceptical process, enable the Montaignean attribution of 
hiddenness to God, and disguise the authorization of self-reference to which it leads. 
The passages in the Apologie which discuss the unknowability of God, and those which 
consider the claims of scepticism, are often intertwined: the hiddenness of God, and the 
sceptical doctrine of suspension, are often used to criticize the presumption of dogmatic 
philosophy. Thus the extended discussion of sceptical philosophy at the centre of the text is 
followed by a denunciation of those who would assign the divine a specific shape or form: 
[C] Perseus, auditeur de Zeno, a tenu qu'on a sumornme Dieu ceux qui 
avoyent apport6 quelque notable utilite a I'humaine vie et les choses mesmes 
profitables. Chrysippus faisoit un amas confus [ ... I et comptoit, entre rrfille 
formes de Dieux qu'il faict, les hommes aussi qui sont immortalisez. Diagoras 
et Theodorus nioyent tout sec qu'il y eust des Dieux. Epicurus faict les dieux 
luisans, transparens et perflables, logez, comme entre deux forts, entre deux 
mondes, a couvert des coups, revestus d'une humaine figure et de nos 
membres, lesquels membres leur sont de nul usage. [ ... I Fiez vous a vostre 
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philosophie; vantez vous d'avoir trouv6 la feve au gasteau, a voir ce 
tintamarre de tant de cervelles philosophiques! (p. 496) 
The contradictory perspectives produced by dogmatic affirmation undermine the notion of 
identifiable truth, and demonstrate the wisdom of the sceptical approach. At the same time, 
dogmatism is identified with presumption, and scepticism with humility. 
However, the close integration of these two themes also has a second effect: 
[A] Croyons nous que Platon, luy qui a eu ses conceptions si celestes, et si 
grande accointance a la divinite, que le surnorn luy en est derneure, ait estim6 
que I'homme, cette pauvre creature, eut rien en luy applicable a cette 
incomprehensible puissance? [ ... ] 11 faudroit luy dire de la part de la raison 
humaine: 'Si les plaisirs que tu nous promets en Fautre vie sont de ceux que 
j'ay senti qa bas, cela n'a rien de commun avec I'infinit6. [ ... I Nous ne 
pouvons dignement concevoir la grandeur de ces hautes et divines promesses, 
si nous les pouvons aucunement concevoir: pour dignement les imaginer, il 
faut les imaginer inimaginables, indicibles et incomprehensibles'. (pp. 498- 
99) 
Examined on its own, this passage reveals itself as a dogmatic assertion of the hiddenness 
and unreachableness of God; a verdict which is necessary if the self is to legitimate life with 
reference to itself. However, in the context of a discussion affirming the sceptical suspension 
of judgement, and showing the confusion produced by dogmatic assertion about God, it 
appears to make a very different statement. Scepticism has no criterion for deciding whether 
any particular statement about God is true or false, and therefore demands that judgement be 
withheld. For the sceptic, unknowability is not a quality of God: rather, the question of who 
or what God is is undecidable. In the extract above Montaigne uses the same idea of 
unknowability, but employs it as a descriptor, which he dogmatically ascribes to God: He is 
an 'incomprehensible puissance', His promises 'inimaginables, indicibles et 
incomprehensibles'. Rather than the condition of not knowing attaching to the subject, the 
property of unknowability is attributed to God. The slippage between the two, however, is 
not immediately visible: the first sense of the term, evoked by the context, appears to govem 
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the discussion of God's hiddenness also; which thus appears to take heed of the warning 
against dogmatic assertion, and to withhold its judgement in a properly humble and sceptical 
manner. In this way the dogmatic ascription of unknowability to God, and the ways in which 
this ultimately serves the purposes of the self, are hidden from view. 
This disguise is helped by the modifications made to Sextus's account of Pyrrhonism by 
Montaigne. Montaigne's re-presentation of epoche as scepticism's ultimate goal, first of all, 
creates a middle ground between the position adopted by Sextus, and his own dogmatic 
assertion. If in Sextus, unknowability is a conclusion; reached through enquiry, conflict and 
undecidability, in Montaigne's reworking of Sextus, it is a premise, which demonstrates itself 
through conflict, and dispenses with enquiry altogether. This presupposition of ignorance 
approaches the negative dogmatism of Academic scepticism, which asserts that nothing can 
be known. '00 And the presumption that nothing can be known is closer to the assertion that 
God cannot be known than the latter is to the sceptical process which reflects that there are 
many philosophies about God between which it is not possible to decide, therefore judgement 
about God must be suspended. The idea that nothing can be known is crucially ambiguous, 
because it fails to make clear whether unknowingness attaches to the agent of knowledge, or 
unknowability to its object. It is thus able to mediate between the Greek position, which 
assumes the first meaning, and the Apologie, which employs the second. This is not to 
suggest, however, that crucial differences do not remain between the two: where the first 
continues to suspend judgement on all subjects, but accounts for this suspension through a 
qLiasi-dogmatic assertion of ignorance, the second actually exercises judgement, but disguises 
it as suspension. 
100 1 Academics treat [truth] as inapprehensIble: the Sceptics keep on searching' (Outlines, 1: 1, p. 3). 
For a summary of the differences between Academic scepticism and Pyrrhonism, see Richard H. 
Popkin, The History of Sceptic isni from Erasmus to Spinoza (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1979), pp. xiii-xvi. 
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The second way in which Montaigne modifies Sextus's account -- extending the concept of 
4nature' beyond the promptings of hunger and thirst to incorporate those of an inherent 
natural virtue -- also has a part to play in his appropriation of autonomy. Although the shift is 
not immediately visible, the extension of the notion of 'natural inclinations' fundamentally 
reverses its significance. According to Sextus's account, such inclinations would be 
registered, but since they are subjective impressions or value-judgements, they should be 
given no authority or credence. All subjective impulses ultimately constitute judgements, 
beliefs or impressions, and as such they must be neither affirmed nor denied. 'O' In this sense, 
Pyrrhonism demands a disengagement from oneself: 'When a thing appears in a certain light 
to [the sceptic], that no more inclines him to believe it is as it appears than would the fact of 
its so appearing to someone else. It is merely one more impression or appearance to be noted. 
Thus the withdrawal from truth and real existence becomes, in a certain sense, a detachment 
from oneself. ' 102 However, it is exactly this subjectivity which Montaigne wishes to 
authorize, and his reinterpretation of Sextus enables him to do so. By turning the Pyrrhonian 
'guidance of nature' into 'natural inclinations', and allowing man to consult and live 
according to his moral, as well as his physical, nature, the subjective impressions which 
scepticism refused to legitimate are validated under its auspices. 103 
The presence of scepticism in the Apologie thus helps to legitimate the theology of self- 
reference which the text elaborates in two ways. While it humiliates human resources, and 
ostensibly JA] presente Yhomme nud et vuide [ ... ] propre a recevoir d'en. haut quelque force 
estrangere' (p. 486), its use in those passages which discuss the hiddenness of God disguises 
101 Burnyeat, p. 50 argues that this undogmatic recording of subjective impressions is problematic: The 
sceptic 'wants to say something of the form "It appears to me that p but I do not believe that 102 Burnyeat, p. 37. 
103 Elaine Limbrick sees the philosophy of life according to (human) nature as an inevitable withdrawal 
from radical scepticism rather than a manipulation of sceptical tenets: 'L'exp6rience, ou le bon sens, 
nous eiiseigne que le scepticisme radical est intenable: il nous faut vivre dans le monde et agir selon les 
i-&-les de la probabilit6. [ ... ] Le crit&re 
de la v6rit6 pour Montaigne, comme pour beaucoup d'autres 
penseurs, est la perception individuelle, subjective de la r6afit6. ' 'La Relation du scepticisme avec la 
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the self s ascription of unknowability to God, and thus presents as a humble withholding of 
judgement what might otherwise appear as a desire to break free from God. This disguise is 
helped by the reinterpretation of epoche as the goal of the sceptical method, and the 
correlative presumption that nothing can be known. At the same time, the validation of self- 
reference for which this interpretation of God prepares the way is performed through the 
sceptical philosophy of life lived according to nature. The subjective impressions excluded 
by Sextus as unverifiable judgements are smuggled in through the expansion of 'nature' to 
include moral inclinations, with the result that the self-detachment demanded by the 
Pyrrhonians is replaced by self-reference. 
Scepticism and the paradox of difference 
I wish to conclude by considering Montaigne's use of scepticism in relation to the paradox of 
otherness which emerges in 'Des cannibales' and 'Des boyteux'. I have suggested that these 
two essays, unlike the Apologie, explore the benefits and drawbacks of difference for the self 
which encounters them. The particular ways in which the sceptical method is used in the 
V- Essais, and the particular ends to which it is put, offer a further response to this paradox of 
difference; a response which is consistent with, and which in many ways resembles, that 
which is articulated in 'Des cannibales'. 
Having outlined the principles of Pyrrhonism, Montaigne proceeds to contrast it with the 
confusion and discordance produced by dogmatic philosophies: 
[A] Or voyons ce que I'humaine raison nous a appris de soy et de Fame. [ ... ] 
A Crates et Dicxarchus, qu'il n'y en avoit du tout point, mais que le corps 
s'esbranloit ainsi d'un mouvement naturel; a Platon, que c'estoit une 
substance se mouvant de soy-mesme; a Thales, une nature sans repos; a 
Asclepiades, une exercitation des sens; a Hesiodus et Anaximander, chose 
compos6e de terre et d'eau; a Parmenides, de terre et de feu; a Empedocles, de 
sang, 
subjectivitC, in La Problematique du slijet chez Montaigne, ed. by Eva Kushner, Colloques, Congr6s et 
Conf6rences sur la Renaissance, 4 (Paris: Champion, 1995), pp. 73-85 (pp. 82-83). 
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Sanguineam vomit ille animam; 
a Possidonius, Cleantes et Galen, une chaleur ou complexion chaleureuse, 
Igneus est ollis vigor, et ccelestis origo; 
a Hypocrates, un esprit espandu par le corps; a Varro, un air receu par la 
bouche, eschauff6 au poulmon, attrempe au cceur et espandu par tout le corps; 
a Zeno, la quint'essence des quatre elemens; a Heraclides Ponticus, la 
lumiere. (pp. 523-24) 
The contradictory perspectives which are rehearsed in the extract here bring into focus once 
again the threat which difference poses to the self. Each of these perspectives challenges, and 
threatens to undermine, each of the others. Whatever position the self might choose to 
identify with, therefore, it would be undercut by a series of alternative locations. The extent 
of the danger is far greater here than in 'Des cannibales' or 'Des boyteux'. In the latter, the 
self is confronted by a single alternative perspective: New World practice in the first 
instance; witchcraft and the supernatural in the second. In the extract above, by contrast, 
there is a huge array of competing theories and ideas: Crates, Dicýearchus, Plato, Thales and 
Asclepiades all have different theories to offer when it comes to the human soul. 
This plurality makes the reconciliation of self and other very much harder to achieve. Some 
of the theories in the extract here are available for elirmnation: as 'Des boyteux' fictionalizes 
or rejects the others it encountered, so here also, the text is able, to a certain extent at least, to 
mediate between the different perspectives to which it gives voice: '[A] la raison pourquoy 
Chrysippus I'argumente autour du cceur, comme les autres de sa secte, West pas pour estre 
oubli6e: "C'est par ce, dit-il, que quand nous voulons asseurer quelque chose, nous mettons 
la main sur 1'estomac; et quand nous voulons prononcer F-yw, qui signifie moy, nous baissons 
vers Pestornac la machouere d'embas. " Ce lieu ne se doit passer sans remerquer la vanit6 
d'un si grand personnage' (p. 525). In the same way, the view of the ancient Stoics is 
dismissed from serious consideration: '[C] Voyla les Sto*fciens, peres de I'humaine prudence, 
qui trouvent que I'ame d'un homme accabI6 sous une ruine, traine et ahanne longtemps A 
sortir, ne se pouvant demesler de la charge, comme une souris prinse a la trapelle' (p. 525). 
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However, when so many opinions are drawn together at once, there is no chance at all of 
integrating or refuting them all: whichever point of view the self might adopt, many others 
will exist which contradict it entirely. 
However, Pyrrhonian scepticism offers an alternative to this problematic play of difference. 
When he finds himself faced with such a clash of philosophies, but without a criterion for 
mediating between them, the sceptic chooses epoche, which effectively dissolves the threat to 
which the self is exposed. Renouncing affirmation or denial, it prevents the emergence of 
otherness altogether: the different opinions which the self encounters are assigned no status 
in relation to it. Categories of self and other are suppressed or elided, and the threat which 
those othemesses posed is thus likewise overcome. 
Sceptical principles are used in a comparable way in 'C'est folie de rapporter le vray et le 
faux a nostre suffisance'. 104 Montaigne describes the difficulty of drawing conclusions when 
one's own beliefs are contradicted by the testimony of trustworthy others: 
[A] Quand nous lisons, dans Bouchet, les miracles des reliques de sainct 
Hilaire, passe: son credit n'est pas assez grand pour nous oster la licence d'y 
contredire. Mais de condamner d'un train toutes pareilles histoires me semble 
singuliere impudence. Ce grand sainct Augustin tesmoigne avoir veu, sur les 
reliques Sainct Gervais et Protaise, a Milan, un enfant aveugle recouvrer la 
veuiý; une femme, a Carthage, estre guerie d'un cancer par le signe de croix 
qu'une femme nouvellement baptis6e luy fit. [ ... ] Dequoy accuserons nous et luy et deux Saincts Evesques, Aurelius et Maximinus, qu'il appelle pour ses 
recors? Sera ce d'ignorance, simplesse, facilit6, ou de malice et imposture? 
Est-il homme, en nostre siecle, si impudent qui pense leur estre comparable, 
soit en vertu et piet6, soit en sqavoir, jugement et suffisance? (1: 27; p. 180) 
104 Although the ideas in this essay are clearly very similar to those in the section of the Apologie I have t:, 
examined above, and although Brush (p. 40) identifies the piece among Montaigne's sceptical early 
essays, it does not consciously draw on the Pyrrhoman philosophy. According to Villey, Montaigne is 
most likely to have read Sextus's Outlines of Pyrrhonism in early 1576: 'Au d6but de I'ann6e 1576 (en 
janvier ou en f6vrier), Montaigne fit frapper A son effigie une m6daille pyrrhomenne: 11 ya IA une 
pr6somption s6rieuse pour croire que la lecture de Sextus se place aux environs de 1576. ' Les Sources 
et V&olution des 'Essais'de Montaigne 2nd edn, 2 vols (Paris: Hachette, 1933) 1, P. 243. This is 
possibly before he completed 'C'est folie de rapporter' as a whole, but after he wrote the section 
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Once again, the self is threatened by a contradictory other which cannot easily be dismissed. 
To reject the opinion of such a learned opponent would be inappropriate: '[A] les condamner 
impossibles, Cest se faire fort, par une terneraire presumption, de sqavoir j usques oU' va la 
possibilite' (p. 179). There is no way of conflating the two positions - the self is inclined to 
disbelieve such miracles, while the account it is considering flatly asserts that they took place 
-- yet to deny its own belief would constitute self-contradiction. However, there is another 
solution: '[A] si nous ne pouvons estre persuadez, au moins les faut-il laisser en suspens' (p. 
179). Once again, decision is refused, affirmation and denial resisted, and categories of self 
and other thus remain unformed. In this second case, the withholding of decision also 
protects the self from internal fragmentation: '[A] Cest une hardiesse dangereuse et de 
consequence, outre I'absurde ternerite qu'elle traisne quant et soy, de mespriser ce que nous 
ne concevons pas. Car apres que, selon vostre bel entendement, vous avez estably les limites 
de la veritý et de la mensonge, et qu'il se treuve que vous avez necessairement a croire des 
choses oU' il ya encores plus d'estrangete qu'en ce que vous niez, vous vous estez des-ja 
oblige de les abandonner' (p. 180). When the self is so slippery and inconsistent, the creation 
of boundaries identifying self and other may lead to a temporal disjuncture. As the self 
adopts first one position in relation to the other, and then switches to take up another, its 
shifting response defines its own instability, and brings about a form of self-fracture. 
However, there are problematic, as well as beneficial, implications for the self in this 
suspension of otherness. As I have suggested above, the self always in some sense depends 
upon the other for the formation or identification of selfhood. The refusal to create a category 
of otherness, therefore, prevents the elaboration of an individual identity: without an other to 
appropriate to itself, or to establish itself against, the self has no way of negotiating its own 
identity. The atara-via to which epoche leads, as Montaigne himself makes clear, is not a 
discussed here-, which Villey dates 1572: 'Une allusion tr6s directe A Bouchet inclique qu'une partie au 
moins de cet essai est de la premi6re p6riode (environ 1572). ' Villey, 1, p. 357. 
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position of its own: '[A] Les Pyrrhoniens, quand ils disent que le souverain bien c'est 
I'Ataraxie, qui est l'immobilit6 du jugement, ils ne 1'entendent pas dire d'une faqon 
affirmative; mais le mesme bransle de leur ame qui leur faict fuir les precipices et se mettre 
couvert du serein, celuy la mesme leur presente cette fantasie et leur en faict refuser une 
autre' (p. 562). The tranquillity and serenity of ataraxia, therefore, does not make provision 
for the self-consciousness of the subject: it seeks only to protect the self from the turbulence 
and uncertainty produced by the conflicts it encountered. 
However, I wish to suggest that while the sceptical suspension of judgement does not itself 
furnish an otherness in relation to which a selfhood can be fashioned, the particular use to 
which it is put, both in the Apologie and in 'C'est folie', finally leads not to the dissolution, 
but rather to the definition, of the self. I have suggested that scepticism is primarily used in 
the Apologie as a way of establishing human ignorance; a conclusion which is used in turn to 
criticize the presumption of those who claim that their human resources are able to furnish 
certain knowledge. In this sense, it is a tool in a wider project, rather than a free-standing 
enquiry. The passage which elaborates theories of the soul above is followed by another 
denouncing those who formulate such ideas: 
[A] Toutes choses produites par nostre propre discours et suffisance, autant 
vrayes que fauces, sont subjectes a incertitude et debat. C'est pour le 
chastiement de nostre fierte et instruction de nostre misere et incapacit6, que 
Dieu produisit le trouble et la confusion de Fancienne tour de Babel. Tout ce 
que nous entreprenons sans son assistance, tout ce que nous voyons sans la 
lampe de sa grace, ce West que vanit6 et folie. (p. 535) 
The predisposition of philosophers to adopt a fixed position is very clearly seen in terms of 
presumption here: failing to recognize the 'incertitude' of 'toutes choses produites par nostre 
propre discours et suffisance', their pride resembles that of those who built the Tower of 
Babel. While judgement is suspended about these theories individually, therefore, and on the 
question of the soul to which they refer, at a second level, a verdict is reached: these 
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dogmatic philosophies represent human vanity and presumption. At this point, categories of 
other and self begin to emerge once more: as judgement is passed, values and positions are 
established once again. However, the otherness which emerges in this process is crucially 
different in form to the individual dogmatic philosophies which the self originally 
encountered. The self was threatened at the outset by the multiplicity of these others. As the 
passage above re-establishes these others, however, it absorbs them into a single position. 
They no longer represent individual philosophies: rather, they stand as a whole for human 
presumption and dogmatic assertion. 
The self is now faced with only a single other, therefore, and it is an other with which it can 
easily negotiate. Set against such vanity and pride, the suspension of judgement for which the 
self has come to stand automatically becomes identified with humility and reverence. In the 
passage above, this remains implicit; elsewhere in the Apologie, it is more directly stated. 
Scepticism is seen to produce a man '[C] ny mescreant, [A] ny establissant aucun dogme, 
contre les observances communes; humble, obeissant, disciplinable, studieux; ennerni jur6 
d'hxresie, et s'exemptant par consequant des vaines et irreligieuses opinions introduites par 
les fauces sectes' (p. 486). While Montaigne insists that Pyrrhonian doubt is not itself a 
philosophical position, he is willing as the Apologie proceeds to transform it into a moral 
position with which he wishes to identify, and through which he is able to fashion his own 
identity. 105 
105 In so doing, he moves beyond the exploitation of scepticism in other sixteenth-century texts. 
Scepticism had already been used as a tool for combatting particular moral or spiritual others by Gian 
Francesco Pico della Mirandola (in Examen vanitatis doctrinae gentium, 1520), Agrippa von 
Nettesheim (De incertitudine et i, anitate sclentiaruin declaniatio invectiva, 1526) and Henri Estienne 
(1562) and Gentian Hervet (1569) in prefaces to editions of Sextus. However, none of these writers 
attempts to make scepticism itself a moral location with a specific identity. Montaigne probably did not 
read Pico, but certainly did read Agrippa: Villey ( I, pp. 61-62) finds 'de tr6s nombreux emprunts dans 
[1] Apologic de R. Sebond. Des phrases enti6res sont copi6es. Agrippa, grdce ý sa grande 6rudition, 
ramasse et met A la port6e de Montaigne des indications prises aux auteurs les plus vari6s: saint Paul, 
Pline, Lactance, Galien, Hippocrate, et beacoup d'autres auteurs et compilateurs, auxquels les 
commentateurs des Essais nous renvoyaient ý tort'. 
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Scepticism is used in the Apologie, therefore, to transform a series of others into a single 
position against which the self can be defined. However, at the end of this process, there 
remains a confrontation between other and self. The single other of dogmatic philosophy 
stands against sceptical doubt, and now that the contradictory strands of which it was 
originally composed have been drawn together under a single banner, its position appears in 
many ways strengthened. The self appears to have reinvented otherness in a more powerful 
form than before. However, in another sense, the self has re-established otherness in a form 
which is already discredited, and it is therefore disabled as a threat to the morally sound 
position he identifies with the self. The paradox of otherness is thus in some sense resolved. 
The resolution is less comfortable than that achieved in 'Des cannibales'; where otherness is 
partially integrated by the self, and both upholds and defines it. Here, the self takes up a place 
in a coherent and unproblematic, but no longer an integrated, order. 
A more complete resolution is attempted and achieved in 'C'est folie'. In many ways, the 
process is the same here as in the Apologie. Since attempts to judge between one's own 
opinions and those of respected others are perceived in the essay as presumptuous, the 
suspension of judgement which subsequently takes place becomes associated once again with 
a proper humility and respect. This humility then stands against the presumption which 
attaches to the idea of dismissing another's opinion, and a humility-presumption dichotomy 
emerges once again. 
However, there is also a significant difference in this second example. Where in the 
Apologie, the self is clearly aligned with sceptical suspension of judgement, and therefore 
with the humility and reverence which it comes to represent, in 'C'est folie', the self is 
associated with both humility and presumption at once. While the self recommends a 
suspension of judgement. with which it clearly identifies morally, it is often seen to deviate 
from such an ideal. The past self especially is accused of the presumption the essay 
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condemns: '[A] Autrefois U'ay] us6 de [lal liberte de mon chois et triage particulier, mettant 
a nonchaloir certains points de l'observance de nostre, Eglise, qui semblent avoir un visage ou 
plus vain ou plus estrange, venant A en communiquer aux hommes sqavans, j'ay trouv6 que 
ces choses la. ont un fondement massif et tres-solide, et que ce West que bestise et ignorance 
qui nous fait les recevoir avec moindre reverence que le reste' (p. 18 1). The suspension of 
judgement for which the essay argues is here rejected by the self; which chooses instead to 
set itself apart from the authoritative other it encounters, not only presumptuously, but 
wrongly, as the passage concludes. And it is not only this past self which falls into such error. 
As the passage proceeds, it moves into the present tense: 
[A] Que ne nous souvient il combien nous sentons de contradiction en nostre 
jugement mesmes? combien de choses nous servoyent hier d'articles de foy, 
qui nous sont fables aujourd'huy? La gloire et la curiosit6 sont les deux fleaux 
de nostre dme. Cette cy nous conduit A mettre le nez par tout, et celle la nous 
defant de rien laisser irresolu et indecis. (p. 18 1) 
Once again, the self is aligned here with presumption rather than reverence. This has 
important consequences in terms of the essay's response to the paradox of difference. The 
presumption/other--humility/self dichotomy established in the Apologie produces an other 
which is denounced and in this sense controlled by the self, but it is controlled through 
containment rather than the integration which reinforces and upholds the position of the self. 
In this second instance, however, the situation resembles more closely that adopted by 
Montaigne in his discussion of the Golden Age; where the only difference which finally 
exists is between adherence to, and deviation from, a single moral code. In 'C'est folie', a 
single moral position is upheld throughout: the self expounds and acknowledges in theory, 
but in practice deviates from, the ideal of sceptical suspension. Rather than the self 
precariously controlling an oppositional other through denunciation, therefore, 'C'est folie' 
presents a single moral position which is propounded, if not upheld, throughout. Sceptical 
suspension is finally used to produce an integration, rather than a confrontation, between 
othei- and self. and thus to fashion a stable community in which the self can participate. 
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The sceptical self in 'C'est folie' and the Apologie thus traces out a pattern of negotiation 
with the other which resembles in many respects that in 'Des cannibales' and 'Des boyteux'. 
In each instance, the self is confronted with an other if not radically, at least decisively, 
different from itself; a difference which is experienced as a threat to the validity and stability 
of the self, but which is also perceived as a valuable tool for self-definition. In each case, the 
self seeks to control this difference, and to defuse this threat, through the construction of a 
community of belief. The other is reinterpreted in such a way that it reflects and affirms the 
moral or philosophical locus of the self, while preserving a degree of difference which 
continues to operate as a defining otherness. The self is thus able to participate in a wider 
cultural community, while retaining a distinct identity within this larger order. Such a 
community is most successfully constructed in 'Des cannibales', where the New World other 
is fashioned as an equivalent of the self, and employed to reinforce the beliefs of the 
constructing self. It is anticipated, however, in the appropriation of Socrates' demon as a 
natural, rather than supernatural phenomenon in 'Des prognostications', and (more partially 
and distantly), in 'Des boyteux' and 'C'est folie'; where otherness is reduced to a fiction, 
delusion, or temporary moral deviation, but which is consequently not subsequently available 
for recruitment by the self as a spokesman for its own position. 
The second broadly-defined self-other relation I have identified is represented by the 
Apologie de Raymond Sebond, 'De Finstitution des enfanst' and 'De la vanitd', 'De mesnager 
sa volont6' and 'De l'utile et de I'honneste'. In these essays it is the close integration or 
conformity of self and other which is explored. At one level, the other is felt to constrain, 
erase, or disperse the self: the social whole delimits it, the classical past overshadows it, and 
the shaping hand of God is felt to circumscribe it. At the same time, however, the subject 
finds that it is authorized, stabilized or realized through its identification or engagement with 
the other, and with the wider orders and contexts it represents. In the case of theApologie, 
these tensions are resolved through continued participation in, and affirmation of, a ýwlder 
103 
order; which has been manipulated, however, to accommodate the impulse to self-reference 
which underwrites the essay. In 'De l'institution des enfants', the self seeks to authenticate 
and legitimate its position within a philosophical order; in 'De mesnager sa volont6' and 'De 
l'utile et de I'honneste', to occupy a specific position in a wider social whole, but with a 
detachment which protects the integrity of the self. In each case, the self takes up a place in 
an existent order or community, but negotiates with it, or reconstructs it, according to the 
needs or priorities of the self. 
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PROUST 
A la recherche A temps perdu announces a new set of priorities and assumptions in its 
treatment of the relationship between other and self. While it continues to describe an 
intensive process of self- and other-fashioning, it chooses to acknowledge, where the Essais 
suppressed, the constructedness of the identities it elaborates, and to examine the ways in 
which this constructedness might be exploited by the individual subject. The goal is no longer 
to identify, or to participate in, an integrated order, but rather to invent a framework 
advantageous to the self; to impose a form on the other, and to compose the identity of the 
self. The text exhibits three types of self-other relationship: bourgeois self and aristocratic 
other; French Catholic self and Jewish other; desiring self and desired other. In the first two 
cases, identity is still conceived in terms of belonging to wider groups. However, the subject 
now seeks to appropriate a privileged position within the given order. The bourgeois self 
seeks to relocate itself within the existing social framework; the antisemitic self to construct a 
coherent order through the demonization or absorption of its other. A greater detachment 
from, and decreasing dependence upon, the wider community is articulated in the text in the 
relation between the subject and object of desire. No longer seeking to appropriate an identity 
through taking up a place in a wider group, the self expresses and pursues its desires, and 
seeks self-realization through their imposition upon the other it has identified. 
ARISTOCRACY AND BOURGEOISIE 
The bourgeois self in A la recherche seeks to reinvent itself as its aristocratic other. 
Throughout the novel a series of social aspirants attempt to climb out of the class they 
occupy, and to appropriate an identity in the ranks of the nobility. At one level, they clearly 
succeed in their attempts to penetrate the circles of the highest social class. By the conclusion 
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of the novel, the formerly exclusive drawing rooms of the faubourg Saint-Germain are 
thronging with ex- bourgeois who, through marriage, money, politics or art, have succeeded 
in securing access to the most elevated social gatherings. However, the text draws a clear 
distinction between access to the faubourg Saint-Germain, and successful self-fashioning as 
the aristocratic other. The ambitious bourgeois depicted in the novel fail to achieve this 
second level of self-transformation on two counts. First, the manner of their ascent leads to 
the redefinition and disintegration of social hierarchy, rather than to their relocation within it. 
Secondly, their penetration into aristocratic circles does not constitute naturalization within 
them. The language and behaviour of the aristocratic other are in various ways either 
unavailable to the aspiring self, or impossible for it to imitate, and the partial integration 
which results ultimately leads to self-fragmentation and loss. 1 
It is clear that A la recherche does depict a gradual penetration on the part of its bourgeois 
aspirants into the formerly exclusive circles of the faubourg Saint-Germain. The novel begins 
by presenting a social order which is essentially hierarchical and static. The narrator describes 
his family's 'idee un peu hindoue' of society, which they 'consid6raient comme compos6e de 
castes ferm6es ou' chacun, des sa naissance, se trouvait place dans le rang qu'occupaient ses 
parents, et d'oU' rien, a moins des hasards d'une carriere exceptionnelle ou d'un mariage 
inespere, ne pouvait vous tirer pour vous faire penetrer dans une caste superieure. 92 The 
boundary between the nobility and the bourgeoisie is at this stage impenetrable; their 
hierarchical relation apparently secure. Even the brilliant social life of Swann -- figured in the 
margins of 'Combray' -- fails to threaten this essential stability. While Swann's career signals 
the possibility of crossing the great divide, Marcel's great-aunt interprets the information that 
1 The bourgeoisie's ascent is more often hailed in terms of unmitigated triumph. Michael Sprinker, for 
example, concludes that 'The loss of social exclusivity that the novel progressively discloses, indicates 
the definitive, final triumph of capitalist social relations and the bourgeoisie's undisputed ideological 
hegemony over French society as a whole'. History and Ideology in Proust: 'A la recherche du temps 
perdu' and the Third French Republic (Cambridge: C. U. P., 1994), p. 54. 
2 Marcel Proust,, -A la recherche du temps perdii, ed. by Jean-Yves Tadi6 and others, 4 vols (Paris: 
Gallimard, 1987-89), 1: P. 16. All references are to this edition, and are cited hereafter parenthetically 
after quotations in the text. 
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he 'etait un des plus fideles habitu6s des dejeuners du dimanche chez le duc de X. - .' (I: pp. 
20-21), in an unfavourable light: 'quelqu'un qui choisissait ses fr6quentations en dehors de la 
caste ou' il 6tait ne, en dehors de sa "classe" sociale, subissait a ses yeux un fdcheux 
d6classement' (I: p. 21). The same stability is effectively preserved throughout Du c6te de 
chez Swann. While characters such as the Verdurins clearly have none of the great-aunt's 
scruples about the propriety of social advancement (despite their proclamations to the 
contrary), the faubourg Saint-Germain remains, at this point, exclusive. Only Swann is seen at 
both the gathering of the little clan, and the party of Mme de Saint-Euverte. 
As the text proceeds, however, the boundaries which separate these strictly circumscribed 
spaces slowly begin to break down. They are put under pressure first of all by the Dreyfus 
Affair; discussed at length in Le Cbte de Guermantes. As the nobility pursues the case against 
Dreyfus, it finds itself compelled to open its boundaries to political allies who may be of a 
lower social class. Thus Odette, for example, previously unable, despite her marriage to 
Swann, to secure introductions to his fashionable friends, is able to penetrate the margins, at 
least, of aristocratic society by adopting a fervent nationalism (11: p. 549). And when the 
political situation has been resolved, the bourgeois aspirants co-opted in this way refuse to 
relinquish their privileges: 'On Waccusera pas Faffaire, Dreyfus d'avoir prem6dite d'aussi 
noirs desseins a Fencontre du monde. Mais la certainement elle a brise les cadres. Les 
mondains qui ne veulent pas laisser la politique s'introduire dans le monde sont aussi 
prevoyants que les militaires qui ne veulent pas laisser la politique p6n6trer dans Farmee. 11 
en est du monde comme du goOt sexuel, oU' l'on ne sait pas jusqu'a quelles perversions il peut 
arriver quand une fois on a laiss6 des raisons esthetiques dicter ses choix. La raison qu'elles 
6taient nationalistes donna au faubourg Saint-Germain Fhabitude de recevoir des dames d'une 
autre soci&6, la ralson disparue avec le nationalisme, Fhabitude subsista' (III: p. 740). 
3 As Bowie observes, 'When the case is over and Dreyfus has been freed and rehabilitated, these social 
upstarts do not obligingly melt back into the obscurity from which they had emerged. They have taken Lý r-I 
up a new social position during the state of emergency and are not now to be dislodged. ' Malcolm 
Bowie, Proust Aniong the Stars (London: HarperCollins, 1998), p. 130. 
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The boundaries between the two classes disintegrate further in the closing volumes of the 
novel, due to the aristccracy's financial plight. Albertine disparue depicts a series of 
marriages between aristocrats and wealthy bourgeois: Robert de Saint-Loup marries Gilberte-, 
the Prince de Guermantes, Mme Verdurin; M. de Forcheville, Odette. " By the time the 
narrator attends the reception at the end of Le Temps retrouvi, therefore, the gathering he 
discovers in the Pfincesse de Guermantes' drawing room is very mixed indeed: 
La presence de gens que j'avais vus dans de tout autres soci6t6s et qui me 
semblaient ne devoir jamais pen6trer dans celle-la m'6tonna moins encore que 
l'intime familiarite avec laquelle ils y etaient requs, appel6s par leur pr6nom. 
Un certain ensemble de prejug6s aristocratiques, de snobismes, qui jadis 
ecartait autornatiquement du nom de Guermantes tout ce qui ne s'harmonisait 
pas avec lui avait cess6 de fonctionner. [ ... ] Dkendus ou brises, les ressorts de la machine refoulante ne fonctionnaient 
plus, mille corps etrangers y p6netraient, lui 6taient toute homog6neite, toute 
tenue, toute couleur. Le faubourg Saint-Germain, comme une douainere 
gdteuse, ne repondait que par des sourires timides a des domestiques insolents 
qui envahissaient ses salons, buvaient son orangeade et lui pr6sentaient leurs 
maitresses' (IV: pp. 534-35) 
The barriers which ensured the exclusivity of the faubourg have broken down entirely in this 
passage. Individuals from much lower circles are received with familiarity, and even the 
'domestiques' are now able to enter the drawing room to introduce their mistresses. Even the 
sense of a hierarchy within this expanded social group has all but disappeared. While some of 
those present know and respect the Duchesse de Guermantes ('sa naissance, sa primaut6 
h6raldique, ses intimites avec ce que Mme de Forcheville efit appeI6 des royalties' (IV: pp. 
537-38)), a number of characters new to this social world '[1a] tenaient pour peu de chose 
parce qu'elle connaissait des actrices, etc. ' (IV: p. 537). And while there are 'gourmets' who 
4, D'anciennes amies de Swann s'occupaient beaucoup, de Gilberte. Dans I'aristocratie on apprit le 
dernier h6ritage qu'elle venait de faire, on remarqua combien elle 6tait bien 6lev6e et quelle femme 
charmante elle ferait' (IV: p. 159); Torcheville 6pousa [Odette], apr6s avoir entrepris une longue 
tourn6e de chdteaux et s'6tre assur6 que sa famille recevrait sa femme. (Cette famille fit quelques 
difficult6s, mais c6da devant l'int6r8t de ne plus avoir ý subvenir aux d6penses d'un parent besogneux 
qui allait passer d'une quasi-mis6re A l'opulence)' (IV: pp. 154-55). In these instances, the aristocracv 
is clearly complicit with the bourgeois project of entry to the faubourg; as it was historically. Jean- 
Marie Mayeur observes that T'aristocratie [ ... 
] ne garde de puissance sociale que dans la mesure oEt 
elle s'est fondue A la haute bourgeoisie. Les alliances matrimoniales, la pr6sence dans les conseils 
d'administration ont permis cette fusion'. Les Dýbuts de la Troisi6ne Wpublique, 1871-1898, 
Nouvelle Histoire de la France Contemporaine, 10 (Paris: tditions du Seuil, 1973), p. 85, 
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know that 'Gilberte Wetait pas Forcheville, ni Mme de Cambremer Ws6glise, ni la plus jeune 
une Valentinois' (IV: p. 540), there are others who believe 'le nom de Forcheville sup6rieur ý 
celui de Saint-Loup' (IV: p. 539). Hierarchy no longer has more than a conceptual value in 
this world: reconstructed moment by moment by the guesses of untutored arrivistes, the more 
informed perspectives of an older generation, and the detailed knowledge of connoisseurs, it 
is characterized by an instability and fluidity which effectively dissolve it. 
The bourgeois selves depicted in the novel are successful in gaining access to the circles of 
the aristocracy, therefore. However, the question remains how far this access represents or 
enables their self-fashioning as their aristocratic other. It is clear that penetration into the 
society of the faubourg is an important part of claiming an aristocratic identity. The ambition 
of almost all the social aspirants in the novel is expressed and pursued above all through their 
attempts to secure introductions to the nobility, and to gain access to their socially-exclusive 
gatherings. Thus Legrandin, the inveterate flatterer; is depicted throughout the novel striving 
to gain access to, and to consolidate his position within, the upper echelons of Parisian 
5 
society. Thus too, there are the Cottards and the Bontemps, flitting from salon to salon, and 
seeking to establish themselves in aristocratic circles; Mme Swann, setting up a salon of her 
own, and exploiting both political and financial circumstance to gain entry to the salons of 
others; Bloch, manipulating his friendship with the narrator to cultivate the acquaintance of 
Robert de Saint-Loup, and seeking through his interest in theatre and art to gain access to the 
circle of Mme de Villeparisis. Even the Patronne of the Verdurin clan -- who affects to 
despise the 'ennuyeux' who populate the aristocracy, and to forge an oppositional identitY6 __ 
abandons her hostility as soon as access to the faubourg becomes available: 'au fur et a 
5 For the extravagant flattery through which Proust himself sought social ascent, see, for example, 
Edmund White, Pi-oust (London: Weldenfeld & Nicolson, 1999), pp. 54-56. 
6 The 'petit clan' alternately seeks to define itself as an artistic salon -- which gathers to appreciate the 
its Patronne -- and in terms of talents of the painters and musicians successively championed by II 
intimacy and informality: 'Les Verdurin n'invitalent pas A diner: on avait chez eux "son couvert mis". 
jeune pianiste jouait, mais seulement si "qa lui Pour la soir6e, il n'y avait pas de programme. Le 
chantait", car on ne forqait personne et comme disait M Verdurin: "Tout pour les am's, vivent les 
carnarades! "' (1: p. 186). 
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mesure qu'augmenta le nombre des gens brillants qui firent des avances a Mme Verdurin, le 
nombre de ceux qu'elle appelait les "ennuyeux" diminua. Par une sorte de transformation 
magique, tout "ennuyeux" qui etait venu lui faire une visite et avait sollicit6 une invitation 
devenait subitement quelqu'un d'agr6able, d'intelligent' (IV: p. 308). ' 
However, it becomes clear over the course of A la recherche that despite this access to the 
circles of the faubourg, the bourgeois selves depicted in the novel fail in their attempts to 
appropriate an aristocratic identity. There are two reasons in particular for this failure. The 
first becomes clear in the scene which describes the 'exp6riences de sociologie' (1: p. 512) 
conducted by Swann in A Vombre des jeunesfilles enfleurs. Gathering together 'des el6ments 
het6rogenes', Swann composes 'bouquets sociaux'; which provoke, however, a mixed 
reaction from the bourgeois acquaintance invited to take part: 
Tai Fintention d'inviter ensemble les Cottard et la duchesse de Vend6me', 
[Swann] disait en riant a Mme Bontemps, de Fair friand d'un gourmet qui a 
l'intention et veut faire 1'essai de remplacer dans une sauce les clous de girofle 
par du poivre de Cayenne. Or ce projet qui allait para-itre en effet plaisant, 
dans le sens ancien du mot, aux Cottard, avait le don d'exasp6rer Mme 
Bontemps. Elle avait 6te recernment presentee par les Swann a la duchesse de 
Vend6me et avait trouve cela aussi agreable que naturel. En tirer gloire aupr6s 
des Cottard, en le leur racontant, n'avait pas ete la partie la moins savoureuse 
de son plaisir. Mais comme les nouveaux decores qui des qu'ils le sont 
voudraient voir se fermer aussit6t le robinet des croix, Mme Bontemps efit 
souhaite qu'apres elle, personne de son monde a elle ne ffit present6 a la 
princesse. (1: p. 512) 
While her own introduction to the Duchesse de Vendome is a matter of considerable 
importance to Mme Bontemps, it is not her only concern. Almost as crucial is the exclusion of 
her fellow-bourgeois the Cottards. To a certain extent, it is their omission from the guest list 
which defines her own ascent: someone must be excluded in order to make her own 
admission meaningful. In this sense, 'tirer gloire aupres des Cottard' is a way not simply of 
7 As Ren6 Girard puts it, 'C'est au salon Guermantes que tr6nent les v6ritables dieux de la Patronne. 
Mais celle-ci se ferait tuer plut6t que de leur rendre ouvertement, ou m6me subrepticement, le culte 
qu'ils r6clament. C'est pourquol elle accomplit les rites de sa fausse religion esth6tique avec une 
passion aussi fr6n6tique que menteuse. ' Mensonge romantique et vMtý romanesque (Paris: Grasset, 
1961), p. 205. 
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announcing, but also of confirming, her ascent. The narrator goes on to describe how, when 
both invited to the same party with members of the aristocracy, the Bontemps and Cottards 
adopt ways of describing the evening 'dont le cadre etait identique et ou' seuls leurs noms 
respectifs 6taient interchanges': `H6 bien, il y avait seulement les maitres de maison, le duc 
et la duchesse de Vendörne -- (en souriant avantageusement) le professeur et Mme Cottard, et, 
ma foi, du diable si on a jamais su pourquoi, car ils allaient la comme des cheveux sur la 
soupe, M. et Mme Bontemps... (1: p. 513). The identification which each wishes to make with 
the socially-exclusive society into which they have been introduced is rendered problematic 
by the presence of the other. The aristocratic gathering within which they could have carved 
out an identity if the Duc and Duchesse de Vend6me were the only other guests is 
transformed by the admission of other bourgeois into a socially-heterogenous affair, which 
affords considerably less opportunity for the redefinition of the self in noble terms. Only by 
casting each other as intruders can the Bontemps and Cottards sustain a sense that they 
circulate in these circles as accepted members of it. 
8 
While the desire for access to the aristocracy is universal in the novel, therefore, it is not a 
desire for universal access. For the bourgeois aspirant, self-fashioning as its social other 
requires not only personal penetration into aristocratic circles, but also the exclusion of its 
fellow-bourgeois. It wishes to reinforce the hierarchies which already exist, but to relocate 
itself to the other side of the divide. And this is a desire which is frustrated rather than 
realized by the dissolution of boundaries which takes place in the later volumes of the novel. 
The desire to exclude others actually reverses the significance of the widespread penetration 
into the faubourg's drawing rooms in the novel's final scene. The quantity of bourgeois 
admitted to the Princesse de Guermantes' reception has been seen as the measure of their 
triumph. If the agenda of the various bourgeois characters is seen to involve the exclusion of 
others, however, as well as their own ascent, the volume of ryfiddle-class characters present in 
8 The same desire to see others remain in place is expressed at another level by the lift-boy's sister, 
who declares of 'les malheureux' that -11 faudra toujours qu'll y en ait pour que maintenant que je suis 
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this final scene might be seen instead as a measure of their defeat. 
This widespread invasion of aristocratic ranks also frustrates the bourgeois aspirants in a 
second way. In dissolving the boundaries which separate noble and bourgeois classes, it not 
only abolishes the latter, but also redefines the former. The narrator describes how Gilberte 
ýpensa[it] que le nom de Guermantes s'etait maintenant incorpor6 a elle conirne un ýmail 
mordor6', but observes that she is mistaken: 'la valeur d'un titre de noblesse, aussi bien que 
de Bourse, monte quand on le demande et baisse quand on l'offre. Tout ce qui nous semble 
imperissable tend ý la destruction' (IV: p. 247). She has attained what she sought, but its 
value has changed: the admission of others has reduced the significance and status of what 
she sought to gain. 9 The aristocratic other has no inherent value, but only what the market 
assigns it, and when bourgeois ascent is so widespread, this is not as high as she had hoped. 
Where she had sought to transform herself into the aristocratic other, she discovers that the 
'other' is itself an unstable category; which is redefined as it accommodates their ascent. 
gap opens up between access to, and self-realization as, the aristocratic other in the first 
instance, therefore, through the extent of the bourgeois ascent. There is also a second sense in 
which access to the aristocracy in the novel falls short of the self-transformation to which the 
bourgeois self aspires. Over the course of the novel, a number of characters do succeed, 
before the general stampede, in penetrating the social circles of the nobility. In this sense they 
achieve the access they have sought, which yet remains withheld from the other members of 
riche, je puisse un peu les emmerder"' (III: p. 369). 
9 For the narrator, the access which he sought has also changed value in a second sense. Seeking 
initiation into a fuller, more complete reality, he invests a good deal of hope in the mythological 
aristocracy he constructs; only to discover, however, as do all the rising bourgeois, that the other he 
sought to be assimilated to, finally resembles the self : 'Jamais je ne m'6tais avis6 qu'elle pouvait avoir 
une figure rouge, une cravate mauve comme Mme Sazerat, et [... qu'elle] appartenait ý uncertain type 
f6minin, qui comprenait aussi des fernmes de m6decins et de commerqants' (L pp. 172-73). See also in 
this context Leo Bersani, Marcel Proust: The Fictions of Life and of Art (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1965), p. 145. 
10 In proposing such a redefinition, I wish to reverse the trajectory implied by Walter Benjamin when 
he suggests that 'The pretensions of the bourgeoisie are shattered by laughter. Their return and 
i ilation by the aristocracy is the sociological theme of the work'. 'The Image of Proust', in reassimi I L- 
Illuminations, trans. by Harry Zohn, ed. by Hannah Arendt, rev. edn (London: Fontana, 1992), pp. 197- 
I I) 
their class. However, the text makes clear that their invitation into aristocratic circles does not 
enable their naturalization within them. 
The failure of the bourgeois self-transformers to integrate fully into the faubourg Saint- 
Germain, and the conditions which make that failure inevitable, are focussed in the novel 
through the differences in the behaviour of the Duchesse de Guermantes, and Mme de 
Cambremer, nee Legrandin. The Duchesse de Guermantes treats those of lesser social rank 
for the most part with condescension. While there are times when she witholds herself from 
the bourgeoisie -- as when she attends the performance of Phedre, and performs her identity 
from the circumscribed space of a private box, or when she parades before the adrruring 
bourgeoisie in the course of her morning walk" -- more typically, she affects the greatest 
humility. While still the Princesse des Laurnes, for example, she attends the party of Mme de 
Saint-Euverte: 
Pour montrer qu'elle ne cherchait pas a faire sentir dans un salon, oU' elle ne 
venait que par condescendance, la sup6riorit6 de son rang, elle 6tait entree en 
effaqant les epaules la meme oU' il n'y avait aucune foule a fendre et personne 
a laisser passer, restant expres dans le fond, de Fair d'y etre a sa place, comme 
un roi qui fait la queue a la porte d'un th6dtre tant que les autorites Wont pas 
6t6 prevenues qu'il est la; et, bornant simplement son regard -- pour ne pas 
avoir I'air de signaler sa presence et de reclamer des egards -- a la 
consid6ration d'un dessin du tapis ou de sa propre jupe, elle se tenait debout a 
1'endroit qui lui avait paru le plus modeste (et d'oU' elle savait bien qu'une 
exclamation ravie de Mme de Saint-Euverte allait la tirer des que celle-ci 
I'aurait aperque), a c6te de Mme de Cambremer qui lui etait inconnue. (1: p. 
325) 
Aristocratic superiority is here affirmed by affecting modesty and humility. Rather than 
performing herself before the admiring other and having it participate in or affirm that self- 
representation (in a subjective short circuit whereby identity is projected and reabsorbed 
through the collaboration of an acquiescent other) she chooses to perform a role with which 
2 10 (p. 202). 
Descombes notes the distinction in the novel between knowing someone personally, and knowing I 
them by name ('connaitre sans connaitre'). The Duchesse, who parades before the bourgeoisie, 'peut 
connaitre personnellement tous les gens qu'elle connait de nom', and her rank is affirmed by this 
privilege. Bourgeois aspirants, by contrast, know many by name, but not in person. Vincent 
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she does not identify, and to have that role dismantled from without. While she remains in 
complete control of the ritual which is performed in the following pages, therefore, she is able 
to stage it in such a way that her superior identity is confirmed without her appearing to solicit 
or demand such a reading of herself, or to initiate the process by which it is established. 
Likewise the Duc, later in the novel, is able to behave with the utmost courtesy and affability 
towards those who stand below him, secure in the knowledge that his superiority is 
understood by all. The narrator reflects towards the end of the novel: Je commenqais a 
connaitre l'exacte valeur du langage parle ou muet de Famabilite aristocratique, amabilitý 
heureuse de verser un baurne sur le sentiment d'inf6riorite de ceux a 1'6gard desquels elle 
s'exerce mais pas pourtant jusqu'au point de la dissiper, car dans ce cas elle n'aurait plus de 
raison d'6tre. "Mais vous etes notre egal, sinon mieux", semblaient, par toutes leurs actions, 
dire les Guermantes; et ils le disaient de la faýon la plus gentille que l'on puisse imaginer, 
pour &tre aimes, admires, mais non pour etre crus' (III: p. 62). 12 
This is signally different to the behaviour of Mme de Cambremer when she meets with the 
Verdurins -- her new family's tenants -- at La Raspeliere: 
Elle etait furieuse de se compromettre ce soir chez les Verdurin et ne le faisait 
qu'a la priere de sa belle-mere et de son mari, dans l'int6r6t de la location. [ ... I 
Elle arriva hautaine et morose, de I'air d'une grande dame dont le chdteau, du 
fait d'une guerre, est occupe par les ennemis, mais qui se sent tout de m6me 
chez elle et tient a montrer aux vainqueurs qu'ils sont des intrus. [ ... ] 
Desireuse pourtant de remplir ses fonctions de femme du monde, quand on lui 
eut nomme Brichot elle voulut lui faire faire la connaissance de son mari parce 
qu'elle avait vu ses arnies plus elegantes faire ainsi, mais la rage ou Forgueil 
1'emportant sur l'ostentation du savoir-vivre, elle dit, non comme elle aurait 
dO: 'Permettez-moi de vous presenter mon mari', mais: Je vous presente mon 
mari', tenant haut ainsi le drapeau des Cambremer, en depit d'eux-memes, car 
le marquis s'inclina devant Brichot aussi bas qu'elle avait prevu. (III: pp. 306- 
07) 
While the humility and affability displayed by her husband are in a literal way available to 
Descombes, Proust: philosophie du roman, (Paris: 
tditions de Minuit, 1987), pp. 194-97. 
12 See also the incident at Balbec where the Princesse de Parme tips all the servants at the hotel. The 
narrator comments: je pensal au palais de Parme, aux consells moltI6 rellgleux, molt'6 politiques 
L- i ier pour donn6s ý cette princesse, laquelle agissait avec 
le peuple comme si elle avait da se le concili 
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Mme de Cambremer, in another they are not. Where her husband, like the Duchesse, is secure 
in his identity, and in the knowledge that his deference will be seen as a mark of his nobility, 
Mme de Cambremer can make no such assumptions. Having come from the same class as the 
Verdurins, she cannot now bow before them and perform the role of humble equal, because 
she cannot guarantee that the audience before her will contradict her performance and 
acknowledge her superiority. She is obliged, therefore, to affirm her identity by disparaging 
her family's bourgeois tenants, and by asserting her difference from them. 
However, this is a mode of behaviour which ultimately, and somewhat paradoxically, 
threatens to disclose her own bourgeois past. There is a noticeable similarity between her 
desire to denigrate the Verdurins here, and the way in which the middle-classes treat their 
own social inferiors in other parts of the novel. Andree's mother, for example, might have 
been 'incertaine et inquiete sur l'importance de sa propre situation si elle ne s'etait rassur6e 
elle-m8me et replacee dans la "realite de la vie" en disant au maitre d'hötel: "Vous direz au 
chef que ses petits pois ne sont pas assez fondants. " Elle retrouvait alors sa s6r6nit6' (11: p. 
288). Likewise, the narrator's mother 'eQt donne aussi difficilement la main a un valet de 
chambre qu'elle lui donnait ais6ment dix francs. [... ] Pour elle, qu'elle Favoudt ou non, les 
maitres etaient les maitres et les domestiques etaient les gens qui mangeaient a la cuisine' (III: 
p. 415). In some sense, therefore, the disdain which Mme de Carnbremer metes out to her 
bourgeois tenants here is simply an application of the way in which, as a bourgeois, she has 
leamt to treat social inferiors. And as such, it exposes her bourgeois inheritance even as it 
seeks to cement her new-found nobility. 13 
r6gner un jour; bien plus, si elle r6gnait d6jý' (III: p. 185). 13 Watching the audience at the opera, the narrator reflects upon the differences in behaviour between a L, 
wealthy nobleman, and an equally wealthy bourgeois: U 0ý Pun de ces derniers e8t cru affirmer son 
chic par un ton tranchant, hautain A 1'6gard d'un inf6rieur, le grand seigneur, doux, souriant, avait Fair 
de consid6rer, d'exercer I'affectation de Fhumilit6 et de la patience, la feinte d'6tre l'un quelconque des 
spectateurs, comme un privil6ge de sa bonne 6ducation' (11: r_1 p. 337). The one figure who reverses this 
trend in the novel is Saint-Loup, who speaks harshly to his groom in order to demonstrate his contempt 
for the sense of superiority which underwrites aristocratic affability: ... pourquoi affecterais-je de lui 
parler poliment? Yest-il pas mon 6gal'? [ ... ] Vous avez I'air de trouver que je de is le traiter avec vra 
6gards, comme un inf6rieur! Vous parlez comme un aristocrate... (11: p. 138). 
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The naturalization of an aristocratic identity is problematic in the first instance, therefore, 
because the language and behaviour of the aristocratic other are in various ways unavailable 
to the ambitious bourgeois self. I wish now to suggest that bourgeois self-fashioning is also 
frustrated through a failure to imitate convincingly the mannerisms, vocabulary and attitudes 
of the aristocracy. In this second instance, the failure to self-transform has serious 
implications for the individual subjects who attempt it. 
Proust himself very famously in-ýitated the language and manners of his aristocratic 
acquaintances. His impersonations explore both the self-loss and self-exclusion to which 
imitation can lead, and also the alternative, in some sense equivalent, identity which mimicry 
enables the self to appropriate. Elisabeth de Clermont-Tonnerre recalls his performances of 
Robert de Montesquiou: 
Proust imitait Montesquiou a un tel point dans la voix et les manieres, qu'il 
avait pris son fire et la faqon qu'avait celui-ci de se cacher la bouche pour 
qu'on ne vit pas ses dents noires. [ ... I Puis, il tapait du pied comme Montesquiou, ce qui etait tres laid, car il etait petit. 14 
Proust takes up the gestures of the desired other here, and traces out in his own features and 
movements the form of his aristocratic exemplar. Montesquiou's voice, laugh and manners 
are all carefully observed and reproduced. However, such a self-transformation is finally 
impossible. By taking up the features and idiosyncracies of a particular aristocratic other, 
rather than imitating aristocratic manners more generally, Proust effectively evacuates himself 
from his own performance: he 'becomes' Montesquiou; rather than an aristocratized version 
of himself. Rather than elevating himself through his appropriation of aristocratic gestures 
and voice, he ultimately performs his own absence and erasure. 15 
14 Elisabeth de Clermont-Tonnerre, Robert de Montesquiou et Marcel Proust (Paris: Flammarion, 
1925), p. 34. 
15 Finn suggests that his imitation becomes 'a hysterical re-enactment which, through linguistic and 
gestural re-creation of the Other, poses the question of personal identity'. Proust, the Body and Literarv C- - Forin (Cambridge: C. U. P., 1999), pp. 73-74. L- 
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At the same time, however, there is a second project at play in this scene. The self takes its 
revenge upon the unattainable aristocratic identity even as it demonstrates its own exclusion 
from it. While Proust sought to persuade Montesquiou that his impersonations were 
complimentary, 16 his choice of the latter's least attractive features to reproduce suggest a 
degree, at least, of malice. There is without doubt in his performance a desire to secure the 
laughter of his acquaintance at the expense of the aristocratic other. And this 'revenge' for his 
failure to self-transform also, paradoxically, begins to realize such a transformation. A 
reversal of sorts takes place in the passage above. Positioning himself at the centre of an 
admiring circle of spectators, and implicitly excluding through their laughter his aristocratic 
friend, he assumes for himself a typically aristocratic position: equivalent, for example, to the 
Duchesse de Guermantes when she claims the attention of the crowds on the boulevards or of 
the spectators at the opera. At the same time, he makes Montesquiou an object of satire, 
reminiscent of the unfashionable bourgeois acquaintance excluded through the famous 
Guermantes' wit. While on the one hand, Proust's parody alienates him from the role he 
performs, therefore, on the other, it enables him to construct and take up an equivalent 
position. Contrary to what one might expect, the mimetic function of impersonation leads to 
self-erasure, while its parodic impulse enables the partial reclamation of the desired identity. 
Proust's performance sets in play, therefore, a series of unstable dialectics; hovering between 
self-absence and self-realization, self-erasure and self-empowerment; between a desire to 
become the other, and a desire to renounce and exclude it. Imitation and impersonation also 
have a part to play in A la recherche itself, but they are now distributed among various 
characters of different ranks; to produce a very different statement about the consequences of 
16 'Quant ý I'hypoth&se que vous hasardiez au sUiet de mes "imitations", qui ne furent jamais que des 
(I gammes, ou mieux des vocalises, n'ayant aucune pr6tention de rendre aucune m6lodie, rien du g6nie 
oj-l, -, Inal, mieux, elles 6taient de simples exercices et 
jeux de Fadmiration, ludi solennosfestivolia, de 
a 's cantiques o6 s'exerqait et se complaisait une admiration i uv6nile. ' Proust, Correspondance nff, 
gcnýrale, ed. by Robert Proust and Paul Brach, 6 vols (Paris: Plon, 1930-36), 1: Lettres a Robert de 
Montesquiou, 1893-1921, p. 181. 
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imitation for the social aspirant. 
In the text, the parodic impulse of imitation is displaced onto the Duchesse de Guermantes: 
Quand elle 'in-ýitait' le duc de Limoges, les Courvoisier protestaient: 'Oh! non, 
il ne parle tout de meme pas comme cela, j'ai encore din6 hier soir avec lui 
chez Bebeth, il m'a parle toute la soiree, il ne parlait pas comme cela', tandis 
que les Guermantes un peu cultives s'ecriaient: 'Dieu qu'Oriane est 
drolatique! Le plus fort c'est que pendant qu'elle Fimite, elle lui ressemble! Je 
crois 1'entendre. Oriane, encore un peu Limoges! ' (11: pp. 752-53) 
Performed by an aristocrat, impersonation has a different purpose in the novel than in the 
scene described in Clermont-Tonnerre's memoir. The other is no longer an object of envy or 
desire, and no longer subject, therefore, to revenge. Instead, Oriane impersonates the Duc de 
Limoges in order to play out and affirm her witty aristocratic identity. The other becomes far 
less central: where Proust's imitation of Montesquiou clearly expresses and explores his 
relationship with his aristocratic friend, the passage here focusses instead upon the quality of 
the performance. This is the issue that the audience gathers to decide; the Courvoisiers (who 
are, however, chided by the narrator for their failure to understand mimicry) concluding that 
the Duchesse fails ('iI ne parlait pas comme cela'), while the Guermantes affirm her status as 
aristocratic wit: 'Dieu qu'Ofiane est drolatique! [... ] pendant qu'elle Firnite, elle lui 
ressemble! '. 
The parodic strain of Proust's biographical performance thus finds a new place and role as a 
tool for affirming aristocratic identity. This leaves the bourgeois aspirants in the novel with 
the slavishly mimetic role; seeking to reproduce, in language and gesture, the manners and 
forms of aristocratic behaviour. In one sense, this does not appear a difficult task: throughout 
the novel, aristocratic behaviour is highly codified and self-conscious. At the performance of 
Phedre, for example, as he watches the aristocracy exchanging sweetmeats in their boxes, the 
narrator comments that he 'comprenai[t] bien que cc qu'ils faisaient la n'etait qu'un jeu, et 
que [ ... 1 11 convenait en vertu 
de rites ignorýs de moi qu'ils feignissent d'offrir et de refuser 
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des bonbons, geste d6pouille de sa signification et r6g16 Tavance comme le pas d'une 
danseuse qui tour a tour s'el6ve sur sa pointe et toume autour d'une echarpe' (11: p. 342). 
Aristocratic language is equally self-conscious. Priscilla P. Clark surveys a whole range of 
linguistic codes through which aristocratic identity is expressed: 'the mania of nicknames 
(Wm6, Babal, Prince Von, Gri-Gri), the studied affectation of simplicity in the Duc de 
Guermantes' use of slang or popular terms, [ ... ] the bons mots, the "luxe de paroles", the 
jargon in the Duchesse's use of rMaction, ridiger'. 17 
However, when the bourgeois characters in the novel seek to reproduce this artificial 
language and behaviour, they find, paradoxically, that they are unable to do so in an authentic 
way. When the narrator opens up the Goncourt journal in the final volume of the novel, he 
finds a description of the language of Mme Verdurin, now the Princesse de Guermantes, 
which makes clear her failure to imitate the language of her new family: 
'Et ma foi, en entendant cette femme qui, en passant par tant de milieux 
vraiment distingu6s, a garde pourtant dans sa parole un peu de la verdeur de la 
parole d'une femme du peuple, une parole qui vous montre les choses avec la 
couleur que votre imagination y voit, 1'eau me vient a la bouche de la vie 
qu'elle me confesse avoir menee la-bas. ' (FV: p. 291) 
The freshness and freedom of Mme Verdurin's language, preserved right through her social 
ascent, is apparently characterized here in extremely favourable terms. The 'verdeur' of her 
speech -- Ia parole d'une femme du peuple' -- implies a naturalness and frankness which 
stand in stark contrast to the artificiality of the language of the aristocracy. However, this 
contrast ultimately signals her failure to adapt to the position to which she has risen. Her 
language has no place in the strictly-circumscribed and highly codified realms of the faubourg 
Saint-Germain, which requires the transcendence, rather than the preservation, of her former 
language and identity. The extract finally operates as a wicked retelling of Mme de t-1) 
Guermantes' attempts to preserve a rustic accent (11: pp. 784-85). Where the Duchesse is able, 
17 Priscilla P. Clark, 'Proustian Order and the Aristocracy of Time Past', French Review, special issue, 
6 (Spring, 1974), 92-104 (pp. 98-99). L- 
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through her links with the past, to demonstrate her ancient blood, the traces of the past in the 
language of the new Princesse, and her enthusiastic discussion of her roots, expose her as an 
imposter. She ought to imitate the language and manners of the society to which she has risen, 
but she chooses instead to adopt its habit of talking about its past. Proust himself disposes of a 
literary rival through his own imitation in this passage, which parodies the style of the 
Goncourt brothers. However, within this frame, the text discloses a failure of imitation. The 
bourgeois Mme Verdurin is incompletely erased before the Princesse de Guermantes, and the 
two identities stand in uneasy tension in the same way as those of Mlle Legrandin and Mme 
de Cambremer. 
A second bourgeois character who struggles to imitate the forms and language of the class 
into which she has married is Gilberte, who approaches the narrator during the reception in Le 
temps retrouve: 
'Mais comment venez-vous dans des matin6es si nombreuses? me demanda 
Gilberte. Vous retrouver dans une grande tuerie comme cela, ce West pas ainsi 
que je vous sch6matisais. Certes, je m'attendais a vous voir partout ailleurs 
qu'a un des grands tralalas de ma tante, puisque tante il y a. ' (IV: p. 562) 
Unlike the ex-Madame, Verdurin, Gilberte clearly understands the need to reproduce the 
language of the circles in which she has begun to move. However, in this instance the very 
faithfulness with which she recycles aristocratic words and phrases ('tuerie', 'tralalas') 
betrays their foreignness on her lips: derivative and clich6d, her language arrogates the speech 
of the other, but is too exaggerated and imitative to enable her self-realization within the 
aristocratic community. Where the new Princesse de Guermantes fails to imitate aristocratic 
biguage closely enough, Gilberte reproduces it too precisely. 18 In the former case, the result 
is a problematic instability or multiplicity of identity, but for Gilberte it leads instead to a loss 
18 See also in this context Odette, earlier in the novel, self-consciously recycling phrases she has heard 
on the lips of Swann's smart friends (I: p. 501). Both she and Gilberte resemble the unfortunate 
bourgeois aspirant described by David Higgs: 'No sooner had an erstwhile M. Jourdain carefully 
learned the current form of good manners than his patient mimicry was derided. ' Cý Nobles in Nineteenth- Century Fi-ance: The Practice of Inegalitarianisin (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987), 
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of personal subjectivity. Where Proust erases his own features and speech to take up those of 
Montesquiou, Gilberte substitutes for her own voice a general aristocratic discourse which is 
equally unable to sustain a sense of her individual selfhood. '9 To return to the terms of 
Erasmus, she fails to digest, exploit or appropriate the language of the other, or to ground it in 
her own subjectivity, and her 'self -expression thus paradoxically turns into a form of self- 
20 
erasure. 
The attempts of the bourgeois characters in A la recherche to assume the identity of their 
aristocratic other, and to relocate themselves within the social order, are finally unsuccessful, 
therefore. While they succeed in penetrating the circles of the faubourg Saint-Germain, they 
discover when they do so that they have not relocated themselves to a privileged position 
within an enduring hierarchy, but rather collapsed the order in terms of which they were 
seeking to negotiate their identity. It also becomes clear in the novel that there is a decisive 
difference between gaining access to the highest social circles, and becoming integrated into 
them. The career of Mme de Cambremer in particular suggests that the transformation of self 
into other must always be incomplete; while the examples of Gilberte and Mme Verdurin 
suggest that this failure to transcend the bourgeois self can lead to an incoherence or erasure 
of identity. The novel finally presents not an unmitigated 'triumph' of bourgeois self- 
fashioning, but a sustained examination of the difficulties which accompany its desire to 
reinvent itself in the image of its social other, and to renegotiate its position within the 
rp. 181-82. 
9 Arno J. Mayer also describes bourgeois imitation in terms of self-loss, although, more harshly than 
Proust, he sees it as a form of self-disavowal and denial: 'Throughout the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries the grands bourgeois kept denying themselves by imitating and appropriating the 
ways of the nobility in the hope of climbing into it. ' In doing so, 'by disavowing themselves in order to 
court membership in the old establishment, the aristocratizing bourgeois impaired their own class 
formation and class consciousness and accepted and prolonged their subordinate place in the "active 
symbiosis of the two social strata"'. The Persistence of the Old Regime: Europe to the Great War 
(London: Croom Helm, 198 1), pp. 13-14. 
20 The pianist's aunt in 'Un Amour de Swann' loses self-expression in a different way. Concerned that 
her imitation of those around her may be imperfect, she slurs her speech to such an extent that her 
meaning is obscured: 'Comme elle n'avait aucune instruction, elle prononqait expr6s d'une 
mani6re confuse, pensant que si elle ldchait un cuir il serait estomp6 d'un tel vague qu'on ne pourrait le 
distincruer avec certitude, de sorte que sa conversation n'6tait qu'un graillonnement indistinct duquel 
emercreatent de temps A autre les rares vocables dont elle se sentait sOre' (I: p. 201). 
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existing social order. 
REPRESENTATIONS OF JEWISHNESS 
The relationship between the antiserrtitic self and Jewish other in A la recherche resembles 
that between the bourgeois self and its aristocratic other in a number of ways. Once again, the 
self seeks to appropriate an identity within a wider order, and once again, this identity is 
sought through the construction, manipulation and contestation of categories and boundaries. 
However, the subject is now primarily concerned not to reinvent and relocate itself within an 
established social frame, but rather to construct a coherent order by manipulating the other. 
This attempted appropriation takes two forms. There is on the one hand an attempt to 
assimilate the Jewish other; a project with which the Jewish characters in the novel are to 
varying degrees complicit. " On the other hand, there is an impulse to clemonization: the other 
is cast by antisernitic voices in terms of deviance and deficiency, and a favourable image 
secured for the self in terms of normativity and superiority. 22 1 wish to examine the text's 
engagement with these projects, and to suggest that both are ultimately frustrated. Owing to a 
crucial overdetermination of the self-other relation, assimilation -- whether the project of the 
Jewish other or the self -- always remains incomplete, while attempts to demonize or exclude 
the Jew lead the subject into self-contradiction, self-condemnation, or self-loss. 
21 This loosely reflects a historical impulse at work in nineteenth-century France. The assirnilationist 
drive was strongest in the years following the emancipation of French Jewry in 1791. The civil rights 
, granted to Jews by the 'Loi relatif au Julfs' came at the expense of national autonomy and privileges; I 
which were revoked by the same decree. The degree of historical complicity by the French-Jewish 
population is hotly contested; Phyllis Cohen Albert outlines the terms of the debate, while arguing 
strongly that French Jews understood assimilation as a flexible, partial process, in 'Israelite and Jew: 
How Did Nineteenth-Century French Jews Understand Assimilation? ', in Assimilation and Community. - 
The Jews in Nineteenth-Century Europe, ed. by Jonathan Frankel and Steven J. Zipperstem 
(Cambridge: C. U. P., 1992), pp. 88-109. 
22 The historical sources of these views are only too well-known. The theories of race 'scientists' such 
as Renan, Taine and Gobineau were elaborated, applied and propagated through the antisernitic 
publications which proliferated in France in the final two decades of the nineteenth century; notably, 
Drumont's La Francejuive in 1886, and the newspapers La Libre Parole (from 1892), and La Croix 
(increasingly antisemitic from the mid-1880s). 
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The ways in which the assimilationist project operates, and the premisses by which it is 
underwritten, are clearest at the moment of its failure. When the Duc de Guermantes speaks 
with Froberville at the evening reception in Le Cote de Guennantes, he confesses that his 
attempts to absorb Swann into the highest circles of the faubourg Saint-Germain have finally 
proved unsuccessful: 
'On me dit qu'il est ouvertement dreyfusard. Jamais je Waurais cru cela de 
lul, de lui un fin gourmet, un esprit positif, un collectionneur, un amateur de 
vieux livres, membre du Jockey, un homme entoure de la consid6ration 
generale, un connaisseur de bonnes adresses qui nous envoyait le meilleur 
porto qu'on puisse boire, un dilettante, un pere de famille. Ah! j'ai 6t6 bien 
trompe. Je ne parle pas de moi, [ ... I mais rien que pour Oriane, il Waurait pas 
dQ faire cela, il aurait d& desavouer ouvertement les Juifs et les sectateurs du 
condamne. [ ... 111 est vrai que Swann est juif. Mais jusqu'a ce jour -- excusez- 
moi, Froberville -- j'avais eu la faiblesse de croire qu'un Juif peut 8tre 
franqais, j'entends un Juif honorable, homme du monde. Or Swann etait cela 
dans toute la force du terme. H6 bien! il me force a reconnaitre que je me suis 
tromp6, puisqu'il prend parti pour ce Dreyfus [ ... I contre une soci6t6 qui Pavait adopt6, qui I'avait trait6 comme un des siens. ' (IH: pp. 76-77) 
The Duc very clearly expects the other to conform to self. Rather than attempting any kind of 
integration, or practising a liberal accommodation, he anticipates the elimination of the 
difference of the other. This is not in his eyes a form of colonization: rather, he feels wronged 
by Swann's failure to conform, which he interprets as an act of ingratitude. Having been 
treated by the faubourg 'comme un des siens', Swann has failed, as far as the Duc is 
concerned, to respond to the privilege accorded him with a proper respect for the views of the 
class which has embraced him. 
23 
For as long as this conformity to the faubourg consisted simply in sending the best port, 
attending the Jockey club and knowing the right addresses, Swann was compliant. However, 
23 A similarly noble interpretation of the assimilative impulse no doubt also underlies his determination 
elsewhere to 'purify' Swarm by inventing a genealogy which erases his Jewishness entirely: 'sachant L- C- 
que la grand-m&e de Swann, protestante mari6e A un juif, avait 6t6 la maitresse du duc de Berri, 11 L- 
essavait, de temps en temps, de croire A la 16gende qui faisait du p6re de Swann un fils naturel du 
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the Dreyfus Affair is more problematic. Creating (at least in the Duc's account above) an 
opposition betweeen Jewishness and Frenchness, Jewish and French interests, it demands 
that Swann either renounce his identity as a Jew (rather than simply laying aside the 
trappings of his Jewishness), or that he affirm his Jewishness at the expense (again, in the 
Duc's economy) of his identity as a member of the highest circles of the French aristocracy. 
Choosing the latter, he demonstrates a primary identification with his origins which is cast by 
the text in specifically racial terms: 
le nez de polichinelle de Swann, longtemps r6sorbe dans un visage agreable, 
semblait maintenant enorme, turnefie, cramoisi, plut6t celui d'un vieil 1-16breu 
que d'un curieux Valois. D'ailleurs peut-6tre chez lui en ces derniers jours la 
race faisait-elle reparaitre plus accus6 le type physique qui la caracterise, en 
m6me temps que le sentiment d'une solidarit6 morale avec les autres Juifs, 
solidarite que Swann semblait avoir oubli6e toute sa vie, et que greff6es les 
unes sur les autres, la maladie mortelle, Faffaire Dreyfus, la propagande 
antisemite avaient reveillee. (III: p. 89)24 
The text apparently uncovers an irreducible Jewish other. It is an otherness which may be 
interpreted in one of two ways. Isabelle Monette Ebert suggests that it represents 'the 
inescapable nature of [Swann's] heritage'; a racial identity which he wishes, but is finally 
unable, to conceal or to evade. 25 The words 'solidarite' and 'reveill6e' in the extract above, 
however, suggest instead a renewed identification with his Jewish inheritance, and a refusal 
to succumb to, rather than a failure to achieve, assimilation. If his 'maladie mortelle' in one 
sense exposes him, in another it expresses and enables the reclamation of a Jewish identity. 26 
prince. Dans cette hypoth6se, laquelle 6tait d'ailleurs fausse, Swann, fils d'un catholique, fils lui-m8me 
d'un Bourbon et d'une catholique, n'avait rien que de chr6tien' (III: p. 68). 
24 A similar resernitization through the Dreyfus Affair is attributed to Proust himself by Hannah Arendt; 
who describes him as 'himself half Jewish and in emergencies ready to classify himself as a Jew'. The 
Origins of Totalitarianism, rev. edn (San Diego: Harvest, 1979), p. 80. Before this time, he was 
apparently ambivalent about being identified as a Jew. He records in a letter to his mother on 22 
September 1899 his distress at being addressed as 'le neveu de M. Weil'; but in a letter to Robert 
Dreyfus (29 May 1905), he says that he refrained from correcting a newspaper misprint because it 
would have appeared that he was seeking to suppress his Jewishness. Correspondance, ed. by Philip 
Kolb, 21 vols (Paris: Plon, 1970-93), 11 (1896-190 1), p. 34 1; V (1905), pp. 180-8 1. 
25 ... Le Premier Dreyfusard": Jewishness in Marcel Proust', French Review, 67 (1993-94), 196-217 (p. 
205). 
26 In earlier drafts of the novel, Swann's Jewish heritage is prominent from the start. Julia Kristeva 
gathers together evidence from notebooks 4 and 8 which shows that Swann originally had a Jewish 
mother, and that his father was the source of the grandfather's antisernitic remarks. Le Temps sensible: 
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The other prominent Jewish character in the novel, the narrator's friend Albert Bloch, is more 
completely complicit with the assimilative process. He is willing, where Swann is not, to 
disown and renounce his race as the Duc requires: "'On ne peut pas faire deux pas sans 
rencontrer [des Israelites]. [ ... I Je ne suis pas par principe 
irr6ductiblement hostile a la 
nationalit6 juive, mais ici il ya plethore. On n'entend que: 'Dis donc, Apraharn, chai fu 
Chakop. ' On se croirait rue d'Aboukir... (11: p. 97). However, his attempted self-assimilation 
is undercut by his incorrect pronunciation and his incomplete understanding of European 
27 
titles . It is natural, he says, that the narrator should wish to visit Venice, "'pour 
boire des 
sorbets avec les belles madames, tout en faisant semblant de lire les Stones of Venai*ce de 
Lord John Ruskin, sombre raseur et l'un des plus barbifiants bonshommes qui soient. " Bloch 
croyait donc evidernment qu'en Angleterre non seulement tous les individus du sexe mdle 
sont lords, mais encore que la lettre i s'y prononce toujours ai' (H: p. 99). In the same way, 
he says 'la*fft' for 'lift'; dismissing his mistake when it comes to light with 'un ton sec et 
hautain': ... Cela n'a d'ailleurs aucune espece d'importance... (P. 99). 
28 
A similar failure of assimilation befalls the Jewish girls at Balbec; 'cette horde de fillasses 
mal 61evees, poussant le souci des modes de "bains de mer" jusqu'a toujours avoir Fair de 
revenir de p6cher la crevette ou d'6tre en train de danser le tango' (H: p. 98). Exaggerating 
Proust et Vexp&ience litt&aire (Paris: Gallimard, 1994), p. 48. For a very interesting discussion of 
Mine Swann in the notebooks, and the significance of her excision from the final text, see Marion A. 
Schmid, 'The Jewish Question in A la recherche du temps perdu in the Light of Nineteenth-Century 
Discourses on Race', Neophilologus, 83 (1999), 33-49. 
27 The inassimilability of Bloch is a constant critical theme. See, for example, John K. Hyde, 'Proust, 
his Jews and his Jewishness', French Review, 39 (1965-66), 837-48 (p. 840); Albert Sormenfeld: 'every 
episode accentuates Bloch's innate misperception of the dynamics of French society', 'Marcel Proust: 
Antisemite? F French Review, 62 (1988-89), 25-40 (p. 37); and Seth L. Wolitz; who describes him as 
'the imacye of the unassimilated Jew in the salon', The Proustian Community (New York: New York 
Univei-sity Press, 1971), p. 188; see also pp. 186-87 and 189. 
2S Drumont sees language as one of the loci where Jewishness is exposed: 'Le Julf attrape LI 
admirablement le jargon parisien. Heine, Albert Wolff, Hal6vy dont nous parlions tout ý I'heure, Cl 
beaucoup de nos confr6res allemands sont plus parisiens que nous qui sommes n6s A Paris. [ ... I Parler franqais est autre chose. Pour parler une langue il faut d'abord penser dans cette langue; 11 ya entre 
1'expression et la pens6e une corr6lation 6troite. ' tdouard Drumont, La Francejuive: essal d'histoire 
contemporaine, 48th edn, 2 vols (Paris: Marpon and Flammarion, [n. d. ]), pp. 29-30. 
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their enthusiasm for the traditional seaside activities, the girls find that their behaviour 
becomes distinctive rather than naturalized, and is constructed by the unsympathetic 
onlookers in terms of moral deviance ('fillasses mal elev6es'). The text diagnoses in each 
case a fundamental otherness, which, as with Swann, is figured in terms of a racial difference 
which can be disguised, but not erased: 'Les cheveux, jadis boucles, coiff6s a plat avec une 
raie au milieu, brillaient de cosmetique. Son nez restait fort et rouge, mais semblait plut6t 
turnefie par une sorte de rhume permanent qui pouvait expliquer I'accent nasal dont il 
debitait paresseusement ses phrases. [ ... ] Et grdce a la coiffure, a la suppression des 
moustaches, a 1'616gance, au type, a la volonte, ce nez juif disparaissait comme semble 
presque droite une bossue bien arrangee' (IV: pp. 530-3 1). 
29 
A third Jewish character in relation to whom the idea of assimilation is explored is Rachel, 
the actress who becomes the mistress of Robert de Saint Loup. She clearly recalls the 
historical Jewish actress Rachel Felix, who was able in the eyes of Matthew Arnold to 
transcend her Hebraicism through her art and attain a 'universalist' quality in its place. 30 
However, when Proust's Rachel steps up to perform before the Duchesse de Guermantes' 
guests in La Cbtj de Guermantes, and when she later recites at the final reception, her 
performance is received in very different terms: 
29 Proust was apparently marked by the same physiological otherness in the eyes of some of his 
acquaintances. Jean Recanati reports Lucien Daudet's remarks upon his '6paisse chevelure orientale', 
the Comtesse de Noailles's comment upon his 'visage orientale', and Fernand Gregh's recollection that 
'Un soir, apr6s avoir pendant quelque temps laiss6 pousser sa barbe, c'6tait tout ý coup le rabbin 
ancestral qui 6tait reparu derri6re le Marcel charmant que nous cormaissions'. Profilsjuifs de Marcel 
Proust (Paris: Buchet/Chastel, 1979), pp. 15-16. 
30 See, for example, the last of three sonnets probably written in 1863; five years after Rachel's death. 
The final tercet in particular emphasizes her combination of Hebraic and Hellenic qualities: 
'Germany, France, Christ, Moses, Athens, Rome. 
The strife, the mixture in her soul, are ours; 
Her genius and her glory are her own. ' 
The Poenis of Matthew Arnold, ed. by Kenneth Allott (London: Longmans, 1965), p. 485. 
John Stokes describes instead a refusal either to transcend, or to symbolize, her Jewishness; a resistance 
which leads to a different type of universal appeal: 'In her tragic roles Rachel addressed [her] factional 
audience [which included both 'a Jewish claque' and antisemites] as if it were one, and by refusing to 
be appropriated, yet retaining her racial identity, held it in thrall. ' 'Rachel Felix', in Michael R. Booth, 
John Stokes, Susan Bassnett, Three Tragic Actresses: Siddons, Rachel, Ristori (Cambridge: C. U. P., 
1996), pp. 66-116 (p. 68). 
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Quand on vit I'actrice, avant de commencer, chercher partout des yeux d'un 
air egar6, lever les mains d'un air suppliant et pousser comme un gernissement 
chaque mot, chacun se sentit g6ne, presque choque de cette exhibition de 
sentiments. [ ... I Les auditeurs furent stupefaits en voyant cette 
femme, avant 
d'avoir 6mis un seul son, plier les genoux, tendre les bras, en berqant quelque 
6tre invisible, devenir cagneuse, et tout d'un coup, pour dire des vers fort 
connus, prendre un ton suppliant. (IV: p. 577) 
Rather than producing a transcendent universal communication, the gesticulations and 
dramatic intonations of Rachel are alien and unintelligible to her audience. The passion and 
intensity which helped the historical Rachel to represent the Greek and Roman heroines of 
Corneille and Racine 3' here suggest instead an alienation from Hellenic representation and 
art. In the same way earlier, when she is invited to perform at the Duchesse de Guermantes', 
her rendition of a scene from Les Sept Princesses ( ... elle disait une phrase, pas m6me, un 
quart de phrase, et puis elle s'arr6tait; elle ne disait plus rien, mais je n'exagere pas, pendant 
32 
cinq minutes ... ; 11: 527) elicits only howls of laughter from the gathered guests. The text 
appears to assert, against Arnold and Lewes and their (implicitly antisemitic) vision of a 
transcended racial identity, the existence of an irreducible difference which inscribes itself in 
artistic performance as clearly as in any other sphere. 
However, unlike the otherness of Bloch and Swann, the difference detected in Rachel's 
performance here is finally presented in ambiguous terms. Proust's Rachel is displaced from 
the classical roles played by the historical actress: where the latter plays Phedre, Camille (in 
Horace), and Hern-ýione (in Andromaque), 33 the former performs scenes from Maeterlinck; a 
playwright whose work, the text makes clear, has been greeted in its own right with 
31 For the intensity of Rachel's dramatic performance, see George Henry Lewes: 'Her thin, nervous 
frame vibrated with emotion. Her face, which would have been common, had it not been aflame with 
genius, was capable of intense expression. Like Kean, she had a power of concentrating into a 
single phrase a world of intense feeling. ' On Actors and the Art of Acting (London: Smith Elder, 1875), 
pp. 24,27. 
32 The Duchesse also describes her unusual ideas about stage furniture and dramatic posture 'imaginez- 
\, oiis qu'elle avait eu la pr6tention que je fisse dresser un escalier au beau milieu de mon salon. Cest un 
rien, nest-ce pas, et elle m'avait annonc6 qu'elle resterait couch6e ý plat ventre sur les marches' (11: p. 
526). 
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incomprehension and derision by readers and spectators unable to appreciate its merits . 
3-And 
in the passage from Le Temps retrouvi, while she is now reciting 'POesies que presque tout le 
monde connaissait', the effect of her performance is interpreted by the narrator in terms of 
newness rather than inalienable otherness: Tersonne ne s'6tait dit que reciter des vers 
pouvait 8tre quelque chose comme cela' (IV: p. 577). While the text constructs a Jewish 
performance marked by difference, the reason for, and the degree of, this otherness are not 
made clear. 
Despite this ambiguity, however, Rachel, like Swann and Bloch, is ultimately characterized 
by difference. In the case of Swann, the Jewish other resists the appropriation attempted by 
the self: while he accepts the erasure of his cultural specificity, he is at a deeper level 
unwilling to relinquish his Jewish inheritance. In other instances, the inassimilability 
attributed to the Jew signals the failure of his or her own project of self-assimilation, while 
equally, implicitly, demonstrating once again the impossibility for the self of controlling 
through erasure the difference of the other. I now wish to consider two instances where the 
self abandons the project of assimilating the Jew, and seeks instead to emphasize its 
difference; constructing it in forms favourable to the self. These attempts bring to light 
aspects of, and contradictions within, the self-Jewish other relation which, in their turn, 
develop and complicate the relationships depicted in the instances above. 
The character who defines and elaborates Jewish difference most frequently in the text is the 
Baron de Charlus: 
'Quand on donne dans la Semaine sainte ces indecents spectacles qu'on 
appelle La Passion, la moitie de la salle est remplie de juifs, exultant a la 
pens6e qu'ils vont mettre une seconde fois le Christ sur la Croix, au moins en 
effigie. Au concert Lamoureux, j'avais pour voisin un jour un riche banquier 
juif. On joua L'Enfance A Christ, de Berlioz, il etait consterne. Mais il 
33 For a discussion of the roles performed by Rachel, see Stokes, pp. 77-107. 
34 The Duchesse is scathing about Les Sept Princesses, while M. d'Argencourt remarks that 'L'auteur 
I'a envovýe au Roi qui Wy a rien compris et m'a demand6 de lul expliquer' (11: p. 526). 
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retrouva bient6t 1'expression de b6atitude qui lui est habituelle en entendant 
"L'Enchantement du Vendredi saint". ' (III: p. 490)35 
The Jewish other is controlled in the passage here through a very familiar process of 
demonization. The Jewish other is constructed in terms of spiritual deviance: responsible for 
the Crucifixion of Christ, he continues to celebrate His death, and '8tre constem6' at mention 
of His life . 
36 And the identity of the Jew concerned -- 'un fiche banquier' -- also suggests a 
moral degeneracy; focussing as it does the familiar theme of economic exploitation at the 
hands of the greedy Jew. 37 This moral and spiritual deficiency implicitly defines a virtuous, 
pious and superior constructing self; as it does in colonial discourse. 38 However, unlike 
colonial discourse, antisemitic self- and other-fashioning is conceived as permanent and 
static. Where the relation between the colonial self and its other is dynamic -- the other is cast 
as uncivilized, primitive and morally deficient in order to justify its subsequent colonization 
and conversion to the terms of the self -- the antisemite resists any attempt to absorb or 
35 Curiously, Proust himself seems to have produced a somewhat irreverent artistic representation of the 
Crucifixion. William Sansom prints a comic sketch, drawn by Proust and sent to his Jewish friend, 
Reynaldo Hahn, of La TrinW adorýe par tous les saints, after Durer. The kneeling figures, many 
bearing palm-leaves, who bow before the crucified Christ in the original, are replaced in Proust's 
depiction with sketchy figures with ambiguous expressions. Proust and his World (London: Thames 
and Hudson, 1973), p. 9. 
36 This is a well-rehearsed theme in antisemitic discourse. Mgr E. Jouin, for example, declares that the 
Jew belongs to 'a fallen race; there is deep inside him an atavistic tendency, which means that at the 
crucial hour there rise from his heart to his brain all the heady eternal dreams of his fathers, scheming 
incessantly to conquer the world, and all the ancestral hatreds which, throughout twenty centuries, have 
repeated the clamour of Calvary: "Let his blood be on us and on our children"'. Le Nri1jud&- 
inaConnique, 2 vols (Paris, 1921), 11: La Judýo-maqonnerie et VEglise catholique; cited by Stephen 
Wilson, Ideology and Experience: Antisemitism in France at the Time of the Dreyfus Affair 
(Rutherford: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press; London: Associated University Presses, 1982), p. 
46 1. Drumont also makes the case for Jewish spiritual deviance; this time through the figure of Judas: 
Wous tous petits et grands qui d6fendez comme vous pouvez la victime du Calvaire, le Dieu qu'ont pri6 
vos p&res, ne vous sentez-vous pas plus heureux que cet apostat qui baise la main du bourreau du Christ 
pour une poign6e d'6cus qu'on lul jette avec d6gofiff La France juive, 1, pp. 15-16. 
37 The idea of being taken over by the semitic other is elaborated by Charlus in the passage with which 
this extract ends: learning that Bloch lives at La Commanderie, he complains of the way that Jews come 
to settle in towns with particularly Catholic names, and transform them into their ghettos (III: pp. 490- 
91). 
M 
' Elsewhere in antisemitic discourse, the themes of inferiority and deviancy are extended to intellectual 
deficiency and physical deformity. Thus Jules Soury, drawing upon the findings of racial 'scientists' 
such as Renan and Gobineau, writes to Maurice Barr6s that he considers that 'le Juif est n6 d'un 
anthropolde sp6cial comme le noir, le jaune, le peau-rouge'. Quoting Renan, he insists that 'la race 
s6mitique compar6e A la race indo-europ6enne repr6sente r6ellement une combinaison inf6rieure de la 
nature humaine'. See Barr&s, Mes Cahiers, 14 vols (Paris: Plon, 1929-57), 11: F&rier 1898-inai 1902 
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colonize the Jew. Established in part in opposition to the assimilationist impulse, the 
antisemitic movement in France steadfastly rejected the idea that the Jewish other might be 
converted or absorbed by the self. The relation between self and other operates as a fixed 
hierarchy, therefore: the self constantly reinforces its identity, and controls the other's threat 
to its values through a vocabulary of hierarchy and deviance. 
A different way of constructing and controlling the otherness of the Jew is attempted by the 
narrator's grandfather. Whenever Marcel brings a new friend to the house: 
c'6tait toujours un juif, ce qui ne lui eOt pas deplu en principe -- meme son 
arrfi Swann etait d'origine juive -- s'iI n'avait trouve que ce Wetait pas 
d'habitude parmi les meilleurs que je le choisissais. Aussi quand j'amenais un 
nouvel ami il etait bien rare qu'il ne fredonndt pas: '0 Dieu de nos Peres' de 
La Juive ou bien Vsra, ý1, romps ta chafne', ne chantant que I'air naturellement 
(Ti la lam ta lam, talim), mais j'avais peur que mon camarade ne le connat et 
ne r6tablit les paroles. 
Avant de les avoir vus, rien qu'en entenclant leur nom qui, bien souvent, 
Wavait rien de particulierement israelite, il devinait non seulement Forigine 
juive de ceux de mes amis qui 1'6taient en effet, mais meme ce qu'il y avait 
quelquefois de fdcheux clans leur famille. [ ... ] Apres nous avoir pose 
adroitement quelques questions pr6cises, il s'ecriait: 'A la garde! A la garde! ' 
(L P. 90). 
The notion of deviance still has a part to play in the extract here: while the grandfather 
carefully separates Jewishness and deviance, it is clear that the associations he makes 
between Jews and immorality is not an innocent one. However, for the most part, he 
constructs and defines the otherness of the Jew in a different way. Where Charlus establishes 
a good/evil, normative/degenerate dichotomy, the grandfather sets up a simpler opposition 
between self and not-self, which is used to marginalize, rather than to demonize, the Jewish 
other. Where Charlus ascribes a series of negative characteristics to the figure of the Jew, the 
grandfather quotes lines from the operas La Jifive and Sanison et DaIda which mark out and tn 
(1930), pp. 117-20. Drumont also describes the aesthetically deviant Jewish body: 'Ies ongles carr6s au 
lieu d'etre arrondis en amande, le torse trop long'. La Francejuive, 1, p. 34. 
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stigmatize the Jew as different from the self, but which do not define him in either positive or 
negative terms. Instead they exclude him. 
Proust identifies two ways of constructing the difference of the Jew, therefore. While Charlus 
recycles the strongly defined, hierarchical oppositions deployed by Drumont and his 
contemporaries, to produce a static, normative, positive account of the self, the narrator's 
grandfather establishes a more fluid opposition which trades upon the idea of the other 
without seeking to evaluate or demonize it for the purposes of the self; which demands only 
that the boundaries between self and other be made clear. The significance of the distinction 
between these two ways of exploiting the notion of difference should become clear as I 
proceed to consider the ways in which the text responds to these racial constructions. Each is 
vulnerable to subversion, and to resistance by the other, but the two are susceptible in 
different ways. 
The first way in which antisen-fitic constructions are challenged in the text is through the 
destabilization of the boundaries upon which they depend: 
Quant aux hommes, malgre 1'eclat des smokings et des souliers vernis, 
1'exag6ration de leur type faisait penser a ces recherches dites 'intelligentes' 
des peintres qui ayant a illustrer les Evangiles ou les Mille et Une Nuits, 
pensent au pays oU' la scene se passe et donnent a saint Pierre ou a Ali-Baba 
pr6cisement la figure qu'avait le plus gros 'ponte' de Balbec. (H: p. 98) 
The resemitization of St Peter in the passage here establishes a degree of continuity between 
Judaism and Christianity. It makes clear that Jews were the spiritual fathers and teachers of 
the French Catholic population, and the chosen people of the Christian God. The same idea is 
taken in a slightly different direction in the passage towards the start of the novel in which 
the narrator describes 'deux tapisseries' representing le couronnement d'Esther' (I: p. 60), 
on the walls of the church at Combray. The representation of Old Testament characters on 
the \valls of a Catholic church emphasizes more clearly the links which exist between other 
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and self. Jews are not simply the people out of whom God made the first Christians, but the 
branch onto which Christians are grafted as the covenant of the Old Testament shared by the 
two religions is renewed and fulfilled by the new covenant of Christ. 
The continuities thus established between the two religions introduce contradictions and 
incoherences into the grandfather's representation of Jewishness. The within/without 
dichotomy he constructs assumes that self and other are separate categories: the timid 
Israelite can be stigmatized and excluded because a clear distinction is perceived to exist 
between him and the Christian self. The grandfather hums the tunes of '6 Dieu de nos 
Peres', and 'Oui, je suis de la race elue' (1: p. 91) in order to 'other' the narrator's 'Jewish' 
friends. The figures of Peter and Esther, however, demonstrate that both the 'Dieu' and 
'Peres' concerned are also those of the self, and that 'la race 6lue' of the Hebrew people is 
also that of the Christian. To exclude and disparage the Jewish other, once it has been 
defined in these terms, is in some sense to disown, and to be alienated from, the inheritance 
and spiritual identity of the self. In his description of the tapestries of Esther in the church, 
Marcel remarks that the colours, 'en fondant, avaient ajout6 une expression, un relief, un 
6clairage: un peu de rose flottait aux levres d'Esther au-dela du dessin de leur contour' (1: 
60). As the pink on Esther's lips strays beyond its designated boundaries, and the colours of 
the tapestries begin to merge, so too through these representations the categories established 
by antisernitic discourse begin to dissolve and collapse together. 39 
The examples of Esther and St Peter are less effective, however, as a response to the 
demonization performed by Charlus. While there may be continuities between Judaism and 
Christianity, clearly there are also fundamental differences, and by taking the Crucifixion as 
39 Matthew Arnold avoids this blurring of categories between Hellenic and Hebraic by making 
Christianity, as well as Judaism, an expression of the Hebraic: 'Christianity changed nothing in th[e] 
essential bent of Hebraism to set doing above knowing. Self-conquest, self-devotion, the following not 
our own individual will, but the will of God, obedience, is the fundamental idea of this form, also, of 
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his subject, Charlus chooses the single event which focusses this difference most closely. The 
shared Old Testament inheritance which the figure of Esther makes clear does not undermine 
this mutual otherness of Judaism and Christianity, however distastefully it is cast in the 
Baron's interpretation. However, in another sense, the figures of Peter and Esther do 
challenge, at least, Charlus's representation. When the tapestry of Esther and the painting of 
St Peter are placed alongside his depiction of spiritual wickedness, it becomes clear that his 
interpretation does not encompass or exhaust the figure of the Jew. Esther figures Jewish 
faithfulness to God and His people; Peter the Jewish follower of Christ. The figure of Peter 
also subverts Charlus's account in a second way. Demonstrating that a Jew may become a 
follower of Christ, he begins to break down the static, irreducible opposition with which 
antiserrfitism replaces the cycle of invention and conversion at the centre of colonial 
discourse, and to reintroduce instead a more fluid relationship in which the other may be 
transformed into the self. 
The attempts of the antisen-ýitic self to construct the Judaic other in terms of difference are 
susceptible to subversion in a number of ways, therefore. The continuities between Judaism 
and Christianity make the grandfather's attempts to stigmatize and exclude the 'chosen race' 
problematic, while Charlus's demonization of the Jews who killed Christ is set against the 
historical counter-examples of a Jewish apostle and faithful queen. However, the Judaic other 
which emerges in these extracts addresses more than the issues of demonization and 
exclusion. It also returns and responds to the question of assimilation. I have suggested that 
while at one level, Judaism is presented as continuous with Christianity, at another, the two 
stand in opposition: the Crucifixion expresses the fundamental, irreducible distance which 
stands between the two. The Jewish religious other is thus equally resistant either to attempts 
to demonize and exclude it, or to attempts to assin-fflate it. On the one hand, it is characterized 
the discipline to which we have attached the general name of Hebralsm' (Italics In original). Culture 
and Anarchy and Othei- Writings, ed. by Stefan Collini (Cambridge: C. U. P., 1993), p. 128. 
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by continuities with the self, and by a spiritual purity and propriety which undermine the 
processes of exclusion, stigmatization and demonization through which the antisemitic self 
seeks to define and control its difference. On the other hand, it is irreducibly different from 
the self: the Crucifixion scene articulates an unbridgeable divide. No integration or 
assimilation is therefore possible by the self. The text finally describes an other which is at 
once irretrievably different from the self, yet stubbornly attached to it. 
The combination of sameness and difference attributed to the other here recalls Montaigne's 
'Des cannibales'. However, in Montaigne, the construction of an other at once different from 
and similar to the self enables the self to negotiate a coherent relation: grounded in sameness, 
the defining quality of difference is retained, while the threat which it posed to the vision of 
the self is successfully defused. In the instance above, by contrast, the other's simultaneous 
similarity to and difference from the self is deeply problematic. Difference is no longer 
paradoxical in Proust; on the one hand needed, on the other a threat. Rather, it can be dealt 
with in one of two ways. Either it can be eliminated, or it can be exaggerated to the point 
where it is separate from the self, and thus can safely be demonized or excluded. A 
combination of continuity and difference in the other is no longer helpful, therefore. Instead, 
it suggests that the other can never be controlled to the satisfaction of the self. 
I wish now to suggest that this 'doubleness' also characterizes other instances of the self- 
Jewish other relation in the text. In the same way as the Jewish religious other, both the 
Jewish national other (which I have begun to discuss above in the figure of Swann) and the 
exotic Jewish other come to manifest both a fundamental difference from the self, and a 
continuity with it. The constructing self is thus frustrated at a number of levels. However, the 
artistic Jewish other represented by Rachel fails to develop this double relation to the self, 
and although it takes various forms in the text, it is in each case susceptible to antisemitic 
exploitation. 
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I have suggested above that through his support for Dreyfus, and in his physiognomy, Swann 
displays an irreducible Jewish identity, and rejects the 'French' selfhood. offered by the Duc. 
However, while the debate about Dreyfus is at its height, he also begins to adopt a deliberate 
and visible militarist stance: 
11 portait, ce qu'il Wavait jamais fait jusque-la, la decoration qu'il avait 
gagnee comme tout jeune mobile, en 70, et ajouta a son testament un codicille 
pour demander que, contrairement a ses dispositions prec6dentes, des 
honneurs n-fflitaires fussent rendus a son grade de chevalier de la Legion 
d'honneur. (III: p. 111) 
Bloch sees this behaviour as a compromise, and disparages Swann as 'cocardier' (p. I 11). 
However, I would suggest that the passage above demonstrates instead a determination to 
claim a multiple identity: as a Frenchman as well as a Jew. The faubourg has sought first to 
eliminate his difference through assimilation, and then to control it through ostracism. 
However, at the moment of exclusion, Swann re-positions himself within, and reclaims the 
rights due to him by, the society from which he has been set apart, and from which he has 
withdrawn . 
40 He continues to display an archetypal Jewish physiognomy -- and thus to 
represent otherness -- but situates himself inside the boundary of French nationality. As in the 
examples above, therefore, he is at once decisively other to the self which wishes to 
assimilate him, and inseparable from the self which wishes to ostracize him. Deliberately, in 
this instance, the Jewish other adopts an identity which frustrates at once the different 
appropriative strategies of the self. 
40 Jewishness and French nationhood are also brought together in the tapestry of Esther. The narrator tý 
recounts how: Ia tradition voulait qu'on e6t donn6 A Assu6rus les traits d'un rol de France et A Esther 
ceux d'une dame de Guermantes dont il 6tait amoureux' (1: p. 60). Symbols of French and Jewish 
nations are thus condensed into these two figures. Lawrence R. Schehr, however, interprets this 
conflation in a different way. Rather than a fusion of Jewishness and Frenchness, he sees a making- 
Je\\, ish of the non-Jew, a 'Judaism by aesthetics' which he also extends to the Odette-after-Zipporah 
constructed by Swann. 'Rachel, quand du Seigneur', L'Esprit CrMteur, 37.4 (Winter 1997), 83-93 (pp. 
89-9-1). 
135 
In this instance, the complex relation forged between other and self provides a coherent 
identity for the other. Swann conceives himself as both Jewish and French, and the double 
relation he establishes with the French self thus enables him to integrate the different parts of 
his identity; rather than imposing upon him a problematic multiplicity or excess of selfhood. 
Elsewhere in the text, however, the construction of an other at once irreducibly different 
from, but continuous with, the self, denies the other, as well as the self, a coherent 
subjectivity. To describe the Jewish other in terms of a double relatedness to the self is to 
elaborate an incoherent, unstable or overdetermined comparative identity; while to describe it 
in terms of resistance is not to afford it a place or a space of its own. The same double 
relation which enables the Jewish other to resist the appropriations of the self also prevents it 
from forging a stable identity for itself. 
A third version of Jewishness which manifests this double relation is the exotic Jewish other. 
In this instance, the relation with the self is more complex and flexible, and the text tests and 
explores the ways in which the self can exploit the other, before finally depicting a relation 
which prevents either the assimilation, or the demonization or exclusion, of the Jewish other. 
The image of the exotic Jew is primarily explored through the figure of Bloch in the drawing 
room of Mme de Villeparisis: 
Un Israelite faisant son entree comme s'iI sortait du fond du desert, le corps 
penche comme une hyene, la nuque obliquement inclin'e et se r6pandant en e 
grands 'salams', contente parfaitement un goOt d'orientalisme. [ ... ] [Bloch] 
restait, pour un amateur d'exotisme, aussi 6trange et savoureux a regarder, 
malgre son costume europeen, qu'un Juif de Decamps. (H: pp. 487-8 8)41 
The relationship between self and other is still characterized by both difference and 
continuity in the extract here. On the one hand, the Jew is used to evoke a profound sense of 
41 The scene from which this extract is taken, which describes Bloch's invitation and entry into the 
salon of Mme de Villeparisis, draws upon a familiar historical scenario. Wolitz describes how 'The 
Jew's entry into high society was furthered because the members of high society had a constant thirst 
for noveltv to entertain themselves, for people who were interesting and even a little notorious'. The 
Proustian Community, p. 155. 
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otherness: arriving as if from the desert, and carrying his body in a distinctive way, he 
appears 'etrange' to the exoticizing eyes of the watching European. On the other, he is also 
strangely attached to the self. The exotic is in some sense an imaginative self-extension of the 
subject: it is different to it, but the self nevertheless makes a degree of investment in it. The 
relation between self and other is more complex and engaged here than in the examples 
above: fascination and attraction pull against and complicate the exclusion and 
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marginalization which are apparently performed . (In some sense, of course, this 
is true of 
every 'other' invented by the self. The result of the self's imaginative resources, the 
projection of its anxieties, or the exorcism of its own moral or spiritual deviance, it can never 
be entirely distinct. ) The same ambiguities can also be seen in the passage which describes 
Charlus's desire to witness a circumcision or other Jewish rite: ... Peut-6tre pourriez-vous 
demander a votre ami de me faire assister a quelque belle fete au Temple, a une circoncision, 
a des chants juifs. [ ... 111 pourrait m6me, pendant qu'il y est, frapper a coups redoubl6s sur sa 
charogne, ou, comme dirait ma. vieille bonne, sa carogne de mere. Voila qui serait fort bien 
fait et ne serait pas pour nous d6plaire, hein! petit ami, puisque nous aimons les spectacles 
exotiques... (11: pp. 584-85). In one sense, the Jew is othered by Charlus's envisaged 
spectatorship: he becomes, like a circus act, a spectacle, paradoxically marginalized by his 
position at the centre of what Charlus construes as a performance. In another sense, however, 
Charlus acknowledges a degree of fascination as he describes his compulsion to be present at 
such an event, and that same imagined spectatorship which threatens to cast the Jew as other 
also suggests a degree of participation by the self. 
4' Alaine Buisine describes another oriental 'other' characterized by continuity with the self; this time, 
howc%, er, a matter of familiarity rather than imaginative identification. He recalls the moment in 
'Combray' when the narrator muses over the origin of the 'boutons d'or' which he sees spread over the 
helds before him: 'venus peut-8tre il ya bien des si6cles d'Asie mais apatri6s pour toujours au village'. 
Te plus 6tranger', he suggests, 'est to 'ours d6jA pr6sent dans le plus familier. Le plus f66rique C, L_ r-I Uj 
c6tole le plus prosa*ique, la quotidiennet6 est enchant6e: sans que vous vous en doutiez, FOrient [ ... ] est 
chez vous'. 'Marcel Proust: le c6t6 de I'Orient', Revue des sciences huniatnes, 214 (April-June, 1989), 
123-44 (pp. 123-25). 
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However, there is a crucial difference between the 'double' relation forged between self and 
other here, and in the examples above. Where previously, the self sought either to demonize 
or to assimilate the other, and found that in each case, its project was resisted by the 
simultaneous difference and continuity manifested by the other, now the self constructs the 
other according to a double project. The construction of an exotic other enables the self to 
marginalize it and to emphasize its otherness, while at the same time performing some kind 
of imaginative self-extension through it. Rather than continuity or difference disrupting a 
project which demands an other either completely separate from the self, or assimilable to it, 
the self constructs an other which is both similar to and different from it, according to a new 
set of purposes. Continuity and difference no longer pull against each other in this 
formulation: the investment by the self in the exotic Jew remains invisible and does not 
complicate its construction as 'other'; while the difference of the exotic other is contained by 
the self s investment, by its marginalization, and by its surface character. 
As the passage proceeds, however, the Jewish other begins to metamorphose, and to take up a 
form which problematizes these constructions: 
Le spectacle auquel 1'entree dans un salon d'une Turque, d'un Juif, nous fait 
assister, en animant les figures, les rend plus 6tranges, comme s'iI s'agissait 
en effet d'6tres 6voqu6s par un effort m6diumnimique. Cest I'dme (ou plut6t 
le peu de chose auquel se r6duit, jusqu'ici du moins, I'dme, dans ces sortes de 
mat6rialisations), [ ... ] des anciens Juifs, arrach6e a une vie tout a la fois insignifiante et transcendentale, qui sernble ex6cuter devant nous cette 
mimique d6concertante. [ ... ] 11 me semblait que si j'avais dans la lumiere du 
salon de Mme de Villeparisis pris des clich6s d'apres Bloch, ils eussent donn6 
Tlsraiýl cette rnýme image, si troublante parce qu'elle ne parait pas emaner de 
I'humanit6, si decevante parce que tout de m6me elle ressemble trop a 
I'humanit6, que nous montrent les photographies spirites. (H: pp. 488-89) 
The otherness of the Jew begins to become more radical and uncontainable, in the passage 
here. The superficial images of otherness -- the crouched body, the profound saalams -- 
attributed to the Jewish figure by the exoticizing self are replaced by a disturbing 
otherworldliness: seemingly evoked by medium activity, it manifests a transcendental quality, L- 
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which transforms its drawing-room manner into a 'mimique d6concertante'. Its otherness has 
escaped the control and limits of the appropriating self, and become, like that of the 
racialized, Dreyfusard Swann, and that of the unassin-fflable Bloch, irreducible and 
problematic. At the same time, however, it continues to bear, or perhaps at this moment 
begins to make clear, an unmistakeable and undeniable resemblance to the self: while the 
image produced by the photographs which the narrator imagines taking of Bloch would be 
'troublante parce qu'elle ne parait pas emaner de I'humanit6', it would also be 'd6cevante', 
4parce que tout de m8me elle ressemble trop a I'humanit6'. At this point, the sameness and 
difference by which the exotic other is characterized cease to work according to the purposes 
of the self, and begin instead to operate in the same fashion as in the examples above. The 
otherness of the other is too great for the self either to control or invest in, while its 
resemblance prevents its detachment or separation from the self. The other has become once 
again both irreducibly different from the self, and indivisible from it. 
While the constructions of the exoticizing self are apparently successful at first, however, but 
ultimately frustrated, neither their failure nor their success serves the cause of Bloch as a Jew 
seeking assimilation. When constructed as an exotic other, he gains access to the faubourg, 
but his 'inclusion' is (paradoxically) the result of his otherness, and depends upon his 
continued construction as such: 'seulement il faut [ ... ] que le Juif Wappartienne pas au 
"monde... (11: p. 488). When this projected identity begins to transmute, however, and the self 
to lose control of the otherness it has made, this other becomes characterized by a greater, 
rather than a lesser, degree of difference from the self. It escapes the exploitative construction 
of the self only by manifesting a radical difference which reinforces, rather than reverses, its 
exclusion. 
The relationship between self and exotic other, therefore, like that between the French self 
and Jewish other, and that between the Catholic self and Judaic other, is finally characterized 
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by a doubleness which frustrates the appropriative strategies of the constructing self. 
However, there are also examples in the text of self-Jewish other relations in which this 
doubleness mutates or breaks down, leaving the other susceptible to exploitation by the self. 
One such relation is that between the Hellenic self and Hebraic other in the realm of art and 
performance. The figure of Rachel suggests that the Jew is at an artistic level marked by an 
irretrievable otherness. The text develops as it proceeds a more complex relation between 
French and Jewish art, but the self remains able throughout either to marginalize or to 
colonize its Hebraic artistic other. 
French and Jewish culture and art are discussed once more at the evening reception in Le 
C&j de Guermantes. The narrator is appalled, when drawn to one side by Charlus, to hear of 
his plans for a performance by Bloch: 
11 pourrait peut-6tre louer une salle et me donner quelque divertissement 
biblique, comme les filles de Saint-Cyr j ouerent des scenes tirees des 
Psaumes par Racine, pour distraire Louis XFV. Vous pourriez peut-6tre 
arranger m6me des parties pour faire fire. Par exemple, une lutte entre votre 
ami et son pere oU' il le blesserait comme David Goliath. Cela composerait une 
farce assez plaisante. (H: p. 584) 
While Bloch's envisaged reenactment of David killing Goliath is the central performance in 
this scene, it is the staging of Racine's Psaumes which focusses the relationship between 
French and Jewish culture most clearly. Were Bloch to perform the Jewish role marked out 
for him by Charlus, he would be a Jew enacting a Jewish text, and would therefore open up 
no dialogue between Hellenic and Hebraic art. In the performance of the Racinian play, by 
contrast, self and other are brought into direct contact. Written by Racine, the Psaitmes are an 
expression of high French culture (and in this instance also of French nationhood, since 
performed in the presence of the Icing). At the same time, however, the subject-matter of the 
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41 Psaumes is quintessentially Jewish . In this instance, the combination of the two 
is 
apparently unproblematic. The self draws upon and appropriates the literature of the other as 
it fashions its own cultural and literary tradition. Where Rachel's performance of Maeterlinck 
uncovers tensions between French and Jewish art, the extract above describes a 
rapprochement of other and self. 
A la recherche provides two very different accounts of the relationship between Hellenic and 
Hebraic art, therefore. On the one hand, it describes irreconcilable difference, on the other, it 
envisages the conflation of the two. However, the Hebraic other is not simultaneously both 
irreducibly different from, and stubbornly attached to, the Hellenic artistic self. Rather, in 
different contexts, it manifests either a difference or a similarity, each of which can be 
controlled by the self. When the Jewish performer seeks to inhabit Hellenic discourse -- to 
convert himself into his European other -- he is characterized by otherness alone. Rachel's 
unintelligible gesticulations signal a fundamental difference which the self is able to control 
through derision, while Bloch's pro-Dreyfusard. views, expressed at party to which he has 
been invited as a performer, are dealt with through eviction and exclusion. When the terms 
are reversed, however, and the French self rewrites and performs a Jewish text -- when 
colonization replaces imitation and self-transformation -- the Hebraic text is vulnerable to 
such appropriation. Unlike the other forms of Jewishness depicted in the text, the Hebraic 
other is finally unable to resist the constructions of the self. 
As the bourgeois self failed in its attempt to refashion itself as its aristocratic other, therefore, 
and to relocate itself within the wider social frame, so too the antisemitic self in A la 
43 This is also the case with the tales of Ali-Baba, which the quotation at p. ? above presents as a 
European text resernitized, like St Peter by 'Intelligents' illustrators. Drumont uses the Mille et Une 
Nuits as an example of the (inferior) oriental text: 'Ce qui plait [I'Aryen] ce ne sont pas des aventures 
dans le genre des s6mitiques Mille et Une Nuits, oý des enchanteurs d6couvrent des tr6sors, oý des 
p&heurs, jetant leurs filets dans la mer, les retirent pleins de diamants. Il est n6cessaire, pour qu'il soit 
touch6, que sur la trame de toutes ces fictions se d6tache un etre qui se d6voue, qui combatte pour une 
cause. ' La France juive, I, P. II- 
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recherche fails in its attempt to construct a coherent order through the exploitation of the 
Jew. Characterized at once by an irreducible difference from, and an equally undeniable 
continuity with, the self, the Jewish other is able to resist attempts both to assimilate it, and to 
demonize or exclude it. The Judaic other stands at once profoundly opposed to the central 
beliefs of the Christian self, and as its ancestor and source; Swann as both a Frenchman and 
Jew; the exotic other - at first sight apparently available for appropriation by the self - as a 
voice from another world which yet refuses disavowal by the self. It is only when the 
sameness and difference of the other are distributed between different contexts and 
frameworks - creating an other which is no longer both continuous with and different from 
the self at once - that the self is able to control and exploit the 'Jew' it constructs, and to 
forge a coherent order. 
DESIRING THE OTHER 
The relationship between the subject and object of desire in A la recherche represents a 
decisive departure from the self-other relations elaborated above. No longer perceiving 
external orders as the source and site of selfhood, the subject consults instead its inner 
desires, and seeks to project them outwards, and to impose them upon the world. It tries to 
circumscribe, fashion, control and possess the object of its desire. "Its failure to achieve such 
possession has many well-documented causes: the resistance and elusiveness of the other, the 
impossibility of securing complete knowledge of its movements and desires, and the flaws in 
the strategies employed by the self. However, the self is also frustrated by a series of 
paradoxes, contradictions and perversities which characterize and attend the operation of 
44 Jonathan D. Walsh identifies the reverse dynamic when he suggests that 'the desire to appropriate the 
identity and physical being of an inscrutable Other, culturally or socially different from the subject, is 
motivated by an envious need to complete the self by means of the Other's qualities'. 'Jealousy, Envy, 
and Hermeneutics in Pr6vost's L'Histoire d'une Grecque moderne and Proust's A la recherche du 
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desire itself. I wish to sketch out briefly a number of these paradoxes as they emerge in the 
course of the narration, and then to look in greater detail at the perversities of the cycle of 
desire which comes to dominate the novel. While in some sense this cycle reinforces the 
failure of the self discussed in the earlier examples, in other ways, it admits the possibility of 
forging the semblance, at least, of a productive and coherent relation between other and self. 
Once Swann has himself been excluded from the 'petit clan' which gathers around the 
Verdurins, he fears that Odette, if allowed to attend the outings to which the clan continues to 
invite her, may have the opportunity to satisfy her desires with his rival, Forcheville, or with 
other, unknown, men. He seeks, therefore, to prevent her attendance: 
'Ce qu'il faut savoir, c'est si vraiment tu es cet 6tre qui est au dernier rang de 
1'esprit, et m6me du charme, 1'6tre m6prisable qui West pas capable de 
renoncer a un plaisir. Alors, si tu es cela, comment pourrait-on Caimer, car tu 
Wes m6me pas une personne, une cr6ature d6finie, imparfaite, mais du moins 
perfectible? Tu es une eau informe qui coule selon la pente qu'on lui offre, un 
poisson sans memoire et sans reflexion qui, tant qu'il vivra dans son 
aquarium, se heurtera cent fois par jour contre le vitrage qu'il continuera a 
prendre pour de 1'eau. Comprends-tu que ta r6ponse, je ne dis pas aura pour 
effet que je cesserai de Caimer imm6diatement, bien entendu, mais te rendra 
moins s6duisante a mes yeux quand je comprendrai que tu Wes pas une 
personne, que tu es au-dessous de toutes les choses et ne sais te placer au- 
dessus d'aucune? ' (1: pp. 285-86) 
Many of the ideas employed in the extract here are familiar from colonial discourse. The 
notions of absence and deviancy ('1'8tre m6prisable', 'au dernier rang de Fesprit', 'm6me pas 
une personne', 'une eau informe', 'au-clessous de toutes les choses'), of amelioration 
('imparfaite, mais du moins perfectible') and its opposite (Odette 'ne sais [sle placer au 
dessus d'aucune') are all deployed by Ury and Thevet -- and some by the Duc and Charlus -- 
in various ways above. However, they are now used in a different way. Rather than seeking 
to control or construct an irreducible difference, or using the concept of deviancy to justify 
colonization in terms of education or civilization, Swann uses these vocabularies to construct 
tenips perdu', Roniance QuarterlY, 42 (1995), 67-81 (p. 70). Such self-completion through the object of 
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two positions through which he hopes to manipulate Odette. If she goes to the theatre against 
his wishes, she will be cast in terms of deviance. He hopes that she will therefore decide not 
to go. However, he does not simply encourage her to stay and appropriate the morally 
virtuous alternative location he has prepared. This position itself is constructed in terms 
which will give him control. The idea of amelioration -- imperfect but at least perfectible -- 
suggests that even if she adopts the identity of one who is prepared to give up a pleasure, she 
will be cast in terms of inferiority which implicitly grant him the authority to undertake the 
process of perfection he perceives to be required. 
However, Odette's response is far from what he hopes: 
Odette depuis un moment donnait des signes d'emotion et d'incertitude. A 
defaut du sens de ce discours, elle comprenait qu'il pouvait rentrer dans le 
genre commun des 'laYus' et scenes de reproches ou de supplications, dont 
I'habitude qu'elle avait des hommes lui permettait, sans s'attacher aux details 
des mots, de conclure qu'ils ne les prononceraient pas s'ils n'etaient pas 
amoureux, que du moment qu'ils etaient amoureux, il etait inutile de leur 
ob6ir, qu'ils ne le seraient que plus apres. Aussi aurait-elle 6coute Swann avec 
le plus grand calme si elle Wavait vu que I'heure passait et que pour peu qu'il 
parldt encore quelque temps, elle allait, comme elle le lui dit avec un sourire 
tendre, obstine et confus, 'finir par manquer l'Ouverture! ' (1: p. 286) 
The first sentence of this second extract suggests a susceptibility on the part of Odette to the 
moral rhetoric which Swann has employed. However, as the passage continues, it becomes 
clear that this is not in fact the case. Odette does not attempt to evade his control through 
counter-construction -- as Albertine will later do, seeking to refute the narrator's charges of 
deviance, and to cast his own attempts to manipulate her in a morally dubious light. Odette, 
by contrast, has not even heard the arguments offered by Swann: she registers them only as a 
'scene de reproche'. But this is in one sense entirely fitting: Swann's careful constructions 
are in a crucial way irrelevant in her economy of desire. His attempts to manipulate, whatever 
their terms, signal his desire, and this automatically empowers her. A paradox begins to 
desire remains subsidiary, however, to the project of self-realization through imposition upon the world. 
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emerge at this point: the desire to control or manipulate automatically disempowers. Every 
attempt to exercise control inevitably articulates the jealousy which underwrites it, and thus 
reverses the hierarchy which the self had hoped to establish. 
This paradox, and the ascendancy which it bestows upon the object of desire rings true 
throughout 'Un Amour de Swann'. Odette consistently ignores the strategies which Swann 
deploys in his attempts to control her, in the knowledge that his jealousy effectively releases 
her (politically rather than morally) from the need to respond, and places her in control. Thus 
his supplications meet with refusals, and his anger with indifference: 'Odette, s8re de le voir 
venir apres quelques jours, aussi tendre et sournis qu'avant, lui demander une r6conciliation, 
prenait-elle l'habitude de ne plus craindre de lui d6plaire et m8me de Firriter' (I: p. 299). 
The relationship between Marcel and Albertine works in a different way. However, once 
again, the strategies of the self are frustrated by the operation of desire itself. The narrator 
describes how Albertine avoids meeting any of his acquaintances: 
Fentendai s le bruissement de la j upe d'Albertine se dirigeant vers sa 
chambre, car par discr6tion et sans doute aussi par ces egards oU' autrefois 
dans nos diners a La Raspeliere, elle s'etait ingeni6e pour que je ne fusse pas 
jaloux, elle ne venait pas vers la mienne sachant que je Wetais pas seul. Mais 
ce n'6tait pas seulement pour cela, je le comprenais tout a coup. Je me 
souvenais, j'avais connu une premiere Albertine, puis brusquement elle avait 
6t6 chang6e en une autre, Factuelle. Et le changement, je n'en pouvais rendre 
responsable que moi-m6me. Tout ce qu'elle m'eat avoue facilement, puis 
volontiers, quand nous etions de bons camarades, avait cesse de s'epandre des 
qu'elle avait cru que je I'aimais, ou, sans peut-8tre se dire le nom de I'Amour, 
avait devin6 un sentiment inquisitorial qui veut savoir, souffre pourtant de 
savoir, et cherche a apprendre davantage. Depuis ce jour-la elle m'avait tout 
cach6. (III: p. 565-66) 
In complete contrast to Odette, Albertine seeks to behave in a way which accommodates the 
jealousy of Marcel: avoiding the presence of his friends, she seeks to protect him from the 
painful suspicions which might otherwise plague him. Likewise elsewhere in La Prisonniere. 
she relinquishes a trip to the Verdurins' -- which Odette refused to do -- and NA, hen she travels 
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through the streets with the narrator, keeps her eyes averted from the men and women whom 
they pass (HI: p. 596). Where Odette understands Swann's jealousy as a sign of her own 
empowerment, Albertine is herself controlled by that of the narrator. Circumscribing her 
behaviour, and curtailing her self-expression, she fashions herself in the terms which his 
jealousy demands. 
The jealous self succeeds in this instance, therefore, in controlling both the self-articulation 
of the other's desire, and her exposure to rivals who rt-ýight awaken his suspicion. However, 
the passage above makes clear that this control not only falls short of the possession he 
demands, but is itself a barrier to that possession. Once Albertine begins to behave in 
conformity with the demands of his jealousy, the narrator loses the chance he formerly had of 
knowing her desires, which are concealed by the part he imposes upon her. And this is 
problematic; for knowledge, as the extract above begins to suggest, and the text as a whole 
continually insists, is also a crucial part of possession. 'The jealous lover hears', above all, 
and makes it his mission to heed, 'an imperious call to know. 945 Desire creates at once in its 
subject the desire to control and the desire to know, but these are contradictory, mutually- 
frustrating projects. The desire to control seeks to impose a form upon the other; but this 
inscription, or rather superscription, obscures the original text which the desire to know 
wishes to decipher. The self is cast at once as author and detective; called to determine the 
desires of the other both in the sense of deciphering them, and in the sense of dictating 
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them. Once more, the self is frustrated not by the other -- who is in this instance almost 
entirely compliant -- but by the complex demands of desire itself. 
45 Malcolm Bowie, Freud, Proust and Lacan: Theory as Fiction (Cambridge: C. U. P., 1987), p. 49. 
Bowie examines this jealous desire to know as a form of scientific enquiry, in which the narrator 
envisages himself in turn as chemist, philologist, pathologist, cryptanalyst, logician, biologist, 4-- 
physiologist, ornithologist, ichthyologist, astronomer, grammarian, philosophical analyst both deductive L- 
and inductive, historian, psychologist of perception, physicist, botanist, mathematician and 
meteorologist' (p. 50). 
4' The roles of author and interpreter do also combine in more productive ways in the novel. When 
Carol de Dobay Rifelj notes that Marcel 'is not only Albertine's reader', but 'also self-consciously her 
author', she is describing the fictions he creates about her. In this instance, authorshi sequent ip, now sub 
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A third contrary feature of the operation of desire emerges in another passage which 
considers the self s desire for authorship. The text describes how 'si, a la devanture d'un 
fleuriste ou d'un joaillier, la vue d'un arbuste ou d'un bijou le [Swann] charmait, aussit6t 11 
pensait a les envoyer a Odette' (1: p. 262), and how: 
11 voulait surtout qu'elle les reqat avant de sortir pour que la reconnaissance 
qu'elle 6prouverait lui valat un accueil plus tendre quand elle le verrait chez 
les Verdurin, ou m8me, qui sait? si le fournisseur faisait assez diligence, peut- 
6tre une lettre qu'elle lui enverrait avant le diner, ou sa venue a elle en 
personne chez lui, en une visite suppl6mentaire, pour le remercier. Comme 
jadis quand il experimentait sur la nature d'Odette les reactions du d6pit, il 
cherchait par celles de la gratitude a tirer d'elle des parcelles intimes de 
sentiment qu'elle ne lui avait pas revelees encore. [ ... ] 
Un jour que [ses] reflexions [ ... ] le ramenaient encore au souvenir du 
temps oU' on lui avait parle d'Odette comme d'une femme entretenue, et oU' 
une fois de plus il s'amusait a opposer cette personnification 6trange: la 
femme entretenue -- chatoyant amalgame d'616ments inconnus et diaboliques, 
serti, comme une apparition de Gustave Moreau, de fleurs veneneuses 
entrelacees a des joyaux precieux -- et cette Odette sur le visage de qui il avait 
vu passer les m8mes sentiments de pitie pour un malheureux, de r6volte 
contre une injustice, de gratitude pour un bienfait, qu'il avait vu 6prouver 
autrefois par sa propre mere, par ses amis. [ ... ] [L']image du banquier lui 
rappela qu'il aurait ay prendre de I'argent. En effet, si ce mois-ci il venait 
moins largement a I'aide d'Odette dans ses difficult6s mat6rielles qu'il Wavait 
fait le mois dernier oU' il lui avait donn6 cinq mille francs, et s'il ne lui offrait 
pas une riviere de diamants qu'elle desirait, il ne renouvellerait pas en elle 
cette admiration qu'elle avait pour sa g6n6rosit6, cette reconnaissance, qui le 
rendaient si heureux. [ ... ] Alors, tout d'un coup, il se demanda si cela, ce 
n'6tait pas precisement Tentretenir'. (1: pp. 262-64) 
This passage substantially reproduces the circumscription attempted by the self in each of the 
instances above. Taken from early in 'Un Amour de Swann', it depicts the subject of desire 
before it has also become the subject of jealousy; when it seeks not to isolate the other from 
contact with possible rivals, that is, but rather to prompt expressions of its love. Essentially, 
however, the object is the same: to govern the physical movements, and through them the 
desires, of the other. However, once again, the desiring self finds itself frustrated. While 
Swann is able, as he anticipates, to elicit from Odette the 'parcelles intimes de sentiment' he 
to the failure of knowledge, approximates, supplements or replaces this unachieved knowledge and 
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requires, he finds that the very process which grants him this control -- the giving of money 
and presents -- also, at another level, dispossesses him. The gifts which secure Odette's 
expressions of affection also define her as 'une femme entretenue', a creature alien, 
threatening, 'inconnue et diabolique'; certainly not possessed. Perversely, the very same 
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gestures which control the other also inscribe its otherness . As the passage proceeds, 
Swann 
attempts to resist this metamorphosis of his mistress: reversing the terms, he seeks to 
familiarize and thus dissolve the evil connotation of the 'femme entretenue', wondering 'si, 
en effet, cette notion d'entretenir pouvait etre extraite d'elements non pas mysterieux ni 
pervers, mais appartenant au fond quotidien et prive de sa vie' (p. 264). However, he is 
ultimately forced to consider once again 'si on ne pouvait pas appliquer a Odette [ ... ] ce mot 
qu'il avait cru si inconciliable avec elle, de "femme entretenue... (p. 264). Where in the 
instance above the desire to possess disempowered the subject, the exercise of control in the 
extract here also dispossesses. 
The working-out of desire is attended in the novel, therefore, by a series of paradoxes and 
contrarieties which ensure the failure of the self in its project of possession. Desire engenders 
a need for control, but that need, once expressed, automatically disempowers. It creates a 
compulsion to know, but sets against this compulsion a desire to shape and control which 
prevents the achievement of knowledge. And the methods through which the desiring self 
seeks to manipulate the other perversely inscribe its otherness. I now wish to turn to examine 
in detail the contrary feature of desire explored in the greatest depth by the novel. The cycle 
control. 'Circumscription: Proust's The Captive', in Reading the Other: Novels and the Problem of 
Other Minds (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1992), pp. 133-62 (p. 155). 
47 Gilles Deleuze identifies a related 'contradiction de I'amour' when he describes how 'les moyens sur 
lesquels nous comptons pour nous pr6server de la jalousie sont les moyens memes qui d6veloppent 
cette jalousie, lui donnant une esp6ce d'autonomie, d'ind6pendance ý 1'6gard de notre amour'. Proust et 
les signes, 2nd edn (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1970), P. 13. Deleuze is describing how 
signs of preference and pleasure given by the other -- which, like the letters and visits of thanks in the 
extract above, should signify possession -- become instruments of torture to Swann when he imagines 
them offered to another: 'chaque pr6f6rence dont nous profitons dessine l'image du monde possible oý 
d'autres seraient ou sont pr6f6r6s' (p. 13; italics in original). 
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of desire in one sense compounds, but in another reinflects, the failure of the self to control 
or possess the other. 
While the selves which seek to immobilize and control the objects of their desire are for the 
most part unsuccessful in the text, there are moments when they believe that they have, 
finally, succeeded in possessing the '6tres de fuite' they have been pursuing. However, when 
they do so, they find that this possession is not characterized by the satisfaction or fulfilment 
that they anticipate. Once the narrator has imprisoned Albertine in his apartment and believes 
that he possesses her completely, he finds that 'Chaque jour, elle me semblait moins jolie; 
[] je sentais le neant qu'elle 6tait pour moi, que je devais 6tre pour elle. J'6tais malheureux 
que cet etat durdt' (HI: pp. 537-38). Likewise Swann, even before he reaches the point where 
he believes he possesses Odette, 'se doutait bien que ce qu'il regrettait ainsi c'6tait un calme, 
une paix qui n'auraient pas et6 pour son amour une atmosphere favorable' (1: p. 295), and 
imagines his lack of interest should Odette cease to be for him 'une cr6ature toujours absente, 
regrettee, imaginaire quand le sentiment qu'il aurait pour elle ne serait plus ce m6me trouble 
myst6rieux que lui causait la phrase de la sonate, mais de Faffection, de la reconnaissance 
quand s'etabliraient entre eux des rapports normaux qui mettraient fin a sa folie et a sa 
tristesse' (1: p. 295). In each case, the subject becomes the victim of a cycle of desire. For as 
long as he does not possess the other, he is subject to suffering and anguish, but as soon as he 
feels assured of his mistress's affection, he is seized by boredom and indifference, from 
which he will only be relieved by renewed threats to his possession. 48 There are moments of 
happiness between these phases; moments of transition in which the self feels assured that he 
possesses the object of his desire, before the inevitable boredom has begun to set in, or his 
suspicions been reawakened . 
49However, for the most part, the self finds himself swinging 
48 The narrator reflects of Albertine early in La Prisonniýre that 'Seul le d6sir qu'elle excitait chez les 
autres, quand I'apprenant je commenqais A souffrir et voulais la leur disputer, la hissait A mes yeux sur 
un haut pavois' (III: p. 537-38). 
49 Thus when the narrator interrogates Albertine in Sodome et Goininorlie, the protestations of affection 
lie secures afford him, briefly, a genuine pleasure. By La Prisoniziere, ho-,, vever, even these moments of 
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between painful jealousy and boredom: 'Je sentais que ma vie avec Albertine n'6tait, pour 
une part, quand je n'6tais pas jaloux, qu'ennui, pour Fautre part, quand j'etais jaloux, que 
souffrance' (IH: p. 895). 
This cycle is interpreted in two very different ways in the text: 
Le plus souvent Famour n'a pour objet un corps que si une 6motion, la peur 
de le perdre, l'incertitude de le retrouver se fondent en lui. Or ce genre 
d'anxi6te a une grande affinite pour les corps. 11 leur ajoute une qualit6 qui 
passe la beaut6 m6me. [ ... ]A ces 6tres-la, a ces 6tres de fuite, leur nature, 
notre inqui6tude attachent des ailes. Et meme aupres de nous, leur regard 
semble nous dire qu'ils vont s'envoler. La preuve de cette beaut6, surpassant 
la beaute, qu'ajoutent les ailes, est que bien souvent pour nous un m6me 6tre 
est successivement sans ailes et aile. Que nous craignions de le perdre, nous 
oublions tous les autres. SOrs de le garder, nous le comparons a ces autres 
qu'aussit6t nous lui pref6rons. [ ... ] Dans la mesure ou' les unions avec les femmes qu'on enleve sont moins durables que d'autres, la cause en est que la 
peur de ne pas arriver a les obtenir ou Finquietude de les voir fuir est tout 
notre amour et qu'une fois enlevees a leur mari, arrach6es a leur th6dtre, 
gu6ries de la tentation de nous quitter, dissoci6es en un mot de notre 6motion 
quelle qu'elle soit, elles sont seulement elles-m6mes c'est-a-dire presque rien 
et, si longtemps convoitees, sont quittees bient6t par celui-la meme qui avait 
si peur d'6tre quitte par elles. (IH: pp. 600-01) 
There are two ways of reading the passage above. The opening reflections and the closing 
sentence suggest a process of projection and disillusionment. Marcel's anxiety and 
uncertainty about the extent of his possession lead him to see in Albertine 'une qualit6 qui 
passe le beaut6 m6me', in the same way that the discovery that others desire her raises her to 
a lofty pinnacle in his eyes elsewhere. However, the value which he thus assigns her is a false 
one; the product of subjective investment rather than an estimate of her worth. Detached from 
the emotion by which the self has coloured them, women like Albertine 'sont seulement 
elles-mýmes Cest-a-dire presque rien'. According to such a reading, the narrator's boredom 
is caused by the inadequacy of the other, which is not, 'arrach6e a [son] thedtre', all that It 
had seemed. 
peace and happiness have disappeared, and possession is marked solely by an absence of suffering: 
'Elle 6tait capable de me causer de la. souffrance, nultement de la joie' (III: p. 5 38). 
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However, stripped of its final sentence, this extract invites -- while never acknowledging or 
explicitly endorsing -- a very different interpretation. When the narrator reflects upon the 
'ailes' which attach to fugitive others, he concludes that 'souvent pour nous un m6me 6tre est 
successivernent sans ailes et ail6', and that 'Que nous craignions de le perdre, nous oublions 
tous les autres. Sürs de le garder, nous le comparons a ces autres qu'aussitöt nous lui 
pref6rons. ' Rather than a process of projection and disillusionment, this appears to suggest a 
cycle driven by the perversity of the self. When it does not possess the other it desires above 
all to do so. Once possession is achieved, however, this is no longer what it wants: it 
immediately begins to prefer those others which remain unpossessed. In this interpretation, it 
is not the inadequacies of the other which cause the boredom experienced by the self, but 
rather the nature of the subject itself. Perpetually desiring what it does not possess, it is 
characterized by a fundamental incapacity for satisfaction. 50 
The text as a whole, and La Prisonniýre in particular, fluctuates (while rarely explicitly 
distinguishing) between these two interpretations of the cycle which it elaborates. However, 
neither adn-tits an easy solution. The self which pursues an unworthy other is confronted with 
a choice between non-possession and boredom, while the subject which desires what it does 
not have suffers from a perpetual displacement of desire. 51 Since resolution is so difficult, the 
self seeks instead to disguise or suspend the cycle of desire, and I wish now to consider a 
50 Such an incapacity for fulfilment is directly acknowledged elsewhere in the text. Reflecting on his 
lm! e for Gilberte, in A Voinbre des jeunesfilles enfleurs, the narrator concludes that 'le bonheur ne 
peut jamais avoir lieu. Si les circonstances arrivent ý 8tre surmont6es, etre vaincues, la nature transporte 
la lutte du dehors au dedans et fait peu A peu changer assez notre cceur pour qu'il d6sire autre chose que 
cc qu'll \, a poss6der' (1: pp. 613-14). 
51 Such a condition also pitches the self towards temporal disjuncture and fragmentation. If the selt7s 
shifting relation to the other is the result of an internal inconsistency of response, rather than of a 
multiplicity of characters ascribed over time to the other, then the rift bet,, veen self and other is mirrored 
by an internal fracture. 
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series of measures which enable it to imagine, at least, the unproblematic possession which it 
will never in reality achieve. 52 
Towards the end of La Prisonniýre, Marcel learns from Mme Bontemps that on the day v, 'hen 
Albertine had suddenly decided to leave Balbec with him, and to live in his apartment in 
Paris, she had learnt that Andree, who was expected at Balbec, was prevented from coming, 
and would herself be remaining in Paris. As he seeks to interpret this disclosure, he finds that 
Albertine's behaviour may be seen in two very different ways, according to which of two 
character traits he relates it to: 
Le premier trait, le consolant, fut cette habitude de faire servir une meme 
action au plaisir de plusieurs personnes, cette utilisation multiple de ce qu'elle 
faisait, qui 6tait caract6ristique chez Albertine. C'6tait bien dans son 
caractere, revenant a Paris (le fait qu'Andr6e ne revenait pas pouvait lui 
rendre incommode de rester a Balbec sans que cela signifidt qu'elle ne 
pouvait pas se passer d'Andr6e), de tirer de ce seul voyage une occasion de 
toucher deux personnes qu'elle aimait sincerement: moi, en me faisant croire 
que c'6tait pour ne pas me laisser seul, pour que je ne souffrisse pas, par 
d6vouement pour moi, Andree, en la persuadant que, du moment qu'elle ne 
venait pas a Balbec, elle ne voulait pas y rester un instant de plus. [ ... ] Mais 
malheureusement je me rappelai presque aussit6t un autre trait du caract&re 
d'Albertine et qui etait la vivacit6 avec laquelle la saisissait la tentation 
irresistible d'un plaisir. Or je me rappelais, quand elle eut d6cid6 de partir, 
quelle impatience elle avait d'arriver au train, comme elle avait bouscule le 
directeur, qui en cherchant a nous retenir aurait pu nous faire manquer 
l'omnibus. (III: p. 892) 
The hypotheses constructed by the narrator in this passage set up two very different versions 
of Albertine. On the one hand, she may be genuinely fond of him, and her urgent desire to 
leave Balbec an expression of her devotion; on the other, she may be having a lesbian affiar 
with Andr6e, and her impatience to depart may signify his dispossession. In the light of the 
cycle of desire, neither interpretation will ultimately lead to satisfaction for the self. Should 
52 An alternative to the idea of resolving or disguising this cycle is offered by Deleuze, who suggests 
that the repetition of suffering in the cycle of desire itself tends towards redemption; revealing the 
essence embedded beneath its surface: 'la r6p6tition amoureuse ne se separe pas d'une loi de 
progression par laquelle nous nous rapprochons d'une prise de conscience qui transmue nos souffrances 
en joie. [ ... ] 11 ya un tragique 
de ce qui se r6p6te, mais un cornique de la r6p6tition, et plus 
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he decide that the second hypothesis is true, and that Albertine is in love with Andr6e, he will 
be subject to the anguish of jealousy. Should he conclude that the first hypothesis is true, and 
that Albertine is devoted to him, he will find, and indeed does find, that he exchanges the 
suffering of jealousy for the bondage of boredom. However, while he remains undecided 
about which of the two is true -- and since each finds support in what he already knows of his 
mistress's character, neither can finally be discounted -- he postpones the moment when 
either of these outcomes is attained, and thus the moment when he is confronted either with 
the truth of his suspicions, or the realization that the 'devoted' Albertine he has envisaged no 
longer arouses his interest. 53 The undecidability of the hypotheses constructed in the text, 
combined with their evocation of one faithful and one unpossessable object of desire, enables 
the narrator to elaborate the fiction of a happy outcome, which, never attained, can never 
disclose its illusoriness. 
This illusion might be seen in one of two ways. It might firstly be interpreted as a cruel trick 
of which the desiring subject is the victim: the final impossibility of fulfilment in desire is 
withheld from him, and he is tantalized instead with a picture of loyalty and love; which 
would crumble were he ever to attain it. However, it might be seen instead as a form of self- 
deception. The example above occurs after the narrator has already become bored with 
Albertine several times over, only to find his desire reawakened in each case by revelations 
which suggest that she is less possessed than he had supposed. He has already encountered 
the cycle of desire, therefore, and the impossibility of fulfilment. However, his hypotheses 
enable him to carve out for himself the prospect, at least, of satisfaction, and to disguise from 
profond6ment une Joie de la r6p6tition comprise ou de la compr6hension de la loi. Nous extrayons de 
nos chagrins particuliers une We g6n6rale'. Proust et les signes, pp. 89-90. 53 Bersani, p. 77 suggests that deferral is used in a different way as he elaborates an alternative 
interpretation of the cycle of desire: 'For Marcel, personality -- his own and that of others -- is by 
definition what has not happened or has not yet been revealed; it is in its essence a secret. Even if there 
is no objective reason for him to be jealous of Albertine, you might say that he has to ask her to make 
him belie\7e that there is. If she persuaded him of her faithfulness, he would not have, in her reliable 
lo\, e for him, the fixed image of himself he needs, for this image is by nature something that others L- Z=ý 
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himself through deferral the boredom which would, inevitably, replace it were he ever to 
accept Albertine's faithfulness and devotion. According to this interpretation the Proustian 
subject, like the Montaignean self, constructs a favourable relation with its other through the 
exploitation of the concept of undecidability. Where sceptical epoche is used in the Apologie 
to dissolve the category of otherness in the face of multiple threatening others, and then to 
appropriate an identity of humility and reverence in contrast to these unspecified dogmatic 
others, Marcel reverses the process. He clings to the notion of multiplicity in order to 
preserve the possibility of a satisfactory resolution, and to postpone the moment when he is 
confronted with the truth of the negative cycle. 
However, this self-deception, if it enables the construction of a happy fiction, ultimately 
signals the failure of the self. 
54 Even as the unclecidability of the other's identity holds out the 
hope of possession, it also represents a failure to possess. In the passage above, the subject is 
essentially a detective, seeking knowledge of the other, and in this he clearly fails. The same 
postponement which prevents the realization of a problematic possession also prevents the 
achievement of knowledge. The trajectory of the passage above remains, therefore, one of 
failure. The subject continues to inhabit the realm of anguish, suffering and suspicion, even 
as he succeeds in suspending the cycle of which this suffering is part. 
cruelly withhold from him. ' In this reading, possession of the other replaces the anguish of jealousy not 
with disappointment and boredom but with self-loss. 
54 Most interpretations of the narrator's hypotheses focus on this failure of knowledge, rather than upon 
the ways they may serve the constructing self. Bowie, for example, interprets them in terms of an excess 
of interpretative power which leads to contradiction and a failure of knowledge: 'Each explanation is 
ýN, orked through to its point of maximum coherence and the two are then evaluated comparatively. [ ... I The narrator pushes his first fine edifice to one side, saying "that was one way of solving it all; now 
let's solve it again". This is the moment at which the speculative intelligence breaks out, moves on, 
takes risks. With proud ingenuity he builds an alternative model of reality and in so doing persuades 
himself briefly that his power of speculation is indefinitely self-replenishing. But the new model enters 
into competition with the old. The two hypotheses, each of them complete but the pair of them 
incompatible, lock together to produce a new form of mental captivity. ' Freud, Proust and Lacan, p. 
53. In the same way Bersani, p. 88, sees the overdetermi nation of Albertine's motives in these passages 
as an imaginative confusion which sets the object of desire at a greater distance from the self: 'The 
Proustian system of multiple motivations [ ... ] and, especially, the agonized moving from one painful 
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The passages which operate in this fashion need to be distinguished, however, from others 
which reflect upon the identity of the other in a similar, but more general way. Often when 
Swann or Marcel seeks in his jealousy to know the desires of his mistress's heart, his 
imagination moves between contrasting images of a faithful and faithless Odette or Albertine, 
in the same way that the self which constructs hypotheses moves between narratives of the 
other's devotion to him, and betrayal of him. Thus when Swann interrogates Odette, either 
about her failure to open the door to him (1: pp. 273-74), or about rumours he has heard of her 
lesbian encounters ("'Je sais bien que je suis odieux, mais il faut que je te demande des 
choses. Tu te souviens de l'idee que j'avais eue a propos de toi et de Mme Verdurin? Dis-moi 
si c'etait vrai, avec elle ou avec une autre... (I: p. 356), he is essentially seeking to decide 
between an image of a faithful Odette, and one of an unpossessed other whose desires are 
satisfied with other men and women. However, these examples do not finally reproduce the 
self-deception to which the construction of hypotheses leads. While they continue to evoke 
positive and negative versions of the other, and fail to decide between them, they do not 
reflect upon a specific picture of a devoted other in the same way, nor do they hold onto the 
idea of undecidability. While they continue to invest in the hope of a possession which would 
never satisfy them were they to attain it, therefore, the process of manufacturing but deferring 
the possession of a faithful other is absent, and the emphasis on the failure to possess much 
greater. 
I wish finally to consider the relationship between the desiring subject and its other in A 
Vombre desjeunesfilles enfleurs, which presents the narrator's first encounter with 
Albertine and her friends on the beach at Balbec, and their friendship in subsequent months. 
The relationship between the self and this first mysterious, then familiar, other in one sense 
resembles that between the jealous self and its mistress, but in another opens up complexities 
mental picture to another illustrate how the desire merely to absorb certain facts results in a 
proliferation of conjectures that make external reality seem more ungraspable than ever. ' 
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which enable the negotiation of the semblance, at least, of an acceptable relation between the 
subject and object of desire. 
The basic trajectory of the narrator's relationship with the band of girls on the beach is one of 
demystification: 
Ni parmi les actrices, ou les paysannes, ou les demoiselles de pensionnat 
religieux, je Wavais rien vu d'aussi beau, impregne d'autant d'inconnu, aussi 
inestimablement precieux, aussi vraisemblablement inaccessible. Elles 
6taient, du bonheur inconnu et possible de la vie, un exemplaire si d6licieux et 
en si parfait etat, que c'etait presque pour des raisons intellectuelles que 
j'etais desespere de ne pas pouvoir faire dans des conditions uniques, ne 
laissant aucune place a 1'erreur possible, 1'experience de ce que nous offre de 
plus mysterieux la beaute qu'on desire. (II: p. 155) 
Les geographes, les archeologues nous conduisent bien clans l'ile de Calypso, 
exhument bien le palais de Minos. Seulement Calypso West plus qu'une 
femme, Minos qu'un roi sans rien de divin. M6me les qualites et les d6fauts 
que I'histoire nous enseigne alors avoir 6te I'apanage de ces personnes fort 
reelles, diff6rent souvent beaucoup de ceux que nous avions pr6tes aux 6tres 
fabuleux qui portaient le m6me nom. Ainsi s'etait dissip6e [des jeunes filles] 
toute la gracieuse mythologie oceanique que j'avais composee les premiers 
jours. (II: p. 301) 
The disillusionment which takes place in the transition from the first to the second of these 
passages is in the context of the cycle of desire a very familiar one. Once more, a desire to 
know and possess, once fulfilled, leads only to the discovery that the other is less precious 
and interesting than the subject had at first supposed. The notion of ascription in the second 
extract makes clear that desire has invested the girls with a mythological dimension and value 
which they do not, in fact, possess. The mysterious other glimpsed by the admiring subject on 
the beach is therefore as unavailable for satisfactory possession as the desired mistress 
pursued by the jealous self. However, there are a number of significant differences between 
the self-other relation which emerges in the passages here, and the cycle of desire. First, the 
mystery with which the band of girls is invested is no longer depicted in entirely negative 
terms. While it causes a painful sense of longing and exclusion, it is nonetheless alluring and 
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attractive. This is not true of the otherness of the jealous self's mistress: Odette and Albertine 
may be invested with value by virtue of their elusiveness, but this elusiveness is not in itself 
an attractive quality. With the 'petite bande', by contrast, there is a sense in which the 
disappearance of the other's mystery is regretted by the self. Minos and Calypso are 
something less once divested, even though their mythological dimension was, it transpires, 
projected by the self. 
The mysterious/mythological nature of the band of girls encountered at Balbec elicits 
contradictory responses from the desiring self, therefore, which are absent from the later 
relation between the jealous self and its mistress. It also elicits these responses 
simultaneously. The jealous self reacts to the other with alternate anguish and lack of interest 
in a cycle of shifting response, but in contemplating the 'petite bande', the subject 
experiences both pleasure and pain -- although in shifting degrees -- throughout. In the 
passage which describes the narrator's first glimpse of the group of girls, he confesses to 
feeling 'desesper6', but the terms in which he describes them (Inestimablement pr6cieux'; 
'du bonheur inconnu et possible de la vie, un exemplaire se delicieux et en parfait etat [ I') 
make clear also a delighted admiration. Likewise, while the second extract expresses regret at 
the dissolution of the mystery which had surrounded the little band, the passage goes on to 
suggest that the self is at the same time glad: 'il West pas tout a fait indiff6rent qu'il nous 
arrive au moins quelquefois de passer notre temps dans la. familiarite de ce que nous avons 
cru inaccessible et que nous avons desire' (11: p. 301). 
The passages above thus replace the fluidity of the jealous subject's reaction to his mistress 
with a simultaneity of response, and substitute for the entirely negative character of the latter 
a complex combination of appreciation and anguish in the first instance, boredom and 
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satisfaction in the second. " These differences inevitably alter the operation of the self-other 
relation in quite significant ways. In some sense, the relation between Marcel and the little 
band resembles the cycle of desire less than the paradoxical relation between other and self 
identified and explored by Montaigne. The mystery of the other is characterized by both 
positive and negative qualities, and its dismantlement is thus both required and regretted by 
the self, in the same way that sameness and difference are in various ways both needed by. 
and a threat to, the self which encounters them in the Essais. This similarity to Montaigne 
suggests that in this instance the desiring self may be able to negotiate a satisfactory relation 
with the other: in many of the self-other relations depicted in Montaigne, the self succeeds in 
approximating, at least, a resolution of the paradox with which it finds itself confronted. 
Such a resolution is attempted in the passage which follows the second extract above; in 
which the narrator seeks to remythologize Albertine and the band of girls: 
Mon desir avait cherche avec tant d'avidite la signification des yeux qui 
maintenant me connaissaient et me souriaient, mais qui, le premier jour, 
avaient crois6 mes regards comme des rayons d'un autre univers, il avait 
distribu6 si largement et si minutieusement la couleur et le parfum sur les 
surfaces carnees de ces jeunes filles qui, 6tendues sur la falaise, me tendaient 
simplement des sandwiches ou jouaient aux devinettes, que souvent dans 
I'apres-midi pendant que j'6tais allonge, comme ces peintres qui, cherchant la 
grandeur de I'antique dans la vie moderne, donnent a une femme qui se coupe 
un ongle de pied la noblesse du 'Tireur d'6pine' ou qui, comme Rubens, font 
des d6esses avec des fernmes de leur connaissance pour composer une scene 
mythologique, ces beaux corps bruns et blonds, de types si opposes, r6pandus 
autour de moi dans I'herbe, je les regardais sans les vider peut-6tre de tout le 
m6diocre contenu dont Pexperience journaliere les avait remplis, et pourtant 
sans me rappeler expressement leur celeste origine comme si, pareil a Hercule 
ou a T616maque, j'avais ete en train de jouer au milieu des nymphes. (11: p. 
302) 
This passage in one sense resolves in a typically Montaignean fashion the paradox I have 
described. It reintroduces the idea of mystery, yet grounds that mystery in familiarity; in the 
Jean-Franqois Revel sees a similarly static, simultaneous and contradictory response to the other in 
La Prisonniýre also-, Sur Proust. - remarques sur 'A la recherche A temps perdu' (Paris: Julliard, 
1960), p. 13 1. However, it seems clear that love is conceived in the later volumes above all in terms of 
cwlical alternation. 
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same way that Montaigne grounds difference in sameness in 'Des cannibales'. The narrator 
grafts back onto the girls a scene from Greek mythology, and thus reinvests them with a 
degree of mystery and divinity. However, this projection is performed 'sans vider' the girls of 
their ordinariness, and in one sense reinforces their familiarity; transforming them into 
stereotypical figures from a stock mythological scene. The mystery with which they are 
reinvested no longer excludes the subject, therefore; particularly since it is he himself who 
controls and mediates the celestial otherness which he bestows upon them. The intimations of 
the divine and the beyond which the self had initially ascribed to the band of girls, and the 
allure with which this dimension had invested them is rediscovered, but now in terms which 
erase the negative counterweight of exclusion which characterized the original encounter. 
However, it would be wrong to suggest that the extract above constitutes, or pretends to 
constitute, an unmitigated triumph. While it resolves the paradox which has evolved, it also 
continues to express a sense of disillusionment. Self-consciously projecting back onto the 
girls the mystery and divinity with which the self's initial anticipatory glance had 
unconsciously clothed them at the outset, the passage above acknowledges that the promise 
of initiation which the goddesses had seemed to hold out was simply an illusion. The mystery 
of otherness causes the self to pursue that which, when possessed, has no value at all. fn this 
sense, the passage above inverts those which describe the narrator's formulation of 
hypotheses: where the latter depict a process of self-deception which repeats the original 
illusion of desire, the former exposes, by self-consciously re-enacting, the illusion from 
which the self has now been released. Nor is it possible to recover a legitimacy for this 
projection by appealing to its artistic nature. Unlike the subjective apprehension which the 
narrator will, in his final volume, interpret as a vital part of the artist's vision, 56 the 
imaginative reflection which takes place here is deliberately transformative; projecting onto, 
i-athei- than experiencing within a necessarily subjective frame, the objects upon which it 
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plays. The passage does not show a genuine artistic vision replacing a naive belief in the 
external world as the source of truth, and thus a genuinely productive engagement with the 
other. Instead it re-enacts and acknowledges its original illusion. 
The passage above rearticulates and responds, therefore, to the two very different ways in 
which the self encounters the mysterious object of desire; describing a way of preserving its 
mystery while defusing the problems it posed to the self. However, it is compelled to 
acknowledge that this alluring mythological dimension is, in the final analysis, a projection 
of the self, and that the mysterious other, like the unpossessed other pursued by the jealous 
self, is ultimately an illusion. I wish finally to turn to a passage earlier in the text which goes 
one step further than this, questioning the success, as well as the validity, of projection onto 
the other by the self. 
The passage which records Swann's joy when he remarks the resemblance of Odette to 
Botticelli's painting of Zipporah describes a process of projection similar to that performed 
by the narrator in relation to the 'petite bande': 
11 Westima plus le visage d'Odette selon la plus ou moins bonne qualit6 de ses 
joues et d'apres la douceur purement camee qu'il supposait devoir leur 
trouver en les touchant avec ses levres si jamais il osait Fembrasser, mais 
comme un echeveau de lignes subtiles et belles que ses regards deviderent, 
poursuivant la courbe de leur enroulement, rejoignant la cadence de la nuque 
a 1'effusion des cheveux et a la flexion des paupieres, comme en un portrait 
d'elle en lequel son type devenait intelligible et clair. 
Il la regardait; un fragment de la fresque apparaissait dans son visage et 
dans son corps, que des lors il chercha toujours ay retrouver, soit qu'iI ffit 
aupres d'Odette, soit qu'il pensdt seulement a elle. [ ... ] Et, tandis que la vue 
purement chamelle qu'il avait eue de cette femme, en renouvelant 
perp6tuellement ses doutes sur la qualit6 de son visage, de son corps, de toute 
sa beaut6, affaiblissait son amour, ces doutes furent d6truits, cet amour assure 
quand il eut a la place pour base les donnees d'une esth6tique certaine. [ ... ] 11 plaqa sur sa table de travail, comme une photographie d'Odette, une 
reproduction de la fille de Mthro, [ ... I et adaptant ce qu'il trouvait beau 
jusque-la dune faqon esth6tique A I'We d'une femme vivante, il le 
56 See my discussion below, pp. 
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transformait en merites physiques qu'il se f6licitait de trouver r6unis dans un 
6tre qu'il pourrait posseder. (1: pp. 220-21) 
Swann here responds to the cycle of desire by investing the woman he hopes to possess -- and 
who has therefore become a little uninteresting -- with an artistic dimension which justifies, 
deepens and perpetuates his desire . 
5' As with the 'petite bande', an extra dimension is grafted 
onto an other which is basically familiar and accessible to the self, in an attempt to preserve 
its interest and circumvent the cycle of desire. Once again, however, the value which is thus 
assigned is clearly an illusion. The self deceives itself in this instance not only in the sense 
that its object is not what it makes her out to be; but also in the sense that the aesthetic 
dimension it assigns her makes her desirable to it: '[Swann] oubliait que [ ... ] son d6sir avait 
toujours ete oriente dans un sens oppose ý ses gofits esth6tiques' (p. 22 1). 58 
However, the success of this self-projection is challenged both in the passage itself, and 
elsewhere in the narrative of Swann's love. When Swann reflects that 'tandis que la vue 
purement chamelle qu'il avait eu de cette femme, en renouvelant perp6tuellement ses doutes 
sur la qualite de son visage, de son corps, de toute sa beaut6, affaiblissait son amour, ces 
doutes furent detruits, cet amour assure quand il eut a la place pour base les donnees d'une 
esth6tique certaine', he identifies a battle between the material and artistic versions of Odette 
which questions the stability of the self-projector's vision. 59 Likewise elsewhere in the text, 
57 Franqo1se Leriche proposes a 'complicit6' on the part of Odette with Swann's projection here. Why 
does Odette wish to see the 'gravure' which she is bending over when Swann notices her resemblance 
to Zipporah? 'Pour "8tre initi6e", sans doute. En clair, entrer dans l'univers des repr6sentations de 
Swann. 11 faut bien, du reste, qu'elle ait demand. 6 A voir cette gravure parce que Swann lui en aura pai-16, 
aura manifest6 int6r8t ou pr6dilection pour cette ceuvre. Tout se passe comme si la femme Jusque IA 
non desir6e avait le pouvoir osmotique, en prenant connaissance de l'id6al esth6tique de Swann, de 
modeler ses traits ý cette ressemblance, seul moyen de devenir l'objet de I'amour pour 1'esth6te. ' 'La 
Seule Femme Cest la femme peinte: Fimaginaire de la Recherche, le fruit d'une longue "leqon 
d'i&alisme.. (italics in original), BSAMPAC, 36 (1986), 487-504 (pp. 501-02). 
S8 These passages thus both exemplify and twist the triangle of desire explored by Ren6 Girard; 
according to which desire is inspired by a mediator, a rival in love, or a literary figure such as Bergotte. L- 
'Le d6sir proustien est toi4joiirs un d6sir emprunt6' (italics in original), Mensonge rontantique, p. 40. In 
the passage here, Swann's desire for Odette is clearly mediated by Botticelli, but in this instance the 
other does not direct the self and its desires, so much as lead it to contradict them. 
59 A similar battle between imaginative projection and reality clearly takes place at a number of levels L- 
in the text. Neither the vision which he seeks to project upon Balbec, nor that with which he approaches 
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there are passages which suggest that the material is capable of imposing itself and 
frustrating the interpretative strategies of the self. A little further into 'Un Amour de Swann', 
Swann remarks that Thysiquement, [Odette] traversait une mauvaise phase: elle epaississait; 
et le charme expressif et dolent, les regards 6tonnes et r6veurs qu'elle avait autrefois 
semblaient avoir disparu avec sa pren-ýere jeunesse. [ ... ] 11 la regardait longuement pour 
tdcher de ressaisir le charme qu'il lui avait connu, et ne le retrouvait pas' (1: p. 287). The 
projection through which the self at Balbec succeeded in constructing a satisfactory, if 
illusory, relation with the other is here only sporadically and partially able to overcome the 
ordinariness of the other through its displacement into a work of art. In some sense, the 
projection is too formal and inflexible in this instance to accommodate the necessarily mobile 
and shifting nature of Odette's physical form. Juliette Monnin-Homung notes that while 
Proust usually compared human and painted figures in terms of 'la vie de I'dme', in the case 
of Odette 'il n'a pas su animer Odette d'autres mouvements que celui que le peintre lui a 
donne pour 1'6temite 9.60 The self is unable consistently to recapture the form and posture of 
Zipporah in his mistress, therefore, and is pitched once more towards a problematic cycle of 
desire; not in this instance an alternation of suffering and boredom, but instead a cycle of 
successful projection followed by the disillusionment which accompanies its failure. 
This resistance -- now entirely unconscious -- on the part of the other begins to demonstrate 
an important common factor between the failure of the desiring self, which operates through 
N/Ime de Guermantes, is able to survive his encounter with the material or physical form. (II: pp. 19-2 1; 
1: pp. 172-73; see also footnote ? above). In the latter case, the battle between the mythological and the 
human realities is a protracted one. Disconcerted by the appearance of the Duchesse at the wedding of 
Dr Percepled's daughter, he is nevertheless able to invest her with an historical and mythological 
dimension; which will only slowly be dismantled in Le C6M de Guermantes. 
60 Proust et la peinture (Geneva: Droz; Lille: Giard, 195 1), pp. 102,110. Mormin-Hornung sees 
Proust's close translation of Botticelli as a weakness in the characterization of Odette -- who takes on 
no life of her own -- rather than as a mould too specific to contain the 'human' figure, and thus to 
sustain a successful projection: 'si cette comparaison a le m6rite de traduire avec bonheur I'ceuvre 
peinte, [ ... I elle pr6sente un 
16ger d6faut, celui d'8tre trop fi&lement la description d'une peinture. 
[L]a grande m6moire et [I]a sensibilit6 [de la r6alit6 que Proust a perque], qui le servent 
magnifiquement, le genent aussi parfois. Elles 1'emp6chent, dans ce passage par exemple, de faire vivre 
rdellement un personnage' (pp. 109-10). 
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projection onto the other, and the bourgeois and nationalist selves, which depend upon 
assimilation, whether their own transformation into the likeness of the other. or the 
conversion of the other to the terms of the self. These latter colonizations fail because of the 
other's irreducible difference. When the Duc seeks to assiryfilate Swann, he is frustrated by 
the 'racial' otherness of his firiend, who refuses to denounce Dreyfus, and affirms instead his 
Jewish inheritance. Likewise, when Mlle Legrandin seeks to naturalize herself in the sphere 
into which she has married, her bourgeois past continues to inform her attitudes and 
behaviour, and thus to prevent her fully assuming her new identity. It would seem at first 
sight that projection onto the other by the desiring subject should avoid such a difficulty: in 
the passage above, no demands are directly placed on the other, which is not itself 
substantially changed. The site of transformation has shifted, with the perceptions of the self, 
rather than the other, becoming the locus of assimilation, and there is consequently no 
apparent reason why this form of conversion should not be successful (in the same way that 
the Duc succeeded in assimilating Swann when he constructed in his own mind a fictional 
genealogy for him, rather than demanding that his friend renounce his Jewishness). However, 
the contest which takes place between the physical and 'artistic' dimensions of Odette 
suggests that even when the other is assigned a much less central role in its own assimilation, 
its difference from the ideal which the self has conceived for it continues to make itself clear. 
The projection attempted by the desiring self is ultimately subject to the same unsuccessful 
confrontation with otherness as the bourgeois and French selves which sought to carve out an 
identity through the colonization of the other. 
However, for the subject of desire, irreducible difference is not the only reason for the failure 
to control the other. It is now the self-defeating nature of desire itself which moves centre 
stage, disempowering and dispossessing the self as it seeks to control and know the other, 4-- 
and mutating into boredom as soon as it is realized. The subject of desire also finds ways of 
responding to its failure unconsidered by the bourgeois and antisemitic selves. Where the 
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social self persists in its unsuccessful self-transformations, and where the non-Jewish self 
shuttles between assimilation and demonization, the subject of desire confronts its failure, 
and turns instead to a form of self-deception which enables it to approach, at least, a less 
problematic relation with the other. However, like the bourgeois and antisernitic selves, the 
subject of desire ultimately discovers that its powers of projection, narration and 
fictionalization are insufficient to enable it to exploit the other or wider order as it had hoped. 
As the bourgeois self fails to relocate itself within the social order, and the antisernitic self to 
construct a coherent cultural and religious order, so too the subject of desire fails in its 
attempts to project its emotions outwards, and to impose them upon its other. The text's 
extended enquiry into the possibility of self- and other-fashioning, and into the exploitation 
and creation of coherent frameworks and communities, unequivocally demonstrates the limits 
of subjective agency, and shows the self tending in addition towards self-absence, alienation, 
fragmentation and loss. 
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WOOLF 
In Virginia Woolf s To the Lighthouse, the situation of the subject is very different from that 
in the Essais or A la recherche. Now occupying the position of the other, the female self is no 
longer the exploiter or constructor of wider communities, but rather the victim of 
circumscription; no longer the agent, but now the object, of other-fashioning. As such, its 
self-realization involves not the negotiation of a coherent and consistent community, but 
rather the dissolution of the Victorian patriarchal order which controls and delimits it. And as 
such, it appears to complete the trajectory of increasing self-detachment from external orders 
that I have sought to trace out. Where the Montaignean self negotiates with wider 
frameworks to produce an integrated order which yet accommodates its own values and 
priorities, and where the Proustian subject seeks first to exploit, and then to construct, wider 
orders and communities, Woolf depicts self-realization and expression in terms of the 
dissolution of order. However, as To the Lighthouse proceeds, complete autonomy and self- 
detachment prove to be problematic for the female self, and the text begins to elaborate 
instead a new form of community; a community which releases, rather than frames or 
controls, female self-expression, and inspires, rather than curtails, female vision. 
Having traced this trajectory of increasing self-detachment and self-authorship from 
Montaigne to Proust to Woolf, I wish in the second half of the chapter to turn in a decisively 
different direction, and to identify a second, in some sense a counter-trajectory which 
emerges when Proust and Woolf are read in relation to Montaigne. While at one level the 
later writers develop the impulse to agency and self-construction which the Montaignean self 
negotiates, and increasingly move away from the integrated orders he describes, at another, 
they depict selves seekinc, to recuperate something of the integration and embeddedness I- 
identihed in the Essais. When Proust and Woolf turn to examine the plight of the modernist 
subject, they describe a self isolated or alienated from the world beyond itself, and painfully 
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aware of its exclusion from wider realities. This self is no longer concerned to secure the 
greatest possible degree of autonomy, and no longer sees self-realization in terms of 
detachment from external frameworks, but instead seeks to establish a contact with the world 
which will stabilize and authorize its subjectivity. 
There are two stages in the development of this discussion. In Woolf s Mrs Dalloway, the 
issues of isolation and reintegration are raised and explored, but never unequivocally 
resolved. Through her representation of Septimus Smith, Woolf traces out a dialectic 
between a desire for communication with the world beyond the self, and an uncertainty, 
bordering on a scepticism, that such a communion might ever be achieved. In To the 
Lighthouse and A la recherche, a firmer resolution is sought. Proust identifies the work of art 
as a site of revelation and communication which bridges the gap between self and external 
world. In To the Lighthouse, where the separation of self from world takes a number of 
different forms, the proposed resolutions are more partial and provisional. However, the final 
section of the text depicts a series of negotiations between self and self, and self and outside 
world which lead, if not to complete or unproblematic resolutions, at least to the construction 
of precarious orders which go some way towards stabilizing and integrating the individual 
subject. 
TO THE LIGHTHOUSE 
The relationship between the female subject and the Victorian order in the early part of To 
the Lighthouse is uncompromisingly drawn: 
It was sympathy he wanted, to be assured of his genius, first of all, and then to 
be taken within the circle of life, warmed and soothed, to have his senses 
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restored to him, his barrenness made fertile, and all the rooms of the house 
made full of life. [ ... j He was a failure, he repeated. Well, look then, feel then. Flashing her 
needles, glancing round about her [ ... ] she assured 
him, beyond a shadow of a 
doubt, by her laugh, her poise, her competence (as a nurse carrying a light 
across a dark room assures a fractious child), that it was real; the house was 
full; the garden blowing. If he put implicit faith in her, nothing should hurt 
him; however deep he buried himself or climbed high, not for a second should 
he find himself without her. So boasting of her capacity to surround and 
protect, there was scarcely a shell of herself left for her to know herself by; all 
was so lavished and spent; and James, as he stood stiff between her knees, felt 
her rise in a rosy-flowered fruit tree laid with leaves and dancing boughs into 
which the beak of brass, the and scimitar of his father, the egotistical man, 
plunged and smote, demanding sympathy. 
Filled with her words, like a child who drops off satisfied, he said, at last, 
looking at her with humble gratitude, restored, renewed, that he would take a 
turn. [ ... ] Immediately, Mrs Ramsay seemed to fold herself together, one petal 
closed in another, and the whole fabric fell in exhaustion upon itself [ ... ] 
while there throbbed through her, like the pulse in a spring which has 
expanded to its full width and now gently ceases to beat, the rapture of 
successful creation. ' 
The coherence of the relationship between Mr and Mrs Ramsay does not consist in a natural 
congruence here, but depends instead upon female complicity with male demands. Mrs 
Ramsay is not an autonomous subject with an independent integrity, but an uncentred 'other', 
whose subjectivity is developed in relation to, and circumscribed by, the demands and needs 
of her 'egotistical' husband. The passage begins with a list of his desires and demands: 'it [ils 
sympathy' he wants; 'to be assured of his genius', 'to be taken within the circle of life', 'to 
have his senses restored to him, his barrenness made fertile', and it is in relation to these 
needs that Mrs Ramsay's subjectivity is shaped: 'He was a failure, he repeated. Well, look 
then, feel then'. He behaves like 'a fractious child', and she is therefore cast as the 'nurse' 
who reassures him; he approaches with his 'beak of brass', and she is forced to 'rise in a 
rosy-flowered fruit tree laid with leaves and dancing boughs' into which this 'arid scimitar' 
can 'plunge'. 
I Virginia Woolf, To the Lighthouse, ed. by Stella McNichol (London: Penguin, 1992). pp. 43-44. All 
references are to this edition, and are hereafter cited parenthetically after quotations in the text. 
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Makiko Minow-Pinkney, comparing Lily Briscoe's multi-perspectivism with the 'icily 
focussed' gaze of the male, sees the female act of 'surrounding' undertaken by Mrs Ramsay 
here in extremely favourable terms: 'Penetration must give way to gentle envelopment. The 
former burrows at a single point in order to infiltrate the core of its object, while the latter 
surrounds so caressingly that the object rather becomes its inner core. [ ... ] Envelopment is a 
mode of total contact that paradoxically leaves the loved object its autonomy, whereas male 
penetration makes a localised incision but claims absolute possession' (italics in original). 
The passage above, by contrast, considering the effects of envelopment upon the enveloper, 
rather than upon its object, sees it as deeply problematic. Mrs Ramsay allows her husband to 
become her inner core at the cost of her own identity: surrounding becomes a moulding of the 
self to the shape of the other it seeks to protect. It is also clear that the female self gives at the 
cost of herself in a second sense. The images which suggest a natural nourishment in the 
passage (Tilled with her words, like a child who drops off satisfied, he said, at last, [ ... ] that 
he would take a turn') are countered by others which intimate a parasitic relationship: 'all 
was so lavished and spent'; 'the whole fabric fell in exhaustion upon itself'. Mrs Ramsay 
renews her husband not from her surplus, but from her essence: her giving is self-sacrificial. 
The affirmation of Mr Ramsay's identity, and the stability of the relation as a whole, depend 
Wif -. 
3 
upon a perpetual appropriation of the subjectivity of his e 
However, Woolf elucidates a crucial ambiguity in the way this circumscription is 
experienced by the female self While female subjectivity is clearly delimited in the passage 
above, it is provided in the process with a positive role and coherent and stable identity. As a 
2 1"irginia Woolf and the Problem of the Subject (Brighton: Harvester Press, 1987), p. 105. 
3 The absence and relativity of identity described in this passage were actively sought by Victorian anti- 
feminist writers. Sarah Ellis, for example, writing in 1842, argued that women's 'highest duty is so 
often to suffer, and be still; whose deepest enjoyments are all relative; who has nothing, and is nothing 
of herself; whose experience, if unparticipated, is a total blank. ' The Daughters of England, their 
position in societý% character and responsibilities (London: Fisher, 1842), pp. 3,126; cited by Valerie 
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nurse, Mrs Ramsay has a specific role to play, and a positive identity; as a figure of 
competence, poise and protection. 4 The demands of the barren male, too, define, and enable 
the expression of, the fertility and vitality of the woman who renews and restores her 
5 husband, and brings life and warmth in her act of successful creation. The passage above 
also suggests that circumscription and submission may, paradoxically, be experienced in 
terms of agency and authority. Many of the roles and characteristics ascribed to Mrs Ramsay 
here are typically male: protection and reassurance of her spouse, competence and poise, and 
all suggest a degree of agency, if not power. The text even has Mrs Ramsay assume the 
power of a deity, 'creating' the subjectivity of her husband, and inviting him to place his 
hope and trust in her: 'If he put implicit faith in her, nothing should hurt him; however deep 
he buried himself or climbed high, not for a second should he find himself without her. ' This 
authority is, of course, ironically described: Mrs Ramsay's 'power' consists in answering her 
husband's demands; her act of creation in restoring his ego at the expense of her own 
identity. In the same way, her 'triumph' at the end of 'The Window' consists in admitting 
that he was right, she wrong, about the possibility of visiting the lighthouse, and the success 
of Minta Doyle at dinner ('she knew, directly she came into the room, that the miracle had 
happened; she wore her golden haze') in denigrating herself and serving the ego of Mr 
Ramsay; making herself out 'even more ignorant than she was, because he liked telling her 
Sanders, Eve's Renegades. - Victorian Anti-Feminist Women Novelists (London: Macmillan, 1996), p. 
20. 
' Julia Stephen takes this one stage further when she portrays nursing not simply as a coherent role, but 
also as an art: 'A nurse's life is certainly not a dull one, and the more skilful the nurse the less dull she 
will be. The more she cultivates the art of nursing, the more enjoyment she will get. [ ... 
] To give relief, 
even if only temporary [ ... ] is perhaps a greater pleasure than can 
be found in the performance of any 
other duty' (italics in original). 'Notes from Sick Rooms', in Julia Duckworth Stephen: Storiesfor 
Children, Essaysfor Adults, ed. by Diane F. Gillespie and Elizabeth Steele (Syracuse: Syracuse 
University Press, 1987), pp. 216-40 (p. 217). 
5 Woolf does not, however, assign Mrs Ramsay the moral and spiritual role commonly ascribed to C, 
women by anti-suffrage writers; according to which the mother should remain in her domestic space, 
and act as the moral guardian of her own generation and the next. See Eve's Renegades, pp. 15-2 1. 
169 
6 
she was a fool' (TL, p. 107). However, this triumph and authority offer the female self an 
attractive sense, at least, of her selfhood and identity. 
While Woolf is unequivocal, therefore, in her depiction of a female subjectivity 
circumscribed and dictated by the egotism of the patriarchal order, she identifies important 
tensions and contradictions in the way this delimitation is experienced. The passage above 
depicts both the sacrifice and exhaustion of female subjectivity through its continual pouring- 
out, and the coherent self-definition paradoxically made possible through this self-sacrifice; 
both the reduction of the female subject to a relative other, and its apparent establishment as 
author and agent. The female self is not simply, in Woolf, subject to a prescriptive, 
exploitative order which oppresses and suppresses it, but rather, subject to an order which 
offers it a coherent identity as it denies it the freedom to shape itself; which reveres it as part 
of a process of controlling and imposing upon it. These profound contradictions at the heart 
of Victorian female experience complicate the question of renegotiation. While Mrs Ramsay 
does seek to respond to the curtailment of her subjectivity, her allegiance to, and investment 
in, the positive identity proffered by the patriarchal order limit and problematize that 
response in crucial ways. 
For the most part, Mrs Ramsay remains complicit with the order by which she is exploited. 
She is detern-ýned to protect the status quo ('woe, betide the girl -- pray Heaven it was none of 
her daughters! -- who did not feel the worth of [men's reverence], and all that it implied, to 
the marrow of her bones'), and has 'the whole of the other sex under her protection; for 
reasons she could not explain, for their chivalry and valour, for the fact that they negotiated 
treaties, ruled India. controlled finance; finally for an attitude towards herself which no 
woman could fail to feel or to find agreeable, something trustful, childlike, reverential' (TL, 
6 For a discussion of this passage, and the price which Minta pays for her golden haze, see Margaret 
Homans, Bearing the Word: Language and Female Experience in Nin eteen th - Ceti tu ry Women's 
Writing (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986), pp. 277-79. 
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p. 10). Elevated by the patriarchal order, she chooses in these instances to accept the identity 
it prepares for her, and with it the correlative circumscription; to be ruled along with India 
and controlled along with finance. 
However, there are moments in the text when she begins to explore the possibility of 
renegotiating her relationship with this wider order: 
Arriving late at night, with a light tap on one's bedroom door, wrapped in an 
old fur coat (for the setting of her beauty was always that -- hasty, but apt), 
[Mrs Ramsay] would enact again whatever it might be -- Charles Tansley 
losing his umbrella; Mr Carmichael snuffling and sniffing; Mr Bankes saying, 
'the vegetable salts are lost'. All this she would adroitly shape; even 
maliciously twist; and, moving over to the window, in pretence that she must 
go, -- it was dawn, she could see the sun rising, -- half turn back, more 
intimately, but still always laughing, insist that she must, Minta must, they all 
must marry, since in the whole world, whatever laurels might be tossed to her 
(but Mrs Ramsay cared not a fig for her painting), or triumphs won by her 
there could be no disputing this: an unmarried woman (she lightly took her 
hand for a moment), an unmarried woman has missed the best of life. (TL, pp. 
55-56) 
Mrs Ramsay seeks here to respond to her circumscription by assuming an authority which 
does not consist in sacrifice or submission, and which grants her instead a genuine power to 
control and determine male subjectivity. In one sense, she is able to do so: replaying and 
reinventing the words and actions of her victims according to her own desire and malice. 
However, there are a number of ways in which this performance is deeply problematic. Mrs 
Ramsay's control of male subjectivity, first of all, is partial and unstable. This becomes clear 
when the passage above is compared with similar performances by Julia Stephen. 
Remembering her mother in her 'Reminiscences', Woolf recalls her ability to sculpt and 
dictate male character: 'She stamped people with characters at once, and at St Ives, or on 
Sunday afternoons at Hyde Park Gate, the scene was fit for the stage; boldly acting on her 
conception she drew out from old General Beadle, or C. B. Clarke, or Jack Hills, or Sidney 
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Lee, such sparks of character as they have never shown to anyone since'. ' Julia Stephen 
stages a public perfon-nance, in which General Beadle and Jack Hills are compelled to act 
according to her conception; Mrs Ramsay, by contrast, performs a private reconstruction, in 
which fictional re-workings are substituted for actual performances. The passage above 
describes an imagined, rather than a substantive, power over masculine subjectivity. And 
these reinscriptions are the preface to a celebration of marriage -- the symbol throughout the 
novel of female deference and submission to patriarchal codes. The domination, inscription 
and interpretation of male character boldly envisaged at the outset clashes with, and cannot 
sustain itself for long before, Mrs Ramsay's more familiar assumption that female 
subjectivity may, even must, be realized in the context of the patriarchal order. 
There are also more significant difficulties with Mrs Ramsay's restaging of male subjectivity. 
Faced with a situation in which her subjectivity is circumscribed by her husband's demands, 
but through which her plenitude and vitality are expressed, she addresses the negative part of 
this formula -- seeking to escape her position as exploited other by assuming power over 
masculine identity -- rather than identifying contexts in which her energy and creativity might 
be less problematically expressed. The result of this choice is a form of self-loss. When she 
assumes the identity of Tansley or Mr Carmichael during her performance, she forfeits access 
to the positive subjectivity elucidated, however problematically, by the demands of Ramsay 
and Tansley. At the same time, however, her performance prevents her from fashioning an 
alternative identity: adopting the tone, and delivering the words, of another, she effectively 
empties out her own identity. When Mr Ramsay seized control of her subjectivity in the 
earlier passage, he came to have his identity renewed; and received such replenishment at her 
expense. In the passage above, by contrast, Mrs Ramsay receives nothing in the way of a 
coherent identity from the other she manipulates; and at the same time loses the identity she 
possessed when she was herself subject to manipulation. In exchanging the position of object 
7, Reminiscences', in Moments of Being: Utipublislied, Aiitobi'ograpiii'cal Writings, ed. by Jeanne 
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for that of subject of circumscription, she gains control of masculine subjectivity, but finally 
not of her own. The collapse of her performance into a eulogy on the benefits of marriage 
effectively acknowledges that the more she takes on the role of author and controller in this 
context, the less, paradoxically, of a positive identity she can assume. 
There is also a related problem with the assumption of authority by the female subject. In 
reversing the relationship between self and other, Mrs Ramsay not only denies herself access 
to the parts of her identity expressed through her original position, she also comes perilously 
close to assuming the negative identity of the male tyrant. As she becomes through her re- 
enactments the physical site of the words and actions of Mr Tansley and Augustus 
Carmichael, so in her malicious reworking of their mannerisms and habits she also becomes 
the denigrator (akin to Tansley), and a circumscriber like her husband. 8 (Elsewhere in the 
text, even her concern for others tips over into a form of tyranny. Put out when Mr 
Carmichael barely responds to her friendly enquiry, she wonders whether it is 'for her own 
self-satisfaction' that she 'wished so instinctively to help, to give, that people might say of 
her, "0 Mrs Ramsay! dear Mrs Ramsay ... Mrs Ramsay, of course! " and need her and send 
for her and admire herT (TL, p. 47). As she is cast in various roles by her husband, according 
to his need, so also she casts others as needy, in order to secure her own identity. ) The 
assumption of such a role is problematic: having examined circumscription from the 
perspective of its victim, the text effectively closes it off as a valid ideological space for 
either the male or female subject to occupy. However, there is also a second, more important, 
issue at stake here. In taking up the position formerly held by her husband, Mrs Ramsay 
effectively abandons the idea of female difference -- championed by Woolf in A Rooin of 
Schulkind (London: Chatto & Windus, 1976), pp. 28-63 (p. 35). 
St ng also, Woolf quest ons whether the 'excluded I Rachel Bow1by discusses how, in her polemical wri II 
woman should want or attempt to join' the ... procession" of masculine tradition' and power. Feminist 
Destinations and Fui-ther Essays on Virginia Woolf (Edinburgh: Edinburgh Univeristy Press. 1997), p. 
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One's Own, 9 written shortly after To the Lighthouse -- and seeks to transform the female self 
into its masculine other. Like the French bourgeois self castigated by Mayer, the female 
subject represented by Mrs Ramsay denies itself the opportunity to fashion its own identity 
by seeking to appropriate that of its other; an other which, in this instance, is denigrated 
rather than desired. 
Mrs Ramsay's responses to the patriarchal order are therefore problematic. For the most part, 
she collaborates with the patriarchal order, and accepts the identity -- as object of gratitude 
and worship, and source of life and plenitude -- which it offers her in compensation for the 
sacrifices it demands, and the boundaries which it imposes. When she does seek to 
renegotiate her position, she does so only in private, in part, and in ways which problernatize, 
rather than enabling, the realization of a positive identity. However, there are other female 
subjects in the text: outwardly submissive, but inwardly resistant to her vision of female 
fulfilment in marriage, and ready to embrace more radical reworkings of the relationship 
between self and patriarchal order. 'In silence, looking up from their plates [ ... ] her daughters 
-- Prue, Nancy, Rose -- could sport with infidel ideas which they had brewed for themselves 
of a life different from hers; in Paris, perhaps; a wilder life; not always taking care of some 
man or other; for there was in all their minds a mute questioning of deference and chivalry, of 
the Bank of England and the Indian Empire, of ringed fingers and lace' (TL, pp. 10-11. ). 
Through this younger generation, and in particular through Lily Briscoe, the text begins to 
explore ways of releasing female creativity, and of elaborating a specifically female 
subjectivity. 'o 
9"A Rown of One's OwWand 'Three Guj'neas', ed. by MIch6le Barrett (London: Penguin, 1993), pp. I- 
[10 
14; see especially pp. 66-7 1. 
Woolf believed that such a process was taking place in her own generation. She declares her 
conviction in 'Women and Fiction' that women are ready to face the criticism which will accompaný 
their attempts to write as women and to express female values: 'women are coming to be more 
independent of opinion. They are beginning to respect their own sense of values. [ ... ] 
Women are 
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The way is paved for this renegotiation with the death of Mrs Ramsay: 
[Mr Ramsay stumbling along a passage stretched his arms out one dark 
morning, but, Mrs Ramsay having died rather suddenly the night before, he 
stretched his arms out. They remained empty. ] [ ... ] Did Nature supplement what man advanced? Did she complete what he 
began? With equal complacence she saw his misery, condoned his meanness, 
and acquiesced in his torture. That dream, then, of sharing, completing, 
finding in solitude on the beach an answer, was but a reflection in a mirror, 
and the mirror itself was but the surface glassiness which forms in quiescence 
when the nobler powers sleep beneath? Irnpatient, despairing yet loth to go 
(for beauty offers her lures, has her consolations), to pace the beach was 
impossible; contemplation was unendurable; the mirror was broken. (TL, pp. 
140; 146) 
Where the female self in many Victorian novels is compelled to embrace either marriage or 
death, Mrs Ramsay here has to die because she has embraced the ideal of marriage too 
completely. And with her death comes that of the order she has colluded with and come to 
represent. Mr Ramsay's outstretched arms signal the end of the Victorian institution of the 
married couple, while the breaking of the mirror -- gendered feminine -- which formerly 
reflected back 'what man advanced' has also been seen 'to inform Mrs Ramsay's absence': 
4she is no longer there to reflect her husband's sense of self. " The text envisages the 
emergence of an unrestricted female subjectivity in place of the Victorian wife: the 'nobler 
powers' which have 'slept' beneath 'the surface glassiness' of the mirror will now be able to 
stir. Freed from the order which dictated and delimited their identities, women can begin to 
develop as subjects with an independent integrity and a degree of personal agency formerly 
unknown. The fragments of the broken mirror symbolize both the explosion of stable male 
identities, and the heterogeneity of female subjectivity for which this disruption prepares the 
way. 
beginning to explore their own sex, to write of women as women have never been written of before,. 
Granite and Rainbow: Essays b N, Virginia Woolf (London: Hogarth, 1958), p. 82. 
1 Jane Goldman, in Randall Stevenson and Jane Goldman, "'But What? Elegy"": Modernist Reading 
and the Death of Mrs Ramsay', Yearbook of English Studies, 26 (1996), 173-86 (p. 184). See also 
Makiko Minow-Pinkney, who discusses (pp. 98-102) Woolf s own comment, in A Rooin of One's Oivn, 
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This dissolution of order, and the anticipated elaboration of an autonomous female 
subjectivity, completes the detachment I have been tracing of self from wider order, and the 
increasing emphasis upon the self as source and agent in the construction of its identity. 
Where the Montaignean self negotiates with the cultural, religious and philosophical 
frameworks it encounters, to produce an integrated order which reflects and encompasses its 
subjectivity; where the bourgeois and antisernitic selves in A la recherche seek to exploit and 
reconstruct wider orders and communities, and to fashion themselves as privileged agents, 
but remain fundamentally situated entities; where the desiring subject in Proust dispenses 
with the idea of participation or embeddedness in a particular order, and seeks self-realization 
through imposition upon the object of its desire, To the Lighthouse, having considered and 
rejected both the existing Victorian order, and the partial, unstable reworking attempted by 
Mrs Ramsay, depicts the explosion and dissolution of coherent, integrated order, and the 
institution of heterogenous parts, spiritually and psychologically independent. The self no 
longer depends upon the wider context, and looks to itself as it fashions its identity. 
However, 'Time Passes' is not the end of To the Lighthouse, and the explosion of order, and 
institution of heterogeneity which it depicts, do not represent its final conclusion. In the final 
section of the novel, 'The Lighthouse', Woolf explores the implications of the self-other 
relation she has theorized, and demonstrates the impossibility of autonomous self-realization. 
Through Lily Briscoe, she suggests that the female subject must construct, and locate herself 
within, a different, less oppressive tradition, before she can negotiate and express an 
explicitly female identity. 
There are parts of 'The Lighthouse' which suggest a successful self-detachment from what 
has gone before: 'Mrs Ramsay has faded and gone, [Lily] thought. We can over-ride her 
wishes, improve away her lin-ked, old-fashioned ideas. [ ... ] All her being, even her beauty, 
that women are forced to serve 'as looking-glasses possessing the magic and delici f L_ r__ i ious power o 
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became [ ... ] dusty and out of date' (p. 190). Likewise, when Lily reflects that Mrs Ramsay's 
wishes have not come to pass ('she seemed to see her there at the end of the corridor of years 
saying, of all incongruous things, "Marry, marry! ... ), she suggests an unproblematic 
renegotiation of identity: '[Paul and Mintal are happy like that. I'm happy like this. Life has 
changed completely' (TL, p. 190). However, other parts of the text suggest both the difficulty 
of shedding past relations, and of establishing an independent identity. The female identity 
instituted by the Victorian order is sustained through Lily's internalization of Tansley's 
comments in 'The Window': 'She looked at the canvas, lightly scored with running lines. It 
would be hung in the servants' bedrooms. It would be rolled up and stuffed under a sofa. 
What was the good of doing it then. [ ... ] Can't paint, can't write, she murmured 
monotonously, anxiously considering what her plan of attack should be' (TL, p. 173). 
Formerly barred, in the person of Mrs Ramsay, from the realm of self-expression, and invited 
only to create and perpetuate the identity of her husband, the female self in 'The Lighthouse' 
involuntarily recycles the premisses which opposed and controlled her creativity. 12 More 
problematic than these internal censors, however, is the threat of re-circurnscription 
represented by Mr Ramsay. When Lily sets up her easel and begins to paint, the approach of 
Mr Ramsay imposes upon her a very familiar version of female identity: 'You shan't touch 
your canvas, he seemed to say, bearing down on her, till you've given me what I want of you. 
Here he was, close upon her again, greedy, distraught' (TL, p. 164). Left by the death of his 
wife with his 'arms outstretched', he seeks to establish an equivalent order with a different 
female other, and as the passage proceeds, Lily is forced to lay aside her paintbrush, and to 
substitute self-surrender for self-realization through self-expression: 'Well, thought Lily in 
reflecting the figure of man at twice its natural size'. A Room, p. 32. 
12 L- t ng. In 'Professions for Women' This is a difficulty which Woolf repeatedly raises in her critical wri I 
she describes 'a girl sitting with a pen in her hand, which for minutes, and indeed for hours, she never 
dips into the inkpot. [ ... ] She was 
letting her imagination sweep unchecked round every rock and cranny 
of the world that lies submerged in the depths of our unconscious being. [ ... ] And then there was a 
smash. There was an explosion. There was foam and confusion. The imagination had dashed itself 
against something hard. [ ... ] The consciousness of what men will say of a woman who speaks the truth 
about her passions had roused her from her artist's state of unconsciousness. She could write no more., 
The Death of the Moth and Other Essays (London: Hogarth, 1942), pp. 149-54 (p. 15-2). 
177 
despair, letting her right hand fall at her side, it would be simpler then to have it over. Surely 
she could imitate from recollection the glow, the rhapsody, the self-surrender she had seen on 
so many women's faces' (TL, p. 164). 13 Unlike Mrs Ramsay, however, Lily is alienated from 
her role. Where the former was circumscribed by the demands of her husband, but was able 
to appropriate through her role a coherent identity and illusion of agency, the latter performs 
an empty inutation, which she self-consciously interprets in terms of surrender and loss. 
The new order is continually threatened, therefore, by the structures of the old. However, it is 
also problematic in itself The difficulties which attend autonomous self-fashioning are 
focussed in the scene which follows the departure of Mr Ramsay and his demands, and 
considers Lily's emotions as she stands alone on the lawn: 
So they're gone, she thought, sighing with relief and disappointment. Her 
sympathy seemed to fly back in her face, like a bramble sprung. She felt 
curiously divided, as if one part of her were drawn out there -- it was a still 
day, hazy; the Lighthouse looked this morning at an immense distance; the 
other had fixed itself doggedly, solidly, here on the lawn. She saw her canvas 
as if it had floated up and placed itself white and uncompromising directly 
before her. It seemed to rebuke her with its cold stare for all this hurry and 
agitation; this folly and waste of emotion; it drastically recalled her and 
spread through her mind first a peace, as her disorderly sensations (he had 
gone and she had been so sorry for him and she had said nothing) trooped off 
the field; and then, emptiness. She looked blankly at the canvas, with its 
uncompron-ti sing white stare; from the canvas to the garden. (TL, p. 171) 
On one level, there is a huge sense of possibility in this passage. When Lily observes how the 
I cold stare' of the canvas 'seemed to rebuke her' for her 'folly and waste of emotion', it 
would seem that she is directing back towards Mr Ramsay what ought to be discharged onto 
the canvas which stands before her. She needs to turn to the blankness of her canvas, and to 
13 The impediments to female self-expression here, are different from those in late Victorian writing. 
Where Mr Ramsay's interference compels Lily to put down her paintbrush, and to summon her 
resources of sympathy, Lyn Pykett describes how petty domestic duties are commonly portrayed 
elsewhere as the chief barriers to the female artist. 'Portrait of the Artist as a Young Woman: 
Representations of the Female Artist in the New Woman Fiction of the 1890s', in Victorian Women 
1ý'riters and the Woman Question, ed. by Nicola Diane Thompson (Cambridge: C. U. P., 1999), pp. 
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carve out for herself, through the process of self-expression, a new, less circumscribed 
identity. A subsequent passage notes that once she has succeeded in subduing 'the 
impertinences and irrelevances that plucked her attention and made her remember how she 
was such and such a person, had such and such relations to people, she took her hand and 
raised her brush. For a moment it stayed trembling in a painful but exciting ecstasy in the air. 
Where to beginT (TL, p. 172). 
However, there is also in this passage a disconcerting sense that the explosion of the 
Victorian order also prohibits the formation of a new subjectivity. Once Mr Ramsay has left, 
and she is no longer called to perform the recognizable role that his demands have conferred 
upon her, Lily experiences a loss of self: 'her disorderly sensations (he had gone and she had 
been so sorry for him and she had said nothing) trooped off the field; and then emptiness'. 
She is left exchanging blank looks with the 'uncompromising white stare' of the canvas, 
which becomes both a metaphor for the blankness of her own mind, and a symbol of her new 
relation to the world. The backdrop and context provided by Victorian expectations has gone, 
but there is no clearly-defined 'female' identity for her to assume in its place; no vocabulary 
either for female self-expression. This is a difficulty which 'Professions for Women' also 
explores: 'The Angel was dead; what then remained? You may say that what remained was a 
simple and common object -- a young woman in a bedroom with an inkpot. In other words, 
now that she had rid herself of falsehood, that young woman had only to be herself. Ah, but 
what is "herself'? I mean, what is a woman? I assure you, I do not know. I do not believe that 
you know. ' 
14 
At this point, the text appears to reach an impasse. The heterogeneity of the order which 
governs 'The Lighthouse' liberates female subjectivity from its former circumscription, and 
115-50 (pp. 142-44). Woolf transforms and displaces this discussion in her portrait of Mrs Ramsay; the 
mother who must express her creativity through her bowl of fruit (p. 105) and bauf en Daube (p. 109). 
14 The Death of the Moth, p. 15 1. 
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anticipates and invites its self-inscription and expression. At the same time, however. the 
absence of relatedness by which it is characterized apparently leads to self-loss. The 
complete detachment from wider orders, experienced in terms of autonomy and freedom, also 
represents an isolation which prevents the articulation of identity. However, the text does not 
end with a stark choice between the circumscribed but coherent identity of 'The Window', 
and the self-loss of self- I iberation. As it proceeds, it moves beyond both circumscription and 
isolation to the production of a new form of relatedness. The fragments of the mirror, 
released by the explosion of the patriarchal order, must now be gathered together in a new 
configuration. 
Such a renegotiation is achieved through Lily's evocation of the dead Mrs Ramsay: 
And now slowly the pain of the want, and the bitter anger [ ... ] lessened; and 
of their anguish left, as antidote, a relief that was balm in itself, and also, but 
more mysteriously, a sense of some one there, of Mrs Ramsay, relieved for a 
moment of the weight that the world had put on her, staying lightly by her 
side and then (for this was Mrs Ramsay in all her beauty) raising to her 
forehead a wreath of white flowers with which she went. Lily squeezed her 
tubes again. She attacked that problem of the hedge. It was strange how 
clearly she saw her, stepping with her usual quickness across fields among 
whose folds, purplish and soft, among whose flowers, hyacinths or lilies, she 
vanished. It was some trick of the painter's eye. For days after she had heard 
of her death she had seen her thus, putting her wreath to her forehead and 
going unquestioningly with her companion, a shadow, across the fields. (TL, 
pp. 196-97) 
Mrs Ramsay is no longer a symbol of marriage in this passage, or of female complicity with 
the patriarchal order. She is no longer arm-in-arm with the demanding male other, Mr 
Ramsay, but now accompanied by an ungendered, insubstantial 'shadow'; relieved 'of the 
weight that the world had put on her'. And divested of her former associations, she is able to 
become a source of inspiration for Lily, who is able, once she feels her mysterious presence 
beside her, to resume her self-articulation onto the canvas before her (she 'squeezed her tubes 
again'). Elsewhere in 'The Lighthouse', she becomes a source of revelation: 'This, that, and 
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the other; herself and Charles Tansley and the breaking wave; Mrs Ramsay bringing them 
together; Mrs Ramsay saying "Life stand still here"; Mrs Ramsay making of the moment 
something permanent (as in another sphere Lily herself tried to make of the moment 
something permanent) -- this was of the nature of a revelation. [ ... I "Mrs Ramsay! Mrs 
Ramsay! " she repeated. She owed this revelation to her' (TL, p. 176). 
At this point, a new community begins to emerge. Having rejected the old order (and Mrs 
Ramsay too to the extent that she represents that order) Lily begins to appropriate Mrs 
Ramsay as a mother through whom, in the terms of Woolf s very famous injunction, she is 
able to 'think back'. 15 Unlike the mothers envisaged in A Room of One's Own, Mrs Ramsay is 
not an intellectual or artistic forebear, providing a model and tradition for those who follow. 
However, in a more mystical way, she models a female imagination and insight which 
releases Lily's own creativity, and enables her self-expression. Female subjectivity is 
generated and sustained through, and in relation to, a community of other female selves. 16 
However, the relationship between the female self and the community it constructs is a 
carefully-negotiated one. Like the bourgeois and antisemitic selves depicted in Proust, Lily 
assigns herself a privileged position in the order she envisages. Perpetually remaking her 
4 vision' of Mrs Ramsay (TL, p. 197) she is the author and controller of her 'mother's' 
significance; as she will also be later when she makes Mrs Ramsay (the 'odd-shaped 
15 The idea of 'thinking back' through Mrs Ramsay is suggested by Homans, p. 279. Her very 
suggestive reading of To the Lighthouse continues with a discussion of different ways in which this is 
attempted in the novel. Where Cam seeks to reproduce her mother, echoing her words, Lily's painting 
tends towards representation. See Bearing the Word, pp. 281-85. Goldman also identifies Mrs Ramsay 
as *the origin of the feminine', acknowledged by Lily as 'a source of artistic strength'. 'But What? 
Elegy? % p. 183. For Woolf s original discussion of how women 'think back through [their] mothers', 
see A Room, p. 69. 
16 The necessity of this community behind the female voice is most famously expressed in A Room of 
One's Own: 'Without those feighteenth-century] forerunners, Jane Austen and the Bront6s and George 
Eliot could no more have written than Shakespeare could have written without Marlowe, or Marlowe 
without Chaucer. For masterpieces are not single and solitary births; they are the outcome of many 
years of thinking in common, of thinking by the body of the people, so that the experience of the mass 
is behind the single voice. ' A Room, pp. 59-60. However, unlike the 'mothers' in this and many other 
passages, Mrs Ramsay inspires and enables female writing without being an artist herself. Zý L- L- 
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triangular shadow'; TL, p. 218) the subject of her painting. While a new community is 
constructed, it is a community which makes provision for the individual integrity of the 
constructing female subject; who wishes only to ground herself within, and refuses to be 
encompassed or contained by, the tradition she establishes. 
Mrs Ramsay is also controlled through the text's insistence upon her pastness. As the subject 
of an elegy, she is displaced from the present by the work of art which commemorates her; 
excluded from the here-and-now, even as she is in some sense restored to life in it. (In the 
same way, Woolf herself claimed to have laid the ghosts of her parents, and to have escaped 
their influence, and their invasion of her thoughts, through the writing of To the 
Lighthouse. )17 Mrs Ramsay is also relocated in a more distant past. Gilbert and Gubar have 
noticed that Lily's 'triangular shadow' recalls the women, 'squatting on the ground in 
triangular shapes' seen by Rachel and Terence as they pass by a primitive village in The 
Voyage Out. ' 8 Mrs Ramsay is represented at once as primordial origin and as history, 
therefore; honoured as the source, and excluded as agent from, the present of the painting 
which depicts her. There is a sense in which she is like the shadow which Lily imagines 
accompanying her. Present, but not threatening, adding depth and definition to the identity of 
the next generation, but standing behind it, and always subordinate to it, she represents a 
tradition and community in relation to which Lily can fashion herself, yet does not threaten a 
return to the prescriptive, circurnscriptive orders described in the opening part of the novel. 
17 , Father's birthday. He would have been 1928 - 1832 = 96, yes, 96 today; & could have been 96, like 
other people one has known; but mercifully was not. His life would have entirely ended mine. What 
would have happened? No writing, no books; -- inconceivable. I used to think of him and mother daily; 
but writing The Lighthouse, laid them in my mind. And now he comes back sometimes, but differently. 
(I believe this to be true -- that I was obsessed by them both, unhealthily; & writing of them was a 
necessary act. )' The Diary of Virginia Woolf, ed. by Anne Olivier Bell, 5 vols (London: Hogarth, 1977- 
84), 111: 1925-1930, p. 208 (28 November, 1928). 
18 Sandra M. Gilbert and Susan Gubar, No Man's Land: The Place of the Woman Writer in the 
Twentieth Century, 3 vols (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988-94), 111: Letters From the Front, 
pp. 15,31 
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Having begun by delineating a circurnscriptive order, therefore, having rejected the idea of 
renegotiating that order through role reversal, having theorized and explored the idea of 
completely exploding external frameworks, and establishing entirely autonomous 
subjectivities, To the Lighthouse finally interprets this dissolution of order as a necessary 
preface to the establishment of a new community, which inspires and enables, but does not 
prescribe, female self-definition. As such, it stops short of radically completing the trajectory 
of increasing self-detachment and and self-fashioning which I have been tracing out. 
However, an impulse to self-construction clearly remains central to its depiction of female 
subjectivity. Like the desiring self in Proust, the female self in To the Lighthouse moves 
away from concepts of containment within, or self-identification with, a strict or strictly- 
defined order; ascribing the other a vital role in enabling self-realization and expression, but 
refusing to make it constitutive. Looking outwards -- beyond the community, to new spaces 
which it might occupy -- rather than seeking to appropriate an identity within or in terms of 
the current order, it marks a departure from both the tightly-controlled communities depicted 
in Montaigne, and the orders within which the bourgeois and antisemitic selves seek to place 
themselves in A la recherche. However, unlike the desiring self explored by Proust, Woolf's 
female subjects retain a sense of community. Where the subject of desire often stands in 
opposition to its other, and seeks to impose upon it, the Woolfian self is inspired by the 
female other which it appropriates. The subjectivity which is subsequently articulated is 
decisively individual ('I have had my vision'; italics mine, TL, p. 226), but it remains 
indebted to the female forebear, and rooted within a tradition of specifically female 
imagination. This positive relation between self and other helps to make Woolf s the more 
successful detachment from wider contexts. Where Proust's others resist the specific and 
negative identities imposed upon them, Lily's (m)other, source of inspiration, and assigned 
no identity beyond a pastness which prevents her own imposition upon the present, offers no 
opposition to the construction by Lily of a community in which she can ground herself. Less 
exploitative and appropriative, and more loosely-related to the other, the female subject 
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depicted in Woolf is more successful than any of her Proustian counterparts in becoming the 
source of her own identity. 
At this point, I wish to turn aside from the trajectory of increasing self-authorship and 
increasing self-detachment from wider orders and communities which I have been tracing out 
so far. Begun in Montaigne, and developed in Proust, this impulse to autonomy and agency 
reaches a logical conclusion in Woolf's representation of female subjectivity. I wish now to 
turn instead to a counter-trajectory which emerges in the work of Woolf and Proust. To the 
extent that they write about a distinctively modernist subjectivity, they articulate a profound 
anxiety about the separation of self and world. Variously alienated, isolated and dislocated 
from the world beyond its own frontiers, the modernist self experiences the gap between 
itself and others not in terms of a freedom which enables self-articulation, but rather in terms 
of a disjuncture which undermines and erases subjectivity. Instead of seeking to develop the 
impulse to autonomy and self-detachment depicted in Montaigne, therefore, this modernist 
self seeks to recover a sense of community, and thus tends back towards the integrated orders 
elaborated in the Essais. It is to this second discussion that I now wish to turn, first in 
Woolf's Mrs Dalloway, and then comparatively in To the Lighthouse and A la recherche. 
MRSDALLOWAY 
'Have I the power of conveying the true reality? Or do I write essays about myself? '. '9 It was 
while writing Mrs Dalloway in 1923 that Woolf asked these famous questions, and the issues 
they raise -- about the status of subjectivity, and its relation to the outside world -- are central 
to the novel itself. They are focussed most clearly through the figure of Septimus Smith. 
19 Diary, 11: 1920-1924, p. 248 (19 June 1923). 
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Representing at once the Romantic visionary in communion with, and the modernist subject 
alienated from, the world beyond himself, he is used to stage a dialogue between the two 
positions; a dialogue which is used both to explore the disinheritance of the modernist 
su ect -- the loss which accompanies the detachment of self from world -- and also to 
consider the possibility that some form of reintegration might take place. The novel refuses, 
however, to resolve this second question, and simply traces out instead a dialectic between a 
sense of fragmentation and a longing for reintegration and communion. It is not until To the 
Lighthouse that these tensions will be provisionally, if precariously, resolved. 
Woolf's reading notebooks make it clear that she read widely around the work of the major 
Romantic poets in the years before she began to write Mrs Dalloway. Her early reading for 
The Common Reader, in notebooks dated 1918-22, includes notes upon, and quotations from, 
The Prelude, the 'Preface to Lyrical Ballads', 'Tintem Abbey', Biographia Literaria, Table 
Talk and Omniana, Endymion, A Defence of Poetry and The Banquet . 
20 References scattered 
through her essays, diaries and letters likewise testify to a continued engagement with, and 
reflection upon, Romantic thought and writing during these years . 
2' As a result, a number of 
critics have read her work with reference to the Romantic tradition. Charles Schug uses her 
4 narrative lyricism and use of persona' to illustrate his thesis that 'the modem novel has a 
20 The notebooks in which these notes are gathered (the first of six volumes in preparation for The 
Coninion Reader) are vol. XXX ([A Writer's Diary] Holograph Notebook), in which almost all the 
entries can be dated 1918, and vol. XXXVIII (Monk's House Papers/B. 2d), variously dated 1918-22. 
See Brenda R. Silver, Virginia Woolf's Reading Notebooks (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1983), pp. 152-55 and 189-95. 
21 See, for example, Diary, 11, pp. 77 (5 December 1920), 81 (19 December 1920), 88 (31 January 
1921), 129-30 (15 August 1921). While her interest is constant, however, her appreciation is less so. 
She writes to Saxon Sydney-Turner om 13 April 1911 of her admiration for The Prelude: 'Dont you 
think it one of the greatest works ever written? Some of it, anyhow, is sublime'. The Letters of Virginia 
Woolf, ed. by Nigel Nicolson, 6 vols (London: Hogarth, 1975-80), 1: The Flight of the Mind, 1888- 
1912, p. 460. However, in 1922 she speaks of his 'vagueness and poverty of thought' ('Byron and Mr 
Briags'; The Essays of Virginia Woolf, ed. by Andew McNeillie, 4 vols (London: Hogarth, 1986- ), 111, 
pp. 473-99; p. 483), and in 1923 describes his poetry as 'sedative to the point of somnolence' in ('How 
it Strikes a Contemporary'; Essays, 111, pp. 353-60; p. 358). See John W. Moses. 'Orlando's 
"Caricature Value": Virginia Woolf s Portrait of the Artist as a Romantic Poet', in English 
Ronianticisin and Modern Fiction: A Collection of Critical Essays, ed. by Allan Chavkin (New York: 
AMS Press, 1993) pp. 39-81 (p. 64). 
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Romantic form' ; 22 John W. Moses sees Orlando's aesthetic, throughout his/her life, as 'a 
synthesis of Romantic theory and the aesthetic of the age' ; 23 and various critics have argued 
for specific Romantic allusions in her novels. 24 
However, these discussions have for the most part overlooked the figure of Septimus Warren 
Smith . 
25This is surprising, since Septimus is directly identified with Keats in the course of 
Mrs Dalloway itself. Meditating first upon the 'beauty, th[e] exquisite [ ... I unimaginable 
beauty' of his surroundings, and then upon the 'profound truths' he has been called to reveal 
to the world, he comes to realize that 'all of this [ ... ] was the truth now; beauty, that was the 
truth now', and to identify himself as 'the poet of the immortal ode' . 
26 Miss Isabel Pole, too, 
muses, 'Was he not like KeatsT (MD, p. 93). This final reference is interpreted by Beverly 
Ann Schlack as 'an intricately interlocking allusive reinforcement of the death and rebirth 
theme, via the Adonis myth, here applied to Septimus by Woolf as it had been applied to 
Keats by Shelley'. 27 1 would like to suggest, more simply, that it identifies Septimus as a 
symbol of the Romantic self. 
22 The Romantic Genesis of the Modern Novel (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1979), pp. 
191,3. Schug reads Mrs Dalloway in the light of Karl Kroeber's comment that the organization of The 
Prelude 'is founded upon a continuous and systematic dialectic between public and private affairs, 
between social developments and personal growth, between an objective drama of political events and 
the subjective drama of psychological change' (p. 199). 
23 Moses, p. 54. For another article linking Orlando with the Romantic tradition, see Nathaniel Brown, 
'The "Double Soul": Virginia Woolf, Shelley, and Androgyny', Keats-Shelly Journal, 33 (1984), 182- 
204. 
24 See, for example, William J. Burling, 'Virginia Woolf s "Lighthouse": An Allusion to Shelley's 
Queen Mab? ', ELN, 22.2 (December, 1984), 62-65, and Beverly Ann Schlack, Continuing Presences: 
Virginia Woolf's Use of Literary Allusion (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1979). 
25 Both Schug and Schlack have considered passages and references relevant to my own discussion, and 
I shall discuss their conclusions as I proceed. Neither, however, makes the identification I am 
proposing. See Schug, pp. 203-05, and Schlack, pp. 66-75. 
26 Mrs Dallowav, ed. by Stella McNichol (London: Penguin, 1992), pp. 23,76,106. All references are 
to this edition, and are hereafter cited in parentheses after quotations in the text. 
27 Schlack, p. 67. A few pages later, she returns to develop the comparison between Septimus and Keats 
in Adonais: 'Adonis was pursued by the boar he wounded; in Shelley's poem, Keats is hounded by 
bestial critics who are called "herded wolves" or "obscene ravens" or "the monsters of life's waste". As 
Keats is "a herd-abandoned deer struck by the hunter's dart", so Septimus is hounded and persecuted by 
his bestial doctors with blood-red nostrils who "hunt in packs". Shelley's hunted-hunter metaphor for 
Keats and the critics is echoed in Septimus's feelings about "human cruelty -- how they tear each other 
to pieces. The fallen, he said, they tear to pieces"' (p. 75). 
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Such a reading is suggested above all by the nature visions which punctuate Septimus's 
experience. 28 The first of these takes place when he walks with Rezia to Regent's Park in the 
early part of the novel. Sitting on a bench in the park with his wife, he begins to be filled with 
ecstasy at the sight of the scene before him: 
A marvellous discovery indeed -- that the human voice in certain atmospheric 
conditions [ ... ] can quicken trees into life! Happily Rezia put her hand down 
with a tremendous weight on his knee so that he was weighted down, 
transfixed, or the excitement of the elm trees rising and falling, rising and 
falling with all their leaves alight and the colour thinning and thickening from 
blue to the green of a hollow wave, like plumes on horses' heads, feathers on 
ladies', so proudly they rose and fell, so superbly, would have sent him mad. 
[ ... ] But they beckoned; leaves were alive; trees were alive. And the leaves being connected by millions of fibres with his own body, there on the seat, 
fanned it up and down; when the branch stretched he, too, made that 
statement. The sparrows fluttering, rising, and falling in jagged fountains 
were part of the pattern; the white and blue, barred with black branches. 
Sounds made harmonies with premeditation; the spaces between them were as 
significant as the sounds. (MD, p. 24) 
This passage resembles the Romantic encounter with nature in a number of ways. Septimus is 
drawn, first of all, into a close communion with the scene before him, which tends towards 
sublimity or ecstasy, and which is characterized by the dissolution of boundaries: 'the leaves 
being connected by millions of fibres with his own body, there on the seat, fanned it up and 
down'; 'when the branch stretched, he, too, made that statement'. The form this communion 
takes is more dynamic than in Wordsworth: where the Wordsworthian narrator typically 
describes a composed and tranquil mind, which expands to absorb the static and peaceful 
landscape it encounters, 29 Septimus is drawn into the vigorous rhythms of the scene before 
28 Schug, pp. 203-05, also suggests that Septimus, along with Peter and Clarissa, 
' 
experiences 'spots of 
time' akin to those described by Wordsworth's persona. However, he sees these moments' not in terms 
of communion, but of intensity and revelation, and sees Septimus's 'spot' -- the appearance of Evans 
and the voice behind the screen, not the nature visions (to which he does not refer) -- as 'an ironic 
version' of those experienced by Clarissa, since it leads to death rather than life, even if a death that 
frees him from his madness and suffering'. 
29 Wordsworth's speaker describes how he 'sate / Alone upon some jutting eminence, / At the first 
gleam of dawn-light, when the Vale, / Yet slumbering, lay in utter solitude': 
Oft in those moments such a holy calm 
Would overspread my soul, that bodily eyes 
Were utterly forgotten, and what I saw 
Appeared like something in myself, a dream, 
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him; a scene which is characterized also by extravagant colour and contrast (I shall return at a 
later stage to consider its tendency towards frenzy and fragmentation). However, the 
substance and shape of the communion which takes place are suggestively close to those in 
Romantic poetry. 
Again as in Wordsworth or Coleridge, it is the human subject who precipitates the 
communion in the passage here: where for the Romantic poets, the creative imagination 
vitalizes the world beyond the self, and enables communion with it, for Septimus, the human 
voice quickens trees into life . 
30 This animation of nature, too, recalls the Romantic encounter. 
As the natural world is imbued with a moral force in Wordsworth, and becomes the child's 
instructor, so too in Woolf, it offers a form of teaching to the self: 'Every power poured its 
treasures on his head. [ ... ] At every moment Nature signified by some laughing hint like that 
gold spot which went round the wall -- there, there, there -- her determination to show, by 
brandishing her plumes, shaking her tresses, flinging her mantle this way and that, 
beautifully, always beautifully, and standing close up to breathe through her hollowed hands 
Shakespeare's words, her meaning' (MD, p. 153). This passage also suggests the privileged 
status of the subject able to communicate with the natural world. Septimus is a man 'called 
forth in advance of the mass of men to hear the truth, to learn the meaning' (MD, p. 74), in 
the same way that Wordsworth's speaker confesses a hope that his responsiveness to nature 
might be a sign of divine ordination: 'poetic numbers came / Spontaneously to clothe in 
priestly robe/ A renovated spirit singled OUti. 
31 
A prospect in the mind. 
William Wordsworth, The Prelude: A Parallel Text, ed. by J. C. Maxwell (London: Penguin, 1971), 
1850 text, 11,342-45; 348-52; p. 93. 
30 See Coleridge's famous account of the imaoination, which is 'essentially vital, even as all objects (as 
objects) are essentially fixed and dead' (italics in original). Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Biographia 
Literaria, or Biographical Sketches of inY LiterarY Life and Opinions, ed. by James Engell and W. 
Jackson Bate, Samuel Taylor Coleridge, 7,2 vols (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1983), 1, pp. 304- 
05. 
31 The Prelude, 1,51-53; p. 37. 
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There are moments in the text, therefore, when Septimus recalls the Romantic nature poet. 
Performing an intense emotional and spiritual identification with the sights and sounds which 
surround him, he re-enacts and re-stages the Wordsworthian communion with the world. 
However, at other moments in the text, different sets of resonances play across the figure of 
Septimus. There are times when he endures a degree of isolation, and a psychic 
fragmentation, which recall a very different model of subjectivity and relation to the world. I 
wish now to suggest that alongside his Romantic communion, Woolf presents, through his 
'madness', a vision of modernist subjectivity; a dissociation and alienation which 
problernatize and reverse it. 32 
Woolf s diaries and letters make clear that Septimus's 'madness' is a transposition and 
reworking of her own, and her reflections during her periods of depression and 'anxiety' 
already begin to suggest ways in which the experience of mental illness draws suggestively 
close to that of the modemist self: 
I wish I could write out my sensations at this moment. They are so peculiar & 
so unpleasant. Partly T[ime] of L[ifel? I wonder. A physical feeling as if I 
were drumming slightly in the veins: very cold: impotent: & terrified. As if I 
32 Septimus's madness, like his visions and his death, have accrued a wide range of significances in 
critical interpretations. Schlack sees it first as 'a deeper insight into reality than others can achieve'; 
which she relates to 'the Platonic myth of the cave and the man who emerges from illusory darkness 
into the sunlight of truth' (p. 59), and then notes its 'mythological ambiance' (p. 66), and the 
resemblance of his vow that 'he would not go mad' to Lear's plea '0, let me not be mad' (p. 66). 
Harvena Richter, in Virginia Woolf. - The Inward Voyage (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970), 
p. 91, compares 'the terrifying or beautiful images in which his thoughts present themselves' to 'the 
visions in De Quincey's opium dreams'; while Erwin R. Steinberg seeks 'to demonstrate [ ... ]a loose but, nevertheless', he believes, 'very clear relationship between patterns in the life of Thomas Steams 
Eliot and patterns in the life of Septimus Warren Smith. 'Mrs Dalloway and T. S. Eliot's Personal 
Waste Land', Journal of Modern Literature, 10 (1983), 3-25 (pp. 9-12). Karen DeMeester, in 'Trauma 
and Recovery in Virginia Woolf s Mrs Dalloway', Modern Fiction Studies, 44 (1998), 649-73, comes 
close in passing to my own interpretation; before reading Septimus at length in very different terms. 
Having commented upon the appropriateness of modernist narrative form for the representation of 
madness, she suggests that 'The ultimate paradigm of the trauma survivor and hence modernist man 
emerged in the aftermath of the First World War - the shell-shocked war veteran' (p. 652). However, 
she defines the relation between Septimus and the people around him as a conflict between the 
meaningful perceptions of a visionary whose experience could 'instigate positive social change' 
(Septimus's 'view of himself as a prophet, despite the seemingly fantastical presentation, is quite 
ý, alid'), and a Nvider community which does not wish to listen to his unwelcome description of war, and 
its own participant in it. See in particular pp. 649,652,659-60. 
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were exposed on a high ledge in full light. Very lonely. L. out to lunch. Nessa 
has Quentin and don't want me. Very useless. No atmosphere round me. No 
words. Very apprehensive. As if something cold & horrible -a roar of 
laughter at my expense were about to happen. And I am powerless to ward it 
off: I have no protection. And this anxiety and nothingness surround me with 
a vacuum. It affects the thighs chiefly [ ... 
I the exposed moments are 
terrifying. I looked at my eyes in the glass once & saw them positively 
terrified. 33 
A sense of isolation and exclusion is articulated in this passage. The feeling of loneliness and 
exposure, the sense of being surrounded by nothingness and of inhabiting a vacuum, the 
failure of language ('no words'); all communicate a powerful sense of alienation and 
remoteness from the world. However, this isolation is not, for the most part, expressed in 
specifically modernist terms. The exclusion to which the passage refers is a social one: Nessa 
has Quentin round and does not want Virginia, who thus feels 'lonely'. Likewise later, she 
fears 'a roar of laughter at my expense', and conceives her position on the sidelines in terms 
of a failure to participate: 'very useless', 'impotent'. Elsewhere in the passage, the 
description of physical symptoms tends to make illness the cause, and the body, the site, of 
isolation from the world ('it affects the thighs, chiefly'). The diary does not describe the 
imprisoned subjectivity of the alienated modernist self, therefore (nor would we expect it to). 
However, the powerful sense of isolation which it communicates suggests that the experience 
of psychological instability might potentially be exploited to represent that of the modernist 
subject. 
As Woolf begins the process of planning Mrs Dalloway, such an appropriation appears to 
take place. As she consciously begins to sculpt (rather than to represent - even in her diary, 
she never simply transcribes) her experience, and to set it within a conceptual frame 
(Septimus should not only be 'founded on me' but 'might be left vague - as a mad person is - 
not so much character as an idea'), 
'4 she presents a picture of isolation which tends far more 
33 Diam V, 1936-1941, p. 63 (1 March 1937). 
34 , Mrs Dalloway', Holograph Notes, Nov. 9 1922-Aug. 2 1923, Berg, 19 November, 1922; cited by I 
Hermione Lee, Virginia Woolf (London: Chatto & Windus, 1996), p. 192. 
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towards that of the modernist self. In the holograph notes to the novel, she decides that 
'There shd- be a fairly logical transition in S's mind. Beauty of natural things. This 
disappears upon seeing people. His sense of their demands upon him. What is his relation to 
35 
them? Inability to identify himself with them'. Where Woolf is 'lonely' in the extract from 
her diary, physically excluded from the company of her sister and husband, Septimus will 
find himself unable to identify spiritually with the people who surround him. His relationship 
with the external world is a matter of estrangement and dislocation: his lack of 'a natural 
response I suggests an alienation and disjuncture. The isolation and remoteness expressed in 
Woolf's own reflections are reinflected in ways which begin to recall more closely the 
predicament of the modernist subject. 
These resonances carry through into the final version of the text; which continually reflects, 
particularly through the worried Rezia, upon Septimus's disorientation and otherness. His 
first major vision is followed by a scene where, distressed by his 'violent' starting and 
preoccupied air, his wife withdraws to contemplate his behaviour: 'She could not sit beside 
him when he stared so and did not see her and made everything terrible. [ ... I Looking back, 
she saw him sitting in his shabby overcoat alone, on the seat, hunched up, staring. [] 
Septimus had fought; he was brave; he was not Septimus now' (MD, p. 25). And a little later 
in the novel, the visit to William Bradshaw also describes a disturbing disjuncture between 
the private reality he inhabits and the wider social whole: 
'You served with great distinction in the WarT 
The patient repeated the word "war" interrogatively. He was attaching 
meanings to words of a symbolical kind. A serious symptom to be noted on 
the card. 
'The WarT the patient asked. The European War -- Had he served with 
distinction? He really forgot. In the War itself he had failed. 
'Yes, he served with the greatest distinction, ' Rezia assured the doctor; 'he 
was promoted. '[ ... I 
3' Holograph Notes, 2 August 1923; cited by Charles G. Hoffmann, 'From Short Story to Novel: The 
Manuscript Revisions of Virginia Woolf s Mrs Dalloivay% Modern Fiction Studies, 14 (1968-69), 17 1- 
86; P. 178. 
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'So that you have nothing to worry you, no financial anxiety, nothing? ' 
He had committed an appalling crime and been condemned to death by human 
nature. 'I have -- I have', he began, 'committed a crime --' 
'He has done nothing wrong whatever, ' Rezia assured the doctor. (MD, p. 
105) 
There is a strong sense here that Septimus is imprisoned in a subjective realm inviolably 
remote from that of the people around him. He is unable to comprehend the meanings of 
others ('he repeated the word "war" interrogatively'), and when he attempts to communicate 
his own experience, he finds himself contradicted by his wife: as he contemplates his 
'failure' in the war, he hears Rezia assuring the doctor of his 'great distinction'; as he tries to 
articulate his sense of guilt ('He had committed an appalling crime and been condemned to 
death by human nature'), she cuts him short: "'He has done nothing wrong whatever. "' Once 
again, this develops Woolf's own situation; which frequently also involved disagreements 
with her doctors. When she, like Septimus, tries to interpret her behaviour in terms of moral 
deviance, she too is contradicted, and labelled in terms of insanity. 36 But in her case, the 
battle is a straightforward confrontation between narratives of moral and psychological 
deviance. For Septimus, by contrast, the reality or validity of his perspective upon the world 
is at stake; and it is this which makes his experience modernist where that of Woolf herself is 
not. He is locked in a private reality which has no meaning for the people who surround 
hiM. 3' And this isolation from the world is a constant theme of the text. Bradshaw, for 
36 Quentin Bell recalls Woolf s belief 'that there was nothing wrong with her, that her anxieties and 
insomnia were due simply to her own faults, faults which she ought to overcome without medical 
assistance'. Virginia Woolf. - A Biography, 2 vols (London: Hogarth, 1972), 11: Mrs Woolf, 1912-1941, 
p. 15. The frequency with which Woolf disagreed with the diagnoses of her doctors is clear from her 
diaries and letters, which continually express her frustration at rest cures and treatments with which she 
does not agree. See for example her letter to Violet Dickinson, 30 October 1904, which complains 
about 'that tyrannical, and as I think, shortsighted Savage', and declares 'I never shall believe, or have 
believed, in anything any doctor says'. Letters, I, pp. 147-48. 
37 For a modernist example of such isolation, see T. S. Eliot's 'The Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock': 
Would it have been worth while, 
To have bitten off the matter with a smile, 
To have squeezed the universe into a ball 
To roll it towards some overwhelming question, 
To say: 'I am Lazarus, come from the dead, 
Come back to tell you all, I shall tell you all' - 
If one, settling a pillow by her head, 
Should say: *That is not what I meant at all. 
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instance, dismisses his revelations: 'when a man comes into your room and says he is Christ 
(a common delusion), and has a message, as they mostly have, [ ... ] you invoke proportion; 
order rest in bed; rest in solitude [ ... ]' (MD, p. 108). 
Another passage, which describes Septimus's diagrams and drawings, introduces a second 
modemist theme: 
Diagrams, designs, little men and women brandishing sticks for arms, with 
wings -- were they? -- on their backs; circles traced round shillings and 
sixpences -- the suns and stars; zigzagging precipices with mountaineers 
ascending roped together, exactly like knives and forks; sea pieces with little 
faces laughing out of what perhaps might be waves: the map of the world. [ ... ] Now for his writings; how the dead sing behind rhododendron bushes; odes to 
Time; conversations with Shakespeare; Evans, Evans, Evans -- his messages from the dead; do not cut down trees; tell the Prime Minister. Universal love: 
the meaning of the world. (MD, pp. 161-62)38 
Septimus finds that language is inadequate to encompass his experience; to span the immense 
distance which separates him from his fellow-men. His visions and revelations, when 
translated into language, are reduced to meaningless abstractions and unexplained 
imperatives: 'Men must not cut down trees. There is a God. [ ... ] Change the world. No one 
kills from hatred. Make it known' (MD, p. 26). Even when he tries to escape the limits of 
language, and to express himself instead through pictures and diagrams, he produces only 
indecipherable designs, which even Rezia is unable to interpret. Pictures seeking to 
communicate important revelations are appreciated only as a child's might be: 'Some were 
very beautiful, she thought. She would tie them up (for she had no envelope) with a piece of 
silk' (MD, p. 162). As Hermione Lee suggests: 'There is a ludicrous, awful gap between 
That is not it, at all. ' 
The Complete Poems and Plays of T S. Eliot (London: Faber and Faber, 1969), pp. 13-21 (pp. 15-16). 
38 Schlack (pp. 69-72) interprets this passage instead with reference to Dante's Inferno. She notes that 
the seventh (Septimus) circle punishes suicide and war, and links the trees which Septimus sees -- and 
\\, hich he proclaims to be alive -- to the wood in which the suicides have been turned into trees. The 
zigzagging precipices with mountaineers ascending roped together' are related to the moment when 
Dante has to remove the cord tied around his waist to descend off the Great Cliff to the Eighth Circle on 
the back of Geryon. 
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Septimus's manic inspiration, and the banal unintelligibility of his utterances and scribbles. 39 
His sense of isolation, his inability to reach outside himself, is due in part to the fallen status 
of language, which is unable to translate or transcribe his experience into a form 
comprehensible to others. 
A wedge is continually driven between Septimus and the world, therefore. He is trapped in a 
subjective perspective which is both inaccessible and incomprehensible to those who lie 
beyond it, and which is close in many ways to the incommunicable subjective perspective in 
which the modernist subject, haunted by fears of solipsism, and unable to reach beyond 
himself to verify his impressions, finds himself imprisoned. The medical 'symptoms' 
Bradshaw notices as he performs his examination might be read instead as a modernist 
writer's diagnosis of her time. 
Septimus thus comes to embody two periods at once. He is used both to re-stage the 
communions between self and world depicted in Romantic poetry, and to present the 
dislocations and disjunctures which characterize the modernist subject's relation to the 
world. It is the combination of these two perspectives which produces the startling suggestion 
of madness in the nature vision discussed above. Where Wordsworth presents a scene of 
uninterrupted harmony, Woolf's is disrupted by an intimation of insanity: 'the excitement of 
the elm trees rising and falling, rising and falling with all their leaves alight and the colour 
thinning and thickening from blue to the green of a hollow wave [ ... ] would have sent him 
mad'. The ecstasy Woolf describes in the scene moves in two directions at once. The images 
of communion with which the passage ends suggest a comýing or gathering together: his body, 
the leaves, the branches and the birds are drawn into a single series of movements. The first 
39 Lee, pp. 194-95. She goes on to link modernism and illness in Woolf s own self-expression: 
'Septimus's scribbles about his dead friend and "the meaning of the world" reflect her own fear of 
unintelligibility. In all her fictional versions of her illness she expresses the horror of not being able to L- 
make sense to others. The fear of incomprehensibility links madness and writing. There is a 
relation between illness and modernism in Virginia Woolf s writing life' (p. 195). L- 
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part, however, moves in the opposite direction. His excitement at the sight of the elm trees 
culminates not in a consummation, but tends instead towards fragmentation. The centrifugal 
impulse of modernism confronts, and finds itself conflated with, the centripetal tendency of 
Romantic vision. 
This yoking-together of the two positions is used by Woolf to conduct a dialogue between 
them. It enables her first of all to measure the extent, and to identify the nature, of the 
dispossession which has taken place with the birth of modernism and the twentieth century. 
As she places Romantic visions of communion alongside modernist fears of isolation, the 
disinheritance which has taken place becomes clear. However, this slippage also generates 
tensions which are used in other instances to question the validity of subjective Romantic 
vision. Projecting the fears of solipsism which preoccupied her own generation back onto the 
Romantic visions she presents, she produces an ironic re-reading of the 'spontaneous' and 
4natural' communions which she finds in Romantic texts: 
He felt himself drawing towards life, [ ... ] something tremendous about to happen. He had only to open his eyes; but a weight was on them; a fear. He 
strained; he pushed; he looked; he saw Regent's Park before him. Long 
streamers of sunlight fawned at his feet. The trees waved, brandished. We 
welcome, the world seemed to say; we accept; we create. Beauty, the world 
seemed to say. And as if to prove it (scientifically) wherever he looked, [ ... ] beauty sprang instantly. To watch a leaf quivering in the rush of air was an 
exquisite joy. Up in the sky swallows swooping, swerving, flinging 
themselves in and out, round and round, yet always with perfect control as if 
elastics held them; and the flies rising and falling; and the sun spotting now 
this leaf, now that, in mockery, dazzling it with soft gold in pure good temper. 
(MD, pp. 75-76) 
While it makes no explicit charge of self-projection, the passage above does invite a measure 
of suspicion about the harmony it describes. Rather than moving from sight to insight; from 
observation or contemplation of nature to a revelation which marks its fusion with the 
creatively perceiving mind, it is now anticipation ('something tremendous [was] about to 
happen. He had only to open his eyes') which precedes the important disclosure: 'beauty, the 
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world seemed to say'. Subjectivity replaces external reality as the point of departure, 
therefore. The idea that 'he strained; he pushed' also suggests a solipsistic cycle, in which 
nature is simply a vehicle through which an internal impulse to insight is fulfilled. Likewise, 
his reflection that 'wherever he looked, beauty sprang up instantly' is ambiguous: does 
Septimus watch beauty spring up around him, or does that beauty spring up in response to his 
expectant look? The choice of 'look' over the more passive 'saw', combined with the 
ambiguous 'seemed to say' and the ironic reference to 'scientific' proof, suggests that the 
beauty perceived is in some sense solicited, and not simply apprehended, by the self. The 
exaggerated vocabulary also pushes the passage towards parody. The description of 
Septimus's 'tremendous'anticipation, of the 'fawning' streamers of sunlight and the 
'brandishing' trees, of the 'exquisite' joy caused by the 'quivering' leaf, and of the swallows 
'swerving' and 'flinging' themselves about suggests that Woolf intends to ironize and subvert 
the moment of ecstatic communion she describes. 
This passage is used to question the validity of Romanticism's harmonious reality, therefore. 
Any direct judgement of Romantic practice is finally witheld, but the inevitable consequence 
of combining Romantic and modernist accounts in the single figure of Septimus is that 
modernist anxieties will reverberate back to question Romantic tenets. Comparable 
challenges are issued throughout the course of the novel: many of the instances I have 
considered above are susceptible to similar secondary readings. Septimus's perception of 
himself as a figure singled out, for example, clearly does not go unchallenged. His dramatic, 
exaggerated response when he discovers that Rezia has taken off her wedding ring ('He 
dropped her hand. Their marriage was over. [ ... ]The rope was cut; he mounted, he was free'; 
MD, p. 73) suggests an element of self-dramatization, and the heightened tone and language 
tend towards irony rather than intensity. Equally, the way in which Septimus's sense of 
communion with the world dissolves when he enters the realm of (intersubjective) human 
relationships suggests that the difference between the two is a matter of Romantic self- 
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construction. The evidence in Mrs Dalloway combines to suggest that the difficulties of 
relating self to world encountered by modernist writers are already latent in the poetry of the 
previous century. The dislocations and disjunctures experienced by the modernist subject are 
simply concealed or eluded in Romantic texts; either through the exclusion of alterity, or 
through the attribution to the world of emotions or ideas which correlate with those of the 
self. 
However, in Mrs Dalloway, these accusations are never explicitly levelled: Woolf never 
finally endorses the ironic second reading she provides. This ambiguity becomes clear when 
the passage above is read in comparison to the more explicit ironization of Romantic 
communion performed in passages of Orlando: 
There were mountains; there were valleys; there were streams. She climbed 
the mountains; roamed the valleys; sat on the banks of the streams. She 
likened the hills to ramparts, to the breasts of doves, and the flanks of kine. 
[ ... ] Trees were withered hags, and sheep were grey boulders. Everything, in fact, was something else. She found the tam on the mountain-top and almost 
threw herself in to seek the wisdom she thought lay hid there; [ ... ] she prayed 
that she might share the majesty of the hills, know the serenity of the plains, 
etc, etc, as all such believers do. Then, looking down, the red hyacinth, the 
purple iris wrought her to cry out in ecstasy at the goodness, the beauty of 
nature; raising her eyes again, she beheld the eagle soaring, and imagined its 
raptures and made them her own. Returning home, she saluted each star, each 
peak, and each watch-fire as if they signalled to her alone. 40 
The more witty and playful tone adopted by Woolf in this passage makes explicit the 
ironization which remains below the surface in Mrs Dalloway. Orlando's emotions and 
gestures are more exaggerated than those of Septimus: her instinct is to 'thr[olw herself' into 
the tarn in order to discover its secrets, she 'cr[ies] out in ecstasy' at the sight of the hyacinth 
and iris, and makes her own the 'raptures' of the eagle who soars above her. The parodic 
intent of this extravagance is confirmed by the narrator's ironic asides: 'everything, in fact, 
was something else'. This passage is also less ambiguous in its accusations of self-projection. 
40 Virginia Woolf, Oi-lando. - A Biography. ed. by Brenda Lyons (London: Penguin, 1993), pp. I 10- 11. 
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While sometimes remaining oblique -- 'to seek the wisdom she thought lay hid there'. for 
example, cloaks its challenge in the same disingenuousness as 'we welcome, the world 
seemed to say; we accept, we create' -- it often adopts a far more direct approach: 'raising her 
eyes again, she beheld the eagle soaring, and imagined its raptures and made them her own. ' 
Where Septimus anticipates the vision which then takes place, Orlando consciously searches 
for communion: 'she prayed that she might share the majesty of the hills, know the serenity 
of the plains, etc, etc, as all such believers do'. Even Orlando is brought to question the 
source of the beauty which she finds in the natural world: 'she asked herself what this beauty 
was; whether it was in things themselves, or only in herself (p. 
111). 41 
The significant similarities which clearly exist between the passage above and the extract 
from Mrs Dalloway -- the sense that the communion they present is generated by the 
perceiving self; the way in which vision or sublimation is first solicited, and then attained -- 
suggest that the two were shaped with a single intention, and that the accusations levelled in 
the second might also be applied to the first. However, Mrs Dalloway never finally licences 
such an interpretation. Woolf evokes and questions, but stops short of completely 
withdrawing the ideal vision of unity she outlines. It is tantalizingly held up, challenged -- 
and then left. This might be equivocation or irresolution, but I would like to suggest that it is 
neither. Rather, it is an attempt to communicate a dialectic which goes to the heart of 
modernist experience. 
41 Moses, p. 47 picks out this line in a brief consideration of the pages from which my own discussion 
here is drawn. Seeking to demonstrate its sinularity with a passage from Wordsworth's Prelude, he 
suggests that 'both passages relate the identical quest for moral knowledge, but both admit the L- L- t-I 
subjective character of that quest as well: the objects that Orlando hails "signalled to her alone", just as 
the world that Wordsworth "made ... only lived to 
him". Troubled by that subjectivity, Orlando 
questions the reliability of her perceptions, whether what she takes for nature's beauty is "in things 
themselves, or only in herself" - 
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In the midst of its isolation and alienation, the modernist subject is sporadically presented 
with glimpses of wholeness and integrity. Towards the start of Mrs Dalloway, Clarissa recalls 
her feelings on those occasions when she has 'yielded' to the charm of a woman: 
It was a sudden revelation, a tinge like a blush which one tried to check and 
then, as it spread, one yielded to its expansion, and rushed to the farthest 
verge and there quivered and felt the world come closer, swollen with some 
astonishing significance, some pressure of rapture, which split its thin skin 
and gushed and poured with an extraordinary alleviation over the cracks and 
sores. Then, for that moment, she had seen an illumination; a match burning 
in a crocus; an inner meaning almost expressed. But the close withdrew; the 
hard softened. It was over -- the moment. (MD, pp. 34-35) 
There is in the extract here something of the communion denied to the modernist in the 
course of his everyday experience. Disjuncture is replaced by union, alienation by alleviation, 
remoteness by closeness; as the world draws near and pours out its rapture. Meanings, too 
become available: the ordinary incomprehensibility of experience is replaced by 'revelation' 
and 'illumination; a match burning in a crocus'. However, even at this moment of epiphany, 
the disclosure is incomplete. The illumination is partial; the inner meaning only 'almost' 
expressed. The 'moment' is also very brief: almost as soon as the world has drawn n ear, it 
begins to withdraw once more; no sooner has its outline crystallized and hardened, than the 
'hard softens', and clarity is lost once more. The same combination of intensity and brevity is 
also expressed in 'How it Strikes a Contemporary'. Woolf describes how, 'Set down at a 
fresh angle of the eternal prospect, [our contemporaries] can only whip out their notebooks 
and record with agonized intensity the flying gleams, which light on what? and the transitory 
splendours, which may, perhaps, compose nothing whatever. ' The present brings brilliant 
flashes, but 'the flash is soon over, and there remains with us a profound dissatisfaction. The 
42 
irritation is as acute as the pleasure was intense' . Once again, the 
illumination is brief: 
consummation and revelation are glimpsed, only to be cruelly snatched away. And where 
Clarissa's revelation withholds its inner meaning, the 'splendours' evoked in 'How it Strikes' 
are potentially illusory; composing, perhaps. 'nothing whatever'. In each case, loss and 
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isolation are replaced by something very different, but this 'something' remains shrouded in 
suspicion, or located beyond the reach of the self; almost expressed, or potentially an 
illusion. 
Woolf's ambiguous depiction of Romantic visionary communion dramatizes these profound 
tensions, and expresses the 'dissatisfaction' and 'irritation' by which they are accompanied. 
Envisaging a communion which cannot be grasped or proven, and which is never finally 
either bestowed or withdrawn, Romantic visions repeat in a different vein the uncertainties 
and ambiguities which lie at the heart of modernist experience, and enable Woolf both to 
articulate and examine her position. The twentieth-century subject is for the most part 
divided from the world: the isolation and alienation suffered by Septimus demonstrate the 
unbridgeable gap which exists between any single subjective perspective, and the alternative 
realities of others. Set against this fragmentation, however, is an aspiration to reintegration. 
Through the Romantic visions of communion which are also evoked through Septimus, the 
wholeness and integrity lost to the modernist subject are imagined and explored, though 
never unequivocally restored. 
PROUST AND WOOLF 
The discussion in Mrs Dalloway of the problematic relationship between self and external 
reality is continued in a different vein in To the Lighthouse. I have suggested above that the 
novel is used to examine the liberation of female subjectivity, and the successful construction 
of a female tradition which enables individual self-articulation. However, other parts of the 
text reflect upon the notion of heterogeneity in a different way, and question at various levels 
the possibility of forming coherent communities. The explosion of order which takes place in 
42 Essays, 111, pp. 359,357. 
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'Time Passes' may be taken to represent not only the dissolution of the patriarchal order, but 
also a modernist fragmentation, and in this sense, it leads not to the liberation of subjectivity; 
but rather to the isolation of the individual subject. As in Mrs Dalloway, therefore, the 
43 
question emerges of whether reintegration may be achieved . Unlike Mrs Dalloway, 
however, To the Lighthouse appears to reach some (albeit tentative) conclusions. The final 
section of the text suggests that a degree, at least, of communication is possible between 
isolated selves, and that meaningful, if unstable, orders may be fashioned which offer a 
measure of stability to individual subjectivity. 
At this point I also wish to return to Proust. A comparable anxiety about the relationship of 
the modernist self to the outside world is also articulated in A la recherche, which explores, in 
addition to the issue of self-fashioning, the extent to which the self may become subject to 
isolation. The young Marcel discovers early in the text that self and other do not hang 
together in the harmonious relation he had supposed, and the rest of the novel constitutes a 
search to bind this fragmented reality back into a whole; a search which ends only with a 
series of revelations, in the final volume of the text, about the nature and power of artistic 
representation. Both Proust and Woolf trace out a second trajectory in relation to Montaigne, 
therefore. In addition to the movement of progressive self-detachment which I have followed 
at length from the Essais through to To the Lighthouse, they also present an impulse back 
towards the integration and coherent wider orders depicted in Montaigne. 
The opening pages of A la recherche describe the close communion which takes place 
between self and world before the self has encountered otherness and been bom as an 
individual consciousness. The narrator describes how, as he sleeps, his mind recycles and 
43 For another discussion of To the Lighthouse which incorporates something of both the trajectories I 
am describing, see Stevenson and Goldman. In this instance, alternative, rather than simultaneous Cl 
readings are proposed. Stevenson traces the development in the novel from 'The Window' ('still 
haunted by the Edwardian age it represents, still shaped and concluded partly in terms of its 
ist conventions') to 'The Lighthouse', which 'is representative of some of the priorities of the modern' 
age of the twenties' (P. 177); while Goldman reads the novel 'as charting an emergent feminist 
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transforms the thoughts which occupied him while awake: 
Je Wavais pas cesse en dormant de faire des reflexions sur ce que je venais de 
lire, mais ces r6flexions avaient pris un tour un peu particulier; il me semblait 
que j'etais moi-meme ce dont parlait l'ouvrage: une eglise, un quatuor, la 
rivalit6 de Franqois ler et de Charles-Quint. Cette croyance survivait pendant 
quelques seconcles a mon reveil; elle ne choquait pas ma raison, mais pesait 
comme des ecailles sur mes yeux et les emp8chait de se rendre compte que le 
bougeoir Wetait plus allume. Puis elle commenqait a me devenir inintelligible, 
[ ... ] le sujet du livre se d6tachait de moi, j'etais libre de m'y appliquer ou non. (1: p. 3) 
In the world of pre-consciousness (symbolized by sleep) an entirely harmonious relation 
obtains between self and world. The passage above describes a relationship so close that the 
boundaries between the two disintegrate, and they take on a single form. Self and other are so 
little distinguished, in fact, that the self is able, with no sense of incongruity, to assume the 
identity of the objects which pass through its mind. Even when it awakes, and begins to find 
this fusion 'inintelligible', it detaches itself only partially from the outside world, and remains 
'libre de m'y appliquer ou non'. Elsewhere in the opening pages of the novel, this harmony is 
expressed in terms of the world's conformity to the imaginative constructions of the self. The 
narrator describes how, in his sleep, he is furnished with a woman, who appears to offer 
herself to him: 'Comme Eve naquit d'une c6te d'Adam, une femme naissait pendant mon 
sommeil d'une fausse position de ma cuisse. Form6e du plaisir que j'6tais sur le point de 
goOter, je m'imaginais que c'etait elle qui me l'offrait' (1: pp. 4-5). Generated by and from the 
self, the woman reflects and conforms to its projected desires. In the same way later, his body 
conjures up a series of physical surroundings: his 'c6t6 ankylose' imagines itself 'allonge face 
au mur dans un grand lit a baldaquin', and immediately his grandfather's house in the country 
springs up around him; the position of his limbs sends the walls and doors sliding in other 
directions, and J'6tais dans ma chambre chez Mme de Saint-Loup' (I: p. 6). For now, the 
world is sensitive and responsive to the projections of the self; the relationship between the 
two entirely harmonious. 
subjectivity' (p. 177). 
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However, it is not long before otherness and difference begin to make themselves manifest, 
and the unity and stability of this world is destroyed forever. The moment of crisis comes 
when the narrator's mother withholds her goodnight kiss. Formerly held out 'comme une 
hostie' (1: p. 13), her face has been a visible symbol of communion with the world, 44and 
when it is withheld, or more importantly, when the narrator refuses to be denied and demands 
a kiss from his mother, a difference of will becomes manifest which drives a wedge between 
them: 
Il me semblait que ma. mere venait de me faire une premiere concession qui 
devait lui etre douloureuse, que c'etait une premiere abdication de sa part 
devant l'ideal qu'elle avait conqu pour moi, et que pour la premiere fois elle, 
si courageuse, s'avouait vaincue. 11 me semblait que si je venais de remporter 
une victoire c'etait contre elle, que j'avais r6ussi comme auraient pu faire la 
maladie, des chagrins, ou Fage, a detendre sa volonte, a faire fl6chir sa raison 
et que cette soiree commenqait une ere, resterait comme une triste date. 
(1: p. 3 8) 
Where Marcel has formerly acknowledged no boundaries between himself and others, he is 
now forced to accept his separation from the world. Discovering that his mother's desires are 
different from his own, he is compelled to recognize that the two of them are not one body, as 
her host-like face has suggested, but rather, independent categories. In the same way, where 
the world has previously conformed to his desires, it now begins to resist him. The conflict 
which emerges between Tideal' that his mother 'avait conqu' for him and his own desire to 
receive her kiss stands in stark contrast to the harmony which defined his relationship with the 
acquiescent 'Eve' fashioned by his imagination in his sleep. The self is 'bom' as an 
independent entity, conscious of its difference, and thus its isolation, from the world. It is this 
painful separation which ensures that the day will remain a 'triste date 9.45 
44 As Gabriel Josipovici puts it: 'The kiss [ ... ] is the tangible symbol of communion with the world; It 
reflects a universe in which there is no distinction between the self and other people or between the self 
and the world of nature. ' The World and the Book: A Study of Modern Fiction (London: Macmillan, 
197 1), p. 5. 
15 Josipovici notes that since this 'first awareness' comes to the self only as it is divided from the 
world, 'our only consciousness of unity, of a fullness of being, comes when we no longer possess it; 
for, possessing it, we are not conscious of it: the only paradise is paradise lost'. The World and the 
Book, 
p. 5. 
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This substitution of difference for sameness, conflict for harmony, isolation for communion, 
takes place in each relationship between self and other after the birth of consciousness. Thus 
the bedrooms which grew up around the narrator in the opening pages of the novel, in 
response to the distribution of his limbs, are replaced as the text proceeds by hostile rooms 
which threaten, rather than anchoring, his selfhood: 'De la place, il n'y en avait pas pour moi 
dans ma chambre de Balbec (rrüenne de nom seulement), elle 6tait pleine de choses qui ne me 
connaissaient pas, me rendirent le coup d'ceil mefiant que je leur jetai. [ ... I 'C'etait presque ý 
l'interieur de mon moi que [I'odeurl du vetiver venait pousser dans mes demiers 
retranchements son offensive, a laquelle j'opposais non sans fatigue la riposte inutile et 
incessante d'un reniflement alarm6. N'ayant plus d'univers, plus de chambre, plus de corps 
que menace par les ennen-ýs qui m'entouraient, qu'envahi jusque dans les os par la fievre, 
j'etais seul, j'avais envie de mourir' (11: pp. 27-28). This alterity has serious consequences for 
the self Where the narrator's conflict with his mother isolates the self, the room at Balbec 
threatens to eliminate it altogether. This erasure of the self is never finally completed, 
however. While it is invaded by the smell of vetiver, and penetrated almost to its core, the self 
remains enough of a centred entity both to resist the offensive of the unfamiliar smell, and to 
become the subject of a wish for (as opposed to becoming subject to) the annihilation of 
death. Once again, the self emerges as an unstable, isolated ('j'6tais seul') category, forged 
and precariously sustained through problematic exchanges with an unsympathetic external 
world. 
The rift which develops between the individual self and external world in these passages is 
central to the text's discussion of modernist isolation. However, the novel also explores a 
second form of separation from the world. A little further into Du cote de chez Swann, as he 
reads in the garden at Combray, Marcel describes his sense of being surrounded by his own 
subjectivity: 
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Si on a la sensation d'8tre toujours entour6 de son dme, ce West pas comme 
d'une prison immobile; plut6t on est comme emporte avec elle dans un 
perpetuel 61an pour la d6passer, pour atteindre a 1'ext6rieur, avec une sorte de 
d6couragernent, en entendant toujours autour de soi cette sonorite identique 
qui West pas echo du dehors mais retentissement d'une vibration interne. 
(1: pp. 85-86) 
The self finds itself locked in the hermetic ally- sealed prism of its own subjectivity. Seeking to 
move beyond itself, and to engage with the external world, it encounters only echoes of its 
own selfhood, reverberating around the chamber of its individual perspective. External reality 
is forever remote; imaginable, but unattainable, and the self remains trapped within the 
confines of its own personality. As in the passage describing the birth of consciousness, a gap 
opens up between self and other, therefore, and this dislocation is experienced once more in 
terms of isolation from the world. However, where the birth of consciousness is prompted by 
the experience of otherness, the extract above describes a subject isolated by itsfailure to 
encounter the otherness of the outside world. There is a sense in which this is a logically 
incoherent position. The self seeks to combine a failure to encounter the world with an 
awareness of that isolation which could only come through experience of the world. It intuits 
an otherness which the imprisoned subject could not logically formulate: how could the self 
recognize reflections of itself if it were unable to encounter otherness? The self inhabits the 
prism of pre-consciousness, but brings to that world a conviction of the existence of otherness 
which transforms its unity into an isolating prison. 
This second form of isolation, like the first, has serious consequences for the self. Now 
separated from the world, the self is no longer subject to invasion by the other, or to the threat 
of obliteration experienced by Marcel in his room at Balbec. However, in a different way, the 
extract above also tends towards self-loss. The self is everywhere present, but this presence is 
also, paradoxically, an absence. It is only when the self encounters the other that it is able to 
define its own subjectivity: it is when Marcel becomes aware of the difference between his 
own desires and those of his mother that the boundaries of his personal subjectivity begin to 
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take shape. Without the other, therefore, the notion of self lacks meaning or significance. 46 
The self is confronted in A la recherche, therefore, with two different forms of isolation 
which ultimately lead, however, to the same self-absence or loss. The novel will address these 
problems in various ways as it proceeds; ultimately identifying a resolution in the 
communicative strategies of art. However, there is a sense in which, partially, at least, these 
two forms of isolation already go some way towards 'resolving' one another. As alternative 
theoretical positions, they stand as opposites, in adopting either of which the self will escape 
the difficulties of the other. Thus the confrontation with the difference of the other releases 
the self from the prism by providing the encounter with otherness for which it has been 
seeking. And although the subjective prism does not 'release' the self from the pain of 
experienced difference in quite the same way -- the transition from the encounter with 
otherness to the prism is an illogical one -- it does protect the self from the difference of the 
other, and remove the threat of annihilation it can bring (in the same way that Habit insulates 
the self from the world by sealing it off from its otherness). However, it is clear in both 
instances that these two positions 'resolve' each other only by substituting one series of 
problems, one form of self-loss, for another. The encounter with otherness explodes the 
prism, but substitutes for the frustration of imprisonment, the isolation of difference. And 
while the prism avoids the painful encounter with otherness, it introduces instead an 
equivalent alienation from the world. The self can shuttle between these two positions, as it 
seeks to approximate a viable relation with the world, but it will ultimately still be condemned 
to isolation and loss . 
47 
46 Vincent Descombes describes an equivalent self-loss in his discussion of solipsism. The solipsist 
insists: ... Chaque fois que Wimporte quoi est vu, Cest toujours moi qui vois. " Mais si Cest le cas, note 
Wittgenstein, le mot moi ne d6signe rien. [ ... 
I Plus on affirme que le monde est nion monde, plus on 
prive de sens et de raison d'6tre le pronom possessif "mon... (italics in original). Proust. - Philosophie 
A roman (Paris: tditions de Minuit, 1987), pp. 61-62. 
47 Something close to the cycle I am describing is memorably characterized by Samuel Beckett in his 
discussion of Habit. Through Habit, the self concludes 'countless treatises' with its 'countless 
correlative objects'. But between these 'consecutive adaptations' are 'periods of transition; [ ... 
] perilous 
zones in the life of the individual, dangerous, precarious, painful, mysterious and fertile, when for a 
moment the boredom of living is replaced by the suffering of being. ' Proust (London: Evergreen 
Books, New York: Grove Press, 193 1), p. 8. 
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A la recherche will find alternative, more successful, solutions to the self s isolation in Le 
Temps retrouve. Before examining these resolutions, however, I wish to return to Woolf. The 
isolation of consciousness is also explored in To the Lighthouse, which, I wish to argue, re- 
evokes and reworks the birth of consciousness depicted by Proust, and also explores other 
aspects of the modernist self s alienation from the world. 
Woolf was reading A la recherche as she planned and wrote To the Lighthouse, and her diary 
anticipates that her own work might be influenced by Proust's. On 8 April 1925, a month 
before she writes of her impatience to 'get onto To the Lighthouse', she reflects upon the 
qualities of A la recherche, in which she is now 'embedded': 'The thing about Proust is his 
combination of the utmost sensibility with the utmost tenacity. He searches out these butterfly 
shades to the last grain. He is as tough as catgut & as evanescent as a butterfly's bloom. And 
he will I suppose both influence me & make me out of temper with every sentence of my 
own. ' 48 And as she considers which books to take with her to Rodmell later in the summer -- 
when she would begin to write To the Lighthouse -- she chooses Proust, whom she wishes to 
finish. 49 
Woolf envisages that the French novel will influence her method and style. However, there 
are also signs in the text that she drew upon the ideas and motifs which she found there. 
James's experience over the course of To the Lighthouse is similar in significant ways to that 
of Marcel in Du c6te de chez Swann; moving from a coherent relation with others, to a 
moment of crisis when he discovers that he is in reality isolated from the people and objects 
which surround him. 
At first James's world, like Marcel's, appears to correlate with the desires of the self which 
48 DiarY, III, p. 7. 
49 Diary, 111, p. 37 (20 July 1925). 
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apprehends it: 
'Yes, of course, if it's fine tomorrow', said Mrs Ramsay. [ ... ] To her son these words conveyed an extraordinary joy, as if it were settled the 
expedition were bound to take place. [... ] Since he belonged, even at the age of 
six, to that great clan which cannot keep this feeling separate from that, but 
must let future prospects, with their joys and sorrows, cloud what is actually at 
hand, since to such people even in earliest childhood any turn in the wheel of 
sensation has the power to crystallize and transfix the moment upon which its 
gloom or radiance rests, James Ramsay, sitting on the floor cutting out 
pictures from the illustrated catalogue of the Army and Navy Stores, endowed 
the picture of a refrigerator as his mother spoke with heavenly bliss. It was 
fringed with joy. (TL, p. 7) 
Unlike her husband, who 'never tampered with a fact; never altered a disagreeable word to 
suit the pleasure or convenience of any mortal being, least of all his own children' (TL, p. 8), 
Mrs Ramsay attempts, in these opening lines, to respond to the desires of her son. Even in the 
face of her husband's insistence that 'it won't be fine', she refuses altogether to dash James's 
hopes that the expedition to the lighthouse might take place: 'But it may be fine -- I expect it 
will be fine' (TL, p. 8). She acts as a mirror; reflecting back to her son an account of the world 
consistent with what he wishes to hear. Like the world of sleep in Proust, the reality she 
produces conforms to the imaginative constructions of the self. 
Mrs Ramsay mediates between her children's desires and the outside world in similar ways 
throughout the opening section of the novel. Later in the evening, she arrives in Cam's and 
James's room to find them arguing over a boar's skull which someone has nailed to the wall. 
Wrapping her shawl around it, she succeeds in convincing Cam, who wants it taken away, 
that it is no longer really a skull at all: 'it was like a bird's nest; it was like a beautiful 
mountain such as she had seen abroad, with valleys and flowers and bells ringing and birds 
singing and little goats and antelopes' (p. 124). At the same time, however, she persuades 
James -- who wants the skull to stay -- that it is 'still there; they had not touched 
it; they had 
done just what he wanted; it was there quite unhurt' (TL, p. 125). As Marcel employs Habit to 
disguise the otherness of the room in which he is sleeping, so Mrs Ramsay physically drapes 
and imaginatively transforms the skull until its foreignness and alterity ('She could see the 
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homs, Cam said, all over the room. [ ... ] It was a 
horrid thing, branching at her all over the 
room'; TL, p. 124) are overcome. 
This passage also recalls the Proustian pre-conscious state in a second way. Filled with joy by 
his mother's response, James infuses his surroundings with the glow of his own excitement: 
jhe] endowed the picture of a refrigerator' with 'heavenly bliss'. Once again here, there is no 
sense of boundary between self and world. James assumes that the world is in some sense 
continuous with himself, and thus might legitimately bear the traces of his own emotion. A 
similar unity of self and world is also associated with childhood preconsciousness in other 
instances in Woolf. The opening lines of The Waves, which describe the rising of the sun and 
the break of day ('The sun had not yet risen. The sea was indistinguishable from the sky, 
except that the sea was slightly creased as if a cloth had wrinkles in it. Gradually as the sky 
whitened a dark line lay on the horizon dividing the sea from the sky' )50 have been seen to 
represent the separation of self from world which the children at the centre of the novel will 
be forced to perform as the action proceeds. And Woolf's reflections upon her own childhood 
summers -- spent at Talland House on the Cornish coast -- are likewise characterized by a 
blurring of boundaries: 'If I were a painter I should paint these first impressions in pale 
yellow, silver, and green. [ ... ]I should make a picture of curved petals; of shells; of things that 
were semi -transparent; I should make curved shapes, showing the light through, but not 
giving a clear outline. ' Nothing has an independent integrity as an individual entity in this 
world: 'sounds would come through this petal or leaf -- sounds were indistinguishable from 
sights'; different parts of the seaside morning are dissolved into a single impression: 'the 
rooks cawing is part of the waves breaking'. 51 Notions of difference have not yet come to 
disrupt the unity and integrity of this world. 
50 The Waves, ed. by Kate Flint (London: Penguin, 1992), p. 3. 
51 A Sketch of the Past', in Moments of Being, pp. 64-137 (p. 66). Woolf also describes 'the feeling C, 
of lying in a grape and seeing through a film of semi-transparent yellow' (p. 65). Both this and the LI Cl Z__ L_ I 
impression of being 'half asleep, half awake' (p. 64) suggest the hermetically-sealed world of pre- 
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In A la recherche, Marcel's mother herself brings about the birth of consciousness which 
takes place. Mrs Ramsay clearly does not precipitate James's crisis in quite the same way: the 
passages I have discussed above, by contrast, show her seeking to postpone the moment when 
he is confronted with the fact that the outside world will not necessarily subscribe to his 
projected desires. However, she is soon forced to acknowledge that his wish to visit the 
lighthouse is not in itself sufficient to make the expedition proceed: 
But he wanted to ask her one thing more. Would they go to the Lighthouse to- 
morrow? 
No, not tomorrow, she said, but soon, she promised him, the next fine day. 
She covered him up. But he would never forget, she knew, and she felt angry 
with Charles Tansley, with her husband, and with herself, for she had raised 
his hopes. (TL, p. 125) 
'The perfect simplicity and good sense of [James's] relations with his mother' (TL, p. 42) are 
disrupted in the extract here as she is forced to acknowledge that the assurances she had given 
him were false, and that the anticipated trip to the lighthouse will no longer be taking place. 
Mrs Ramsay is no longer able to mediate between her son's desires and the outside world: her 
'No, not tomorrow', replacing and contradicting the 'Yes, of course' with which the novel 
begins, opens up a gap between herself and her son, and between him and the outside world. 
The continuities which he had presumed to exist are suddenly replaced by divisions; in place 
of unity and harmony, he is forced, like Marcel, to recognize difference. And once again, this 
discovery is irreversible: as Marcel's birth of consciousness 'commenqait une ere', so James 
I would never forget, she knew'. 
Like Marcel, therefore, James sees the harmonious world of pre-consciousness disintegrate, 
and finds an opposition opening up between himself and the outside world. None of the other 
characters in the novel traces out such a closely-defined movement from communion to 
isolation, or experiences a recognizable rupture of consciousness. However, there are ways in 
which the broad pattern of his experience -- the fragmentation of a formerly unified world; the 
consciousness; the hazy indistinctness which precedes full awareness. 
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division of self and other -- is repeated at various levels as the characters move from the (late 
Victorian) 'The Window' section of the novel, to the (modernist) 'The Lighthouse'. Standing 
beside Mr Bankes on the lawn in the early part of the novel, and watching Mrs Ramsay 
reading to James, Lily is able to build the sights and sounds around her into a complex whole: 
She now remembered what she had been going to say about Mrs Ramsay. She 
did not know how she would have put it; but it would have been something 
critical. She had been annoyed the other day by some highhandedness. 
Looking along the level of Mr Bankes' glance at her, she thought that no 
woman could worship another woman in the way he worshipped; they could 
only seek shelter under the shade which Mr Bankes extended over them both. 
Looking along his beam she added to it her different ray, thinking that she was 
unquestionably the loveliest of people (bowed over her book); the best 
perhaps; but also, different too from the perfect shape which one saw there. 
But why different, and how different? she asked herself, scraping her palate of 
all those mounds of blue and green which seemed to her like clods with no life 
in them now, yet she vowed, she would inspire them, force them to move, 
flow, do her bidding tomorrow. How did she differ? What was the spirit in 
her, the essential thing, by which, had you found a glove in the comer of a 
sofa, you would have known it, from its twisted finger, hers indisputably? She 
was like a bird for speed, an arrow for directness. (TL, pp. 54-55) 
In 'The Window', the flux of experience, like the pre-conscious imagination, draws self and 
other together into a sea"ess whole. As the passage opens, Lily is recalling some 
'highhandedness' which had made her 'annoyed' with Mrs Ramsay; a recollection which 
immediately draws the figure before her on the steps into a personal world of memory and 
emotion. When she observes Mr Bankes's worshipful glance, a second chain of thought is set 
in play: from Mr Bankes, to male worship, from there to the worship of women, from there to 
the 'shelter' afforded by the worship of men. The subjective drama, endlessly flexible, 
expands to incorporate the figure of Mr Bankes, and moves beyond and around his worship. 
As the passage proceeds, the palate and paint before Lily's eyes, and by extension her 
painting also, are drawn into the flux of her thought. Her reflections upon the essence of Mrs 
Ramsay dissolve into reflections upon her failure, in her painting, to capture the essence of 
the scene before her, and stir up a fresh resolution to succeed. Returning to Mrs Ramsay, her 
thoughts build into their flux apparently random objects -- a sofa, a glove -- which are unified 
by association with the central subject of her thought, and which extend the present, once 
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more, into altemative, imagined spaces and scenes. 
The individual consciousness incorporates external reality, therefore, into a complex web of 
reflections, impressions, associations and memorieS52 ('All of this danced up and down, like a 
company of gnats, each separate, but all marvellously controlled in an invisible elastic net -- 
danced up and down in Lily's mind, in and about the branches of the pear tree'; TL, p. 30). 
The sights and sounds which surround the self are filtered and patterned to produce an 
intensely personal, loosely-woven fabric in which everything combines to form a unified 
whole. It is a less exaggerated and naive unity than that produced by James or Marcel: where 
Marcel literally takes upon himself the form of external objects, and James makes a 
refrigerator in a catalogue the deposit for his emotions, the flux of consciousness performs no 
such dissolution of boundaries or confusion of categories. However, its assimilation of 
external reality does recall the transparent transactions between self and world which take 
place in the earlier episodes. 
However, when Lily returns to Skye with the Ramsay family ten years later in 'The Window' 
she finds that the external world is no longer available for such appropriation. Separated from 
'The Window' by 'Time Passes', which describes the physical disintegration of the house, 
and the metaphorical fragmentation of the First World War, 'The Lighthouse' is characterized 
by a decisively modernist separation of subject and world. Sitting at the breakfast table, the 
day after her return to the house, Lily finds that the objects which surround her, and the words 
and phrases which fly past her, are strangely unrelated: 
What does one send to the Lighthouse? [ ... ] What does one send? What 
does 
52 As Erich Auerbach's famous essay puts it, 'exterior events' serve 'to release and interpret inner 
events'. 'The Brown Stocking', in Miniesis: The Representation of Reality in Westem Literature, trans. 
by Willard R. Trask (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1953), pp. 525-57 (p. 538). Where I ha,., e 
interpreted this flux in terms of a productive relation between subject and object, Martha C. Nussbaum 
suggests that it seals the self off from other selves, since the 'drama of thought, emotion, perception, 
memory' is too 'elusive and complex' to be communicated to others, or to be encapsulated by 
language. 'The Window: Knowledge of Other Minds in To the Lighthouse', NLH, 26 (1995), 731-53 L 
(pp. 733-34). 
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one do? Why is one sitting here after all? Sitting alone (for Nancy went out 
again) among the clean cups at the long table she felt cut off from other 
people, and able only to go on watching, asking, wondering. The house, the 
place, the morning, all seemed strangers to her. She had no attachment here, 
she felt, no relations with it, anything might happen, and whatever did happen, 
a step outside, a voice calling [ ... ] was a question, as if the link that usually bound things together had been cut, and they floated up here, down there, off, 
anyhow. How ain-fless it was, how chaotic, how unreal it was, she thought, 
looking at her empty coffee cup' (TL, p. 160). 
The other no longer submits to the self s assimilations in this passage. The play of emotions 
and reflections which absorbed the external world in the earlier passage is replaced by a 
vacuum; the continuity of self and other, by a disconcerting disconnectedness. However, Lily 
is not, like James, confronted with complete disjuncture: the object of perception resists the 
self not by asserting its difference, but rather by refusing to be incorporated into any wider 
scheme, or to stand in any meaningful relation to the self. Thus where Mrs Ramsay's 'no', 
replacing her 'yes', establishes an opposition between her son's desires and the facts of his 
situation, the passage above sees the relationship between subject and wider reality in terms 
of questions: 'What does one send? What does one do? Why is one sitting here after all? '; 
'whatever did happen [ ... ] was a question'. Lily experiences a lack of relatedness; a failure to 
establish meaningful relations with that which lies beyond the self. This is not however to 
return to the subjective prism described in Proust; where the self is so wrapped in its own 
subjectivity that it cannot encounter the other. Rather, Lily is able to experience the world, but 
no longer to absorb it into, or to assign it a place within, her own reflections. 
A comparable lack of relatedness is also attributed to modernity by Woolf in her critical 
writing. In 'How it Strikes a Contemporary', she describes how Scott and Jane Austen 'know 
the relations of human beings towards each other and towards the universe. Neither of them 
probably has a word to say about the matter outright, but everything depends on it'. 
Contemporary writers, by contrast, have 'ceased to believe. [ ... ] They cannot make a world. 
53 
They cannot generalize' . The modernist subject 
is no longer able to control or evaluate 
53 
Essays, III, pp. 358-59. 
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the chaos of its experience, but is confronted instead with an atomized reality in which stable 
relationships have disintegrated entirely. 
This uncertain relation between self and world, like the other forms of isolation depicted by 
Proust and Woolf, threatens the identity of the self. In this instance, it empties out individual 
subjectivity. The text describes how Lily 'could only make a phrase resound to cover the 
blankness of her mind until these vapours had shrunk. For really, what did she feel, come 
back after all these years and Mrs Ramsay dead? Nothing, nothing -- nothing that she could 
express at all' (TL, p. 159). Her subjectivity has been constituted through her weaving of the 
external world into the fabric of her consciousness. When that other resists her attempts to 
incorporate it, therefore, there is nothing left for her to look inwards to. Where James, finding 
his desires contradicted, is able to appropriate and own those desires as constitutive of his 
selfhood -- the oppositional relation he establishes with the world defines, even as it isolates, 
his subjectivity -- Lily, by contrast, has nothing to build a sense of self upon. Requiring the 
other to prompt the processes of reflection and association through which her subjectivity is 
expressed, her failure to establish any kind of relationship with it signals an inevitable 
absence of self. 
To the Lighthouse, therefore, like A la recherche A temps perdu, explores the different forms 
of isolation which emerge when the harmonious conjunction of self and other begins to break 
down. The experience of James in 'The Window', close to that of Marcel in 'Combray' 
reproduces the disjunctive relation identified in A la recherche, although in this instance 
tending not towards the subject's annihilation, but the definition and contradiction of his 
unrealized desire. Lily experiences a disconnectedness from the world which is no longer 
conflictual, and which is apparently less problematic, but which ultimately leads to a more 
complete self-loss. 
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The process of resolving these various forms of isolation is painful and complex. Proust in 
particular extends his discussion right through the length of A la recherche, finding a solution 
only in the final volume of the text. This solution is art; which, Marcel comes to realize, 
opens up new perspectives and angles of vision. Reflecting upon his new-found vocation at 
the Guermantes' reception, he concludes that: 
Le style pour 1'6crivain aussi bien que la couleur pour le peintre est une 
question non de technique mais de vision. 11 est la revelation, qui serait 
impossible par des moyens directs et conscients, de la diff6rence qualitative 
qu'il ya dans la faqon dont nous appareit le monde, diff6rence qui, s'il n'y 
avait pas I'art, resterait le secret eternel de chacun. Par I'art seulement nous 
pouvons sortir de nous, savoir ce que voit un autre de cet univers qui West pas 
le m6me que le n6tre et dont les paysages nous seraient rest6s aussi inconnus 
que ceux qu'iI peut y avoir dans la lune. (IV: p. 474) 
According to this passage, art enables the reader or spectator to perceive something of the 
way in which the artist experiences and understands the world. 'Impossible par des moyens 
directs et conscients', personal vision, expressed through its representation of the world, 
becomes available to the apprehension of another. As such, art offers a response to both the 
problematic self-other relations identified earlier in the text. That it enables the self to escape 
from the confines of the subjective prism is made clear by the language used in the extract 
above. Formerly unable to 'd6passer' the limits of its own subjectivity, the self is now enabled 
to 'sortir'; where it previously heard only the 'sonorit6 identique' of 'une vibration interne', it 
now encounters the 'diff6rence' of the other. And in this instance, the experience of otherness 
does not lead, as the theoretical shuttling between the prism and the confrontation with the 
hostile other inevitably did, to another form of self-loss or alienation from the world. The 
narrator elaborates through art the notion of a productive encounter with difference; an 
encounter which illuminates, rather than isolates, the self, and enables it to establish 
communication. At one level, this seems inconsistent. The birth of consciousness assumes 
that difference separates self from not-self, and drives a wedge between the two; yet art, 
distilling the difference of individual subjectivity ('la diff6rence qualitative qu'il ya dans la 
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faqon dont nous appara^it le monde' ), 54 is apparently able to break down the barriers between 
self and other and to establish understanding between them. 55 However, there are two 
versions of difference in play here. The difference expressed in art is not a fundamental 
alterity which excludes and threatens the self; which contradicts the self's desires, or stands in 
hostile opposition to it. Rather, it is a personal vision, which the self will never be able to 
inhabit entirely, but which, articulated onto the canvas or the page, has been forced to yield an 
artistic or linguistic form which makes it partially available for apprehension, and begins to 
bridge the gap between self and other. 
Rather than moving between an isolation from, and an isolation through, otherness, therefore, 
the self identifies a form of communication which releases it from both. However, there is a 
sense in which this solution stands in a problematic relation to the notion of the prism; a sense 
in which it responds to it by contradicting it rather than resolving it. While the passage above 
does not deny the existence of a world external to, and lying beyond, subjective 
It'56 interpretations of i it does suggest, when it refers to la faqon dont nous apparait le monde', 
54 For the concentration of individual subjectivity in art, see also Proust's essay 'Rembrandt': 'D'abord, 
les ceuvres d'un homme peuvent ressembler plus A la nature qu'A lui-m6me. Mais plus tard, cette 
essence de lui-mýme que chaque contact g6nial avec la nature a excit6 davantage, les imprýgne plus 
compl6tement. Et vers la fin, il est visible que ce n'est plus que cela qui est pour lul la r6alit6, et qu'il 
lutte de plus en plus pour la donner tout enti6re. ' 'Contre Saint-Beuve', precedý de 'Pastiches et 
n0anges' et suivi de 'Essais et articles', ed. by Pierre Clarac (Paris: Gallimard, 197 1), pp. 659-64 (p. 
660). 
55 Descombes makes a strong case for this contradiction in his discussion of point of view. He argues 
that Proust confuses Ia particularW du point de vue' (where 'point de vue' is 'une position d'o6 un 
observateur, quel qu'il soit, voit les choses se disposer selon certaines proportions dans la vision qu'il 
en a') with 'la singularW subjective de 1'exp&ience' (italics in original), where the relationship 
between subject and experience is an internal one, and consequently incommunicable and unavailable 
to anyone who is not that self. The way of seeing expressed in Elstir's painting constitutes his 
subjectivity: it is 'le point de vue singulier d'un esprit original'. As such, it is 'incommunicable'. 
However, the passage on art discussed above and others like it reduce subjectivity to a point of view, 
making its perspective available to others. The spectator could only share the individual vision of Elstir 
par une identification 6trange', through which 'il cesse d'8tre sol et devienne le m6me shJet (ce qui ne 
veut pas dire ici: le m8me corps) qu'Elstir' (italics in original). 'La solution artistique A I'Impossibilit6 
ordinaire de la communication', therefore, is Ia migration des dmes'; a transgression of subjective 
boundaries which could never, in reality, take place. Descombes, pp. 8,39,44-45. 
56 C. j. Mares identifies another passage in A la recherche, however, which does appear to suggest that 
the world has no form -- or coherence, at least -- without a perceiving consciousness: 'We get a 
glimpse of what the "unauthored" world might look like to the Proustian subject in the episode in L- r-I 
Venice when the protagonist, having quarreled with his mother, fears that they are about to be parted 
indefinitely. Temporarily stripped of his usual defences, he finds himself confronting a Venice that has 
been reduced to sheer, meaningless matter. "Les palais m'apparaissaient r6dults A leurs simples parties 
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and the 'univers' of another 'qui West pas le m8me, que la n6tre', that the world as 
experienced is inseparable from a particular point of view. In this sense, there are only ways 
of seeing: the world is always refracted through, and assimilated to, the subject's perception 
of it. This is a vision which does not, however, make provision for the withholding of that 
world. While a point of view or perspective may be inaccessible or incommunicable to 
another subject, it incorporates the world, which is subjectively apprehended to form it. The 
subjective pfism, by contrast, presumes that the self cannot reach beyond itself to encounter 
the world. It cannot hear the world, is excluded from it, because it is surrounded by echoes 
and reverberations of itself. Where the passage above suggests that there are only ways of 
seeing, the idea of a subjective prism imagines an independent world from which the self can 
be sealed off. 
This contradiction is significant in the context of the purposes ascribed to art in the extract 
above. If the narrator intended a re-visioning of the self-other relation through art, if art made 
him realize that subject and world interact in a different way than he had formerly imagined, 
the contradiction which emerges would be part of a coherent scheme; a later interpretation of 
self and world would replace an earlier one, in the light of subsequent revelations and 
recognitions. However, although Le Temps retrouve as a whole is concerned with revelations, 
and in particular, revelations about art, it does not present art as the site of discoveries which 
replace and overwrite the text's previous theories of subjectivity. Rather, art is depicted as a 
locus of resolution: the passage above suggests that art enables the self to emerge from the 
prism because of special conditions which make the other more available and accessible. In 
this context, the contradictions which emerge are problematic. In effect, the text resolves the 
model of isolation it sets up by applying a new set of rules. 
For the most part, however, the theory of art elaborated by Proust responds successfully to the 
et quantit6s de marbre pareilles A toutes autres, et 1'eau comme une combinaison d'hydrog6ne et 
d'azote. "' 'Reading Proust: Woolf and the Painter's Perspective', Comparative Literature, 41 (1989), 
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difficulties of subjective isolation. Providing access to the subjectivity of another, it releases 
the self from the prism, and envisages a positive encounter with difference. A second way in 
which art can overcome the isolation of the self -- in this instance the rift between the self and 
a hostile other -- is elaborated a few pages later. Imagining the novel he is himself about to 
write, Marcel identifies a way of reinterpreting the relationship with the other which dissolves 
its oppositional otherness: 
N Chaque personne qui nous fait souffrir peut 8tre rattachee par nous a une 
divinite dont elle West qu'un reflet fragmentaire et le dernier degr6, divinite 
(Idee) dont la contemplation nous donne aussitOt de la joie au lieu de la peine 
que nous avions. Tout Fart de vivre, c'est de ne nous servir des personnes qui 
nous font souffrir que comme un degre permettant d'acceder a leur forme 
divine et de Peupler ainsi joyeusement notre vie de divinit6s. (IV: p. 477) 
The quasi-Platonic Ideas into which the self here envisages the other transformed might be 
interpreted in one of two ways. They might be seen as ideal individual essences, in which the 
uniqueness of subjectivity is purified and distilled. Such essences are imagined elsewhere in A 
la recherche: the 'moi' which emerges in the madeleine epiphany is an essential self, purified 
through the coalescence of past and present subjects (1: p. 44), while the works of Elstir 
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combine to produce a concentrated version of his subjectivity. However, the context of the 
extract above suggests a different interpretation. The narrator is in the midst of reflecting 
upon 'une foule de verites relatives aux passions, aux caracteres, aux mccurs' (IV: p. 477) 
which he hopes to incorporate into his novel; truths often bom out of suffering or triviality. It 
would seem, therefore, that the divine forms he imagines are not individual essences, but 
rather generalizations or abstractions. The desired other is transformed into a concept. And as 
such, its otherness is overcome. Its difference is not transcended in the transition from 
particular to general itself: while its individuality is transcended, it continues to represent 
suffering, otherness and resistance to the self. However, the relationship between subject and 
327-59 (p. 339). 
57 For a series of other passages in which 'essence' is used to denote individual subjectivity, rather than 
Tessence [singulierl des choses', see Reino Virtanen, 'Differing Essences: Santayana and Proust', in 
Marcel Proust: A Critical Panorama, ed. by Larkin B. Price (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 
1973), pp. 277-88 (pp. 281-82). 
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object shifts in an important way, as much due to the changing perspective of the self as to the 
transformation of the other. The difference of the other consisted in its failure to conform to 
the the demands and desires of the self: the mother's withheld kiss, or Albertine's failure to 
yield herself to his desire for knowledge or control. However, the artist-to-be no longer makes 
the same demands upon them. He no longer requires them to love him, or to stand in any 
specific relation to himself. Rather, he requires them to provide general truths which he can 
incorporate into his novel. Their conformity or non-conformity to the desires of the self 
becomes irrelevant, therefore. Their otherness now consists in their individuality, which 
resists his attempts to generate general truths. As soon as they divest themselves of this 
individuality, therefore, and allow the self to correlate them with their counterparts in his 
memory and experience, their otherness is overcome. 
A la recherche considers two ways in which isolation might be overcome through art, 
therefore. It proposes first of all that the self might come to apprehend the perspective of the 
other through the experience of art; a solution which responds to both forms of isolation 
depicted in the text, although it in some sense contradicts the terms of the subjective prism. 
The second model examined in the text, while it approaches the question more obliquely, 
enables the self (now the artist, rather than the spectator) to negotiate a productive relation 
with others who had formerly caused him suffering through the divergence of their desires. 
In Woolf, the problem of individual isolation is addressed in 'The Lighthouse' section of the 
text. James and Lily perform a series of negotiations with the external world which enable 
them to forge the semblance, at least, of a coherent and integrated relationship. James seeks in 
the first instance to reestablish a unity with his world through a withdrawal into pre- 
consciousness. fn his imagination, he identifies a place which recalls both Woolf s idealized 
childhood memories in 'A Sketch of the Past', and the Proustian account of his mother's 
goodnight kiss: 'The blinds were sucked in and out by the breeze; all was blowing, all was 
growing; and over all these plates and bowls and tall brandishinZc--, red and yellow flowers a 
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very thin yellow veil would be drawn, like a vine leaf, at night. But the leaf-like veil was so 
fine that lights lifted it, voices crinkled it; he could see through it a figure stooping, hear, 
coming close, going away, some dress rustling, some chain tinkling' (TL, p. 201). The 
4rustling dress' here recalls 'le bruit 16ger de [I]a robe de jardin en mousseline bleue, a 
laquelle pendaient de petits cordons de paille tressee' (1: p. 13) worn by Marcel's mother as 
she travels along the passage to kiss her son goodnight; the 'stooping figure' the goodnight 
kiss itself: 'elle avait penche vers mon lit sa figure aimante, et me I'avait tenclue comme une 
hostie pour une communion de paix' (I: p. 13). Woolf s memoir is recalled both by the blind 
sucked in and out by the breeze, and by the 'thin yellow veil': 'A Sketch of the Past' 
describes 'the waves breaking [ ... I behind a yellow blind', and the noise made as this blind 
'drew its little acorn across the floor as the wind blew the blind out'. 58 
However, as soon as James casts back to this unified past, something 'sm[ote] through the 
leaves and flowers even of that happy world and made them shrivel and fall. "It will rain", he 
remembered his father saying. "You won't be able to go to the Lighthouse... (TL, p. 20 1). As 
his mother predicted, he has not been able to forget, and even on an imaginative level, the 
harmony and unity of pre-consciousness prove impossible to reclaim. 
At other moments in 'The Lighthouse', however, James begins to glimpse an alternative 
relationship with his father. As he travels towards the lighthouse, he thinks of 'a waste of 
snow and rock very lonely and austere', where 'he had come to feel, quite often lately, when 
his father said something which surprised the others, were two pairs of footprints only; his 
own and his father's' (TL, p. 200). And when he watches his father reading, as the journey 
draws to a close, 'He looked, James thought, [ ... ] as if he had 
become physically what was 
always at the back of both their minds -- that loneliness which was for both of them the truth 
about things' (TL, p. 219). The isolation to which James has been subject is here replaced by 
an intimation of human understanding. There is a level at which he shares. or identifies with, 
IS8 .A Sketch of the Past', pp. 64-65. 
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the thoughts and experiences of his father. However, the sense of understanding which 
emerges is paradoxical and unstable. While there is a sense of community in the extract 
above, there is no sense of communion or even communication. Rather, a bridge is formed 
between self and other through a shared recognition of individual isolation. Separation and 
loneliness are reaffirmed and rearticulated. even at the moment when, at another level, they 
are finally overcome. 
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The second character subject to isolation in 'The Window', Lily, responds to her isolation 
through the painting of her picture. I have already discussed the way in which the canvas 
becomes the space where, inspired by Mrs Ramsay, she is able to negotiate a specifically 
female subjectivity. However, at another level, it also goes some way towards releasing the 
isolated modernist self. While the fact of Lily's self-articulation liberates her as a female 
subject, the method she adopts in her painting, and the account of reality she provides, 
respond to the disconnectedness with which she has found the post-War world to be 
characterized. 
Right from the outset of 'The Lighthouse', Lily expresses a desire to gather the parts of the 
unrelated reality she encounters into a meaningful order or pattem. Thus, when Mr Ramsay 
strides past her in the garden, uttering broken phrases which strike her as fragmentary 
'symbols', she acknowledges a longing to 'put them together': 'if only she could [ ... I write 
them out in some sentence, then she would have got at the truth of things' (TL, p. 161). 
However, it is not through linear sentences that she finally reconstitutes an integrated whole, 
but rather through providing a visual map of the world: 
There was something [ ... I in the relations of those 
lines cutting across, slicing 
59 Eric P. Levy argues that the community of tragic individuals which emerges in the text 'entails more 
than a necative unity, where all inevitably confront the same "oblivion"'. Interpreting this oblivion in 
terms of a self-erasure brought about by time (which 'efface[s] the structures on which personal 
stability depends'), rather than an isolation from the other, he sees a 'newness' and 'evanescence' in 
the flux which brings about self-loss; at which the characters can 'wonder'. 'Woolf's Metaphysics of 
Tragic Vision in To the Lighthouse', Philological QuarterlN,, 75 (1996), 109-32 (p. I 11). I-- - 
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down, and in the mass of the hedge with its green caves of blues and browns. 
[ ... ] The brush descended. It flickered brown over the white canvas; it left a 
running mark. A second time she did it -- a third time. And so pausing and so 
flickering, she attained a dancing rhythmical movement, as if the pauses were 
one part of the rhythm and the strokes another, and all were related; and so, 
lightly and swiftly pausing, striking, she scored her canvas with brown 
running nervous lines which had no sooner settled there than they enclosed 
(she felt it looming out at her) a space. [ ... I She must try to get hold of something that evaded her. It evaded her when she 
thought of Mrs Ramsay; it evaded her now when she thought of her picture. 
Phrases came. Visions came. Beautiful pictures. Beautiful phrases. But what 
she wished to get hold of was that very jar on the nerves, the thing itself 
before it has been made anything. (TL, pp. 171,209) 
Art is used in the extract here to make recalcitrant matter yield both a formal and emotional 
coherence. At one level, its imaginative transformations compel the external world to 
demonstrate a compositional relatedness. In its balance and mixture of colours (green caves 
of blues and browns'), its 'dancing rhythmical movement', its attention to lines, 'cutting 
across, slicing down', and to the heavy mass of the hedge, Lily's picture constructs fluid and 
mobile, but definite patterns which assemble the random parts of her reality within a single 
frame, and integrate them into a coherent design. At the same time, however, Lily sees her art 
in terms of an emotional, spiritual recuperation. The pattems she produces seek to describe 
not abstractions, but 'the thing itself, 'before it has been made anything'. The shapes and 
masses on her canvas seek to capture the 'jar on the nerves' which precedes the evolution of 
concrete being. 
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As such, Lily's painting both recalls and moves beyond the self-other relation negotiated 
through the flux of consciousness. At one level -- in its fluidity, in its dependence upon 
pattern and rhythm (and, when it imagines and reinstalls Mrs Ramsay as a shadow on the 
60 Both these goals are implied in Roger Fry's Post-Impressionist aesthetic. His famous idea of 
sionificant form' expresses both a commitment to 'agreeable arrangements of form' and a desire 'to 
bend to our emotional understanding some intractable material which is alien to our spirit. ' 
'Retrospect', in Vision and Design (London: Chatto and Windus, 1923), pp. 284-302 (p. 302). The 
tradition interpreting Woolf s work in relation to Fry's theories goes back as far as John Hawley 
Roberts, who noted in 1946 a shared emphasis on 'inner essence' over 'external reality', and identified 
in both a 'vivid sense of life and [ ... I vibration and movement'. "'Vision and 
Design" in Virginia 
Woolf, PMLA, 61 (1946), 835-47 (pp. 836,842). Woolf s Post-Impressionism is linked back to her 
feminist project (where I have suggested that the two are articulated separately in Lily's painting), in 
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steps, also upon memory) -- the picture reproduces and reconstitutes the ebb and flow of 
consciousness in which subject and object originally hung together. Where Lily formerly 
incorporated the sights and sounds around her into the fabric of her consciousness, she now 
arranges the shapes and rhythms of the external world into her painting. However, there are 
also decisive differences between the work of art and the stream of consciousness. Where the 
latter internalizes the world beyond itself, drawing it into its own subjective frame, Lily's 
desire to pin down the thing itself implies the reverse trajectory: a wish to penetrate and grasp 
the other; to reach out, rather than to draw in. This deliberate negotiation with the external 
world also suggests a second difference from the flux of consciousness. Where consciousness 
dissolves the sights and sounds it accumulates into its continual ebb and flow, assimilating the 
external world automatically and unreflectively, the work of art seeks to balance, in colour, 
size and shape, the individual objects it incorporates. These objects retain, therefore, a degree 
of independent integrity from the complete design. The painting ultimately fashions an order 
in which the parts are related to, rather than continuous with, one another, and in which self 
and other are therefore afforded distinct and independent identities. 
Lily's painting enables her to negotiate a coherent relatedness, therefore, which provides both 
self and other with individual, if not precise or closely-defined, identities. However, as Lily 
completes her picture, it becomes clear that art is no more able than James's human 
community to provide a stable, permanent, concrete order. The novel ends by describing how, 
with a 'sudden intensity, as if she saw it clear for a second', Lily 'drew a line there, in the 
centre. It was done; it was finished. Yes, she thought, laying down her brush in extreme 
fatigue, I have had my vision' (TL, p. 226). There is a sense of finality in this conclusion ('it 
was finished'), but no indication of a permanent resolution. Lily achieves the clarity and 
intensity she has sought, but her moment of insight is soon past, and she is left to reflect not 
upon her victory over the chaos of experience, but rather upon its momentary crystallization 
Jane Goldman, The Feminist Aesthetics of Virginia Woolf. - Modernism, Post- Impression isin and the 
Politics of the Visual (Cambridge: C. U. P., 1998). Z-1 
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('I have had my vision'; italics mine). While she is able through art to negotiate with, and 
differentiate between, the component parts of her reality, she is not able to arrest their 
perpetual motion, and to establish a fixed or immutable order. 
Lily's vision is, however, more definite than the flying gleams in 'How it Strikes a 
Contemporary', which 'may compose nothing at all', and the visions of Septimus which, 
ironically described, are never validated as genuine moments of insight. To the Lighthouse 
does move beyond the uncertainty of Mrs Dalloway; to establish a concrete, verifiable 
communion between self and world. It is simply that art, like the epiphanies that punctuate 
both texts, is able to make life yield clarity and coherence only very briefly. Woolf refuses to 
offer a complete or unproblematic resolution to the isolation of consciousness or the 
elusiveness of the external world. Instead, she elaborates fragile human relationships and 
precarious artistic orders which shelter the self from extreme isolation, and provide it with a 
degree of orientation and relatedness, but which perpetually hover on the verge of 
disintegration, or which remain provisional, partial or incomplete. 
In A la recherche, Proust attempts a more complete and final resolution of individual 
isolation. The theories expounded in Le Temps retrouvi declare a definitive triumph, through 
art, over the otherness of the external world, and over the isolation and seclusion of the self. 
Art has the capacity both to make individual perspectives available for (partial) apprehension 
by another, and thus to establish communication between self and world, and also to 
reinterpret and dissolve the otherness of those who, through the divergence of their desires, 
have caused suffering to the self. 
Whatever its final results, the desire for integration expressed in all three texts represents a 
distinctive second trajectory in the relationship between Proust and Woolf, and Montaigne. 
Variously isolated, alienated and excluded from the outside world, the modernist self no 
longer seeks to detach itself from wider communities. or to negotiate a degree of autonomy. 
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fnstead, it is driven by its division from the world to seek an integration and communion 
which will stabilize and validate its subjectivity; an integration and embeddedness which are 
modelled for it in Montaigne. This trajectory remains, however, a secondary one in my 
discussion as a whole. The trajectory of increasing self-authorization I have primarily been 
tracing out -- a movement away from, rather than towards, Montaigne -- also finds its most 
radical articulation in the work of Woolf. Examining the plight of the female subject, 
circumscribed by an order which defines it as the other, she envisages first the complete 
dissolution of order, and the free play of independent, heterogeneous fragments, before 
negotiating instead a female tradition which releases and inspires, without dictating or 
containing, female self-expression and construction. 
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CONCLUSION 
In August 1923, Woolf lists a series of authors through whom she hopes to write a history of 
literature, beginning with the Renaissance, and ending with her contemporaries. The writer 
who heads this list is Montaigne, for whose Essais she has already acknowledged a deep 
admiration and personal affection ('one of my favourites, as they say in birthday books'), and 
whose work would continue to fascinate her throughout her writing life. ' The essay, 
'Montaigne', which she published in the TLS in preparation for this project2 is an 
idiosyncratic piece, which mimics the Montaignean style as it explores his autobiography; 
but in the context of my discussion it is also an important one. Reflecting explicitly upon the 
dialectic of self and other in Montaigne, it implicitly comments also upon the relationship 
between his perceptions of subjectivity and her own. 
Woolf sees above all in the Essais a fierce opposition to conforrnity: 
Once conform, once do what other people do because they do it, and a 
lethargy steals over all the finer nerves and faculties of the soul. She becomes 
all outer show and inward emptiness; dull, callous, and indifferent. [ ... ] The 
laws are mere conventions, utterly unable to keep in touch with the vast 
variety and turmoil of human impulses; habits and customs are a convenience 
devised for the support of timid natures who dare not allow their souls free 
play. But we, who have a private life and hold it infinitely the dearest of our 
possessions, suspect nothing so much as an attitude. Directly we begin to 
protest, to attitudinize, to lay down laws, we perish. We are living for others, 
not for ourselves. We must respect those who sacrifice themselves in the 
public service, load them with honours, and pity them for allowing, as they 
must, the inevitable compromise; but for ourselves let us fly fame, honour, 
and all offices that put us under an obligation to others. 3 
According to Woolf s account, Montaigne sees conformity to external frameworks in terms 
of circumscription, self-contradiction, and self-loss. The self which imitates the behaviour of 
Diary, 11, p. 261 (17 August 1923); Letters, VI: Leave the Letters Till We're Dead, 1936-1941, p. 216 
(to Ethyl Smith, 24 February 1938). 
2 On 31 January 1924. 
3 Essays, IV, p. 73. McNeIllIe uses the (minimally) revised version of the essay used In The Common 
Reader. 
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another must sacrifice its own subjectivity, and reduce itself to a hollow shell, 'callous, and 
indifferent'. The self which relies upon external customs to structure its thought and action 
faces delimitation and constraint: the laws and conventions to which it turns are 'utterly 
unable' to encompass 'the vast variety and turmoil of human impulses, and do not allow the 
soul 'free play'. And the self which shoulders public responsibilities takes on obligations to 
others which lead to an 'inevitable compromise'. In every instance, the self which conforms 
to external orders or frameworks is compelled to betray itself, and to relinquish fulfilment of 
its subjectivity. 
Instead of performing such a compromise, the self should live in accordance with itself. The 
timid creatures who 'dare not allow their souls free play' imply the existence of others who 
do have the boldness to live for themselves alone, while the reference to 'we who have a 
private life and hold it infinitely [ ... ] dear' also suggests that withdrawal is available. The 
same call to self-regulation is more directly pronounced at a later point in Woolf s essay. 
Turning to the question of religion in the Essais, Woolf suggests that Montaigne rejects 
divine order and guidance: 'Perhaps, then, it will be well to turn to religion to guide us? 
"Perhaps" is one of his favourite expressions. [ ... ] Such words help to muffle up opinions 
which it would be highly impolitic to speak outright'. Instead, she identifies 'another 
monitor' in his thought, 'an invisible censor within, "un patron au dedans"'. This is the 
'judge' to whom we should address ourselves (p. 75). It is the voice of the self, not of the 
other, which should direct our behaviour and thought. 
Woolf constructs an opposition, therefore, between adherence to external conventions and 
conformity to oneself, and she unequivocally places Montaigne on the side of self-regulation. 
Elsewhere in her essay, she extends this notion of non-conformity from a philosophy of 
withdrawal and private self-regulation to a more general commitment to individual 
difference. She notes how Montaigne moves beyond withdrawal from the world, and activelv 
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expresses his personal difference. 'This soul, or life within us, by no means agrees with the 
life outside us', and in matters of politics, social conventions and respected laws, the 
Montaignean self is ready to acknowledge that it believes the 'very opposite to what other 
people say' (p. 72). More significantly, Woolf also identifies in Montaigne a commitment to 
the difference of others. Adopting his voice, she criticizes those who, 'when they travel, wrap 
themselves up, "se defandans de la contagion d'un air incogneu" in silence and suspicion. 
When they dine, they must have the same food they get at home. Every sight and custom is 
bad unless it resembles those of their own village. They travel only to return' (p. 76). The self 
should be ready instead to encounter the 'wonders' of the world: 'halcyons and undiscovered 
lands, men with dogs' heads and eyes in their chests, and laws and customs, it may well be, 
far superior to our own' (p. 76). Difference, whether that of the other, or that of the self from 
the other, should be protected and embraced. 
In attributing such opinions to Montaigne, Woolf is clearly recruiting him to stand for her 
own commitments. While she does not make her own position clear in the essay itself, the 
hostility to circumscription which it articulates, and its commitment to individual difference, 
find consistent expression elsewhere in her critical work and novels. The self-betrayal and 
loss which come with conformity to the social order in 'Montaigne' clearly anticipate the 
self-sacrifice and circumscription to which Mrs Ramsay's complicity with the patriarchal 
order will lead in To the Lighthouse, while the commitment to individual difference which 
emerges in her reading of the Essais clearly resonates both with Lily's desire to fashion an 
independent subjectivity, and Woolf s own call, in A Room of One's Own, for the 
construction of a specifically female identity. At the start of her essay on Montaigne, she 
reflects that 'As the centuries go by, there is always a crowd' standing before his self-portrait, 
I gazing into its depths, seeing their own faces reflected in it, seeing more the longer they 
look' (p. 7 1). As her essay proceeds, it becomes clear that she is herself a member of that 
crowd, finding her own priorities and beliefs reflected in Montaigne. 
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In appropriating Montaigne to stand for her own views in this way, Woolf effectively 
establishes him, as Lily employs Mrs Ramsay, as a figure through whom she can think back, 
and forge a sense of tradition. 4 In becoming a voice which represents and advocates 
individual difference, he also, somewhat paradoxically, becomes a figure through whom a 
tradition of 'difference', and thus a sense of similarity, is established. However, as in To the 
Lighthouse, this sense of community does not compromise the autonomy of the individual 
self, and does not contradict or qualify Woolf's antagonism to conformity, and to 
participation in wider orders. Neither the female community created by Lily, nor the tradition 
established in 'Montaigne', involves the self inhabiting a particular framework, or submitting 
or adhering to any particular code; neither defines the self according to a specific set of terms 
or beliefs. In each case, identity is constituted, defined and expressed by the self and the self 
alone. In To the Lighthouse, Mrs Ramsay acts as a catalyst for Lily's self-fashioning, 
enabling and inspiring her self-articulation, but remains external to her self-expression. In 
Woolf s essay on Montaigne, the 'tradition' which emerges refers to a method of independent 
self-constitution which does not shape, define or interfere with the identity which the self 
assumes. In each case, provision is made for individual freedom. 
When critics have written about the relationship between Woolf and Montaigne, they have 
generally sought to develop this picture of a Montaigne committed to individual difference, 
and hostile to external orders and laws, and to make explicit the links, which remain implicit 
in 'Montaigne', between such philosophies and the work of Woolf herself. Juliet Dusinberre, 
in Virginia Woolf's Renaissance: Woman Reader or Common Reader? takes the idea of self- 
reference, and the rejection of authority attributed by Woolf to Montaigne, and reapplies 
them to his writing method. Thus she argues that Montaigne 'defies Ramus's principles of 
41 shall describe Juliet Dusinberre's account of Woolf's appropriation below. Leila Brosnan, by 
contrast, sees Montaigne as a patriarchal writer, whose metaphorical fatherhood is thus 'highly 
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pedagogy, in which logical divisions are constructed and an argument pursued to its 
conclusion. His writing is "an irregular and perpetual motion, without model and without 
aim", which rejoices in its own lack of direction: "Other men's thoughts are ever wandering 
abroad, if they will but see it; they are still going forward. ... For my part I circulate in 
myself " .' Refusing to conform to external pressures and forms ('without model and without 
aim'), he chooses instead the path of self-reference; 'circulating' in himself. Dusinberre also 
argues that Montaigne constitutes himself in a space which she defines as 'woman' (but 
which might equally be labelled 'other' or 'non-conformity') in a set of binary oppositions 
which includes universal/particular, public/private, design/haphazardness, rules/irregularity, 
6 
society/solitude. Once again, Montaigne is placed in opposition to confomfity, and in a 
position which represents particularity and difference. Dusinberre already intimates a link 
with Woolf when she describes his commitment to difference in terms of gender; self- 
constitution in female, rather than male terms. This link is elsewhere made explicit: 'Woolf, 
like Montaigne, writes as she would be read, against the grain of traditional male education 
and culture, reading, as he himself did, in order to inscribe herself in language 9. 
A second critic who accepts Woolf s evaluation of Montaigne, and who seeks to link the 
thought of the two, is Dudley M. Marchi. In Montaigne Among the Moderns: Receptions of 
the 'Essais', he uses Woolf s pronouncements about individual difference in A Room of 
One's Own to exemplify the similarities between her own thought and Montaigne's. When 
she urges her audience to 'write what you wish to write', and not 'to sacrifice a hair of the 
head of your vision, a shade of its colour, in deference to some Headmaster with a silver pot 
in his hand or to some professor with a measuring rod up his sleeve', she demands a 
'conformity to personal motivation' familiar from the Essais. Like Montaigne, Woolf 
problematic'. Reading Virginia Woolf s Essays and Journalism: Breaking the Surface of Silence 
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1997), p. 113. L- Cý 5 Juliet Dusinberre, Virginia Woolf s Renaissance: Woman Reader or Common Reader? (London: 
Macmillan, 1997), p. 54. 
6 Dusinberre, p. 58. 
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demands a freedom from hegemonic discourse, and commits herself instead to 'personal 
vision'. 8 Marchi also identifies a sceptical frame of mind in Woolf and Montaigne which, 
through its uncertainty and its suspension of judgement, refuses commitment and conclusion, 
and thus resists confonmity to any particular code. 9 
In my own account, I have read Montaigne, and by extension the relationship between Woolf 
and Montaigne, in a different way. Rather than placing Montaigne on one side of a 
conforn-fity/difference opposition, I have sought to identify a tension in his work between a 
commitment to individual agency and difference, and a desire if not to conform, at least to 
locate the self within a coherent order or community. Both external orders and individual 
difference are seen in both positive and negative terms in Montaigne. This is the lesson of the 
paradox of otherness, which characterizes both a close integration of self and other 
(conformity), and the difference of self and other, in terms of drawbacks and benefits at once. 
Thus the divine framework which in Woolf's interpretation Montaigne discards in favour of 
self-regulation, is in my own account vital for the definition, organization and expression of 
identity. The impulse to autonomy which Woolf identifies does underwrite the Apologie, but 
it is only one part of the Montaignean theology. In the same way, the social orders which 
Woolf believes to lead only to circumscription and self-loss, are in my interpretation of 'De 
Putile et de I'honneste', 'De mesnager sa volonte' and 'De la vanit6' also crucial to the 
appropriation and realization of identity. The moral dimension of subjectivity is negotiated in 
the public sphere, while social duties are an important part of the purpose and calling of the 
self. In both instances, external orders and frameworks are necessary, as well as a threat, to 
the self which encounters them, and which is thus obliged to negotiate carefully with them. 
Where Woolf depicts the Montaignean self rejecting wider frameworks, and living in 
7 Dusinberre, p. 45. 
8 Dudley M. Marchi, Montaigne Aniong the Moderns: Receptions of the 'Essal's' (Oxford: Berghahn 
Books, 1994), p. 2225 
231 
conformity with itself alone, I have suggested that the self seeks to overcome the threat posed 
by the external order, while preserving a relationship with it, and thus retaining the benefits 
which that relationship confers. The self either reinterprets the order it inhabits in such a way 
that provision is made for its autonomy and self-reference, as in the Apologie, or negotiates 
with its public roles until they cease to compromise its integrity. In each case, the self 
negotiates both a position within a wider framework, and a measure of individual autonomy. 
In the same way, I have suggested that the difference of the self, or of the other from the self, 
has both benefits and drawbacks in Montaigne's account. Where Woolf describes a 
Montaignean self ready to embrace the difference of others, I have suggested that while a 
self-other relation characterized by difference enables self-definition, and the realization of 
individuality, it also threatens to undermine, or destabilize, the perspective or position of the 
self Thus in 'Des cannibales', the customs of the New World both clarify and challenge the 
cultural traditions of Europe, while the clash of philosophies about God depicted in the 
Apologie produces a clamour of competing, mutually-exclusive voices which seek to erase, 
even as they help to define, one another. Once again, therefore, the self is forced to negotiate. 
Rather than embracing difference wholeheartedly, it seeks to limit it in ways which defuse its 
threat while preserving its power to define. The self seeks to construct a community of belief 
in which the customs or philosophies of the other, while they retain a superficial difference, 
are cast in terms which essentially reinforce, or reflect, the beliefs of the constructing self. 
Once again, the self finally constitutes itself within a wider order, even as it seeks to protect, 
as Woolf suggests, individual integrity and difference. 
Since I have interpreted Montaigne's relationship to external frameworks and to individual 
particularity in a different way from Woolf, I have also, inevitably, produced a different 
9 Marchi, p. 227 speaks of their resistance to 'finalistic conclusions'. For the most part, however, he 
relates Montaigne and Woolf instead as writers whose scepticism articulates a sense of personal Cý 
fluidity, and a need for constant self-revision. 
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account of the relationship between Woolf and Montaigne. Woolf clearly sees, while she 
never explicitly identifies, a close correlation between Montaigne's beliefs and her own. Like 
her, he is committed to the expression of individual difference, and like her, he opposes the 
conformity of self to other. In one sense, Montaigne does stand as Woolf s precursor in my 
own account also. Committed to preserving the integrity of individual subjectivity, he offers 
a model that both Proust and Woolf develop in various ways. However, at the same time, 
Woolf and Proust increasingly move away from the commitment to external orders which he 
describes. I have sought to map out a trajectory whereby the self is increasingly perceived 
and installed as the source of selfhood, and increasingly seeks to detach itself from wider 
frameworks and orders. 
The self-other relation depicted in Montaigne is modified first of all by Proust, in his 
discussion of bourgeois and antisemitic identity. Now openly exploiting, rather than silently 
manipulating, the other or wider order, the self seeks not only the freedom to live according 
to its own interpretation of itself, but to construct and reinvent itself according to its own 
desires, attempting to assume a privileged social (in the case of the bourgeois self) or cultural 
(for the antisemitic self) identity. The self is still a situated entity, and its identity is defined 
in terms of the external communities to which it belongs, but its relationship to those 
communities has changed. A more decisive shift is marked by the relationship between the 
subject and object of desire. No longer seeking to appropriate an identity as part of a wider 
group, the self expresses and projects outwards its desires, and seeks to organize the world in 
relation to them. While it continues to negotiate its identity in relation to the other -- upon 
whose submission it depends for the realization of its envisaged subjectivity -- it no longer 
seeks an identity within, or in terms of, wider communities, and becomes more obviously the 
source of its own selfhood. This trajectory of self-detachment is apparently completed in To 
the Lighthouse. Occupying the position of the other, the female self envisages the dissolution 
of the patriarchal order which has circumscribed and suppressed her subjectivity, and 
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imagines the complete autonomy of the female subject. As the text proceeds, however, this 
radical self-detachment is rejected, and a new, female community established; a community 
which has an important role to play in enabling individual self-expression, but which remains 
external to, rather than becoming constitutive of, the identity negotiated through it. Like the 
desiring self in Proust, the female subject refuses to inhabit external traditions, but finds that 
an other is required to inspire the emotion and vision needed for its self-realization. 
There is also a second sense in which the Montaignean. self I have depicted differs from the 
Woolfian subject, a way in which it becomes an enemy rather than a model. Since Montaigne 
presents self-realization in terms of participation in, as well as freedom within, a wider order, 
and since in order to achieve this the self must construct or manipulate the wider framework, 
the self is continually engaged in negotiations which involve the colonization or 
circumscription of the other. In order to carve out an order which grounds and reinforces, 
without curtailing, its individual subjectivity, it has to construct or reinterpret the other in 
ways which betray or erase its independence or difference. In this sense, Montaigne is the 
circurnscriber: Mr Ramsay or Sir William Bradshaw rather than Lily Briscoe, and thus 
Woolf's opponent rather than her precursor. Where Woolf herself sets Montaigne against 
those 'who, when they travel, wrap themselves up, "se defendans de la contagion d'un air 
incogneu"', and who demand the same food and drink that they receive at home, I would 
suggest instead that in his anxiety to recuperate the otherness of the cannibals back into 
familiar schema, to make their religious customs comprehensible to himself, and to make 
their food, drink, beds and buildings resemble those of his own land, he becomes exactly this 
kind of (imaginative) traveller. 
I differ from Woolf, therefore, in perceiving significant differences between, as well as 
important continuities in, her own thought on autonomy and Montaigne's. While the 
Montaignean self is undoubtedly committed to preserving its individual integrity, it 
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negotiates its identity within the frame of a wider order, and often at the expense of the other 
it encounters. However, there is a second way in which Woolf s essay on Montaigne draws 
much closer to my own conclusions. I have suggested in my final chapter that while in one 
sense the selves in Woolf and Proust move away from the carefully-ordered self-other 
relations depicted in Montaigne, there is also an impulse by the isolated modernist self back 
towards the integrated relation of self and other established in the Essais. This second 
trajectory is also, although more obliquely, explored by'Woolf in her essay on Montaigne. 
'Montaigne' was written while Woolf was also working on Mrs Dalloway. On 19 December 
1923, she notes that she is busy: 'publishing, writing; doing Hardy, & Montaigne & the 
Greeks & the Elizabethans & The Hours [her original title for Mrs Dalloway]', and on 23 
January 1924 records that she is 'sending off Montaigne', and preparing to return to 'The 
Hours': 'Now I am going to write till we move -- 6 weeks straight ahead. 
"0 Composed 
concurrently, the two pieces also articulate shared concerns, and significantly, they both 
address the question of individual isolation. Certain phrases migrate from the mouth of 
Septimus to the mind of Montaigne: in Mrs Dalloway, Septimus muses that 'Communication 
is health; communication is happiness' (p. 101); in 'Montaigne', it is now Montaigne who 
'wishes only to communicate his soul. Communication is health; communication is truth; 
communication is happiness' (p. 76). 
However, the context and meaning of these words is very different in the two instances in 
which they occur. Where Septimus is a figure burdened with revelations which he cannot 
communicate to the world, Woolf presents Montaigne as a figure who believes that coherent 
self-articulation may be achieved. While there are still barriers to communication - such as 
dishonesty and laziness - the subject is not condemned to an inevitable 
isolation: 
10 Diar. v, 11, pp. 278,289. 
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We must dread any eccentricity or refinement which cuts us off from our 
fellow-beings. [ ... ] To communicate is our chief 
business; society and 
friendship our chief delights; and reading, not to acquire knowledge, not to 
earn a living, but to extend our intercourse beyond our own time and 
province. [ ... ] To share is our duty; to go down boldly and bring to light those hidden thoughts which are the most diseased; to conceal nothing; to pretend 
nothing; if we are ignorant to say so; if we love our friends to let them know 
it' (p. 76). 
The individual self now has a choice: it may disguise itself, but it may also disclose itself to 
others; it may decide to withhold itself, but it may equally communicate freely. Montaigne 
thus becomes a figure in whom Septimus's anxieties are resolved. As Clarissa becomes 
Septimus's double within the text of Mrs Dalloway (she seeing the truth, he the insane truth), 
so Montaigne becomes an external alter ego, representing a model of communication and 
transaction with the wider community to which Septimus aspires but which he is unable to 
attain. 
This relationship between Septimus and Montaigne is suggestively close to the relation I 
have sought to trace out between Montaigne and the modemist selves depicted in Proust and 
Woolf. Experiencing an isolation or alienation from the world, Septimus, Marcel, James, Mr 
Ramsay and Lily all seek in various ways to integrate themselves within, or to establish 
communication with, the world beyond themselves. The self confined in the prism of its 
su ectivity in A la recherche seeks to escape the echoes o its sel ood, and to establish 
contact with the world. Marcel and James, following their respective births of consciousness, 
and their division from the world, seek the reintegration of other and self into a meaningful 
whole. Lily, inhabiting a world of apparently random parts which lacks any sense of 
relatedness, seeks to negotiate a coherent order which incorporates other and self. Such an 
integration is described by Montaigne in his Essais. The communities of belief constructed 
by the self, and the harmonious orders it negotiates, enable the transactions and exchanges 
for which Septimus and the Proustian self are seeking, and establish the relatedness between 
self and other sought by James and Lily. The relationships which, A la recherche and To the 
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Lighthouse ultimately negotiate are different in form to those in Montaigne: the shared 
beliefs and flexible hierarchies depicted in the Essais are replaced by less closely-defined 
orders and communities. However, the Montaignean self-other relations embody the 
principles of integration and communication which the modernist selves in Proust and Woolf 
strive to attain, and in this sense the modernist writers move towards, rather than developing 
or reworking, the model of subjectivity presented by Montaigne. 
The relationship between the model of subjectivity elaborated in Montaigne, and the self- 
other dialectics represented in Proust and Woolf, therefore, finally travels in two directions at 
once. At one level, the movement from Montaigne to Proust to Woolf describes a trajectory 
of increasing detachment from external communities, and an increasing installation of the 
self as the source, and as an agent in the construction, of its own identity. In this sense, Proust 
and Woolf pull away from Montaigne, and seek to develop and modify his agenda according 
to changing visions and priorities. At the same time, however, the modernist selves depicted 
by Proust and Woolf, isolated or excluded from the world beyond themselves, seek to 
retrieve a measure of contact with the wider communities and external realities from which 
they have become disjunct. The integrated orders constructed in the Essais, therefore, 
licensing and situating subjective vision at once, stand both as their point of departure, and as 
their goal. 
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